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Abstract 
Critical thinking is currently a highly valued educational outcome throughout the 
educational spectrum, but particularly so, in relation to higher and professional 
education. Nursing education is also embracing the construct critical thinking as a 
desirable educational outcome, to the extent that, some commentators refer to the 
importance of critical thinking in nursing as a given. 
The purpose of this descriptive-illuminative study was to explore and evaluate 
achievement regarding the development of critical thinking abilities as a specific 
curricular outcome, and whether they could be identified in the concurrent 
professional reasoning processes of student nurses. A longitudinal multi-method 
approach incorporating across-method triangulation in the collection of quantitative 
and qualitative data have been utilised in order to address the following questions: 
1. Does the current institutional Common Foundation Programme facilitate 
the development of critical thinking ability in student nurses? 
2. Can critical thinking be identified in student nurses' concurrent 
professional reasoning processes? 
3. Does student nurses' reasoning change in complexity over the course of 
the Common Foundation Programme? 
The majority of previous studies relating to critical thinking in nursing have 
predominantly utilised psychometric testing instruments in pre and post test or 
correlational designs. The body of evidence emanating from such designs 
is currently inconclusive. The main challenge in this study was the development of an 
alternative method of identifying the existence or degree of critical thinking present 
in the concurrent verbal reports of student nurses' reasoning. 
Data collection from a group of student nurses involved the combination of the 
Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (1991) test (n=43) and a researcher 
developed think aloud technique incorporating a videotaped client simulation, a 
cognitive task and stimulated recall strategy (n=12). Findings indicate no significant 
differences in pre (51.3, SD 7.7) and post programme (51.6, SD 7.3) Watson-Glaser 
mean scores. With regard to the think aloud technique evidence of critical thinking 
abilities, the sample consistently displayed evidence of reasoning that was reflective 
of an absolutist epistemology. In instances where more complex reasoning was 
demonstrated there was evidence to suggest that metacognitive strategies may 
contribute to this. The findings raise interesting challenges to future curriculum 
development, nursing education and nursing practice. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Outline of Problem Issue 
1.1 Background to Study 
Prior to the changes brought about by the educational initiative of the United 
Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting known as: 
Project 2000: A New Preparation for Practice (UKCC, 1986), nursing education in 
the UK followed an apprenticeship model. Recruits were employed by health 
authorities as student nurses and received their professional education from the 
authority's designated school of nursing. Short blocks of theoretical instruction were 
followed by longer day and night duty clinical allocations in various speciality 
environments, concluding with another short 'consolidation' block and so on 
throughout training. Registration was conferred upon successful completion of a tick 
box schedule of clinical practice statements, four practical assessments, a series of 
intermediate written examinations and a final written examination. The philosophical 
underpinnings of nursing curricula of this era, reflected heavy reliance on a training 
paradigm, the medical model approach to health care, technical or procedural 
mastery and task orientation. The employment status of the student nurse also meant 
that a significant service contribution was commensurate with the role. The 
application of theory and new learning took place against a background of needing to 
'get through the work' and the delegation of responsibilities often beyond the learners 
level of knowledge and experience. The consequences of this situation often meant 
that learning could be haphazard, incidental, non-holistic, devoid of feedback and 
without continuity. 
Concerns regarding nurse education had been the focus of ongoing debate since the 
Athlone report (1938). The issues central to the debate were those of educational 
standards (Dodd, 1973; Briggs, 1972; Judge, 1985; French, 1989), service delivery 
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and skill mix, recruitment and retention of students, changes within the National 
Health Service and the perceived health needs of future populations (Jowett, et al. 
1994). The UKCC (1986) initiative and subsequent consultations culminated in the 
innovative prototype programmes of nurse education launched in 13 demonstration 
districts in 1989 / 1990. Although the period of education remains much the same 
(3yrs) a variety of significant changes were heralded in with the new programmes, 
(see table 1.1.1). 
Table 1.1.1 Significant Changes Related to Project 2000 Initiative 
Widening of the entry gate into nurse education; 
Discontinuation of Enrolled Nurse education 
Supernumerary status for student nurses; 
The introduction of bursaries for student nurses; 
The introduction of a new support worker to assist in care delivery, 
The introduction of an 18 month generic Common Foundation Programme; 
Specialisation into one of four Branch Programmes for final 18 months; 
The broadening of the nursing curriculum; 
Changing the Nursing perspective of care towards one of health and Holism; 
Increased links with institutions of Higher Education; 
Diploma level qualification; 
Move towards the adoption of an educational paradigm. 
The combination and implementation of these changes were purported to achieve 
several notable changes in the new practitioner beyond that of a skilled mastery of 
tasks embedded in a curative perspective of caring. Phrases such as 'holistic 
practitioner" knowledgeable doer' 'research based practice', 'challenging', 'critically 
analytical', 'autonomous', 'accountable' and more recently 'reflective' all pointed to 
desired changes in the new practitioner's thinking abilities. 
The original UKCC document (1986) makes both explicit and implicit references to 
the type of thinking skills desirable to the envisaged 'knowledgeable doer'. For 
example, p. 20 refers to the need for " creativity, thinking ability, problem solving in 
clinical situations... ", p. 33 expresses the need for a "... mature and confident 
practitioner, willing to think analytically and flexibly, able to recognise the need for 
further preparation... ", p. 46 suggests that theory should be "... applied critically by 
the students in different practice settings. " Finally, p. 40 stipulates: 
A registered practitioner in other words must be able to carry out 
care and make the decisions, taking all relevant circumstances into 
into account, whether that care can be assigned to others. That decision 
cannot be taken on the basis of the nature of the task alone, but must 
be seen in the context of the total circumstances of the individual 
patient or client. " 
Implicit in this view is the application of the higher order cognitive skills understood 
to be those of criticality or evaluation. Critical thinking in particular is cited 
frequently by educational proponents explicating the proposition that Project 2000 
courses will or should develop these cognitive skills (Crotty, 1993; Girst, 1993; 
French, 1992; Robinson, 1991; Jowett et al., 1994). The host institution's (formerly 
Sister Dora College of Nursing & Midwifery) Registered Nurse / Diploma in Higher 
Education curriculum, based on project 2000 principles, also cites critical thinking as 
an educational outcome in several instances. Moreover, from a broader clinical 
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perspective, Miller (1992, p. 1401) suggests "Critical thinking is an integral part of 
clinical decision making, a routine part of nurses work. " Jenkins (1985) and Malek 
(1986) also posit that nurses need critical thinking skills in order to be safe, 
competent and skilful professional practitioners. Tolliver (1988, p. 174) claims " For 
the practising nurse, critical thinking is required daily and is, therefore, an expected 
behaviour of professional nursing. " Pardue (1980) believes nurses are expected to 
have good critical thinking ability to process data and make decisions. 
In some areas of the literature the importance of critical thinking to nursing practice 
is conceived of as a given, in that, the former cannot be conducted in the absence of 
the latter (Kramer 1993). On a European level, the recent revised draft European 
Agreement on the requirements and organisation of nurse education cites one of the 
four main functions in the role of the registered nurse as the requirement: "To 
develop nursing practice through critical thinking based on research" (Council of 
Europe, 1995, p. 5). 
There, thus, appears to be a degree of consensus as to the espoused relationship 
between critical thinking ability and competent nursing practice, albeit many of the 
above proponents fail to specify why and how critical thinking applies to nursing 
practice. Concomitant with this consensus, within the United Kingdom, are the 
assumptions or expectations that the profession's new programmes of professional 
preparation will produce practitioners equipped with this ability and, thus equipped, 
will apply it to their practice. There is in prospect increasing demands upon 
practitioners to demonstrate these abilities in light of a range of issues and their 
impact on the complexity of nursing practice, the revision of professional roles and 
perspectives, and associated reasoning processes. 
Recent economic reforms in health care and the introduction of resource 
management initiatives have changed managerial structures in the clinical 
environment and nurse's traditional managerial roles. The devolution of many 
managerial and budgetary responsibilities followed the formation of clinical 
directorates. The inclusion of business managers within the directorates has resulted 
in situations where nurses have increasingly found themselves practising in an 
environment where their practice and resources are determined and managed by 
individuals whose priorities and frames of reference differ from their own. Creation 
of an internal market means that nurses now practice in an increasingly complex and 
competitive environment, dealing with increasingly complex client problems and 
expectations. Issues of quality assurance and standard setting consistent with the 
business like approach require that nurses continually evaluate and modify their 
practice accordingly. In respect of the constant nature and pace of change anticipated 
in healthcare, nurses wishing to act as the patient's advocate, will need to be 
empowered to argue their cases skilfully and evaluate the arguments of others 
(UKCC, 1992). The boundaries of professional practice are also changing in light of 
the new deal on junior doctors working hours. Nurses, thus, need to carefully 
rationalise the need to expand their practice into areas of the medical domain and the 
potential implications for their professional accountability. Nurses have also begun to 
explore new areas of practice, such as complimentary therapies and health education, 
assessment and promotion. This will not only require the acquisition and application 
of new knowledge but also alternative perspectives and careful evaluation of new 
interventions. The shift from healthcare in hospital settings to care in the community 
will also demand new approaches to client problems, revision of roles and alternative 
models of the nurse - client relationship. Faster patient throughput in hospitals and 
nurse's management of the discharge process will also place greater demands on 
nurse's communication skills. Alternative means of effectively informing and 
reassuring patients about their preparation for admission, treatments, recovery and 
discharge will be required. 
In light of the changing roles, areas of practice and client expectations nurses need to 
carefully prescribe, justify and evaluate their interventions and practice, if they are to 
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practice in a competent and accountable manner. Furthermore, initiatives to involve 
nurses in the purchasing, commissioning and contracting process, as well as the 
prescribing of medicines, will require astute critical thinking abilities in a somewhat 
alien arena (NHS Management Executive, 1993). The cumulative demands of these 
issues in the face of the current information and technological explosion upon the 
intellectual abilities and affective dispositions of practitioners will, thus, be 
substantial. The cognitive demands arising from these issues raises the important 
question as to whether the curriculum in question is successful in developing the 
critical thinking abilities required for future practitioners. 
1.2. Current Knowledge and Practice 
Current knowledge regarding the intellectual outcomes of Project 2000 type 
programmes of professional preparation is sparse. This is primarily due to the 
recency of the implementation strategy and subsequent focus on the very issues of 
implementation itself (NFER, 1992). It is commonly asserted, however, that Project 
2000's educational predecessor was not wholly an educational experience but, rather, 
one of training. The rationale underpinning these assertions suggested that the 
associated outcomes of such training were not compatible with the aim of producing 
a critical thinker, capable of making reasoned decisions in the best interests of the 
client (French, 1992). Assessment of academic competence centred on the ability to 
recall and apply content in the context of a medically oriented model of care. Clinical 
competence assessment reflected the ability to perform psycho-motor skills and 
complete organisational tasks which did not always reflect the needs of clients. It is 
generally accepted within the profession that the new courses should embrace an 
educational paradigm and its associated intellectual outcomes, as opposed to one of 
training. In order to achieve this the changes highlighted previously have been 
implemented within individual institutions curricular in accordance with English 
National Board and Higher Education validation criteria. 
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Consequently, admission criteria have changed, significantly broadening the entry 
gate to nurse education. Course content has been altered to encompass knowledge 
domains thought to develop a holistic appreciation of the individual, health, health 
deviation, health care provision and management. Assessment of competence is now 
continuous. Written assignments and assessments of clinical competence are 
apparently designed to demonstrate the acquisition and critical application of theory 
and research to practice. The question as to whether it is succeeding or not remains 
unanswered to date. Evidence suggests, however, that academic development is 
separated from practice and greater emphasis placed upon the former in many 
institutions (Ramprogus, 1995). The host institution's primary means of measuring 
critical thinking at the development stage of the study was in relation to achieving a 
grade A in theoretical assignments. Specifically measuring critical thinking in clinical 
practice was not addressed as a discrete entity. This, however, is also the case in the 
author's experience of alternative educational institutions. 
1.2.1 Current Evaluation of Project 2000 
In relation to the implementation of Project 2000 courses, Jowett et al., (1994) 
reported the perceptions of students, clinical staff, higher education staff and service 
managers regarding course outcomes. Key findings were: 
Early Project 2000 qualifiers demonstrate that the principles of courses have been 
translated into practice, and practitioners feel well prepared and able to identify 
advantages of their particular courses; 
Principal's and course leader's satisfaction that the aim of producing knowledgeable 
doers or reflective practitioners with an holistic appreciation of the patient and their 
needs were evidenced by positive feedback from rostered service placements. 
A typical response by senior managers was their belief that the 'health' and 'holistic 
care' model underpinning project 2000, was creating nurses who are questioning, 
assertive and equipped intellectually and professionally to contribute equally with 
other disciplines; 
Students perceived themselves as more patient-centred, more holistic in their practice 
and less prepared to perpetuate ritualistic practices without a rationale. Very few 
voiced any real concerns as to their ability to cope with the demands of being a staff 
nurse. Although the assessment of intellectual outcomes were not specifically 
addressed in the study. A typical example of subject descriptors of desired project 
2000 outcomes were that the diplomate should be able to: 
" Critically analyse and synthesise material and engage in cogent argument"; 
" Understand the research process and be critical of research methodology 
and findings that may be applied in practice"; 
" Practice autonomously"; 
" Give safe, compassionate, competent nursing care which acknowledges the 
individuality, stage of development and rights of the adult based on a model 
of nursing", (Jowett et al., 1994, p. 4). 
Phillips et al., (1993) examined the nature of the assessment of competence across 
the spectrum of Project 2000 courses. A key discovery was that assessment was 
most effective when dialogue in the form of the externalisation or making public of 
students' knowledge and practice is structured into the process. Within such a 
dialogic culture practice can be legitimately questioned, alternative possibilities 
explored and arguments analysed. They provide evidence that theory and practice are 
more often than not assessed in isolation, as opposed to "... at one and the same 
time. " They further allude to the need for greater evidence of. 
The achievement of competencies which looks at theory and practice 
simultaneously; 
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The construction of assessment documentation which facilitates the clear 
externalisation of learners analytic reflection upon clinical events and nursing 
or midwifery principles. 
Critical thinking portrayed by the authors as reflective critique in this study is cited as 
integral to competent practice. 
Ramprogus (1995, p. 99) in an hermeneutic inquiry examined the effects of Project 
2000 type curricular changes upon academic and professional standards. One such 
academic standard was that of reflective skills, defined as: 
" An ability to use critical thinking for analysing and synthesizing knowledge 
and practice. " 
Although critical thinking was not clearly defined, there appeared a participant 
consensus that learners had developed most of the reflective skills intended as an 
outcome of courses. These reflective skills, however, were perceived by some 
teachers to apply predominantly to coursework and could not be transferred to 
practice. This sentiment was mirrored also by student responses. In addition, there 
emerged an obvious disparity between conceptions of the construct critical thinking 
amongst respondents. Ramprogus concluded that considering learners' inabilities to 
apply reflective skills and knowledge to practice other than at a basic level, the 
production of knowledgeable doers was an unrealistic outcome of project 2000. 
Although these studies refer in part to the importance of the construct critical 
thinking as a course outcome and provide conflicting evidence as to the development 
of the construct, little insight is forthcoming as to its discrete measurement, 
particularly in relation to its transfer to practice. Issues surrounding the transferability 
of coursework skills into practice are not exclusive to nursing. Over recent years the 
higher education community has come under scrutiny from the Government and 
employers in regard to its ability to ensure the development of personal transferable 
skills or core skills, predicated on the feasibility of such a notion. Bradshaw (1986) 
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posits that the concept emerged during the mid - 1980s amid encouragement from 
the then University Grants Committee, the National Advisory Body for public sector 
and higher education and the Council for National Academic Awards, for institutions 
to incorporate such skills into higher education curricula. Employers added their 
weight to such calls, perceiving that higher education was not delivering what they 
wanted, in terms of skills and threshold standards (Woollard, 1995). More recent 
attention has been given to the transferable skills debate within the Enterprise in 
Higher Education initiative and the National Council for Vocational Qualifications 
attempts to define core skills within General National Vocational Qualifications 
(GNVQ). Arguments, however, surround the issue of whether reductionist 
definitions of the core skills one could expect from a graduate can truly capture the 
universally characteristic graduate attributes of critical thought and a search for 
deeper understanding (Barnet, 1994). For Barnet, the word 'skill' implies 
predictability, routine, non-reflection and finiteness of action, whereas the essence of 
higher education is to go beyond such approaches. In addition to the problems of 
actually defining cognitive outcomes, there is much scepticism as to the concept of 
transferability upon which the debate is founded. Woollard (1995) points to the long 
held assumption that the attributes demonstrated in most traditional degree 
programmes can be readily transferred into very different areas. Many observers, he 
claims, have challenged this assumption that the trained mind can prove itself 
precisely by its ability to transfer knowledge and skills across boundaries. Fennell 
(1993) suggests that the idea of a graduate leaving university equipped with a set of 
multi - purpose intellectual skills may be an illusion. The reality he posits is that 
because there is no such thing as a context - free problem, people will tend to view 
problems from their disciplinary vantage point. Nickerson et al. (1985) also claim 
that generic thinking and problem solving skills alone have little transfer value in 
specialised content domains. Similarly, Oates (1992) notes that some forms of 
learning can hinder transfer. He cites for instance, moving from a QWERTY 
keyboard to another kind whereby some touch typing skills have to be actively 
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unlearned. The same questions must, therefore, be pertinent in regards to the transfer 
of intended intellectual outcomes such as critical thinking from nursing educational 
contexts and into real - world practice domains. 
Previous studies related to the measurement of critical thinking as a distinct outcome 
of nursing education are predominantly American. They have thus far investigated 
the relationship of critical thinking to various factors and have utilised a series of 
standardised test instruments. These will be addressed in detail in chapter two. 
Previous works related to nurse reasoning but not from a critical thinking perspective 
have investigated the clinical reasoning of student nurses or qualified practitioners 
and have focused predominantly on care planning and decision making in relation to 
establishing pathologies, interventions and locus of control. The collective 
conclusions drawn from these studies suggest nurses and student nurses use 
hypothesis-driven and cue -based data acquisition strategies in their reasoning and 
hypotheses are activated early in the reasoning process. Moreover, beginning nurses 
tend to perceive causal relationships between cues and states of health as opposed to 
probabilistic ones. Experienced nurses, however, deliberate client problems and 
interventions concurrently when planning care. Finally, nurses and students 
independent clinical decision making is qualitatively affected by their perceived locus 
of control (Itano, 1989; Tanner et. al. 1987; Westfall et al. 1986; Corcoran, 1986; 
Grobe et al. 1991; Fonteyn & Grobe, 1994; Tschikota, 1993). Evidence of this 
nature raises questions as to the appropriateness of teaching the nursing process as 
the predominant model of nurses' clinical thinking process in practice ( Farrell & 
Bramadat, 1990). The nursing process by nature is linear and advocates the 
suspension of judgement and intervention planning until all the data has been 
acquired. By contrast, the evidence portrayed above suggests nurses generate early 
hypotheses and clinical inferences, whilst considering data, problems, patterns and 
outcomes simultaneously. 
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1.3 Gaps and Shortcoming in Current knowledge and Practice. 
Little is known about the clinical reasoning or critical thinking processes of 
experienced, newly qualified and student nurses. Also missing from current 
knowledge and practice is specific evidence of the achievement of developing critical 
thinking ability in our Project 2000 /RN Dip HE learners and whether this can be 
identified in their concurrent practice-oriented reasoning. As previously identified a 
body of knowledge Is being developed in America relating to critical thinking and the 
nursing profession but, to date, this is somewhat inconclusive as Pless & Clayton 
(1993, p. 425) summarise below: 
"Strong support for the impact of nursing education on generic critical thinking 
ability is lacking; 
There is practically no evidence to support congruence between critical thinking and 
clinical judgement; 
Strong support for the relationship between critical thinking and success in nursing 
education is lacking. " 
In addition to these issues there is a paucity of UK studies relating to critical thinking 
or student nurses' clinical judgement processes. 
Beck et at (1992) and Pless & Clayton (1993) attribute the inconclusive results of 
these studies to invalid instrumentation which are not sensitive to a nursing context. 
That is, the overwhelming use of content independent trait or aptitude oriented 
psychometric tests as the sole measure, or in conjunction with other standardised 
tests. Examples of these are the Watson - Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal, the 
Cornell Critical Thinking Test and the Ennis & Wier Critical Thinking Essay Test. 
Such commentators now advocate a multi-method approach to the investigation of 
domain specific critical thinking. One of the central limitations of the standardised 
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approaches is that they only test critical thinking through the medium of reading, as 
do written case simulations. The range of stimuli, however, which informs nurse's 
judgement processes in real time practice is more diverse. For example, nurses attend 
to auditory, tactile, visual and olfactory stimuli. Subtleties of form, colour, smell, 
texture and sound are not easily translated into written symbols (Fonteyn & Fisher, 
1994). Another problem is that tests of this nature measure apparent possession of 
these skills and traits and their potential transfer to everyday or nursing situations, 
but do not provide evidence in their actual transfer to the performance of 
professional practice. 
Evaluating such transfer and performance issues generally requires appropriate study 
over time and an avoidance of one - shot case study approaches in favour of 
investigations designed longitudinally (Marsland & Gissane, 1992). This, however, 
may be problematic particularly in the evaluation of somewhat complex phenomena. 
Should the evaluation of intended generalisable curricular outcomes be, for example, 
over the course of a curriculum alone or during post curricular practice, or both? 
Beck et at. (1992) advocates that there are many questions relating to how best to 
teach, practice or investigate critical thinking in nursing and innovative studies are 
required to provide evidence of critical thinking development in nursing education 
and practice. They also point to the desirability of more qualitative approaches to the 
identification and measurement of critical thinking processes in the nursing domain, 
as a means of developing appropriate methods of measuring nurses' critical thinking 
performances. 
Furthermore, given the professional desire for a paradigm shift in terms of viewing 
the individual from a healthy and holistic perspective and the preponderance of 
studies of reasoning focusing on issues of diagnosis and ill-health. It may now be 
timely that this issue be addressed as a potential vehicle in order to determine 
reasoning processes or degrees of achievement of this outcome. 
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Another central consideration in this overall question is: do we specifically teach 
learners the concepts related to this theoretical construct or do we rely on critical 
thinking ability developing incidentally, as a consequence of a curriculum designed 
generally for another purpose, that is, to produce a Registered Nurse? Glaser (1985) 
believes there exists little evidence that students acquire critical thinking skills as a 
necessary by-product of studying a given subject. He further asserts that the research 
literature indicates that if the objective is to develop the skills of critical thinking and 
an attitude of reasonableness in students then specific training is required. McPeck 
(1981; 1990) contends, however, that the teaching of domain specific knowledge and 
skills is more influential in developing critical thinking skills which on the whole is 
domain restricted. 
Leaving this to chance could prove costly for clients, practitioners, educationalists 
and managers in the future. The information explosion has brought with it new levels 
of complexity to every field, especially health care (Miller, 1987; Brigham, 1993). 
This and the growing prospect of future expansion of the nurse's role may impinge 
dramatically on their professional decision making. Decision-making is purported to 
be an essential component of nursing practice (Joseph et al., 1988; Jenkins, 1985; 
Rhodes, 1985; Pardue, 1987). As decisions become more complex, the dimensions of 
thinking preceding those decisions must ensure adequate deliberation upon these 
complexities. In a healthcare context, the human condition as unique holistic 
individual does not lend itself to indiscriminate application of standardised 
procedures. Clinical judgements must derive from reasoning strategies reflective of 
situational complexity. The potential implications of not practising critical thinking 
in nursing practice may result in clinical decisions which do not accurately represent 
the client's context. Decisions or interventions may, for example, reflect the value 
systems of health care professionals but not take into account patients or families 
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norms or beliefs about health, coping with ill - health, interacting, dying or grieving 
(Carnevali & Thomas, 1993). 
Nurses may also fail to attend to appropriate available data during decision making 
and problem solving processes. Alternative perspectives and, therefore, alternative 
solutions may be excluded. The consequences of such omissions may mean failure to 
identify potential or existing problems. Treatment or organisational requirements may 
subsequently be neither planned nor executed appropriately. Nurses may incorrectly 
interpret data, incorrectly assess need and, therefore, incorrectly or inappropriately 
prescribe interventions for wrong or non-existent phenomena. Furthermore, nurses 
may make vague generalisations when data exists to enable specific diagnosis or 
action (Carnevali & Thomas, 1993). 
Consequently, there are now calls to effectively combine teaching learners 'what to 
think' with strategies for teaching learners ' how to think' ,a central tenet of the 
educational paradigm (Walters, 1990). This need is evermore pressing in light of 
recent criticisms relating to Project 2000 programmes to question their suitability for 
preparing the nurse for the rapidly changing scene of health care and associated 
service provision (Kenworthy, 1993). 
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In summary, the background to the problem consists of several issues presented in 
table 1.3.1. 
1. A professional consensus regarding the relationship between competent clinical 
practice and critical thinking appears to exist; 
2. Nursing education in general values critical thinldng as an educational outcome; 
3. Critical thinking is purported to be an intended outcome of the new preparation for 
practice adopted by the United kingdom (Project 2000); 
4. Compelling evidence regarding ability of nursing education to develop critical thinking 
in its learners does not exist; 
5. There exists criticism of the methodologies utilised in prior studies intended to measure 
critical thinking as an outcome of nursing education; 
6. There is little evidence of qualitative approaches being used in the examination of 
learners critical thinking abilities; 
7. Evidence regarding the achievement of critical thinking as a project 2000 curricular 
outcome is awaited. 
In light of the above issues an evaluation of curricular performance in relation to the 
achievement of intended critical thinking outcomes is required. The perceived value 
of this work is twofold. Achievement of the institution's stated curricular outcomes 
will be tested. The study findings may affirm the efficacy of curricular or teaching 
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strategies, or inform the development of suitable strategies to enhance critical 
thinking abilities in student nurse's professional reasoning and judgements. 
1.4 Research Purpose: 
The purpose of this study is, therefore, to explore and describe the impact of a 
Project 2000, Common Foundation Programme Curriculum on the critical thinking 
abilities of a group of student nurses. In the pursuit of this purpose the following 
questions will be addressed: 
1.5 Research Questions: 
1. Does the current Common Foundation Programme curriculum facilitate the 
development of critical thinking ability in student nurses? 
2. Can critical thinking be identified in student nurses' reasoning /judgement 
processes? 
3. Does student nurses' reasoning change in complexity over the course of the 
Common Foundation Programme? 
Having outlined the background to the problem, the next chapter will review aspects 
of the considerable literature pertaining to critical thinking. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The range of literature reviewed included theoretical and empirical works from the 
disciplines of general education, philosophy, cognitive psychology, nursing practice 
and nursing education. The literature search involved a variety of manual and 
electronic methods both in the United Kingdom and in the United States of America. 
Initially the electronic methods included Library on-line catalogues and CD-ROM 
databases, i. e. Medline, Cinahl, Psych-lit. As the study progressed, however, access 
to some of these databases became possible via the internet. Search terms included: 
critical thinking; critical thinking and nursing; critical thinking and education; critical 
thinking and nursing education; critical thinking and student nurses; critical thinking 
and professional judgement; clinical reasoning; informal logic; protocol analysis; 
think aloud technique. 
This chapter will be in two parts. Part one will focus on general non - nursing 
theoretical literature including general societal issues, the divergent use of the term 
critical, a short historical perspective, a selection of definitions, divergent views in 
respect of the constituents of critical thinking and the role of logic in critical thinking. 
Part two will focus on nursing oriented theoretical and empirical literature. This will 
include the emergence of critical thinking as an issue in nursing, the need for critical 
thinking in nursing, the relationship between critical thinking and the nursing process, 
nursing oriented models of critical thinking, educational issues, studies relating to 
critical thinking in nursing. The concluding sections include a synthesis of the 
literature in the formulation of a conceptual definition of critical thinking that will 
form the basis for the operational definitions that underpinned the study's subsequent 
methods. 
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2.2 Part One. 
Critical thinking is a highly valued ability and is commonly cited as a desirable 
educational outcome, particularly in relation to professional and higher education 
(D'Angelo, 1971; Frederickson & Meyer, 1977; Anis & Anis, 1979; Brabeck, 1983; 
Pardue, 1987; McMillan, 1987; Norris, 1985). Society as a whole is said to benefit 
from a critically thinking citizenry and indeed this is said to form the very basis of 
democracies and fundamental to maintaining the democratic way of life (Glaser, 
1985; Paul, 1984). Conversely, democracies find it difficult to function when their 
citizens are inclined to be unreasonable. Accordingly, Lipman (1987, p. 153) posits 
the view that 'reasonableness' is possibly the most important characteristic of the 
educated person and that "... educated people are not only well learned, they think 
well. " Walters (1986, p. 234) proposes: "A democratic society is predicated upon 
two necessary conditions: first, that public policy is made by an informed and 
educated citizenry, which has carefully evaluated a variety of opposing arguments 
and viewpoints before coming to its collective decision; second that alternative 
perspectives are examined with an open - minded tolerance, even if not ultimately 
agreed with. " The prospect of a society making informed rational and tolerant 
decisions is dependent upon and proportionate to the critical thinking abilities of each 
individual participant in the democratic process. Critical thinking and democracy are 
perceived as so synonymous in the United States of America that many of the 
abilities often associated with lists of critical thinking skills are similar to the abilities 
listed in Remy's (1980) Handbook of Basic Citizenship Competencies. There is, 
consequently a social and pragmatic need for critical thinking and objective 
evaluation in collective decision making; in order to avoid the danger of public policy 
being at the beck and call of glib rhetoricians who appeal more to the emotions than 
to the reason of their audiences. 
The 'thinking' component of the term is taken to refer to the process of thinking in 
general, defined here as: the mental representation and manipulation of internal and 
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external symbols derived from perceptual experience (Smith, 1990; Evans, 1983; 
Tomlinson, 1981). Such a definition, however, fails to illustrate the concomitant 
thinking skills, of which the list is potentially very long indeed. Coles & Robinson 
(1989, p. 10) cite Lipman's (1983) position that 'thinking skills is a catch-all phase in 
that: 
" It ranges from very specific to very general abilities, from proficiency in 
logical reasoning to the witty perception of remote resemblance's, from the 
capacity to decompose a whole into parts to the capacity to assemble random 
words or things so as to make then well-fitting parts of a whole, from the 
ability to explain how a situation may have come about to the ability to 
foretell how a process will likely eventuate, from a proficiency in discerning 
uniformity's and similarities to a proficiency in noting dis-similarities and 
uniquenesses, from a facility in justifying beliefs through persuasive reasons 
to a facility in generating ideas and developing concepts, from the capacity to 
solve problems to the capacity to circumvent them or forestall their 
emergence from the ability to evaluate to the ability to re-enact. " 
The proverbial pit is potentially bottomless because it consists in short of the 
inventory of mankind's intellectual powers. Does the addition of the prefix 'critical' 
thus imply a clear distinction from the above inventory in the form of another type, or 
a quality of thinking? 
The adjective 'critical' is from the Greek, meaning to question, to discern, to choose, 
to evaluate, to make judgement (Flexner, 1987). The term is applied in a variety of 
contexts, for example, managers refer to 'critical path analysis', health care 
practitioners refer to 'critical care units' and to the client's condition as 'critical' . 
Educationalists espouse the need to engender 'criticality' and 'critical thinking' in their 
students as a mark of intellectual attainment and craftsmanship. This diversity 
exposes how the term can apply to specific frames of reference, of which, thinking is 
only one. 
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Dictionary definitions also explicate the variety of accepted usage. The Collins 
English Dictionary (1992) offers the following applications: 
1. Containing or making severe or negative judgements; 
2. Containing careful or analytical evaluations; 
3. Of or involving a critic or criticism; 
4. Of or forming a crisis; crucial; decisive; a critical operation; 
5. Urgently needed; e. g. critical medical supplies; 
6. Physics of, denoting, or concerned with a state in which the properties of a 
system undergo an abrupt change; e. g. a critical temperature. 
Taken collectively the above examples indicate that the term critical may be applied 
to an act of judgement by others concerning the merit of activity undertaken. Such a 
judgement should be rigorous and may be negative although not necessarily so. 
Critical may also indicate that unless certain actions are taken or certain components 
utilised, negative consequences will ensue or opportunities may be missed. Finally, 
critical also suggests that at certain points given certain conditions the composition 
of phenomena undergo change. 
Ferguson (1986) lists synonyms of critical in three categories, which Sheehan (1992) 
labels unflattering, important and unsafe, (table 2.2.1) 
Table 2.2.1 Categorical Synonyms for the Adjective Critical (Sheehan. 1992) 
Unflattering Important Unsafe 
Captious Accurate Dangerous 
Carping Analytical Perilous 
Cavilling Diagnostic Risky 







Although all of the above categories could conceivably apply to thinking. The 
important category appears to be the most positive and would most aptly be applied 
to thinking in order to denote a distinct qualitative standard in that they imply a 
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certain discipline and open-mindedness. Yet, this list also belies similarities to that of 
Lipman's. In relation to identifiable characteristics Halpern (1989, p. 5) asserts "The 
critical part of critical thinking denotes an evaluative component. " Marzano et at. 
(1988, p. 17) echo this and offer a distinction between critical and creative thinking 
by claiming: "... critical thinking is primarily evaluative and creative thinking is 
primarily generative. " These characteristics, however, do little in the way of 
facilitating a clear distinction in the way they appear to in Lipman's example. Could it 
be that critical thinking is also a'catch-all' phrase or does combining the two terms, 
critical and thinking, actually imply a particular approach, type, or a degree of 
quality? 
McPeck (1981, p. 12) believes critical thinking merely "... denotes a particular type 
of thinking. " and that rationality is the true qualitative measure with critical thinking 
comprising a particular aspect or subset of this. Marzano et al. (1988, p. 17), 
however, believe critical thinking should not be considered a cognitive process 
comparable to problem solving and decision making. " Instead, these terms imply 
judgements about the quality of the thinking involved -a judgement about the 
relation of thinking to some ideal model. " Thus as we solve a problem or make a 
decision we do it more or less critically. 
What then is the ideal model and to what extent does critical thinking contribute to 
this? To address this question one must first ask, what is the background to this 
construct and what does critical thinking mean? 
2.3 Historical Perspective 
The study of thinking per se has evolved from two distinct perspectives, that of 
philosophy and psychology. Philosophers it is said, are concerned with the outcomes 
or products of human thinking in the form of reasoned judgements and beliefs, 
whereas psychologists are concerned more with the processes involved in thinking. 
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Thus philosophers argue that the purpose of thinking is deciding what to believe or 
do whilst psychologists maintain that thinking is making sense out of experience, 
constructing meaning and understanding (Splitter, 1991). 
The roots of the philosophical interest extend back to the classical past. In the 
western world, philosophy preceded the growth of what we know as science by some 
2000 years. To think or reason, according to early philosophy, was to take the stance 
of the objective and contemplative spectator in the discovery of truth. Inquiry was 
seen as one of the philosopher's primary tools in the quest for truth. Indeed, the spirit 
of inquiry is woven through the entire history of philosophy and has shaped many of 
the modern notions of science. 
In the mid-19th century scholars started to view the human mind as a 'working 
mechanism' complete with underlying operations which could be studied scientifically 
(Rowe 1985). The observations of Darwin (1859) suggested a correlation between 
the evolutionary increase in the complexity of animal behaviour and the increasing 
size of animals' brains. This led to increased attention in attempting to identify the 
operations that constituted thinking. Wundt, (1879) the founder of the psychological 
laboratory, began to investigate the basic building blocks of all cognition, thought to 
be sensations and perception. 
Since then psychological study has taken many forms and various schools have 
developed as a result; examples include: Gestalt psychology, behaviourism, 
information-processing and cognition. Cognitive psychology represents the most 
recent approach to the study of thinking. Information-processing focuses on how 
humans acquire, transmit, store and transform information. Many of the successful 
analyses of thinking, particularly in relation to the limitations of human memory 
capacity, have been due to the adoption of this approach. Information processing 
theory has also made possible the development of powerful computer models which 
apparently simulate human thought and lead to the prospect of artificial intelligence. 
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Quellmalz (1987) offers a distinction between reasoning skills as proposed from a 
philosophical and psychological perspective which further illustrates the above (Table 
2.3.1) 
Table 2.3.1 Reasoning Skills from Philosophical & Psychological Perspectives 
Critical Thinking Skills Problem -Solving Strategies Probable Dominant Cognitive 
(Philosophy) (Psycholog) processes (Psychology) 
Clarification: Identify the problem Analogical 
Identify or formulate a identify essential elements and Analysis and comparison 
question. terms 
Analyse major components 
Define important terms 
Judge credibility of support. the Identify appropriate Analogical - Analysis and 
source, and observations. information, content. and comparison: component 
procedural schemata. evaluation. 
Inference: Connect and use information to Infer / interpret relationships 
Deduction. Induction. Value solve the problem among components 
judgements. Fallacies 
Use Criteria to judge adequacy Evaluate success of solution Evaluate effectiveness of 
of solution specific and general strategies 
(Quellmalz, 1987, p. 89) 
Theories of critical thinking can also be traced to the Greek philosophers and these 
views have been instrumental in the development of current conceptions of this 
construct. It was Socrates, some 2,400 years ago, who became aware that by 
probing and questioning people often could not rationally justify their confident 
claims to knowledge. He was also disturbed by what he perceived to be the immoral 
use of critical thinking by sophists of the time and hoped that probing challenges to 
loose reasoning would lead to a recognition of reason as a force for promoting moral 
good. Instead, confused meanings, inadequate evidence or self-contradictory beliefs 
lurked beneath persuasive but largely empty rhetoric. Furedy & Furedy (1985, p. 54) 
describe how Socrates embraced the questioning critical attitude, proclaiming " The 
uninquiring life is not the life for man. " He came to believe that all traditions and 
assumptions were open to critical examination and should be regularly subjected to 
such. For it is the purposeful thinking about ideas or assumptions and the weighing 
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of logical arguments against one another which assists in clarifying those ideas and 
positions (Anderson, 1961). 
These influences are also apparent in Platonism. Plato, a student of Socrates, 
describes thinking as "... either a dialogue in the soul involving mental words... or a 
spiritual activity of inspecting or recollecting forms (words) and discerning their 
natures and interrelations. " (Aune, 1967, p. 101). Implicit in this description, is the 
assumption of a clear relationship between thinking and language. Plato believed 
education should not only provide information but aim to enable students to 
question, examine and reflect upon ideas and values. Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics 
revealed his belief in the relationship between thinking and the intellect and that 
prolonged thinking about phenomena resulted in clarification (Oswold, 1962). 
Aristotle also asserted that critical thinking combined abstract thinking and logical 
thinking. He further connected thinking and values, developing the idea of a link 
between moral reasoning and critical thinking. History is replete with further 
examples of proponents stressing the need and benefits of critical thinking to society; 
these include: St Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, 
John Locke and David Hume. 
A more recent contribution to the critical thinking debate was introduced by Dewey 
(1916) who used the term reflective thinking in a manner synonymous with current 
conceptions of critical thinking. Dewey (1916 p. 158) proposed that thinking arose 
from a situation of ambiguity which causes dilemmas and requires the consideration 
of alternatives. Thinking of this nature, he claims, includes "... the sense of a 
problem, the observation of conditions, formation and rationale, elaboration of a 
suggested conclusion and active experimental testing. " In the event of certain results 
or consequences arising from the experimental testing, then the validity of 
alternatives can be established. Dewey suggested that critical thinking is a subset of 
the reflective process involving, thorough assessment, scrutiny and the drawing of 
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conclusions in relation to the issue at hand. This assessment of information and 
decision making contributes to judgement. The importance of critical thinking in this 
process according to Dewey is that problems are subject to healthy scepticism and 
timely suspension of judgement. Dewey's view of education is that it should facilitate 
a reflective process, be student centred and realistic in order to develop students 
intellectually and morally. 
2.4 Critical Thinking: What is it? 
Other more recent contributors to the critical thinking paradigm are Glaser (1941), 
Ennis (1985), McPeck (1981), Paul (1992), Perry (1970), Brookfield (1987), Kurfiss 
(1988), Norris (1990) and Siegal (1991). Each have contributed to the plenitude of 
definitions and interpretations of critical thinking but no single widely accepted 
definition of this construct is apparent (Michael et al., 1980; Landis & Michael, 
1981). It also appears that the construct is neither clearly understood nor 
systematically applied (Katoaka - Yahiro & Saylor, 1994). Brookfield (1987), 
drawing on the works of others, suggests that it has been equated with the 
development of logical reasoning abilities (Hallet, 1984; Ruggerio, 1975) with the 
application of reflective judgement (Kitchener, 1986), with assumption hunting 
(Scriven 1976), and for Hullish & Smith (1961, p. 1 1), with the"... creation, use, and 
testing of meaning. " Ennis (1985, p. 45) defines critical thinking as " Reasonable, 
reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe and do. " Halpern 
(1989, p. 37) sees critical thinking as " Thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and 
goal directed. " Facione (1984, p. 257) proposes that a suitable operational definition 
of critical thinking is " The development and evaluation of arguments. " Blair (1985) 
also maintains that argumentation is central to critical thinking. Landis & Michael 
(1981, p. 1148) view critical thinking in broad terms, as involving "... an individual's 
becoming aware of the demands of a given environmental circumstance (typically a 
problem situation) and of evaluating numerous decision alternatives prior to taking 
an action that in many but not all instances may lead to the solution of a problem. " 
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These somewhat superficial descriptions are dwarfed by that of Scriven and Paul 
(1992, p. 1) who posit that: 
"Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and 
skilfully conceptualising, applying, analysing synthesising and/or evaluating 
information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, 
reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its 
exemplary form it is based on universal intellectual values that transcend 
subject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, 
sound evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and fairness. It entails 
proficiency in the examination of those structures or elements of thought 
implicit in all reasoning: purpose, problem or question-at-issue, assumptions, 
concepts, empirical grounding, reasoning leading to conclusions, implications 
and consequences, objections from alternative viewpoints and frames of 
reference. " 
Watson & Glaser (1991, p. 29) offer a potentially more manageable alternative in the 
form of " Critical thinking is a composite of attitudes, knowledge and skills that 
include: 
1. Attitudes of enquiry that involve an ability to recognise the existence of 
problems and an acceptance of the general need for evidence in support 
of what is asserted to be true; 
2. Knowledge of the nature of valid abstractions, and generalisations in 
which weight or accuracy of different kinds of evidence are logically 
determined; 
3. Skills in employing and applying the above attitudes and knowledge. " 
Alternatively, McPeck (1981, p. 6) claims "Critical thinking involves a certain 
scepticism, or suspension of assent, towards a given statement, established norm or 
mode of doing things. This scepticism might ultimately give way to acceptance, but it 
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does not take truth for granted. Instead , it considers alternative hypotheses and 
possibilities. " McPeck (p. 13) further offers what he calls a more complete description 
by describing critical thinking as " the disposition and skill to do X in such a way that 
E (the available evidence from a field) is suspended (or temporarily rejected) as 
sufficient to establish the truth or viability of P (some proposition or action within 
yin 
Although the definitions above reflect certain unique elements, commonalities are 
also apparent. Critical thinking can clearly be associated with knowledge, cognitive 
skills, complex reasoning, argumentation, beliefs, action, problem identification, 
evidence and the envisioning of alternative possibilities or frames of reference. These 
elements contribute to a purposeful reasoned interaction between an individual and 
received information. 
The literature pertaining to critical thinking is vast. Paul (1985) cited the 
identification of 1894 related articles from a variety of disciplines in the preceding 
seven years. It can be assumed that this has been added to significantly since then. In 
addition to the divergent definitions of critical thinking several distinct positions 
emerge from the literature and the major disputes according to Blair (1987) and 
Hagar (1991) include questions such as: 
1. What exactly constitutes critical thinking? 
2. To what extent does logic play a part in critical thinking? 
3. Is critical thinking largely general across disciplines or is it largely 
specific to each different discipline? 
4. How might critical thinking best be taught? 
29 
Hager (1991) contends that answers to these questions are complicated since they 
are not only interrelated but multidisciplinary by their very nature. 
Given the purpose of this study aspects 1 and 2 of the critical thinking debate will 
serve as the primary focus for clarification of the phenomena to be observed and 
methodological decision making, with point 4 possibly arising later in relation to the 
discussion of findings. 
2.5 What Constitutes Critical Thinking? 
Critical thinking is seen by protagonists as a type of thinking requiring the 
acquisition, combination and application of a variety of what have been called: 
aspects, factors, skills, abilities, elements, behaviours, and dispositions of critical 
thinking. For example, Russell (1943; 1963) claimed critical thinking consisted of 
the following factors: 
The attitudes of questioning and suspending judgement (attitude factor); 
The application of the methods of logical analysis (conotive/functional factor); 
Evaluating in terms of some norm, standard or consensus (judgement factor); 
Acting on the basis of the analysis. 
Anderson (1944) emphasises certain skills involving both facts and logic. That is: 
Identifying specific facts; 
Selecting relevant facts; 
Organising facts in terms of meaningful sub-topics; 
Arranging sub-topics in logical order; 
Making inferences from specific facts and from trends; 
Distinguishing between fact and opinion; 
Recognising situations in which insufficient evidence makes it difficult or 
impossible to draw a clear-cut conclusion. 
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Dressel & Mayhew (1954, p. 37) also proposed a series of critical thinking skills 
based on their extensive examination of professional literature and research in the 
field. They contend that critical thinking constituted "... the sum of certain rather 
specific behaviours which could be described and which could be inferred from 
student acts. " 
These include: 
1. Identifying central issues; 
2. Recognising underlying assumptions; 
3. Evaluating evidence or authority by; 
a. Recognising stereotypes and cliches. 
b. Recognising bias and emotional factors in a presentation. 
c. Distinguishing between verifiable and unverifiable data. 
d. Distinguishing between relevant and non-relevant.. 
e. Distinguishing between essential and incidental. 
f. Recognising the adequacy of data. 
g. Determining whether facts support a generalisation. 
h. Checking consistency. 
4. Drawing warranted conclusions. 
Despite the specificity of Dressel and Mayhew's list of skills they did not describe 
them beyond the level of labels. Explanations provided for the above skills were in 
the form of statements of importance and consequences of non utilisation as opposed 
to specific skill criteria (Beyer, 1985). 
D'Angelo (1971), however, believed critical thinking constituted a combination of the 
following ten attitudes and various linguistic, logical, empirical, methodological and 
valuational skills totalling fifty in all (Tables 2.5.1& 2.5.2). These will be shown in 
their entirety to give the reader an idea of the breadth and complexity of some 
conceptions of critical thinking. 
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Table 2.5.1 D'Angelo's Critical Thinking Attitudes: 




5. Intellectual scepticism, 
6. Intellectual honesty, 
7. Being systematic, 
8. Persistence, 
9. Decisiveness, 
10. Respect for other viewpoints. 
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Table 2.5.2 D'angelo's Critical Thinking Skills Repertoire 
1. Determining the meaning of a term or a 
statement, 
26. Recognising the black or white fallacy, 
2. Recognising ambiguities, 27. Reco 'sin equivocations, 
3. Defining key terms, 28. Recognising the fallacy of begging the 
clucstion, 
4. The analysis of emotional language, 29. Recognising the fallacy of the complex 
question, 
5. Avoiding vague terms, 30. Recognising hasty gcncralisations, 
6. Interpreting words with regard to context, 31. Recognising the mbler's falla 
7. Avoiding slanting judgements, 32. The false cause fallacy, 
8. The analysis of cliches 33. Distinguishing a fact from an opinion, 
9. The realisation that the word is not the thing 34. Distinguishing factual reports from 
inferences, 
10. Distinguishing between denotation and 
connotation 
35. Recognising and defining a problem, 
11. Avoid mistaking figurative language for 
literal lan 
36. Using evidence to test beliefs, 
12. Recognising the etymological fallacy, 37. Seeking explanations, 
13. Giving concrete meaning to abstract terms 38. An analysis of the appeal to ancient wisdom, 
14, Recognising and justifying assumptions, 39. An analysis of the appeal to old age, 
15. Judging whether statements contradict each 
other, 
40. Judging common sense, 
16. Recognising the fallacy of the irrelevant 
conclusion, 
41. Judging faith, 
17. Recognising the fallacy of arguing against 
the man 
42. Recognising the fallacy of authority, 
18. Recognising the fallacy of appealing to force 43. Judging intuition, 
19. Recognising the fallacy of arguing from 
ignorance, 
44. An analysis of the appeal to immediate 
experience, 
20. Recognising the fallacy of appealing to the 
sentiments 
45. Deduction, 
21. Recognising the fallacy of appealing to the 
multitude, 
46. Induction, 
22. Recognising the fallacy of composition, 47. Scientific method, 
23. Recognising the fallacy of division, 48. The consistent use of a principle in ethics, 
24. Recognising the fallacy of extension, 49. Justifying the standards used in ethics, 
25. Recognising the fallacy of prejudicing the 
issue, 
50. The realisation that an ethical dispute may 
not be resolvable. 
D'Angelo's (1971) conception obviously focuses upon the evaluation of evidence, 
logical competence and logical argumentation. Moreover, he furnishes useful 
descriptions and examples of these attitudes and skills and stipulates that this is not 
an exhaustive list of all critical thinking skills. It is, however, a representation of the 
many different skills which in his view are required in the development of critical 
thinking ability. 
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In contrast, Brown & Cook (1971) cite only four "critical-mindedness" skills 
although when compared to other conceptions some of these could be viewed as 
more like affective dispositions. Brown & Cook (1971) did not offer detailed 
descriptions of their skills but they include: 
Refraining from jumping to conclusions; 
Evaluation of given sources of information; 
Analysis of related parts of a problem; 
Retention of an open mind. 
Glaser (1985) asserts critical thinking involves three principle elements: 
An attitude of being disposed to consider in a thoughtful, perceptive manner the 
problems and subjects that come within the range of one's experience; 
Knowledge of the methods of logical enquiry and reasoning; 
Skill in applying these methods. 
Glaser (1985) also refers to certain behaviours relevant to a critically thoughtful 
approach to problem solving which essentially resemble skills these include: 
Recognising unstated assumptions and values; 
Comprehending language and using it with accuracy and clarity; 
Appraising evidence and evaluating arguments; 
Drawing inferences or conclusions and testing them; 
Revising ones attitudes or judgements where the evidence persuades one to 
do so. 
Finally, Glaser (1985) alludes to two attitudinal components that critical thinkers 
must be disposed to, that is, they should: 
listen to another person's presentation or argument no matter whether they 
agree with you or not; 
To understand the other person's point of view. 
Glaser's (1985) attitudinal components as with other conceptions appear to reflect 
dispositions as opposed to skills. The latter attitudinal component according to 
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Glaser (1985) broadens one's ability to accept differences in perception or values 
between one's self and others, and with the emotional perspective being represented 
by the assertions of others. 
The knowledge and skill components are purported to involve the examination of a 
stated belief to see if the presented evidence supports it or the further conclusions to 
which it leads. Such examination requires recognition of problems and the pertinent 
factors bearing upon them, consideration of possible explanatory hypotheses, 
formulation of feasible means of meeting those problems, and logical organisation or 
pertinent information. 
For Ennis (1985) critical thinking involves: "reasonable" thinking, a determination to 
analyse arguments carefully, the seeking of valid evidence, and the subsequent 
reaching of sound conclusions. The outcome of critical thinking for Ennis is fair- 
mindedness, objectivity, and commitment to clarity and accuracy. Achievement of 
these operations he contends, requires the possession or acquisition of certain 
abilities, the application of various sub abilities and appropriate criteria and the 
employment of characteristic dispositions. The sub abilities and criteria are far too 
numerous to reproduce here, although the abilities span the core skills of elementary 
clarification, basic support, inference, advanced clarification, and strategy and tactics. 
Ennis's (1985, p. 54) specific abilities include: 
1. Focusing on a question; 
2. Analysing Arguments; 
3. Asking and answering questions of clarification and challenge; 
4. Judging the credibility of a source; 
5. Observing and judging observation reports; 
6. Deducing and judging deductions; 
7. Inducing and judging inductions; 
8. Making and judging value judgements; 
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9. Defining terms and judging definitions; 
10. Identifying assumptions; 
11. Deciding on action; 
12. Interacting with others. 
Ennis's (1985, p. 54) Specific critical thinking dispositions include: 
1. Seek a clear statement of the thesis or question; 
2. Seek reasons; 
3. Try to be well informed; 
4. Use credible sources and mention them; 
5. Take into account the total situation; 
6. Try to remain relevant to the main point; 
7. keep in mind the original or main point; 
8. Look for alternatives; 
9. Be open -minded: 
(a) Consider seriously other points of view than one's own ("dialogical 
thinking") 
(b) Reason from premises with which one disagrees - without letting the 
disagreement interfere with one's own reasoning ("suppositional thinking") 
(c) Withhold judgement when the evidence and reasons are insufficient. 
10. Take a position (and change a position) when the evidence and reasons are 
sufficient to do so; 
11. Seek as much precision as the subject permits; 
12. Deal in an orderly manner with the parts of a complex whole; 
13. Be sensitive to the feelings, levels of knowledge, and degree of sophistication of 
others; 
14. Use one's critical thinking abilities. 
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Until the relatively recent addition of dispositions, Ennis's conception of critical 
thinking reflected a "pure skills" model. Objections to the somewhat overwhelming 
list of abilities and concomitant criteria centred on the proposition that a person 
could be a critical thinker if they merely possessed the requisite abilities. No 
reference was made to the student's actual application of their skills (Siegal, 1988). 
This presented the possibility that a person may be regarded as a critical thinker by 
merit of passing tests designed to assess these skills, but consequently may 
infrequently or never think critically in practice. This prospect appears, however, to 
have been recognised, because in Marzano et al's (1988) feature of Ennis's "Goals for 
a Critical Thinking Curriculum" the addition of disposition number 14 clearly 
advocates use and not merely possession of critical thinking skills. Ennis (1985, p. 47) 
also appears to make the case for application of skills as integral to critical thinking, 
by asserting that critical thinking portrays the practical side of higher order thinking. 
He contends that " Deciding what to believe or do is a practical higher-order thinking 
enterprise, and most practical higher-order thinking activity is focused on deciding 
what to believe or do. " Thus, Ennis's constituents of critical thinking now 
incorporates a skills plus dispositions plus tendency to use conception. The majority 
of the dispositions presented, however, appear merely as extensions to the identified 
abilities. It is the dispositions of looking for alternatives, being open minded, 
changing positions, being sensitive to the feelings and sophistication of others, and 
use of critical thinking skills which are reflective of affective tendencies which require 
a certain level of motivation and commitment to operationalise and maintain them. 
In reaction to the assertions of other commentators in the field regarding the issue of 
critical thinking constituents, McPeck (1981; 1990) claims critical thinking constitutes 
little in the way of so called general or transferable reasoning skills, but merely a 
disposition and appropriate knowledge. Though saying little pertaining to the former, 
McPeck identifies reflective scepticism as the prevailing disposition, exclusively 
dependant upon context - specific knowledge and information of the field in which 
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critical thinking is to be conducted (epistemological specificity). To McPeck (1981; 
1990) scepticism refers to the suspension of assent towards a given in whatever 
form, until careful examination of the evidence and alternatives warrants acceptance. 
Scepticism, however, should not be habitual or indiscriminate but judicious, 
tempered by experience and be reflective. Reflective in this case means the 
application of criterion which distinguishes judicious scepticism from incorrect or 
frivolous scepticism, as determined by the norms and standards of the subject area in 
question. McPeck asserts that this is contingent on some knowledge of the particular 
field, without which the thinker could not know when, and how to apply reflective 
scepticism. In short McPeck (1981; 1990) views the major constituents of critical 
thinking as: 
A Knowledge Component: comprising knowledge based skills whose general range 
of applicability is limited by the form of thought or kind of knowledge being called 
upon; 
A Critical Component: consisting of the ability to reflect upon, to question 
effectively, to suspend judgement or belief about the required knowledge composing 
the problem at hand. 
Paul (1984; 1991; 1992), however, contends that critical thinking constitutes two 
distinct forms each comprising discrete skills and motives. For example, if thinking is 
conducted and disciplined to serve the vested interests of a particular individual or 
group, excluding the interests of other relevant persons or groups, then the thinking 
is "sophistic" or "weak sense" critical thinking. This is understood to comprise a set 
of discrete micro-logical skills, as follows: 
Comparing and contrasting ideals with actual practice; 
Thinking precisely about thinling: using critical vocabulary; 
Noting significant similarities and differences; 
Examining or evaluating assumptions; 
Distinguishing relevant from irrelevant facts; 
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Making plausible inferences, predictions, or interpretations; 
Giving reasons and evaluating evidence and alleged facts; 
Recognising contradictions; 
Exploring implications and consequences. 
Paul (1991) posits the above to be ultimately extrinsic to the person, that is, skills 
that can be added on to other learning which contributes to the development of 
"technical reason. " Conversely, if the thinking is disciplined to the extent that it 
considers the interests of diverse persons or groups then this is critical thinking 
conducted in a "fairminded" or "strong sense. " Thinking in this sense is understood 
to consist of the following integrated macro-logical skills: 
Refining generalisations and avoiding oversimplifications; 
Comparing analogous situations: transferring insights to new contexts; 
Developing one's perspective: creating or exploring beliefs, arguments, or theories; 
Clarifying issues, conclusions, or beliefs; 
Developing criteria for evaluation: clarifying values and standards; 
Evaluating the credibility of sources of information; 
Questioning deeply: raising and pursuing root or significant questions; 
Analysing or evaluating arguments, interpretations, beliefs or theories; 
Generating or assessing solutions 
Analysing or evaluating actions or policies; 
Reading critically: clarifying or critiquing texts; 
Listening critically: the art of silent dialogue; 
Making interdisciplinary connections; 
Practising Socratic discussion: clarifying and questioning beliefs, theories, or perspectives; 
Reasoning dialogically: comparing perspectives, interpretations or theories; 
Reasoning dialectically: evaluating perspectives, interpretations or theories. 
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The above abilities, according to Paul (1991) are intrinsic to the character of the 
individual. Effective utilisation requires insight into one's own cognitive and affective 
processes, leading to the development of "emancipatory reason", whereby the thinker 
is not blinded by their own values or beliefs. In this conception, Paul clearly links 
critical thinking to self awareness and morality and proposes the potential for a one- 
sided application of critical thought. Fundamental to this conception of critical 
thinking are a cluster of interrelated concepts which Paul (1991) labels: critical 
thinking; uncritical thinking; sophistic critical thinking; fairminded critical thinking and 
are defined thus: 
"Critical Thinking 
a) The art of thinking about your thinking while you're thinking so as to make thinking 
more clear, precise, accurate, relevant, consistent and fair. 
b) The art of constructive scepticism. 
c) The art of identifying and removing bias, prejudice, and one-sidedness of thought. 
d) The art of self-directed, in-depth, rational thought. 
e) Thinking that rationally certifies what we know and makes clear where we are 
ignorant. 
Uncritical Thinking 
a) Thought Captive of one's ego, desires, social conditioning, prejudices, or irrational 
impressions 
b) Thinking that is egocentric, careless, heedless of assumptions, relevant evidence, 
implications, or inconsistency, 
c) Thinking that habitually ignores epistemological demands in favour of its 
egocentric commitments. 
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Sophistic Critical Thinking 
a) Thinking which meets epistemological demands insofar as they square with the 
vested interests of the thinker; 
b) Skilled thinking that is heedless of assumptions, relevance, reasons, evidence, 
implications and consistency only insofar as it is in the vested interest of the 
thinker to do so; 
c) Skilled thinking that is motivated by vested interest , egocentrism, or ethnocentrism 
rather than by truth or objective reasonability. 
Fairminded Critical Thinking 
a) Skilled thinking which meets epistemological demands regardless of the vested 
interests or ideological commitments of the thinker, 
b) Skilled thinking characterised by empathy into diverse opposing points of view 
and devotion to truth as against self interest; 
c) Skilled thinking that is consistent in the application of intellectual standards, 
holding one's self to the same rigorous standards of evidence and proof to 
which one holds antagonists; 
d) Skilled thinking that demonstrates the commitment to entertain all viewpoints 
sympathetically and to assess them with the same intellectual standards, 
without reference to one's own feelings or vested interests, or the feelings or vested 
interests of one's friends, community or nation" , (p. 47). 
Of the above, Paul believes uncritical and sophistic thinking to be the most 
commonly employed in everyday thinking. He also asserts critical thinking 
exemplifies the perfections of thought (table 2.5.3) appropriate to a particular mode 
or domain of thinking, and contrasts the perfections and imperfections of thought 
thus: 
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Table 2.5.3 The Perfections and Imperfections of Thought 
Clarity Vs Unclari 
Precision Vs Imprecision 
Specificity vs Vagucncss 
Accuracy vs Inaccuracy 
Relevance vs Irrelevance 
Consisten vs Inconsistency 
Logicalness vs illogicalncss 
Dcpth vs Superficiality 
Complctcness vs Incompleteness 
Significancc vs Triviality 
Fairness vs Bias or one-sidedness 
Adcquacy (for purposc) vs inadequacy 
Paul, (1991) 
Mastery of these general canons of thought enables the thinker to avoid the unclear, 
imprecise, vague, unreflective, inconsistent, superficial and inaccurate thinking 
associated with the uncritical thinker. These canons of thought can then be applied to 
what Paul identifies as the "elements of thought". Avoidance of the imperfections of 
thought requires an understanding and an ability to formulate, analyse and assess 
these elements as follows: 
1. The problem or question at issue; 
2. The purpose or goal of the thinking; 
3. The frame of reference or points of view involved; 
4. Assumptions made; 
5. Central concepts and ideas involved; 
6. Principles or theories used; 
7. Evidence, data, or reasons advanced; 
8. Interpretations and claims made 
9. Inferences, reasoning, and lines or formulated thought 
10. Implications and consequences involved. 
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The individual's ability to command the elements of thought in order to practise the 
perfections of thought, is contingent upon their ability to adjust or transfer thinking 
across differing question types and thought domains. Paul sees this as essential 
because it is no longer sufficient or effective to solely consider questions from a 
subject matter or monological perspective. Indeed, the most important questions 
currently facing individuals and nations focus on controversial and complex social, 
political, ethical, economic and religious issues of a multi-disciplinary or 
interdisciplinary nature, requiring non-algorithmic or multilogical thinking. 
Monological analysis will not solve multilogical problems. What is required is critical 
thinking in the "strong sense", the development of " strong sense" traits of mind 
which include the following characteristics: 
Thinldng independently; 
Developing insight into egocentricity or sociocentricity; 
Exercising fair-mindedness; 
Exploring thoughts underlying feelings and feelings underlying thoughts; 
Developing intellectual humility and suspending judgement; 
Developing intellectual courage; 
Developing intellectual good faith or integrity; 
Developing intellectual perseverance; 
Developing confidence in reason. 
Equipped thus, thinkers are able to counteract egocentric and ethnocentric 
tendencies and engage in dialogical and dialectical reasoning. Dialogical thinking 
involves a dialogue or extended discourse between differing points of view or frames 
of reference. Dialectical thinking is dialogical thinking in which opposing points of 
view are subjected to tests of their strengths and weaknesses or their susceptibility to 
inconsistency or contradiction. Thus, Paul maintains that critical thinkers, in the 
strong sense, should become adept at considering the perspective of others in order 
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to develop a holistic sense of rationality by incorporating broader issues of values 
and consequences. 
Halpern (1989, p. 29) also subscribes to the skills plus dispositions conception and 
contends that critical thinking constitutes thinking that is: purposeful; reasoned; goal- 
directed; evaluative and self-monitored (metacognition). Fundamental to these 
descriptors are skills related to problem solving, formulating inferences, calculating 
likelihoods, argument analysis and decision making. Equally as important as critical 
thinking skills, is that of possessing or developing a critical thinking attitude, for: 
"Many errors occur not because people can't think critically, but because they don't. " 
Furthermore, Halpern outlines several characteristics of critical thinkers which 
include: a willingness to plan; flexibility; persistence; and a willingness to self-correct. 
Brookfield (1987), in an attempt to overcome the negative connotations, often 
ascribed to the term critical, suggests critical thinking is more than the indiscriminate 
challenging of claims, ideas or activities. He, thus, portrays critical thinking as: a 
productive and positive activity; a process as opposed to an outcome; that is 
manifestly varied according to the context in which it occurs and triggered by 
positive as well as negative events and is emotive as well as rational. 
Moreover, critical thinking comprises four central components and attendant abilities 
in the form of 
1. Identifying and challenging assumptions: requires ability in identifying the 
assumptions underpinning statements, ideas, values and beliefs, skilled examination 
of their accuracy and validity and a willingness to jettison old assumptions in the face 
of evidence as to their inappropriateness to our lives. 
2. Challenging the importance of context: involves an awareness of how context 
influences thoughts and actions, that practices, structures and language are never 
context-free and that our behaviours are culturally and temporally influenced. 
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3. Imagining and  exploring alternatives: involves the realisation that in other contexts 
entirely different norms of employment organisation, political behaviour, media 
interpretation, and relationships are compatible and indeed ordinary. 
4. Reflective scepticism: involves approaching claims to universal truth or ultimate 
explanations with doubt, not accepting the word of authority indiscriminately, 
particularly if experience dictates otherwise, and an ability to accept or initiate 
change. 
Like Dewey (1916) and Watson & Glaser (1991) Brookfield, sees an action element 
in critical thinking which enables individuals to review important aspects of their 
lives, relationships and working practices and act upon them in an informed manner. 
Norris (1985, p. 40) also recognises the importance of context, alternative 
perspectives and affective dispositions by asserting that critical thinking is "A 
complex of many considerations. " Such thinking constitutes: 
1. A rationality in decision making that requires more than avoiding a standard list of 
errors in thinking; 
2. The ability to assess the views of others and one's own views according to 
acceptable standards of appraisal; 
3. Productive thinking, in the sense of conceiving of alternative courses of action and 
candidates for belief, before critically appraising which alternative to choose; 
4. An awareness of the sensitivity of context to the processes and outcomes of 
thinking, and its potential effects on the quality of inference and inference appraisal; 
5. A disposition to think productively and critically about issues. 
Similarly, Blair (1988) conceives of critical thinking as constituting a disposition and 
ability to seek and test reasons for beliefs and actions. These he claims are usually 
expressed in the form of arguments. Blair (1988) also sees critical thinking as a 
complex intellectual virtue comprising skills and understanding. These include but are 
not restricted to: 
An ability to formulate and assess arguments; 
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Sensitivity to language; 
A sense of the importance of context; 
An ability to apply and also to critically reflect on the appropriate criteria for 
judgement. 
As a virtue of character, Blair (1988) contends that it includes a habit of critical 
reflection regarding the problematic assumptions held by oneself and others, plus the 
valuing of reasoned support for beliefs and actions. In addition to the abilities and 
dispositions position, Blair clearly associates critical thinking with the process of 
argumentation. 
To Fisher (1990) critical thinking extends to the generation of appropriate questions 
whilst also comprising certain traits and skills such as: 
learning how to question, that is, when to question and what to question; 
a readiness to reason; 
a willingness to challenge; 
a desire for truth; 
understanding oneself; (self awareness) 
understanding others (being fair and open-minded). 
In terms of critical thinking skills Fisher utilises and clarifies the meaning of Ennis's 
(1985) aspects thus: 
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1. Grasping the meaning of a statement - Is it meaningful? 
2. Judging whether there is ambiguity in reasoning - Is it clear? 
3. Judging whether statements contradict each other - Is it consistent? 
4. Judging whether a conclusion follows necessarily - Is it logical? 
5. Judging whether a statement is specific enough - Is it precise? 
6. Judging whether a statement applies a principle - Is it following a rule? 
7. Judging whether an observation statement is reliable - Is it accurate? 
8. Judging whether an inductive conclusion is warranted - Is it justified? 
9. Judging whether the problem has been identified - Is it relevant? 
10. Judging whether something is an assumption - Is it taken for granted? 
11. Judging whether a definition is adequate - Is it well defined? 
12. Judging whether a statement aken on authority is acceptable - Is it true? 
(Fisher, R. 1990, pp. 68-69). 
Kurfiss (1988), while supporting the centrality of argumentation to critical thinking, 
takes a different position to the pervasive skills plus dispositions construct and 





Critical thinking for Kurfiss (1988, p. 13) involves the justification of one's beliefs. 
Argumentation is seen as the vehicle via which justification is tendered. In this 
context arguments are portrayed as human interactions where a "... train of reasoning 
in which claims and supporting reasons are linked to establish a position. " The core 
components and their concomitant skills are that of analysing arguments, detecting 
errors or fallacies in reasoning, and constructing convincing arguments particularly 
those encountered in "everyday life". Kurfiss (1988) thus suggests that critical 
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thinking has become almost synonymous with inductive argumentation and, 
therefore, applied informal logic. In relation to pertinent skills, Kurfiss acknowledges 
the variety of proposed inventories and cites the essential skills of Facione (1984; 
1986): 
1. Identifying issues requiring the application of thinking skills informed by 
background knowledge; 
2. Determining the nature of the background knowledge that is relevant to deciding 
the issues involved and gathering that knowledge; 
3. Generating initially plausible hypotheses regarding the issues; 
4. Developing procedures to test hypotheses, which procedures lead to the 
confirmation or disconfirmation of those hypotheses; 
5. Articulating in argument form the results of these testing procedures; 
6. Evaluating arguments and, where appropriate, revising the initial hypotheses in the 
light of alternative understandings developed during the testing process. 
Cognitive Processes 
Kurfiss (1988) posits that among the skills issue lies unexplored questions of how 
people arrive at conclusions, how knowledge influences reasoning processes, how 
people learn to use intradisciplinary methods to address complex issues, and how 
they direct and sustain attention to the intellectually demanding, multi-faceted task of 
thinking critically. In line with previous commentator's concerns, Kurfiss finds the 
logicians ever increasing lists of fallacies perplexing, since they do little to facilitate 
understanding as to why people persist in erroneous reasoning, even when alerted to 
the pitfalls of fallacious reasoning. Cognitive researchers have not successfully 
addressed all these questions but have illuminated many aspects of reasoning 
processes, in that: 
Knowledge is meaningful information stored in memory; 
Knowledge in memory is organised; 
Knowledge takes many forms; 
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Knowledge must be well understood and accessible for effective problem solving; 
Novices and experts differ in how they acquire and utilise knowledge in their thinking; 
Critical thinking is similar but not the same as problem solving, 
Metacognitive strategies enhance critical thinking; 
Affective factors, such as curiosity, challenge, and fantasy can play a part in the intrinsic 
motivation to think critically. 
Kurfiss (1988) concludes that research outcomes of this nature have potentially 
broad educational implications in relation to intellectual development. 
Intellectual Development 
The developmental perspective traces the transformations in learners' beliefs about 
the nature of knowledge and truth. One of the major desirable developments in 
students' intellectual growth is recognising the indeterminacy of knowledge and the 
fallacy of single truth and ultimate authority. The ultimate educational task is to 
enable individuals to make rational, caring commitments in a relativistic world. 
Kurfiss, accords with the views of Perry (1970) and Belenky et al. (1986) in 
proposing that it is the mature epistemology of commitment as opposed to pure 
relativism and isolated analytical skills which represents the essence of critical 
thinking. 
In sum it would appear that Kurfiss' (1988) conception of the constituents of critical 
thinking are: 
The cognitive skills concomitant with argument construction and analysis; 
The acquisition, organisation, retrieval, utilisation and transfer of appropriate 
knowledge; 
The development of intellectual dexterity which enables people to commit themselves 
to a contextually relevant position. 
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Siegel (1988, p. 23; 1991), whilst concurring with the general skills plus dispositions 
view, further differentiates the dispositional constituents of critical thinking. He 
postulates that the construct comprises the two fundamental components of reason 
assessment and critical spirit. In relation to the former, Siegel contends that the 
critical thinking individual is one who is "appropriately moved by reasons. " This 
focus on rationality involves: an appreciation of the power of reasons to warrant or 
justify beliefs, claims, and actions; and an ability to properly assess the force of 
reasons in contextually sensitive ways, for example, by applying the skills and criteria 
required in establishing inductive or deductive validity or statistical significance. This 
component essentially advocates not only the application of cognitive and 
mathematical skills but also the issue of contextual skills. 
The critical spirit component, however, involves a complex of dispositions, attitudes, 
habits of mind, and character traits in the form of 
Dispositions 
A willingness, desire, and disposition to base one's actions and beliefs on reasons; 
The disposition to seek reasons and evidence when making judgements; 
The disposition to evaluate reasons carefully in accordance with relevant principles of 
reason assessment; 
Attitudes 
A respect for the importance of reasoned judgement, and truth; 
Rejection of partiality, arbitrariness, special pleading, wishful thinking and other 
obstacles to proper reason assessment 




Engaging in due consideration of the principles of reason assessment; 
Subjecting proffered reasons to critical scrutiny; 
Engaging in fairminded and non-self interested examination of reasons. 
Character traits 
Refer to a person's macro-disposition to: 
Pay attention to reasons; 
Regard reasons as important; 
Act upon reasons; 
Value critical thinking, truth, intellectual honesty, and evidence. 
Kneedler (1985) offers a further tripartite conception in which he cites twelve 
essential critical thinking skills arranged within three categories developed by the 
California History-Social Science Assessment Advisory Committee (1981). These 
comprise: 
Defining and clarifying the problem 
1. Identify central issues or problems; 
2. Compare similarities and differences; 
3. Determine which information is relevant; 
4. Formulate appropriate questions; 
Judging information related to the problem 
5. Distinguish among fact, opinion, and reasoned judgement; 
6. Check consistency; 
7. Identify unstated assumptions; 
8. Recognise stereotypes and cliches; 
9. Recognise bias, emotional factors, propaganda, and semantic slanting; 
10. Recognise different value orientations and ideologies; 
Solving problems/ Drawing conclusions 
11. Recognise the adequacy of data; 
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12. Predict probable consequences. 
Kneedler (1985) clearly links these essential skills with problem solving which is 
enhanced by further attitudinal and action components. A critical attitude enables 
people to maintain an objective, constructive, and questioning stance towards all 
information received, thus avoiding biased perspectives. Critical thinking action 
means the individual operationalises their critical thinking skills and attitude into 
voting, examining issues, communicating without jargon, offering opinions, valuing 
the viewpoints of others, and implies a consistent transfer of critical thinking into 
everyday practice. 
Watson & Glaser (1991, p. 1), in keeping with their definition of critical thinking 
presented earlier, identify five aspects or abilities which they claim to be "... most 
significant and fundamental to the concepts of critical thinking. " These are: 
Inference - the ability to evaluate the validity of inferences drawn from certain 
observed or supposed facts. 
Recognition of Assumptions - the ability to identify presuppositions or unstated 
assumptions taken for granted in assertive statements. 
Deduction - the ability to determine whether certain conclusions necessarily follow 
from information given in statements or premises. 
Interpretation - The ability to weigh evidence and decide if generalisations or 
conclusions based on given data are warranted. 
Evaluation of Arguments - the ability to distinguish between arguments that are 
strong and relevant and those that are weak or irrelevant to a particular 
question at issue. 
In addition to the above abilities Watson & Glaser (1991) include an attitudinal 
component which includes a tendency towards enquiry and valuing of evidence in 
support of knowledge claims. The authors have produced a test founded upon these 
components which apparently tests the application of such abilities and attitudes. 
This will be reviewed later, in greater depth, in the methods section. 
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Walters (1986) sees critical thinking as constituting far more than the reductionist 
analysis of arguments and the repertoire of micro-skills often associated with this 
perception of critical thinking. He reveals four common characteristics predicated for 
critical thinking: 
1. Critical thinking is a method of problem solving. It helps the student to identify, 
clarify, evaluate, and answer perplexities that arise in reading, discussion and so 
forth. 
2. The proper method for problem solving is analysis. Breaking down beliefs or 
opinions into their constitutive propositions, and then further reducing those 
propositions to verifiable justifications, is the only way to solve the problem or 
problems embedded in beliefs. 
3. Beliefs or opinions that are not amenable to this model of analytical reductionism 
are questionable - that is, they are examples neither of critical reflection nor of bona 
fide problems. 
4. Skill in critical thinking results in an increase of power on the part of the subject. 
Control of one's thinking presumably results in both increased ability to concentrate 
and in an argumentative edge in adversarial settings. 
In respect of the methodology of critical thinking Walters cites Facione's (1984) 
analytical process as an common example of how the critical thinker should evaluate 
putative arguments by: 
Identifying the purported conclusion; 
Identifying the purported premises; 
Identifying the purported assumptions, or understood premises; 
Identifying and excluding any extraneous material; 
Rephrasing the argument's content for the purpose of clarification and verification. 
Walters (1986) contends, however, that an overemphasis on such systematic 
programmes of critical thinking results in several undesirable consequences. First, 
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students are encouraged to assume that critical thinking methodology is the sole 
approach to understanding claims regarding the nature of reality. Subsequently, 
interpretations or expressions that fail to conform to this method as in the case of 
aesthetic, imaginative or metaphysical claims, are perceived as unworthy of serious 
consideration. Secondly, students are encouraged to make particular universal; but 
albeit dubious assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge. Finally, 
psychologically speaking it may breed a degree of passivity in thinking as a result of 
the diminution of the creative speculative faculty, which in turn may engender an 
attitude of intolerance. It would appear thus, that while Walters recognises the 
logical and analytical skills constituting some elements of critical thinking, these 
should not be considered absolute in that abilities in evaluating artistic, abstract 
concepts and a tolerance of ambiguity are also legitimate. Moreover, Walters (1990) 
cautions that critical thinking as a conceptual model may be acquiring a'universally 
applicable' and 'uncontentiously authoritative' status which is being endorsed 
uncritically. This tendency may be alleviated if the skills employed in a'calculus of 
justification' (analytical reductionism) which enable the reasoner to logically analyse 
and evaluate propositions and problems, are tempered by intuitive and perceptive 
skills inherent in a'pattern of discovery' which promote creative construction of 
alternative models, the discovery of new problems, and fresh perspectives. This 
prospect adds to the previous constituents, a commitment to persistent and open- 
minded re-evaluation. Walters (1990) also appears to be proposing that critical 
thinking and creative thinking are either analogous or complimentary. 
Gilovich (1991), in relation to the fallibility of human reasoning and uncritical 
thinking in everyday life, asserts that in order to improve everyday reasoning and 
avoid the acquisition of questionable and erroneous beliefs, one should adopt the 
following habits of mind: 
1. The cultivation of an appreciation of the folly of trying to draw conclusions from 
incomplete and unrepresentative evidence by attending to the following corollaries; 
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Essential corollaries 
a, An awareness of how often everyday experience presents us with biased samples 
of information; 
b, Persistence in trying to acquire elusive information; 
c, An awareness of how our role, status, or social position inhibits access to certain 
classes of informative data; 
d, consider alternatives, particularly the possibility of overlooking invisible data. 
2. Try to avoid the drawbacks associated with trying to explain a vast range of 
outcomes in terms of our pre-existing theories and beliefs; that is, our talent for ad 
hoc explanations can result in quite unexpected and damaging outcomes being seen 
as consistent with our original convictions. Our beliefs, thus, can appear to gain too 
much support from equivocal evidence, which are seldom discredited by truly 
antagonistic results or data. Compensatory strategies in this case would be: 
a, Consider the opposite, i. e. would the exact opposite outcome support my belief as well; 
b, How would someone who does not believe the way I do explain this result; 
c, What alternative theory could account for this outcome. 
These questions may make us aware of the often tenuous link between evidence and 
belief, and help guard against premature acceptance of doubtful propositions. 
3. An awareness of the uncertainties and distortions of second-hand information. 
There is always a possibility that information coming to us from others may be more 
remote than first appears; 
4. Question whether beliefs are really as widely shared as they appear. The absence 
of explicit disagreement cannot be regarded as evidence of agreement; 
5. An awareness of the human tendency to impute order to any complex set of 
stimuli, and when and where, statistical regression may likely occur; 
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6. Be prepared to consider the just chance' hypothesis and try to refrain from rushing 
to judgement and intervention. 
Gilovich's (1991) habits of mind are thus consistent with former conceptions of 
critical thinking in that they advocate statistical awareness, metacognition, the value 
of an open mind in regard to evidence and the constant effort to consider or generate 
alternative perspectives. 
Several attempts to construct meta - analytic taxonomies of critical thinking 
constituents have been made with a view to achieving some degree of consensus. 
Beyer (1985), for example, proposed a series of the most commonly used skills or 
operations associated with critical thinking. This was considered to represent a 
professional consensus developed from some 30 years of scholarly reflection, 
research and teaching experience. These include: 
Distinguishing between verifiable facts and value claims; 
Determining the reliability of a source; 
Determining the factual accuracy of a statement; 
Distinguishing relevant from irrelevant information, claims or reasons; 
Detecting bias; 
Identifying unstated assumptions; 
Identifying ambiguous or equivocal claims or arguments; 
Recognising logical inconsistencies or fallacies in a line of reasoning; 
Distinguishing between warranted and unwarranted claims; 
Determining the strength of an argument. 
The American Philosophical Association (1990) consisting of 46 theoreticians from 
throughout the United States of America and Canada identified in their Delphi 







They also developed a consensus description of the desirable attributes possessed by 
an ideal critical thinker, thus: 
" The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed trustful of 
reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation, honest in facing 
personal biases, prudent in making judgements, willing to reconsider, clear 
about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant 
information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and 
persistent in seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the 
circumstances of the inquiry permit. " (p. 3). 
The characteristic attributes inherent in the above description have subsequently 
served as the theoretical basis for what Facione, Facione & Sanchez (1994) identify 








Dick (1991), in his meta-analysis, undertook to construct a catalogue of the various 
processes involved in critical thinking resulting in his "taxonomy of critical thinking". 
Selected works by various authors spanning the previous forty years were analysed 
for descriptive similarities among identified processes. Dick identified what he terms 
15 distinguishable types of critical thinking emerging from the literature accompanied 





Comprehension of statements - meanings; 
Specificity of concepts and definitions; 
Ambiguities in reasoning. 
Applications 
Applying facts and principles in new situations; 
Generalisation; 
Applying old relations to new situations. 
Assumptions 
Assumptions - definitional and descriptive; 
Looking for assumptions; 
Begging the question. 
Authority 
Authority is acceptable. 
Emotional Language 
Language usage - stated vs. suggested; emotive vs. neutral; expressive vs. dynamic. 
Identifiing Issues and Conclusions 
Problem identification; 
Recognising and defining the problem; 
Recognising that a problem exists; 
Identifying the nature of the problem. 
Omissions 
Ascertaining information needed. 
Organisation 
Organisation and planning of argument; 




Deciding process of solution; 
Sequencing optimal strategy; 
Inferring relations between stimulus elements; 
Mapping relations between relations; 
Reasoning by Analogy 
Argument by analogy; 
Faulty analogy; 
Fallacy of analogy. 
Reasoning by Deduction 
Deduction. 




Reasons for Conclusions 
Reasons. 
Sampling and Measuring 
Warranted conclusions. 
Statistical Reasoning 
Warranted inductive conclusions 
Induction. 
Support of Causal Explanation 
Warranted logical conclusions. 
Value Conflicts and Assumptions 
Decision making 
Importance of consequences. 
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Dick further condenses the 15 types of critical thinking into five generic categories, 
each category comprising three types thus. 
Categorisation of Types of Critical Thinking 
Identifying Ar ug ments 
Issues and conclusions 
Reasons 
Organisation. 
The components of a discourse or argument are identified. The emergent issues are 
then taken up and the conclusions drawn, the reasons are given for the conclusions, 





The argument is critiqued by identifying the assumptions used, the points of 





While not always required or relevant to argument analysis, value postures, appeals 
to authority, and strong feelings are often marshalled to influence the reader and/or 
listener. 





The key to scientific arguments are relating data assimilated by observation to 
determine cause, statistical judgement of relations, and the extent to which 
observations represent the broad perspective of nature that an argument attempts to 
embrace. 




Proofs are determined by trying to demonstrate that one argument is similar to 
another proven argument. Drawing specific statements which are implied by more 
general propositions is a basis of arguments like the proofs of geometry. More 
particular examples of deduction are to be found in applications of general principles 
to specific occasions. 
Dick's (1991) work offers a useful condensation of the divergent positions pertaining 
to the issue of what critical thinking constitutes. It clearly illuminates once more the 
centrality of argumentation and the logical determination of argument validity to 
critical thinking. Dick, however, recognises this exercise to be a first approximation 
of a taxonomy of critical thinking constituents, and that the issue of contextual skills 
has not been examined with the same tenacity as other critical thinking processes. 
These processes thus need to be clarified and added as their relevance becomes 
apparent. 
2.6 Synthesis of the Issues Arising from the Critical Thinking Literature. 
A fundamental conclusion to be drawn from this significant but not exhaustive non- 
nursing review of what constitutes critical thinking, is that, although there is no 
single widely accepted definition of the construct, or of its constituents, conceptually 
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the phenomenon exists, at least in western cultures and is of concern to increasing 
numbers of people. The prevailing view appears to suggest that argument is the basic 
unit of critical thinking models and competent argument analysis a desired outcome. 
There appear to be four fundamental ingredients to critical thinking; that of a 
prerequisite knowledge base; a series of intellectual micro-skills; a tendency or 
disposition to utilise both knowledge and skills in scrutinising information or 
situations which comprises the stimuli for individuals to think critically and finally a 
series of intellectual standards to which such thinking should conform . The question 
of a spirit or disposition to think critically is the least contentious of the ingredients. 
The majority of commentators reviewed agree that a repertoire of discrete 
intellectual skills are of little use if they lie redundant or are used preferentially. Paul's 
idea of a sophistic critical thinker exemplifies the potential prospect of one-sidedness 
and self interest in one's disposition to think critically. Gilovich (1991) also brings 
into question the possible motives which stimulate such thinking. When information 
or evidence conflicts with an individual's beliefs, Gilovich suggests that we subject it 
to more precise and sustained critique than we would if the data was in keeping with 
our beliefs. This strategy may perpetuate until evidence is found which allows the 
affront to beliefs to be explained away, so leaving the individual's belief system intact, 
although still potentially erroneous. Having illuminated the possibilities of bias in 
critical thinking disposition, the precise nature of the disposition should be clarified. 
That is, when people find themselves in a position where they need to think critically, 
they need to recognise and employ a commitment to subject all data regardless of its 
potential to confirm or conflict with personal beliefs to equal degrees of scrutiny. The 
rush to early judgement or closure should be resisted in order to facilitate reasoning 
which is reflective of the potential complexity of issues or arguments. As difficult as 
this may prove to be in social, corporate, and spiritual interactions, however, thinking 
cannot be regarded conceptually as 'pure critical thinking' until this condition is met. 
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Critical thinking is, thus, generally conceived of, as a vehicle for complex reasoning 
which overcomes the tendency towards simplistic, egocentric or ethnocentric 
reasoning based upon selective or impoverished search or utilisation of knowledge 
and evidence, or the search for, and understanding of alternative perspectives. 
Informational complexity or merely being uninformed should not, therefore, be a bar 
to complex reasoning but be viewed as a transient deficit which can be overcome 
with careful committed enquiry and learning. 
The following models (Fig 2.6.1) are offered to exemplify this range of reasoning 
derived from the literature spanning the spectrum of uncritical to critical thinking and 
their impact upon beliefs and action. These are intended to be taxonomic as opposed 
to hierarchical in nature, given the proposition that critical thinking may not be fully 
generalisable, in that, people may not think critically about all issues all of the time: 
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Spectrum of Uncritical to Critical Models of Reasoning and Their Potential 
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Fig. 2.6.1 Spectrum of Uncritical to Critical Models of Reasoning and Their Potential 
Impact Upon Beliefs and Action. 
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The above spectrum of reasoning encompasses deficits in cognitive skills, deficits in 
disposition to reason about complex issues, redundancy of critical abilities and 
composite application of critical abilities. With regard to the issue of redundancy one 
needs to clarify at this point a possible distinction between thinking and action. The 
fact that people do not act on the results of their critical thinking cannot be taken as 
evidence that such thinking has not taken place, or that individuals are incapable of 
such thought. Nisbett & Ross (1980) acknowledge this dichotomy between cognition 
and behaviour referring to the inability to bridge the gap as a failing in cognitive 
psychology. Similarly, Billig (1987) claims much of our thinking is in the form of 
personal internal arguments which may not be naturally verbalised. As alluded to 
previously social, familial, corporate and spiritual interactions are often fraught with 
power-relationships, processes of coercion and constraint. An individual's attitude to 
risk-taking in such environs may contribute significantly to their motivation to 
externalise their thinking and challenge the status quo, albeit, that they fully recognise 
the erroneous beliefs, unwarranted assumptions and faulty reasoning implicit in these 
situations or questions-at-issue, and can envision reasonable alternatives. Critical 
thinking in this context can uncover conflicts in systems, situations and problems, 
therefore, creating the conditions for challenging or argument, but not necessarily the 
immediate act. In respect of this issue the following are noted as potential extraneous 
variables: 
Demographic variables 
Age. Stage of growth is a prominent feature in cognitive development theories in 
which age is believed to correlate generally with critical thinking ability (Piaget, 
1969; Watson & Glaser, 1991). Piaget correlated the emergence of critical thinking 
with the changes from sensorimotor to formal operational stages of development. 
Perry (1970) applied the stages or positions paradigm to cognitive development in 
the college years. He observed fundamental changes in attitude towards knowledge 
and authority as students progressed through the dualistic to commitment stages in 
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his patterns of thinking model. Alfaro - LeFevre (1995, p. 21) posits that older people 
are more likely to demonstrate critical thinking for two reasons: 
1. Moral development usually comes with maturity. 
2. Most older people have had more opportunities to practice reasoning in 
different situations. " 
Gender. The influences of gender upon critical thinking represents a sensitive 
challenge in the current politically correct climate. In contrast to Perry's male 
oriented observations of cognitive development, Belenky, et. al. (1986) asserted that 
challenging authority may pose problems for learners who conceive of learning as an 
act of receiving. Such learners may appear incompetent in contexts that demand 
argumentation and disagreement. Clinchy (1989) suggests women may be more 
predisposed to this style of learning than men, and that as a result of this women may 
tend to side with arguers, searching for points of consensus as opposed to conflict. 
Historical Context. It is conceivable that some sociohistorical contexts may 
engender the development or externalisation of criticality to a greater degree than 
others. The "Challenge Authority" sentiments of the late 1960s and 1970s, or the 
economic recessionary and monetarist reforming eras of the 1980s and 1990s are 
indicative of periods of social turmoil or changing perspectives which may influence 
individual's thinking patterns and their attitude towards voicing such thinking. 
Heritage. Halonen (1995) raises the issues of racial and heritage variables in relation 
to critical thinking development. Cultural backgrounds it is posited may not 
predispose some learners to challenge authority in the classroom or in other settings. 
This raises important questions regarding the value placed upon general critical 
thinking by some cultures and, therefore, opportunities to develop and practice such 
thinking. 
With regard to professional practice, however, overcoming potential or actual 
oppression or personal reticence in order to meet the requirements of the client is a 
crucial undertaking. To reason or care in unchallenging silence would do little service 
to the client or the particular profession at large. 
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The skills issue which on first examination appears to represent a more divergent 
debate regarding critical thinking constituents may in fact be more tautological than 
substantive, representing a form of implicit consensus. That is, although many of the 
skills identified are compiled and termed differently, a significant proportion appear 
to be consistent with the processes or procedures related to argument analysis and 
evaluation; the generation of alternative perspectives or theories and recognising the 
adequacy of information as evidence. Scriven's (1976, p. 39) 7 steps model of 
argument analysis illustrates this similarity as indicated in table 2.6.1: 
Table 2.6.1 Scriven's 7 Steps Model of Argument Analysis. 
1. Clarification of Meaning (of the argument and its components) 
2. Identification of conclusions (stated and unstated) 
3. Portrayal of Structure 
4. Formulation of (Unstated) Assumptions (the "missing premises") 
5. Criticism of (a) The premises (given and missing) 
(b) The inferences 
6. Introduction of other relevant arguments 
7. Overall evaluation of this argument in light of 1 through 6. (p. 39). 
Missing from the literature, however, despite consistent citation, is an elaboration of 
appropriate contextual skills, i. e. skills required in recognition of context, contextual 
analysis and contextually sensitive reasoning. Although its centrality to the processes 
of critical clinical reasoning is presupposed, scant attention is given to its description 
and requisite skills. The context or set of circumstances surrounding nurse's clinical 
decision making can make patients' problems or needs unstable and transitory. 
Bowers & McCarthy (1993, p. 107) claims that: '... changing the context of a clinical 
problem not only alters the terrain around it, but may significantly reorder the 
68 
internal structure of the problem, substantially redefining the situation'. Context is, 
thus, an important aspect of clinical reasoning and individualised care. Contextual 
ability in relation to critical thinking in nursing is conceived as an: 
'Ability to recognise that or when the circumstances surrounding an event 
make the generalisation of a claim, principle, rule, intervention or procedure 
inappropriate in respect of the normative or anticipated outcome of such an 
event. ' 
The number of potential circumstances to be considered when nurses make clinical 
decisions are legion but essential for the generation of alternative perspectives and 
critical evaluation of nursing outcomes. For example, nurses may ask themselves 






" Socio-economic status 
" Level of development 
" Physical structure and ability 
" Cognitive ability 
" Pathophysiology 
" Boundaries of practice 
In light of the discussion thus far and for the purpose of this study critical thinking is 
synthesised as: 
Purposeful autonomous thinking which is derived from a physiologically mediated 
interaction between incoming information / stimuli from the external environment 
and an individual's knowledge base, experiential repertoire, belief systems and 
thinking strategies. The purpose of the interaction in the context of critical thinking, 
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is to evaluate the worth or truth of information by expanding peoples' thinking 
processes beyond a self-centred universe founded upon limited personal experiences 
and concrete certainties, towards a richer more diverse realm where a multiplicity of 
values, truths, and visionary possibilities exist (Meyers, 1986). It constitutes a series 
of discrete cognitive abilities, some of which are analytic and reductionist, others 
evaluative, a series of characteristic affective dispositions, and certain intellectual 
standards criteria. Theoretically, the dispositions act as the vehicles which in turn 
activate the utilisation of the cognitive skills in reasoning which conforms to the 
intellectual standards. The dimensions of these aspects are now offered as follows: 
Cognitive Skills 
Selective attention - the ability to initiate and maintain a sustained focus on an issue 
or situation in the face of competing stimuli, and irrespective of degree of 
personal interest; 
Interpretation - clarification of meaning 
Analysis - deconstruction of existing knowledge, theories , claims, 
in order to 
establish constituents and relationships. identification of context. 
Inference - drawing of warranted conclusions derived from relevant informational 
relationships 
Generation of alternative theories / perspectives - even when in conflict with own 
Evaluation -judging the validity and sufficiency of evidence, arguments, claims via 
establishment of appropriate criteria 
Metacognition - ability to consistently monitor and modify one's reasoning 
performance. Ability to recognise emotional attachment o certain premises, 
beliefs and conclusions. 
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Dispositions 
The following dispositions represent a combination of essential individual tendencies 
derived from the literature which are conceived as instrumental in motivating 
individuals in initiating, conducting and sustaining their critical reasoning behaviours: 
Scepticism - resisting the indiscriminate acceptance of evidence and claims. 
Inquisitiveness -a desire to pursue problematic issues to reasoned conclusions 
irrespective of apparent complexities and personal investment demands. 
Tolerance of Ambiguity - an appreciation of the possibility of inconclusive 
outcomes in relation to contextual or time relevant decisions and action. 
Resisting early closure - recognising the sufficiency of evidence and overcoming 
tendencies towards simplistic, single structure reasoning. 
Desire to search for independent evidence - non - reliance on proffered evidence. 
Open-mindedness - an appreciation of alternative perspectives, ways of knowing, 
and methods. 
Flexibility - subjecting beliefs to scrutiny and change. 
Intellectual courage - understands limitations to personal knowledge and able to 
admit this to others. 
Self - Confidence - Doubting personal reasoning abilities and being preoccupied 
with the prospect of failure or challenge can impede critical thinking. 
If the above skills and dispositions are seen as the means underpinning critical 
thinking, then performance in such processes must be contingent upon some desired 
end. For example, how should we know, even when people appear to use the means 
of such reasoning, that the reasoning is effective, of value and above all critical? The 
answer would appear to be some defined intellectual standards by which performance 
can be evaluated against. The following intellectual standards developed by Paul 
(1991) are adopted for the above purpose (Table 2.6.2): 
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Table 2.6.2 Paul's (1991, p. 288) Intellectual Standards Reflecting the Perfections and 
Imperfections of Thought. 
Clarity vs Unclarity 
Precision vs Imprecision 
Specificity vs Vagueness 
Accuracy vs Inaccuracy 
Relevance vs Irrelevance 
Consistency vs Inconsistency 
Logicalness vs illogicalness 
Depth vs Superficiality 
Completeness vs Incompleteness 
Significance vs Triviality 
Fairness vs Bias or one-sidedness 
Adequacy (for purpose) vs inadequacy 
Because of the overall evaluative nature of critical thinking, it is seen as 
predominantly reactive. That is, the reasoner has to be first confronted with data in 
some form, and receive it into sensory stores, before one can analyse and evaluate 
them. In this sense critical thinking differs conceptually from creative thinking, in that 
one can be creative or generative from a blank sheet of paper initially, whereas one 
cannot be critical from such a blank sheet. Critical and creative thinking may thus 
interact cyclically (Fig, 2.6.2) whereby when problems are identified in claims or 
arguments the reasoner generates an alternative explanation or perspective, which is 
in turn evaluated critically. 
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Consideration or Generation 
of alternatives 
Fig. 2.6.2 Cycle of Critical Reasoning. 
A crucial stage in the above cycle and in the critical thinking process is thus the 
generation of alternatives. For, in the absence of the generation of alternatives, the 
critical process is terminated resulting in the acceptance or construction of a one- 
sided argument. 
Moreover, critical thinking in the context of this study is not accepted as completely 
synonymous with problem solving. Critical thinking may not necessarily conclude 
with solutions to problems, but instead, a greater understanding of the problem itself 
and a need to tolerate ambiguity (Landis & Michael, 1981). 
The overall outcome of the interaction and utilisation of the skills, dispositions and 
intellectual standards is purposeful, autonomous thinking which enables an individual 
to: 
Determine the authenticity, accuracy, consistency, objectivity and worth of 
information, arguments and knowledge claims (Beyer, 1985), by avoiding the 
indiscriminate acceptance of one-sided (face value) arguments, and avoiding 
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the indiscriminate construction and defence of one-sided arguments (Daly 
1998). 
Argument in the above sense is defined as: 
What the proponent of a position offers an audience, a questioner or a 
doubter as reasons or basis for acceptance of the claim in question. That is, a 
more or less complex set of premises supporting a conclusion (Blair, 1988). 
In light of espoused relationship between logic and the processes of argumentation 
pervading the critical thinking literature, the next section will review the role of logic 
in critical thinking. The review will serve the dual purpose of differentiating between 
types of logic and associated arguments, and for providing the theoretical 
background in deciding which logical approach best suits the methodological 
demands of the research questions. 
2.7 The Role of Logic in Critical Thinking. 
In the previous section several commentators characterised critical thinking as being 
equivalent to thinking that is logical. McPeck (1981) raises the question as to what 
extent can logic be a surrogate for critical thinking? This raises the further question 
as to which branch of logic should critical thinking best be allied to, that of formal or 
informal logic? The literature pertaining to the distinctions between both forms of 
logic is voluminous and beyond the scope of this study. For the sake of brevity the 
commonly accepted distinctions will be addressed as a means of elucidating later 
methodological considerations. Given the common practice of using the terms logic, 
reasoning and correct reasoning synonomously (Scriven, 1976; Galotti, 1989; 
Salmon, 1991) the term'reasoning' will be adopted here for the purposes of clarity. 
Formal Reasoning 
Bartlett (1958) categorised formal reasoning as closed-system thinking in which all 
terms are defined in advance. Galotti (1989) conceives of formal reasoning as 
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including all problems of logic, i. e. propositional, predicate, modal and others. She 
also concurs that in formal reasoning all information is furnished in advance. 
Salmon (1991, p. 154) posits that formal reasoning is so called because of its focus on 
the "... structural or formal relations in arguments, such as class inclusion, class 
exclusion, conjunction, negation and implication. " The canons of formal reasoning 
demand that whilst focusing on such relations, specific content or subject matter is 
ignored and to facilitate this many logicians expressed the rules of logic in an abstract 
symbology (Nickerson, 1991). Thus, arguments often couched in the form of 
Aristotelian categorical syllogisms consisting of three terms, are adjudged valid or 
invalid by virtue of whether a conclusion correctly follows from premises according 
to a set of defined procedures. These procedures are known as deductive systems 
which rest upon the fundamental cognitive act of inference. An argument can be 
deductively valid if a true conclusion follows from premises that are true. 
Conversely, an argument may also be valid when a conclusion logically follows from 
premises that are untrue. An argument is deductively invalid if true premises lead to 
a false conclusion. One of the fundamental problems with this form of reasoning is 
establishing beyond doubt the truth of the premises given potentially disparate 
meanings and interpretations. The primary focus then, is one of form or syntax as 
opposed to content or semantics. Issues of meaning in formal reasoning, however, 
cannot be entirely avoided for the terms and and or possess considerably more 
precision than in their meaning in everyday speech. It is also necessary to understand 
the content of what is asserted in order to see that an argument is invalid as defined. 
Galotti (1989) refers to an association between formal reasoning, laboratory studies 
and well defined problems. Govier (1988) believes training in formal logic confers 
important benefits for individuals, particularly in habits of rigor, justification and 
clarity which ideally will be transferred to reasoning outside of the laboratory or 
classroom. Another benefit is the inculcation of what a logically ordered valid 
argument will look and feel like. Experience in this aspect of formal reasoning can 
make fuzzy or non-compelling arguments more apparent. This contrasts with Salmon 
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(1991, p. 158) who claims that recent psychological studies suggest that formal 
instruction: 
"... is strikingly ineffective; the skills allegedly taught do not transfer to situations 
outside the classroom. " Students also see little relevance between the type of 
arguments dealt with in formal logic classes and those confronted in real life, or that 
examples are so simplistic, that they hardly warrant utilising the procedures required 
to evaluate them. 
Informal reasoning 
By contrast, informal reasoning is concerned with what is called everyday or 
inductive reasoning, where arguments are not couched in syllogistic forms but often 
comprise more than three terms, and more than two premises. Although recognising 
structural aspects of arguments informal reasoning does not rely on these, or 
deduction, to form the exclusive basis for evaluation. Content is not abstracted from 
the argument, but content and context are both taken into account in the conduct of 
its principles. The deductive arguments encountered in everyday life are rarely 
expressed in canonical form. They are often incomplete, requiring the addition of 
missing elements by means of searching, and the disentanglement of irrelevancies. 
Once this tidying up exercise has been completed, there still remains the problem of 
whether or not to believe the premises. For in many real life reasoning instances it is 
difficult to accept or reject premises with complete certainty. Nickerson (1987) 
cautions that although informal reasoning is not constrained by precise formalisms as 
in syllogistic reasoning, it is not absolutely devoid of form either, citing the following 






These forms themselves are less precise and less understood than those of formal 
deductive reasoning. Furthermore, they do not provide a systematic means of 
evaluating arguments. Evaluating complex informal arguments can be extremely 
difficult. People of considerable intellect, good will and open-mindedness, after 
struggling to consider and understand all sides of a controversial issue often arrive at 
differing conclusions. In addition, two people holding initially conflicting views given 
the task of examining the same evidence, often find reasons for strengthening those 
existing views (Nickerson, 1987). Such tenacity may be explained by differing 
perspectives in the use of evidence. The same evidence can appear very different due 
to the distinct background knowledge individuals bring to its interpretation. 
Blair (1988) claims that despite disagreements between informal logic teachers as to 
grounds for evaluating the cogency of informal arguments a consensus does exist, 
and incorporates three approaches thus: 
1. The Soundness Paradigm 
This approach holds that a cogent argument is one with true premises and either 
valid deductive implications or strong inductive implications. These are assessed by 
establishing the truth of claims in the form of premises portrayed in the argument, 
and by recognising typical invalid patterns of inference. Examples of such invalid 
patterns are denying the antecedent (if a premise is false then anything it implies is 
false) or weak inductive reasoning such as generalising from an unrepresentative 
sample. Weaknesses in this approach rest again on whether the truth of premises is 
necessary for adequacy or sufficient for acceptance given the problems of 
establishing truth with certainty, e. g. generalising from an unrepresentative sample 
although based on insufficient grounds may nonetheless turn out to be true. 
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2. The Fallacies Approach 
This approach advocates that people are best equipped to avoid faulty reasoning by 
learning to recognise a series of common fallacies. These are predominantly informal 
fallacies such as: 
Abusive ad hominem - attacking the proposer instead of the argument substance. 
Appeal to force - where threats are used as a basis for accepting conclusions. 
Begging the question - assuming in the premises the very thing to be proved. 
Hasty generalisation - making universal claims from a small sample. 
Straw man - constructing a weak form of the opponent's argument then knocking it 
down. 
Post hoc ergo propter hoc - because B follows A, B was caused by A. 
Armed with knowledge of the above people are thought to be empowered to 
evaluate the cogency and authenticity of claims and arguments. 
3. The Critical Vocabulary 
This approach is underpinned by the existence of a critical vocabulary within 
everyday language (Blair, 1988) and affords us a set of adequate concepts with 
which to appraise arguments. Students have but to learn this vocabulary and apply it 
with discrimination as a means of improving their critical skills and judgement. The 







Blair's (1988) Critical Vocabulary 
These are further assisted by Blair's (1988) language classifications which facilitate 






Necessary and sufficient condition Imply 
These approaches are not mutually exclusive and may involve both inductive and 
deductive processes. In addition to the inferential abilities of formal reasoning, 
informal reasoning draws on a host of other cognitive abilities and requires 
judgement as follows: 
judgements of relevance; 
judgements of plausibility; 
judgements of value; 
judgements of probability. 
In summary, informal reasoning appears to approximate more closely the thinking 
reflective of the intellectual demands faced in our everyday or professional lives 
where problems are unstable, multi-faceted, ill - structured and content / context 
dependent, as opposed to the well - structured and content / context independent 
focus of formal reasoning. Table 2.7.1 summarises the primary differences: 
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Table 2.7.1 Summary of Primary Differences Between Formal and Informal 
Reasoning 
Formal 
All premises are supplied. 
Problems are self contained. 
Formal arguments may have a long chain 
structure constituting many individual steps, 
each leading to the next. 
There is typically one correct answer. 
Argues for only one side of a case, because their 
logical validity ensures that a contrary argument 
on another side would be invalid. 
Established methods of inference applicable to 
the problem often exist. 
It is typically unambiguous when the problem is 
solved 
The content of the problem is often of limited 
academic interest. 
Problems are solved for their own sake. 
Typically does not require the overcoming of 
emotional attachments to premises or certain 
conclusions. 
Informal 
Some premises are implicit, some are not 
supplied at all 
Problems are not self contained. 
Informal arguments may have a fork - like 
structure, i. e. several short lines of argument, 
each with degrees of uncertainty but which 
converge on the conclusion. 
There are typically several possible answers that 
vary qualitatively. 
Typically includes both sides of a case, i. e. pro 
and con because both types of argument can 
usually be made. 
There are rarely established procedures for 
solving the problem in existence. 
It is often unclear whether the current best 
solution is good enough. 
The content of the problem typically has 
potential personal relevance 
Problems arc often solved as a means of 
achieving other goals 
May involve the overcoming of emotional 
attachments to premises or certain conclusions. 
After: Galotti, 1989, p. 335; Perkins, 1986, pp. 196-197. 
Research on Everyday Reasoning 
Research on people's naturalistic reasoning outside of the laboratory is by no means 
extensive, and has concentrated predominantly upon two aspects of such reasoning. 
That of people's performances in relation to arguing for and against general 
propositions which has only indirect links to action, and how people solve practical 
problems in real life (Garnharn & Oakhill, 1994). The paucity of empirical work on 
this type of reasoning has been attributed to the absence of a well - defined 
methodology and the potential overwhelming pragmatic issues confronting such 
studies. For example, experimenters cannot be sure how subjects will interpret a 
problem, or how relevant information from long term memory is brought to bear on 
current problems. Subjects may apply their knowledge base and personal biases in an 
uncontrolled manner. Additionally, there are seldom singularly correct answers to 
everyday reasoning problems, so standardised techniques for evaluating performance 
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in the form of problems correctly solved are not applicable (Galotti, 1989; Garham & 
Oakhill, 1994). 
Some tentative conclusions in respect of informal reasoning are, however, apparent. 
Wagner & Sternberg (1986) and Fredericksen (1986) claim that the breadth and 
depth of knowledge base is central to the prediction of informal reasoning quality. 
Perkins et al. (1983) point to the more process oriented aspect of thorough and 
unbiased search for evidence and arguments as essential for sound reasoning. Ceci & 
Liker (1986) argue that effective informal reasoning depends upon a more or less 
sophisticated integration of information. With regard to the possible shortcomings of 
informal reasoning Perkins et al. (1991) found peoples' everyday reasoning to be 
typically incomplete and biased. Kuhn (1991) provides similar evidence of 
incompleteness and error in everyday reasoning which is surprisingly not improved 
by domain expertise. 
In relation to the role of logic in critical thinking and this study, although formal 
reasoning does demand substantial intellectual effort in the evaluation of formalised 
arguments, this is only in so far as determining that arguments conform to the 
inferential templates of the relevant system. Difficult as this may prove for many, 
there are no dubious principles or issues of contention within formal systems and, 
therefore, little impetus to consider alternative theories or perspectives. Contention 
arises only when one tries to interpret or apply such issues across contexts (Govier, 
1988). Informal reasoning on the other hand places differing intellectual demands on 
the reasoner beyond concentration on inferential strength alone. Alternative 
dimensions such as the acceptability of premises of the argument, the clarity of 
language in which it is expressed, the purpose of intent within the context it appears 
in and the audience to whom it is addressed, demand of the reasoner the repertoire 
of critical thinking skills and dispositions referred to earlier in the constituent 
discussion. 
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There appears little evidence that critical thinking ability has been examined as a 
distinct aspect of everyday or informal reasoning. With regard to the focus of this 
study critical thinking and the two aspects of informal reasoning research previously 
referred to were pertinent to early design issues. That is, how to explore and describe 
critical thinking performance in the judging of a general proposition which would 
bear upon practical professional decision making. 
With regard to the well - structured or ill - structured distinction relating to problem 
nature, critical thinking in the informal reasoning context, better represents the nature 
of professional judgement and reasoning problems facing nurse practitioners and 
nursing students in their everyday practice. Few of the vexed questions or issues 
faced by nurses have single correct solutions given the holistic individuality of 
patients and their healthcare contexts, the constraints of organisations, resources, 
and boundaries of professional practice alluded to in chapter one. The desired 
outcome of such reasoning would be that of the best contemporaneous solution in 
context derived from practitioners' critical thinking abilities and dispositions. For 
these reasons, the formal reasoning approach was rejected in favour of an informal 
reasoning approach in design and methodological decision making. 
2.8 Critical Thinking and Nursing 
The notion of critical thinking in relation to nursing has only recently begun to 
receive selective attention. The reasons behind the emerging interest in this construct 
appear to be threefold: 
1. Healthcare and informational changes; 
2. Epistemological changes in nursing ideology; 
3. Organisational and cultural changes in nurse education. 
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Recent concerns as to the ability of nursing practitioners to keep pace with diverse 
rapidly changing developments and desired outcomes in healthcare have led to calls 
for the concentration upon developing practitioner's thinking skills. Implicit in these 
concerns are not only that the volume of healthcare knowledge is increasing 
relentlessly to the point where reliance on pure acquisition is nigh on impossible, but 
also that nurses' clinical reasoning and outcome evaluation should keep abreast of 
current knowledge. This also implies that the scope of nurse's clinical reasoning 
requires a degree of complexity and accountability not previously expected. 
Secondly, the evolving paradigm shift in nursing away from positivistic, curative, 
task oriented, linear, objective, detached, rule driven reasoning towards unbiased, 
holistic, autonomous clinical reasoning, reflecting non-detached consideration of 
individualised physical, cognitive, contextual and affective variables is testament to 
the changed perceptions of nursings' cognitive demands in relation to its professional 
practice ( Glen, 1995; Baker, 1996; Hendricks - Thomas & Patterson 1995). Sound 
nursing judgement, thus, requires that the nurse reasons in a manner which utilises 
appropriate generic nursing knowledge contextually adjusted to match clients' unique 
cases (Paul & Heaslip, 1995). Moreover, there appears to be a move to attach 
greater value to thinking skills at the expense of practical skills in nursing. Kataoka- 
Yahiro & Saylor (1994, p. 351) extol such values by asserting that: 
" Increasingly, the characteristic that distinguishes a professional nurse is 
cognitive rather than psychomotor ability. " 
This trend may be further reflected in the development in newer grades of nursing 
assistants and the devolution of increasing areas of practical or psychomotor 
functions to such grades. 
Finally, over recent years nurse education in the 13K has, as a matter of policy been 
systematically integrated into institutions of higher education with the academic 
status of its courses being raised to a minimum of diploma level. In concert with this 
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wholesale integration various social and political forces have underpinned current 
demands for higher education and, therefore, nursing to demonstrate the 
effectiveness and quality of educational programmes. One such distinguishing 
qualitative indicator of higher education, in which there exists general agreement is 
that of critical thinking and the intellectual maturity which it confers (Glen, 1995). 
Girot (1995) posits that it is independent critical thinking which delineates non - 
graduates from graduates. These distinctions and expectations, however, are 
problematic for the majority of UK pre registration education programmes, in that 
three year higher education programmes culminate in diplomate status, whilst 
advocating critical thinking as an intended educational outcome. UK nursing 
education is not distinct from its international partners in its aspirations to inculcate 
critical thinking abilities in its consumers. American institutions, however, have taken 
the additional step of making critical thinking and its assessment a compulsory 
component of course validation criteria (National League for Nursing, 1991). This 
may be instrumental in the preponderance of American theoretical and empirical 
literature pertaining to critical thinking in nursing. The next section will review the 
theoretical and empirical literature on critical thinking specific to nursing. 
Part Two 
2.8.1 Theoretical Nursing literature. 
The main theoretical perspectives pertaining to critical thinking in nursing have 
focused upon either: the relationship of the nursing process to critical thinking; why 
nursing requires critical thinking; the construction of nursing oriented models of 
critical thinking and educational issues. 
The Nursing Process 
Nurses first began to adopt a problem solving approach in the guise of the nursing 
process over three decades ago. It is conceived of generally, as a variation of 
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scientific reasoning which is used by nurses to organise, systematise and 
conceptualise their practice. The question at issue in this context is whether problem 
solving and critical thinking in relation to nursing practice are synonymous. On the 
one hand problem solving begins with a problem and ends as the term suggests with 
a solution. On the other hand critical thinking and nursing judgement may well start 
with a problem but not necessarily conclude with a solution, but merely ongoing 
problematic situations, contextually supportive contingencies, a tolerance of 
ambiguity or extraneous problem resolution, i. e. remission or death. In light of these 
issues and discussions raised in the general literature review, problem solving and 
critical thinking may well be interrelated in some instances but in the case of nursing 
not generally synonymous. 
The process emerged from the United States of America amid a growing consensus 
that generally nursing required a more logical, precise, disciplined and independent 
approach to its practice than that of its forbears. Nurses started to view their role as 
other than a delegated reactive medical function directed towards a curative 
endpoint. Instead, nurses considered parts of their function as being entirely 
independent of that of the doctors, particularly in instances where a curative 
philosophy was not optional. 
Kratz (1979) describes the nursing process as initially focusing on problem solving as 
a means to care delivery, which proposed close nurse patient interaction, and 
comprised a series of four steps as follows: 
Assessment - Determining patients need for nursing care. This is, identifying 
problems that can be alleviated by the nurse. Such problems may be of a 
physical, psychological or social nature. 
Planning - Planning nursing care by means of setting goals which would facilitate 
solutions to the problems identified in the preceding step. 
Intervention- Conduct of nursing care devised to meet patients problem solving 
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needs. Involves therapeutic interaction between patient and nurse by way of 
listening, teaching, motivating, as well as aspect of technical procedural 
competence, i. e. observation, giving of injections, management of drains, 
infusions and monitoring equipment. 
Evaluation - Judging the effectiveness of the care as planned in its achievement of 
the predetermined goals, Involving the construction of appropriate criteria. 
Kratz also posits that despite its apparent linear characteristics the nursing process 
should be continuous and recursive, this is a point of contention for many of the 
critics of the nursing process as alluded to previously. 
More recent conceptions of the nursing process adopt the position that the process 
should be more improvement oriented than problem oriented, more detailed 
guidelines of the steps be provided, and the additional step of diagnosis be included 
Alfaro-LeFevre (1995, p. 44) provides such an example: 
Assessment - Continuous, deliberate data collection designed to provide the 
information required to predict, detect, prevent, control, or eliminate 
health problems. Identify ways of helping people obtain optimum 
wellness and independence. 
Diagnosis - The process of analysing data, putting related information 
together drawing conclusions, and identifying actual and potential 
health problems, underlying causes of the health problems, resources 
and strengths, health states that could be improved. 
Planning - Determination of specific goals (desired outcomes) and 
interventions. The interventions are designed to achieve the desired 
outcomes in a timely fashion, detect and prevent new health problems, 
promote optimum wellness and independence. 
86 
Implementation - Putting the plan into action by assessing readiness to act, acting, 
then reassessing to determine initial responses, making immediate 
changes as needed, keeping records to monitor progress. 
Evaluation - Determining whether the expected outcomes have been met by 
comparing the patient's current assessment data with the outcomes 
recorded during planning, modifying or terminating the plan as 
appropriate, planning for ongoing continuous assessment and 
improvement. 
On balance there appears little difference from the former model albeit that diagnosis 
is seen as a distinct step that presumably was subsumed in the assessment step and 
termed patient / client need in the earlier conception. One discrete difference, 
however, is that the nursing process has more recently been espoused as a tool for 
critical thinking in nursing (Bandman & Bandman, 1988; Alfaro-LeFevre, 1995). 
Bandman & Bandman (1988) assert that strengthening the critical thinking skills of 
nurses increases the effectiveness of the nursing process, thus, enabling nurses to 
examine the basic assumptions of their theory and practice, examine systematically 
policies of personnel, resource and financial allocation, thereby facilitating improved 
decision making. They see argument evaluation as central to critical thinking in that it 
comprises deductive (formal), inductive, informal or everyday practical reasoning 
involving the analysis of language use; formulation of problems; clarification and 
explication of assumptions; weighing of evidence; evaluation of conclusions; 
discrimination between good and bad arguments and seeking to justify facts and 
values that result in credible beliefs and actions. 
Such elements apply to professional nursing as a whole, but particularly to the 
inferences made during the phases of the nursing process. Inference is seen as 
integral to the hypotheticodeductive phases of assessment and nursing diagnosis 
entailing the acquisition of data, and the generation of hypotheses which are 
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confirmed or refuted by additional data until an appropriate diagnosis is reached. 
Critical thinking is applied during these phases respectively by asking fundamental 
questions regarding the source, validity, and uses of acquired data. Secondly, by 
scrutinising the nature and validity of inferential processes as a source of accurate 
diagnosis. Bandman & Bandman (1988) point to the perspective dependent 
complexity of nursing inferences, the prospective impact of insufficient available data 
upon inferential processes, the difficulties of linking outer criteria to inner processes, 
and the danger of drawing stereotypical inferences in relation to individuals. In this 
sense, diagnosing is a matter of trial and error and has the potential to be faulty. 
Critical thinking is, thus, further required to avoid overconfidence in the success of 
the means - ends relationships integral to the nursing process. Many proponents of 
the process imply that utilisation assures solutions, successes and achievements. 
Bandman & Bandman (1988) assert that such undue faith regards the method as 
deductive, whereas diagnosis as a process is largely inductive and uncertain. 
With regard to the planning, implementation and evaluation stages they claim critical 
thinking enables practitioners to set appropriate individually attainable goals, devise 
and implement systematic, scientifically based care plans and evaluate the 
effectiveness of the preceding stages using self - corrective feedback in conjunction 
with appropriate methods of verification. The nursing process in concert with nurse's 
knowledge bases and critical thinking abilities, thus, lends itself to the systematic 
application of scientific theories, theoretical frameworks, and conceptual models in 
diagnosing and treating human responses to potential and actual health problems. 
Alfaro - LeFevre (1995) claims that just as problem - solving provides a basis for 
disciplined thinking in everyday scenarios, the nursing process provides a similar 
basis for critical thinking in nursing. She makes the distinction between a rote linear 
application of the nursing process in the absence of critical thinking, and the 
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dynamic application of the nursing process in conjunction with critical thinking (Fig. 
2.8.1.1): 
Linear Nursing Process Followed 
Rotely, Without Critical Thinking 
Dynamic Nursing Process Used 
by a Critical Thinker 
Assessment 
Diagnosis -Po- Diagnose 
Problems 
Planning 
Implementation -º Put plan 
into action 
Evaluation -º Determine goal 
achievement 




Diagnose Actual Problems 




Assess readiness to act 
Intervene 
Reassess 
Modify if Indicated 
Assess current health status 
Assess accuracy of diagnosis 
Check appropriateness of goals 
Determine goal achievement 
Determining factors that promote I 
or impede goal achievement 
Terminate / Modify Plan 
Fig. 2.8.1.1 Alfaro-LeFevre's_(1995) Model of the Nursing Process With and 
Without the Application of Critical Thinking 
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The dynamic critical thinking utilisation of the nursing process is deemed distinct in 
that it signifies precise, and disciplined thinking reflective of greater depth and 
accuracy of data collection as a means of clearly identifying issues in question. In 
practice, however, it would be difficult to imagine practitioners applying the nursing 
process in such a limited way as portrayed by the rote model, that is, diagnosing 
problems irrespective of current actual or potential patient problems which do not 
take account of patients abilities or altered abilities. It is also difficult to imagine 
groups of nurses functioning in such a rote fashion as fail to modify a care plan if 
modification was indicated. It also remains unclear as to how critical thinking skills 
and dispositions apply to specific stages of the process thus maintaining an implicit 
relationship between the nursing process and critical thinking. 
Wilkinson (1992, p. 27) envisions a clear, albeit partial, relationship between the 
nursing process and critical thinking founded upon the following argument: 
"... the nursing process is a problem-solving method that involves decision 
making. Critical thinking is an essential part of problem solving and decision 
making. Therefore, it is essential to most aspects of the nursing process. " 
The limits to the relationship are exposed by the assertion that people use critical 
thinking in many situations external to the nursing process not synonymous with 
problem solving, e. g. assessing political and commercial claims, math problems, 
Figure 2.8.1.2 illustrates the nature of this relationship: 
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; ritical Thinking 
Nursing Process 
Wilkinson, (1992, p. 27). 
Fig. 2.8.1.2 Wilkinson's (1992) Model of the Relationship Between Critical Thinking 
and the Nursing Process. 
The quality of solutions to complex problems, however, are dependent upon the 
quality of the thinking involved. Because the problems faced by nurses are often 
complex and multivariate, Wilkinson believes nurses must think critically to utilise 
the nursing process effectively, and that critical thinking applies to each stage of the 
nursing process thus: 
Assessment - Critical thinking is required during this stage to make reliable 
observations based upon the ability to distinguish relevant from irrelevant 
information. Validating information is also important whereby the nurse validates 
what the patient reports against what she / he observes. Organising and categorising 
relevant information according to a theoretical nursing framework also requires 
critical thinking. 
Diagnosis - Critical thinking applies to the making of nursing diagnoses in that it 
requires the recognition of generalised patterns and relationships and the making of 
sound inductive and deductive inferences. 
Planning - During the planning stage nurses use professional knowledge and critical 
thinking skills to: 
91 
Generate valid generalisations, explanations and predictions while setting client 
goals. 
Plan nursing interventions and provide supporting rationale by generating and 
considering alternative perspectives and making interdisciplinary connections utilising 
within and between subject insights. 
Develop reasonable hypotheses regarding problem solution and interventions. 
Development and application of evaluative criteria whereby the effectiveness of the 
generated goals are subsequently evaluated. 
Implementation - Wilkinson suggests critical thinking applies during this stage in 
nurses' ability to apply knowledge and principles to each specific patient - care 
situation as opposed to purely memorising them. 
A potential shortcoming in this instance is that knowledge and principles could be 
applied in an uncritical and ritualistic fashion. Theoretically critical thinking could 
apply during implementation when the nurse recognises that changes in patient 
condition or context does not warrant continued rote implementation of interventions 
without modification or transient suspension of interventions, albeit that the 
intervention should not be discontinued. These issues may of course be implicit in 
Wilkinson's use of the term "each specific patient - care situation. " 
Evaluation - Critical thinking applies to this stage when nurses use new patient 
derived observations to evaluate whether hypotheses were correct and interventions 
fit for purpose by using the criterion developed during the planning stage. 
Jones & Brown (1993, p. 72), however, question the assumption that critical thinking 
and the nursing process are synonymous. They see the nursing process as an: 
"... example of how nursing has promulgated a single model of practice to the 
exclusion of other alternatives. " 
This contrasts with the position that critical thinking is predicated on the intellectual 
disposition toward challenging accepted visions of truth and an openness to the 
consideration of alternative possibilities and explanations. Critical thinking is, thus, a 
92 
multidimensional cognitive process, unlike the unidimensional ways of thinking 
concomitant with the rules of logic, and the nursing process as an aspect of the 
scientific or problem solving method. 
To Jones & Brown (1993), problem solving, requires that the nurse identifies the 
most important problem, the problem is then labelled, information is gathered to 
explicate the problem, a solution is then sought, the solution is then implemented, 
and finally the solution effectiveness is evaluated. In this sense complexity and 
uncertainty are reduced to procedural problems in order to conform to a 
methodology that seeks to generate hard data. Patient problems are, thus, solved in a 
scientifically objective, rational, linear, step-by-step manner where truth is absolute 
and the possibility of different truths rejected. 
Nurse - client interactions, however, are often characterised as non-linear in that 
nursing practice should be directed towards the client's frame of reference. Clinical 
decisions should evolve from a process of negotiation often between conflicting 
points of view, contradictory lines of reasoning, and situational contexts. Hence a 
more context - driven approach to human health care befits nursings' client 
orientation as opposed to one driven by scientific objectivity. Critical thinking offers 
nursing such a perspective which is more consistent with the realities of the 
discipline, existing as it does in a complex social world. Jones & Brown (1993) offer 
a valuable example of conflicting perspectives in the management of a terminally ill 
patient, where a physician desires to adhere to a vigorous medical plan involving 
aggressive interventions. The distressed family finds itself deferring to the physician's 
'expert' opinion. The experienced primary nurse, however, advocates a conservative 
supportive care plan in respect of their experience of the expressed and unexpressed 
needs of the patient. A logical case could be built to support either position, the final 
outcome, however, would be affected by multiple factors existing outside the 
framework of deductive reasoning which constitute individual perspectives, for 
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example, cultural beliefs, finances, value systems, age, family responsibility, family 
relationships, and experiences. The same decisions would not be made by all 
physicians, nurses or families because they too will be subject to the same factors in 
differing contexts. 
The nursing process and critical thinking then, according to Jones & Brown (1993) 
are distinct in that they are predicated upon two different types of thinking processes 
each with its particular conception of truth and problem solution. The nursing 
process as a scientific method of problem solving is useful for procedural problems. 
Yet critical thinking is a superordinate concept which can be applied to problem 
solving and thus the nursing process. Applying critical thinking in this way would 
enable nurses to envisage the prospect of more than one right answer, thus, avoiding 
formula driven clinical reasoning in regard to the complex issues confronting their 
practice. 
Miller & Malcolm (1990) criticise the nursing process on the grounds that it de- 
emphasises the contextual basis for nursing practice. Allen et al. (1989) suggest the 
nursing process merely represents an outline by which to organise information 
gathered elsewhere, as opposed to a process through which one makes discoveries 
and learns to manage such previously obtained information. Fonteyn & Flaig Cooper 
(1994) view the written nursing process as incongruent with the complexity and 
variability of contemporary nursing practice. They cite a need to de-emphasise linear, 
dogmatic care models in favour of more individualised models which incorporate the 
intuitive and scientific nature of nursing practice. Such alternatives, they claim, are 
more likely to foster critical thinking skills in learner nurses who also question the 
need to construct elaborate written process plans which bear little relevance to actual 
practice. 
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In summary the arguments are presented thus. That critical thinking is an adjunct to 
effective use of the nursing process. The Nursing process is a useful adjunct to 
critical thinking about nursing practice. The nursing process by its very nature 
constrains clinical reasoning. 
The author's view on the debate is that despite its espoused linear characteristics, all 
stages of the nursing process require reasoning which may or may not be linear in its 
conduct. Such reasoning may also be more or less critical dependent upon the 
situation and the practitioner's critical thinking skills and dispositions. An important 
issue here is not to confuse the cognitive processes used by nurse practitioners with 
the nursing process, which is essentially one model of sequencing and documenting 
nursing care. The sequence is a feasible one which after all represent the client's 
transition between initial encounter within a healthcare episode through to discharge 
from care and a return to independence, or towards a long term healthcare 
relationship. Also one cannot evaluate something which has not first been identified 
and described. The sequence also represents the potential developmental stages of 
nurse - client relationships from introduction to mutual interaction in therapeutic 
interventions to sustained continuity or conclusion of care. Accurate recording of 
such episodes is a current UK professional requirement (UKCC, 1993, p. 2). The 
UKCC view record keeping as an: 
"... essential and integral part of care and not a distraction from its provision. " 
Effective record keeping is thus deemed to be a means of 
Communicating with others and describing what has been observed or done; 
Identifying the discrete role played by nurses, midwives and health visitors in 
care; 
Organising communication and the dissemination of information among 
members of the team providing care for a patient or client; 
Demonstrating the chronology of events, the factors observed and the 
response to care and treatment; 
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Demonstrating the properly considered clinical decisions relating to patient 
care, (p. 4). 
In this sense such records are viewed as potential evidence in law, or as required by 
nursing or medical regulatory bodies. The UKCC, thus, advocates a'process' 
approach to record keeping, not only as a systematic approach to practice, but also 
as a means of providing a framework for the documentation and subsequent analysis 
of that practice. 
The requirement to document care in this manner, however, need not reflect the 
course and nature of practitioners' thinking, albeit that some of the thinking is 
documented in this way. Critical thinking should thus be applied to each stage of the 
nursing process in order to develop individually accurate, effective and holistic care 
plans synthesised from the consideration of knowledge, context and alternative 
frames of reference. For example, in regard to the assessment stage Lutzen & 
Tishelman (1996) remind us of some of the critical questions to consider if one is to 
achieve this when formulating a nursing diagnosis: 
Is the nursing diagnosis value - free? 
Are patients' needs and experiences categorised independent of context? 
Has the formulation of the nursing diagnosis occurred in collaboration with 
the patient? 
Has the nursing diagnosis evolved from a mutually agreed nurse - client 
relationship? 
Is the reasoning underpinning the nursing diagnosis ordered and 
unidimensional or multidimensional in nature? 
The relationship, thus, is perceived as a unidirectional one in that critical thinking can 
be applied to the nursing process as opposed to the converse, and the process need 
not constrain thinking. The nursing process is viewed as a means of the sequential 
conduct and documentation of care, and not as a sole means of concurrent reasoning 
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about care, much of which would go unrecorded. Finally, the nursing process may 
also serve as a useful structural or logical framework for novices to utilise as they 
build up their repertoire of experiences, which are purported to facilitate the more 
intuitive non - linear approaches to clinical judgement used by experts (Benner & 
Tanner, 1987; Grobe et al., 1991; Fonteyn et al., 1991; Field, 1987). 
2.8.2 Why Do Nurses Need to Think Critically? 
As previously identified commentators within the field unreservedly advocate the 
need for nurses to be critical thinkers. Many subsequently, couch their assertions in 
vague generalisations which imply an essential relationship between good clinical and 
professional practice, without specifying precisely why nurses need critical thinking 
skills and dispositions or how they specifically apply to nursing practice. There are, 
however, several who attempt to overcome this shortcoming. 
Bandman & Bandman (1988) espouse the need for critical thinking in nursing on the 
grounds that it is of practical assistance in nursing and acts as a liberating force in 
thoughtful activity pertaining to nursing. Nursing has to continuously review and 
transform its theory, practice, social mandate and status. Such reviews, however, 
serve little purpose if they are conducted from a singular, monolithic, concrete 
perspective. Such an approach effectively eliminates doubt, questioning, inquiry, 
curiosity, examination and the consideration of alternatives. The former approach 
may maintain the status quo and ritualistic practices regardless of utility, whilst the 
latter facilitates more divergent clinical judgement and richer reasoning in relation to 
controversial issues extending beyond clinical judgement. As a means of achieving 
the latter they provide the following checklist (Table 2.8.2.1) of critical thinking 
functions in nursing: 
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Table 2.8.2.1 Bandman & Bandman's 1988) Checklist of Critical Thinking Functions 
in Nursing. 
Use the processes of critical thinking in all of daily living; 
Discriminate among the uses and misuses of language in nursing; 
Identify and formulate nursing problems; 
Analyse meanings of terms in relation to their indication, their cause, or purpose, and their 
significance; 
Analyse arguments and issues into premises and conclusions; 
Examine nursing assumptions; 
Report data and clues accurately; 
Make and check inferences based on data, making sure that the inferences are at least 
plausible; 
Formulate and clarify beliefs; 
Verify, corroborate, and justify claims, beliefs, conclusions, decisions, and actions; 
Give relevant reasons for beliefs and conclusions; 
Formulate and clarify value judgements; 
Seek reasons, criteria, and principles that effectively justify value judgements; 
Evaluate the soundness of conclusions, (pp. 5-6). 
Alfaro - LeFevre (1995, p. 46) asserts that nurses need to be critical thinkers in order 
to practice sound clinical judgement. She defines clinical judgement as: 
" Critical thinking in the clinical area. " 
Accordingly critical thinking applies to nursing in that it: 
Entails purposeful, goal - directed thinking; 
Aims to make judgements based on evidence (fact) rather than conjecture 
(guesswork); 
Is based on principles of science and scientific method (e. g. maintaining a 
questioning attitude, following an organised approach to discovery, and 
making sure information is reliable); 
Requires strategies that maximise human potential (e. g. tapping on individual 
strengths) and compensate for problems caused by human nature (e. g. the 
powerful influences of personal perceptions, values and beliefs). 
She further posits, that nurses must develop a professional level of critical thinking 
ability and performance, that is different from that expected of others. Examples of 
when critical thinking is essential to nursing are when nurses try to: 
Get a better understanding of something or someone; 
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Identify actual and potential problems; 
Make decisions about an action plan; 
Reduce risks of getting undesirable results; 
Increase the likelihood of achieving beneficial results; 
Find ways to improve ( even when no problems exist), (p. 41). 
Although the above could also be said to apply to any professional discipline Alfaro - 
LeFevre does specify ten strategies for the development of effective clinical 
judgement and, therefore, by definition critical thinking in the clinical area. Adopting 
the following strategies purportedly promotes precise, disciplined thinking that 
enhances accuracy and depth of data collection in order to clearly identify the nursing 
issues at hand: 
1. Acquire a storehouse of facts (information required to reason clinically, if not 
available in long term memory refer to other sources). 
Learn terminology and concepts ( Comprehension begins with vocabulary 
acquisition); 
Become familiar with normal findings before being concerned with 
abnormal findings ( e. g. Laboratory values, physical assessment findings, 
disease progression, growth and development); 
Always ask why - find out what theories or principles explain why normal 
findings occur and why abnormal findings occur; 
Learn problem - specific facts - clinical judgement is enhanced by your 
knowledge of problem presentation (signs and symptoms), cause, and 
management. e. g. caring for someone with a medical diagnosis of diabetes 
mellitus and a nursing problem of ineffective individual coping, you need 
a knowledge of associated signs and symptoms, common causes and 
common management of both problems in order to care effectively. 
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2. Use the nursing process as a guide to thinking - Always assess first in order to 
avoid jumping to conclusions. Whenever appropriate, use principles of logic to 
promote making judgements based on fact as opposed to guesswork; 
3. Develop a systematic approach to assessment; 
4. Determine a system that helps you make decisions about what must be done now, 
and what can wait until later: 
Be sure you identify the underlying causes of the problems; 
Always ask yourself, "could any of these signs and symptoms be caused by an 
undetected problem with structure or function of an organ or system requiring 
medical treatment? "; 
To make thinking more automatic, consistently use the same system to set 
immediate priorities. 
5. Never perform an action if you don't know why it is indicated, why it works, and 
whether there are risks of harm. 
6. Learn from your human resources (Faculty, experts, colleagues), and when in 
doubt get help from a qualified professional. 
7. Become familiar with facility standards ( e. g. protocols, policies, procedures, 
critical paths) that relate to your patients problems. 
8. Practice manual skills (e. g., Handling IV tubing, changing dressings). if you are 
not comfortable performing these skills your ability to reason will be hampered by the 
stress of trying to master these technical procedures. 
9. Become familiar with the technology you'll use (e. g., IV pumps, computers, 
monitors). 
10. Remember the importance of caring (being willing to place great importance on 
the wants and needs of patients and their significant others). 
Facione & Facione (1994) describe critical thinking as the cognitive engine which 
drives the processes of knowledge development and clinical judgement in nursing. 
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The skills and dispositional attributes of critical thinking are central to nursing in that: 
They should embody a search for best knowledge in a given context; 
They demand an openness to new evidence and a willingness to reconsider 
judgements; 
They value a focused and diligent approach to clinical reasoning; 
They require a tolerance of multiple perspectives / interpretations when those 
perspectives / interpretations can be supported by reasons and evidence. 
Moreover, Facione & Facione (1994, p. 5) infer critical thinking is common to both 
the nursing reasoning and ethical reasoning categories of clinical judgement, and that 
in concert with content knowledge and practical experiences critical thinking 
completes the essential components of clinical judgement. Thus: 
"One interprets to decode relevant information and to determine its position 
in the organisational structure of the knowledge base. One analyses to 
identify clinical problems, gaps in the knowledge base, warranted and 
unwarranted assumptions and judgements. One uses evaluation to determine 
the warranted and preferable alternatives from unwarranted or less optimal. 
One infers theoretical and observable relationships. And one self - regulates, 
confirms, corrects, one's reasoning through metacognitive reflection. " 
Glen (1995) implies that critical thinking in nursing is required in order that nurses 
educated to a high level in non - clinical settings, avoid the tendencies to become non 
- critical and non - discerning on introduction to the clinical environment. Moreover, 
Glen purports that underpinning this intellectual transition are the competing 
paradigms of occupational vocationalism, predicated upon a desire in clinical practice 
to "get the work done" with minimal reference to any explicit knowledge base. 
Critical thinking is thus seen as an alternative to formula - driven nursing practice and 
as a means of preparing practitioners to deal effectively with the vast range of 
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situations they will encounter, plus the problem of reliance on content which is often 
obsolete before it is disseminated. 
Paul and Heaslip (1995, p. 40) claim nurses need to be critical thinkers in order to 
develop the intellectual capacity to contextualise and adjust what she / he knows to 
particular cases. Sound practice is founded upon sound thinking whereby 
practitioners reason things through, direct their own thinking, and reason in a 
disciplined and effective way whilst engaged in solving nursing problems. Nurses 
must construct accurate and clear comprehension of nursing care needs patient by 
patient, on the understanding that each case is in some sense unique. Failing this: 
"... practice performed automatically without care, vigilance and criticism, can 
result in prejudice and patterns of practice which are misinformed. " 
They further posit that critical thinking applied reflectively in practice situations 
facilitates the gradual development of expert knowledge. 
For Schank (1990) critical thinking skills are crucial for nursing practice due to an 
inherent need for nurses to think, apply, analyse, synthesise and evaluate. Such 
intellectual processes are necessitated by the diversity and complexity of nursing 
practice, derived from nursing's commitment to: 
The care of the total person; 
Nursing's contact with individuals of varying sociocultural and religious 
backgrounds; 
The recognition that nursing is both an art and a science. 
While the first two elements are consistent with previous holistic yet individualised 
foundations for nursing judgement which avoids rote generalisations. The latter is not 
clarified in relation to whether critical thinking applies equally to both the artistic and 
scientific aspects of nursing or otherwise. 
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Jones & Brown (1991) view critical thinking as an essential component of nursing 
science because of nursing's unique frame of reference for dealing with human 
problems. This, they postulate requires a more context - driven approach as opposed 
to the exclusive application of scientific principles. Human interactions involve 
constant consideration of alternative possibilities. Thus, nursing decisions need to be 
explicated as the result of negotiation between alternative points of view, 
contradictory lines of reasoning and situational contingencies. del Bueno (1990, 
p. 290) similarly refers to the evolutionary complexity of current nursing practice in 
acute settings and the inappropriateness of standardised nursing practices. She also 
suggests that the expansion of knowledge concerning human responses to illness 
constantly affects the relevance of nursing interventions. Professional nurses are, 
thus, required to perform technical, interpersonal, and critical thinking skills in a 
"... simultaneously integrated, thoughtful process. " 
Kramer (1993, p. 406) views the importance of critical thinking in nursing as a given, 
due to the complexity of contemporary public and professional life. Nurses in the 
conduct of their practice are required to: 
"... synthesise and integrate multiple forms of knowledge to make health - 
affirming decisions that embody changing values. " 
Furthermore, critical thinking is crucial to understanding personal relationships and 
envisioning alternative ways to organise information and evaluate personal 
perspectives. Subsequently, it is also instrumental in increasing political savvy. 
Thus, the espoused requirement of critical thinking in nursing is founded upon 
nursing's focus in dealing with the health and health deficits of human beings as 
complex physical and holistic organisms, comprising individual ontological 
constructs, perspectives, abilities, levels of functioning, expectations, responses and 
coping mechanisms. Hence, nursing practice requires the primary acquisition, search 
for, discrete discrimination between, and application of appropriate domain specific 
declarative and procedural knowledge, in analysing or constructing arguments whilst 
103 
caring for unique patients amidst constantly changing technologies, environments and 
concomitant philosophies. In this sense critical thinking can apply as much to 
technical - rational aspects of care as it does to the more abstract humanistic aspects 
of care which extends beyond the realms of clinical judgement, e. g. philosophical 
foundations of practice and ethical dilemmas. For example, in relation to the former, 
nurses in the normal pursuit of their role are required to discriminate between 
accuracy and relevance of patient data and professional hypotheses, the validity of 
extradisciplinary prescriptions, standardised protocols, standardised equipment and 
their application to deviant cases wherein the locus of practice and patients 
individual context warrant alternative strategies and interventions. Practice such as 
this is often conducted in the face of multiple and competing pathologies or 
therapies; unique physical structure; idiosyncratic social, gender, cultural or religious 
related norms and conventions; cognitive status; and the availability of human / non - 
human resources. 
This requires that nurses avoid the tendencies towards automatic and simplistic 
generalisation of procedures in the face of vocational or socialisation forces in favour 
of the generation of alternative contextually sensitive perspectives and action in 
clinical judgement processes. This should take account of the various uses of 
language and meaning as interpreted by others. 
From an interdisciplinary viewpoint, critical thinking would theoretically enhance 
nurse's understanding and consideration of alternative domain specific knowledge, 
perspectives, agendas, power relationships and their impact on clinical and 
organisational decision making, therein developing sound professional 
interrelationships and political awareness. 
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2.8.3 Nursing Oriented Models of Critical Thinking 
Despite the dearth of multi - disciplinary literature pertaining to critical thinking, 
there has until recently been little in the way of specific definition or 
conceptualisation of critical thinking in relation to nursing judgement. Kataoka - 
Yahiro & Saylor (1994, p. 352) alone propose such a model founded upon the 
criticism that critical thinking in nursing has been too narrowly defined as a rational - 
linear problem solving activity reflecting the nursing process, or simply as the 
scientific process. Instead critical thinking in nursing should be defined as 
encompassing an interaction between all of these elements and more. In light of this 
purported broader multidimensional basis they define critical thinking in nursing 
adapted from Ennis (1985) and Kurfiss (1988) as follows: 
" The critical thinking process is reflective and reasonable thinking about 
nursing problems without a single solution and is focused on deciding what to 
believe and do. " 
The definition is viewed as the foundation of the model which is influenced by the 
work of Glaser (1941), Miller & Malcolm (1990), Paul (1993) and Perry (1970). The 
model comprises five components and three levels as demonstrated in fig. 2.8.3.1: 
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Kataoka - Yahiro & Saylor (1994), (p. 352). 
Fig. 2.8.3.1 Kataoka-Yahiro & Saylor's (1994) Model of Critical Thinking as 
Applied to Nursing. 
Specific knowledge base refers to the requirements of a specific knowledge of 
nursing in order to facilitate critical thinking in nursing. The authors assert for 
example, that one cannot identify appropriate actions for unexpected clinical 
symptoms without first understanding the underlying physiology. Moreover, they 
caution that the rush to establish critical thinking abilities in nurses must not obscure 
the need for basic levels of nursing knowledge on which one can then build critical 
thinking processes. 
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The experience component refers to the potential for critical thinking to be restricted 
by a lack of practical experience and the opportunity to participate in actual decision 
- making. The authors draw on the work of Benner (1984), Tanner et at. (1993), 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986), & Schon (1983), on the espoused relationship between 
practical knowledge in an applied discipline and clinical experience, and the 
important distinction between experiential and formalised knowledge as a means of 
developing expert intuitive practice. Moreover, expertise developed via real world 
experience, facilitates reflective contexually sensitive reasoning in complex situations 
and reduces simplistic thinking. 
The competencies component relates to cognitive as opposed to psychomotor 
processes and constitute three types as follows: 
general critical thinking competencies; 
specific critical thinking competencies in clinical situations; 
specific critical thinking competency in nursing. 
General Critical Thinking Competencies 
Kataoka-Yahiro & Saylor (1994) suggest that general critical thinking competencies 
are not unique to nursing but are applied in other disciplines and in non clinical 
situations. Examples of such competencies are the scientific process, hypothesis 
generation, problem solving and decision making. 
Specific Critical Thinking Competencies in Clinical Situations 
These competencies refer to clinical reasoning processes such as diagnostic 
reasoning, clinical inferences, and clinical decision making. Once again, the authors 
conclude such processes are not exclusive to nursing but utilised by physicians and 
allied health professionals alike. 
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Specific Critical Thinking Competency in Nursing 
This final category refers to the nursing process as a domain specific critical thinking 
competency. The authors cite similar criticisms of the nursing process as discussed 
previously, yet conclude that the nursing process is unique to the discipline of 
nursing. Unique in the sense that it provides a systematic, rational method for 
planning, providing and evaluating nursing care whilst using higher order thinking 
processes and a common language as a means of reasoning about client's clinical 
problems. 
Kataoka-Yahiro & Saylor accept that the above competencies are not mutually 
exclusive and that a degree of interaction and reinforcement occurs between them. 
The nursing process for example involves both problem solving and decision making. 
Similarly diagnostic reasoning and clinical inference are influenced by data 
acquisition, decision making, hypothesis generation and diagnostic accuracy. They 
omit, however, to discriminate between instances of the above reasoning processes 
that may not require critical thinking, or that such reasoning process could be 
conducted in the complete absence of critical thinking. Decisions may be arrived at 
via an uncritical route, yet deemed competent by some practitioners. Problems may 
be solved in a similar fashion founded merely on idiosyncratic preference, power 
relationships, knowledge / experience deficits and historical ritual. The assumption 
cannot, therefore, be made that the conduct of general cognitive processes imply 
critical thinking competence in nursing. 
The fourth attitude component is adapted from the work of Glaser (1941) and Paul 
(1993), in that it refers to certain traits of mind (Table 2.8.3.1), which are central 
aspects of critical thinking and indeed make it possible. 
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The standards component comprises two parts, being intellectual standards adopted 
from Paul (1993), and professional standards specific to nursing. The intellectual 
standards (Table 2.8.3.2) reflect Paul's universal intellectual standards and evaluative 
framework for individuals critical thinking ability. 
Table 2.8.3.2 Kataoka-Yahiro & Sa lor's (1994) Intellectual Standards for Critical 















With regard to the professional standards these are deemed necessary for critical 
thinking in nursing in that they set a precedent for the requirement that nurses use 
critical thinking for the benefit of individuals as opposed to causing harm. 
Professional standards in this instance are enshrined in American statutory 
instruments and codes of professional conduct. The UK equivalent would be The 
Nurses, Midwives & Health Visitors Act 1979 and the clauses constituting the 
UKCC Code of Professional Conduct (1992). 
The authors also refer to the centrality of the nursing environment in providing the 
context which constrains or facilitates critical thinking in addition to the individual 
characteristics of age, gender, culture, socio-economic status and stage of 
development. 
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Levels of Critical Thinking in Nursing 
Kataoka-Yahiro & Saylor's (1994) model espouses three levels of critical thinking in 
nursing adapted from Perry's (1970) scheme for intellectual and ethical development. 
According to Perry's scheme individuals move from a position of simplistic or 
dualistic reasoning towards more complex relativistic and committed reasoning as 
they develop intellectually. In relation to the basic level of Kataoka - Yahiro & 
Saylor's model, answers to complex problems are either right or wrong and one right 
answer usually exists for each complex problem. They see this level as an early step 
in reasoning ability in each particular area of nursing. Characteristics of reasoning at 
this level are knowledge deficits, inexperience, inadequate competencies, 
inappropriate attitudes and non utilisation of intellectual and professional standards. 
A potential problem with this particular level is whether it should be construed as a 
level of critical thinking at all when critical thinking clearly does not exist even at the 
fundamental level of considering alternative perspectives. Thus, a basic level of 
nursing reasoning may be a more apt category than basic level critical thinking. This 
is not to suggest, however, that there does not exist situations in nursing where basic 
level reasoning does not apply. Many procedural and emergency situations have only 
limited answers and demand immediate rote actions, whereas lengthy deliberation 
could be hazardous to patient outcomes. 
At the complex level nurse's answers to problems differ from the former level in that 
an appropriate response would be in the form of "it depends". This reflects a 
multiplistic position and a realisation that alternative often conflicting perspectives 
exist. Differing choices have benefits and costs and it is the unique aspects of the 
patient and context which contribute to the weighing of generated alternatives. With 
regard to nursing practice a common example of such reasoning is when a nurse 
considers deviating from a standard protocol or rule as a result of taking patient 
circumstances or situational context need into account. Functioning at this level 
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nurses find that there is more than one normal pattern and more than one solution. 
Accurate assessment of salient situational features is important at this level of critical 
thinking. 
The commitment level of critical thinking differs from the complex level in that at 
that level one may be aware of alternative solutions to problems yet defer from 
commitment to any particular solution. Kataoka - Yahiro & Saylor offer an example 
of such thinking whereby a nurse chooses an action or belief based on alternatives 
generated at the complex level, yet action is withheld until a later time until 
presumably commitment is given to such an action. For example, a nurse may 
override a learned racial bias in favour of a belief from a more egalitarian perspective. 
This new belief may eventually result in the nurse's commitment or advocacy for 
improved access to healthcare irrespective of race. Should that chosen action be 
unsuccessful then alternative solutions are considered, utilised and so on. Implicit in 
this level is the ultimate need to make decisions and take action in real world 
practice. One cannot , therefore, consistently avoid taking action 
by deferring to 
relativism, personal choices have to be made using sound criteria, reasoning which 
reflects the complexity of issues and a commitment to a course of action based upon 
these elements. 
Finally, Kataok-Yahiro & Saylor (1994) note the hierarchical nature of the levels but 
state that individuals can operate at differing levels depending upon the status and 
experience of the nurse although, commitment, is the ultimate goal. 
With regard to the levels as espoused by Kataoka - Yahiro & Saylor, the prospect 
that all levels are representative of levels of critical thinking is problematic. As 
previously identified the basic level contains no obvious evidence of critical thinking 
at all but merely, examples of simplistic, concrete, one-sided reasoning which may 
appeal to authority. Level two, however, does consist of some elements of what is 
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understood to reflect critical thinking, namely, the generation of alternatives and an 
appreciation of the complexity of issues. Thus, level two may be viewed as a primary 
or simple level of critical thinking. Level three, the commitment level would more 
fully reflect true critical thinking although the authors do not clarify the nature of 
reasoning at this level sufficiently. Informed commitment according to Perry (1970) 
is characterised by the ability to evaluate the merits of alternative perspectives, to 
understand the contextual nature of each perspective, and make an informed personal 
commitment to one whilst maintaining a respect for the validity of the others in 
different contexts. Reasoning at this level is distinctly more evaluative, flexible and, 
therefore, more complex than at the two preceding levels. The levels may thus be 
better represented as levels of thinking generally reflecting a range of uncritical to 
critical thinking. 
In summary, despite the problems previously alluded to regarding the issues of 
general critical thinking competencies and the levels of critical thinking, the model 
does offer a useful contribution to the debate surrounding critical thinking in nursing 
in that it advocates: 
critical thinking is a composite construct comprising cognitive 
competencies, attitudes and intellectual standard criteria; 
domain specific knowledge and experience as a prerequisite to complex 
clinical reasoning; 
critical thinking is required in many areas of nursing diagnostic and 
clinical reasoning where multiple possibilities and solutions to client 
problems exist; 
critical thinking can be utilised within the nursing process despite its 
purported linear characteristics, albeit the nursing process alone is not an 
adequate conceptualisation of critical thinking in nursing; 
standards of professional conduct can demand and guide critical thinking 
in nursing judgement; 
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nursing judgement processes hould conform to intellectual standards. 
2.8.4 Critical Thinking and Educational Issues in Nursing 
Much of the theoretical literature pertaining to the above, focuses upon integrating 
critical thinking teaching models into nursing curricula, the role of faculty in 
developing learners critical thinking abilities and dispositions, or developing curricula 
founded upon fundamental critical thinking principles. 
Malek (1986) advocated the adoption into nursing curricula of the Taba, concept 
formation model of teaching, as a strategy to develop critical thinking. The model is 
founded upon the principle that active participation in the thinking process is a more 
effective learning strategy than reliance on content memorisation. Malek views the 
model favourably because of its perceived similarities to the stages of the nursing 
process and its relationship between active learning and the manipulation of 
materials, which she claims is synonymous with the interaction between declarative 
and procedural knowledge. Malek (1986) utilises Taba's four teaching strategies 
purported to develop learner's critical thinking abilities in relation to clinical 
instruction as follows: 
Concept formation; 
Interpretation of data; 
Application of principles; 
Interpretation of feelings, attitudes, and values. 
Concept formation is essentially the assessment or data gathering phase which should 
guide learner's identification of known data, the determination of common 
characteristics and the prioritisation of data by importance to the emerging concept. 
Interpretation of data refers to the differentiation between pieces of information, the 
determination of cause and effect relationships and the potential meaning of 
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observations. These two initial phases apparently prepare the learner for the next 
phase 
The application of principles is seen as the analytic phase whereby learners analyse 
the nature of the problem situation. Malek raises the importance of not asking 
analytic or "why" questions until this phase based on the prospect that learners are 
unable to isolate cause and effect relationships until they have identified the problem. 
Only then can learners apply factual information in order to predict an 
outcome based upon cognitive principles. This phase would presumably be analogous 
to the planning and implementation stages of the nursing process. 
The fourth phase is purported to be synonymous with the evaluation stage of the 
nursing process, it involves the affective domain and concerns the interpretation of 
feelings, attitudes, and values. This is imperative in enabling learners to examine the 
nature of their innate perceptions and attitudes and how this may affect their 
reasoning. 
Underpinning Malek' s (1986) endorsement of these particular strategies is the 
educational principle that learning takes place through experience. Malek, however, 
appears to suggest that clinical reasoning experience can be provided by the use of 
realistic clinical teaching guides. The experience derived from such teaching guides is 
purported to develop critical thinking, which the learner then brings to the clinical 
area. Such guides should be written to encompass important clinical concepts, but 
written in such a manner as to provide more than one patient manifestation of the 
clinical concept arising from differing causal elements and contexts. Students' 
reasoning is also stimulated by the sequencing of particular types of question. These 
range from broad opening questions, e. g. "What did you notice about the skin 
textures of Mrs. A. and Mr. B. ", (p. 22), which are intended to generate concept 
formation , to 
lifting questions whose function is to raise learner understanding or 
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transfer to higher levels, broaden their thinking and facilitate clinical inferences. An 
example of this type of question would be " What is being reflected in these 
observations" , 
(p. 22). 
The purported benefits of such a teaching model is that neophyte students are guided 
through the processes of collecting, organising and manipulating unfamiliar 
information in sometimes new and overwhelming environments. The strategies may 
also be adapted to suit learners at advanced levels of knowledge, cognition and 
autonomy. The sequencing of the strategies would appear crucial in this model, and 
according to Malek avoids the common educational mistake of initiating analysis 
prematurely. The effect of which, in light of knowledge and experiential deficits, 
invokes rote deductive conclusions as opposed to deliberative inductive alternatives 
and a realisation that knowledge is not static. 
Despite the absence of a description or definition of critical thinking Malek's (1986) 
utilisation of Taba's strategies does concur with issues commensurate with critical 
thinking as follows: 
The development of cognitive skills such as interpretation, analysis and inference; 
The generation of alternatives in light of changing knowledge and contexts. 
The sequential nature of the model, particularly up to the third stage could be 
criticised by those who conceive of critical thinking as essentially a non - linear 
process or, conversely could be applauded by those who see domain specific 
knowledge as a prerequisite to critical thinking. With regard to critical thinking 
dispositions, however, no mention is made and the strategies outlined appear to 
assume the development of such dispositions. The transfer of critical thinking ability 
and disposition from educational environs to that of clinical environs is also assumed. 
Burnard (1989, p. 271) also comments on the educationalist's role in the development 
of critical ability in nursing students. He makes the distinction between education and 
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training as a means of differentiating between the outcomes of each approach. 
Education, he asserts reflects an "... evolving critical process which enables the 
learner to make decisions for herself through the exercise of rational thought. " 
Conversely, training, "... suggests rote learning and the blind absorption of other 
people's thoughts beliefs and skills. " Burnard offers suggestions as to how nurse 
teachers might develop critical thinking ability in their students by incorporating 
aspects of the work of Brookfield (1987). These include: 
Affirming critical thinker's self worth: 
i. e. critical thinkers should be viewed as risk takers and innovators. Teachers 
should thus encourage and support learner's critical thinking endeavours. He 
cautions, however, that this does not mean wholesale uncritical acceptance of 
all ideas, but an attitude of openness and flexibility towards the learner's 
efforts; 
Listening attentively to critical thinkers: 
i. e. as in nursing practice, listening is an importance element in critical 
thinking ability. Teachers need to avoid reactive tendencies to steer learners 
who express critical ideas back towards the status quo and appreciate 
challenging ideas. Attentive listening enables the teacher to enter the critical 
thinker's frame of reference and understand the proposer's thought processes. 
Be a critical teacher: 
i. e. teachers should avoid utilising what Burnard calls the banking! approach 
to teaching, where learners are filled with predetermined facts. Instead 
teachers should adopt a problem posing approach where specified learning 
objectives are avoided and learners and the teacher examine their taken for 
granted ideas about the world. Being a critical teacher involves being 
prepared to take risks with oneself and learners in order to move thinking 
forward. Burnard also stresses that the term critical teacher must not be 
construed as an opportunity for negative criticism of learner's efforts in the 
traditional sense of the term. 
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Teachers should model critical ability: 
i. e. if teachers are to expect critical thinking from their learners, they too need 
to consistently demonstrate abilities in avoiding defensive, reactionary 
thinking. In this sense teachers must remain open to new ideas and recognise 
that they can also learn from their students. Thus education may become a 
reciprocal process where roles are sometimes switched in the learning 
encounter. 
Encourage breadth of reading: 
because of the changing boundaries, validity and contexts of knowledge 
learners should be encouraged to read widely. Knowledge may be sought in 
domains other than nursing, for it is only by absorbing other perspectives on 
the world that individuals become questioning and thus critical thinkers. 
Learn to shut up!: 
according to Burnard, many nurse teachers do too much talking in the 
classroom. Critical thinking may be stifled if learners are not afforded the 
opportunity to voice their thoughts and emotions. Teacher silence he 
contends can be a useful tool in educational encounters. 
Be conversational: 
talking with learners as opposed to talking at, or to, learners does much to 
enhance the free development of critical thinking. Many learning encounters 
are spoiled by teachers playing out a particular 'teacher role'. Adopting a 
more normal everyday conversational tone whilst teaching helps to facilitate 
an equal relationship between teacher and learner. 
Burnard's (1989) guidelines clearly delineate some of the responsibilities and 
strategies to be adopted by nurse teachers, as a means of developing critical thinking 
in their students. Although he offers useful strategies aimed at achieving this end, the 
scope of his work is limited in that it only refers to Brookfield's four components of 
the construct. This in itself may contravene the component of imagining and 
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exploring alternatives. Little mention is made of specific skills, dispositions, or the 
responsibilities of learners themselves. Similarly, the issue of specifically assessing 
critical thinking as an educational outcome is not raised. 
Miller & Malcolm (1990) similarly advocate an increasing emphasis on curricular 
strategies which facilitate and support critical thinking in nursing education. They 
offer a model which portrays an interaction between a variety of elements in the form 
of knowledge, skills, attitudes, students, faculty, teaching strategies, nursing curricula 
and how these contribute to individual's levels of critical thinking. The nature of the 
interaction is represented in the form of overlapping circles and ellipses. Fig. 2.8.4.1 
reproduces their framework for evaluating critical thinking achievement in nursing 
curricula. 
After Miller & Malcolm (1990) 
Fig. 2.8.4,1 Miller & Malcolm's (1990, p. 70) Interactionist Model of Critical 
Thinking. 
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The dotted (inner) nursing curricular he is meant to represent the semipermeable 
nature of the curriculum in how it draws from life experiences and knowledge 
outside of the curriculum, as well as curricula design elements. The semipermeable 
curricular membrane is also said to facilitate the ebb and flow of new and old 
knowledge, skills and attitudes as appropriate. 
With regard to attitudes Miller & Malcolm (1990) assert that, it is these which set the 
tone for inquiry and is contingent upon individual perspectives or mind sets. They 
further assert certain responsibilities and behaviours are incumbent upon both 
learners and faculty members in initiating and maintaining an open minded approach 
in interpreting events. Students attitudes, they point out, are affected by many 
extraneous variables such as age, nature of life experiences, state of health, level of 
cognitive and psychological development, family and cultural modelling, educational 
attitudes and assumptions. These variables, they claim, in conjunction with students 
desire to be good nurses and good students, often result in a desire for black and 
white answers and security in assurances of correctness in patient situations. 
Moreover, they also recognise that the same variables could apply to faculty 
members, and how this may impact on their theories of learning, teaching strategies 
and assumptions which underpin their attitudes. Table 2.8.4.1 identifies what they 
claim to be common faculty assumptions which may hinder the development of 
critical thinking in students. 
Table 2.8.4.1 Miller & Malcolm's (1990) Common Faculty Assumptions. 
1. Beginning students do not know how to problem solve; 
2. Mistakes are always bad, costly, and to be avoided; 
3. There is a best way to think, 
4. What is taught is what is learned; 
5. All students are plus or minus one standard deviation from the mean; 
6. Certainty is good whether it is client outcomes or student actions; 
7. Complex clients are defined as those who are most sick 
8. A standardised nursing care plan fits all clients; 
9. Begin with less complex learnings and progress to more complex ones; 
10. Students should be able to make expert decisions upon graduation; 
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11. Students should be capable of working in any clinical area upon graduation; 
12. The nursing programme philosophy has been opcrationaliscd in the curriculum; 
13. Faculty knows best. 
Overcoming such student and faculty attitudes is essential if a critical thinking culture 
with concomitant outcomes are to be achieved. Miller & Malcolm (1990) suggest 
that faculty need to develop a flexible and contextually sensitive approach to teaching 
strategies, which enables learners to appreciate, that specific nursing interventions are 
based upon hypotheses that may or may not be proven useful after testing in the 
actual care of a client. 
With regard to knowledge, Miller & Malcolm (1990) take the position that one 
cannot think critically without a knowledge base on which to build arguments. 
Moreover, they discount the rote teaching of thinking in its own right which is 
divorced from the knowledge base of the intended discipline. Instead they assert that 
faculty have a pivotal role in conveying to students the imperative relationship 
between inquiry, critical thinking and the development of nursing knowledge and 
practice. This they suggest can be achieved by faculty acting as critical thinking role 
models, and by clearly explicating the expected behaviour of students in the 
application of knowledge in clinical situations. Faculty can be assisted in this 
endeavour by the increasing body of knowledge surrounding critical thinking itself 
and associated teaching strategies. In this sense, Miller & Malcolm seem to imply 
that knowledge has to be critically acquired as well as critically applied, and that 
faculty have the abilities and dispositions to demonstrate this in their teaching. In 
light of the one - sided nature of the assumptions appearing in table 2.8.4.1 and their 
implied frequency, the assumed role modelling capabilities of faculty may be 
unwarranted. 
The skills component of the model focuses on cognitive skills as opposed to 
psychomotor nursing skills. The authors refer not only to an array of critical thinking 
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processes, but also to the development and refinement of such skills by practice. The 
processes are identified as follows: 
Separating relevant from irrelevant data; 
Making clinical inferences from the data; 
Recognising unstated assumptions; 
Reasoning deductively; 
Weighing clinical findings and other evidence; 
Distinguishing between warranted and unwarranted generalisations; 
Interpreting and evaluating arguments. 
Developing and practising such skills will, it is claimed, enable learners to value their 
cognitive processes and their products, in the form of correct answers. Critical 
thinking skills facilitate learners in focusing on the largest relevant picture of the 
client's current circumstances and, therefore, promotes complex problem solving. 
Miller & Malcolm (1990) conclude that opportunities to practice such skills are the 
responsibility of nurse educators. Faculty members should in this respect, utilise 
teaching strategies which mediate the application of critical thinking skills in learning 
encounters, as opposed to passively listening to lectures. Similarly course 
assignments should be constructed to engage learners in more problem solving 
activities, in the form of case study analysis, position papers, and opportunities to 
discuss and reflect on important nursing issues. 
Miller & Malcolm's (1990) model is useful in clarifying the complexity of issues 
confronting educators and learners in attempting to integrate critical thinking 
developmental strategies into nursing curricular. They clearly advocate and underline 
the responsibility of faculty members as role models in inculcating critical thinking in 
their learners. This they assert may involve a significant degree of self awareness in 
regard to their own attitudes in considering alternative perspectives and change. 
Although they incorporate the works of Watson & Glaser (1980); Kolb (1978) and 
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Perry (1970), their conception of critical thinking appears vague in that it refers to 
useful desired reasoning behaviours and outcomes, but does not detail the precise 
constituents of critical thinking. There appears also a degree of internal inconsistency 
whereby they refer to the need for complex flexible, contextually sensitive reasoning, 
but ultimately focus on the product of reasoning as the 'correct' answer, as opposed 
to the 'best' answer. It is also unclear as to why they stipulate that critical thinking 
should not be taught as a discrete entity, when they draw on the work of Watson & 
Glaser (1980), who describe it and measure it as a discrete entity. They make an 
interesting point regarding assessment in that they believe if critical thinking is to be 
developed, then practice in the associated skills is required. Consideration should be 
given to constructing course assignments which place greater demands on reasoning 
as opposed to memorisation and knowledge recall, no mention is made, however, as 
to how this would apply to clinical aspects of the curricula. Finally, having raised the 
issue of levels of critical thinking they do not elaborate upon what these levels are, or 
what they should consist of. 
While the previous works emphasise the integration of critical thinking strategies into 
existing curricula, Ford & Profetto McGrath (1994) assert that curricula should be 
underpinned by appropriate critical thinking perspectives in their development. They 
draw on the works of Friere, Habermas, and Grundy in contending that nursing 
curricula may be informed by either a technical, practical, or emancipatory interest. 
Curricula informed by these interests are referred to respectively as curriculum as 
product, curriculum as practice, and curriculum as praxis. Table 2.8.4.2 clarifies this 
relationship. 
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= Curriculum as product 
= Curriculum as practice 
= Curriculum as praxis 
Curriculum as product is predicated upon a technical interest concerned with 
controlling the environment through rule based action derived from empirically 
grounded laws. Viewed from an educational context this particular orientation 
focuses on controlling the educational environment in order to achieve predetermined 
goals or objectives. The educational encounter is deemed successful if the students 
function to the predetermined standards. The authors posit that the instrumental 
nature of such a curricular model fosters the type of action where a subject acts upon 
an object, as opposed to interaction between subject and object. 
Curriculum as practice is associated with a practical orientation where the 
fundamental interest is in "... understanding the environment through interaction 
based upon consensual understanding of meaning" (p. 341). Consenual 
understanding and the making of meaning is founded upon interaction between 
subjects. The emphasis in this orientation is on understanding for the sake of doing 
things right. This requires the exercise of judgement. Action in this context follows 
deliberation. Ford & Profetto - McGrath suggest that where curriculum as practice 
dominates "... it tends to frame the situation within the parameters of the tradition and 
excludes, by its nature, the need for critical reflection" (p. 342). 
Curriculum as praxis refers to the development of a critical consciousness, freedom 
from traditionalist dogma and autonomy. Action is this orientation follows the 
generation of what is termed authentic knowledge which is derived from critical 
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reflection. In describing critical reflection the authors draw on the works of Hedin, 
Shor & Friere. Thus, thinking critically and reflectively consists of going "... beneath 
the surface structure of a situation, to reveal the underlying assumptions that 
constrain open discourse and autonomous and responsible action" (p. 343). As 
perception and understanding of situations change individuals are able to question 
what they previously have taken for granted. 
Ford & Profetto - McGrath claim that there currently exist parallel demands in 
nursing education. One is for a paradigm shift in curricula development from 
technical models to emancipatory ones. This is in response to concerns relating to the 
perceived limitations of behavioural models of nursing education in their ability to 
meet society's changing health care needs. The other is for the development of 
critical thinking abilities in nursing students. Moreover, they suggest the potential for 
each of the above curricular models to represent differing conceptualisations of 
critical thinking, as follows: 
Critical thinking as problem solving 
Ford and Profetto - McGrath contend that the prevailing conception of critical 
thinking in nursing is that of critical thinking as problem solving. This conception is 
founded upon the prevalence of the nursing process and its problem solving stages 
within nursing curricula. This, they assert is compatible with a technical interest and 
knowledge in the form of facts and rules. Thus a curriculum as product orientation 
reflects the fundamental principles of objectivity, prediction and control. The authors 
do not, however, make clear the limitations of critical thinking as problem solving. 
They do not elucidate why and when problem solving reasoning processes are more 
or less elaborate than the reasoning processes underpinning critical thinking, or how 
practice may be affected by this. 
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Critical Thinking in Curriculum as Praxis 
Critical thinking as praxis is said to differ from problem solving in that it is based 
upon emancipatory action research as described by Grundy (1989, p. 154) which 
"... mediates between theory and practice through the process of enlightenment. " 
Knowledge in this orientation is described as authentic in that it does not rely on 
facts or rules. Neither should it be equated merely with information, but rather 
composed of patterns which make sense, and insights which facilitate the building of 
cognitive structures. Authentic knowledge extends the limits of presenting situations 
by including larger socio-political, historical, and economic contexts thus exposing 
the fundamental inherent power relationships which can oppress and maintain the 
status quo. Relating the emancipatory interest to critical thinking as a curriculum as 
praxis, the authors propose that such an approach to curricular design enables 
learners to take account of the larger social context of situations by revealing 
underlying assumptions and ideologies. Critical reflection of this nature has two 
facets. One refers to a critical examination of individuals' own practice. The other 
relates to a critical understanding of situations and systems which perpetuate the 
status quo. Hence, learners are able to examine the knowledge and assumptions 
which guide their own practice, and make explicit the implicit environmental 
conditions surrounding their practice. 
Ford & Profetto McGrath (1994) propose an interesting case for a paradigm shift in 
the principles underpinning nursing curricula. Based upon critical social theory, their 
model reflects a rejection of the prior concentration upon content acquisition, 
ritualistic practice and the implicit domination of one discipline within a field by 
others. Whilst obviously favouring an emancipatory curricular model they do not 
address the issues of specific skills or dispositions required by learners in order to 
conduct such emancipatory reasoning. In respect of this, they appear to assume that 
critical thinking will result from encouraging learners to focus upon the larger socio- 
political, historical and economic picture surrounding instances of practice, at the 
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expense of knowledge established by other means. The notion of curriculum as 
practice appears vague and in some areas contradictory. The terms consensus, 
interaction between subjects, deliberation and judgement, appear incongruent with 
the notion of framing situations from singular references. Their conception appears 
to take a radical view and avoids the questions of whether nursing practice can really 
be exclusively devoid of contemporaneous facts and rules, or, whether there is a 
place for all three orientations within nursing curricula to account for contextual 
contingencies, with critical thinking ability functioning as the arbiter. 
This section has examined and evaluated the theoretical perspectives surrounding the 
issues of the relationship between the nursing process and critical thinking in 
nursing; the perceived need for critical thinking ability in relation to nursing practice; 
the construction of nursing oriented models of critical thinking; and critical thinking 
in relation to nursing education issues. There is evidently overwhelming support for 
the espoused interdependence between competent clinical nursing practice and 
abilities in critical thinking. This is based upon the general conception of nursing as a 
complex human, social, and professional activity requiring appropriate intellectual 
skills and affective dispositions that facilitate the conduct of complex reasoning, 
decision making, and clinical judgement. The theoretical literature is thus both 
plausible and laudable in its collective intention of espousing the requirements for and 
models of inculcating critical thinking in learners and practitioners. However, without 
any recourse to empirical evidence relating to the existence of critical thinking in 
practice or its developments a result of nursing education the question arises of "is it 
there? " The next section will examine studies designed to address elements of this 
question. 
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2.9 Empirical literature Related to Critical Thinking in Nursing 
This section will review relevant nursing literature available during the study design 
and data collection phases of the study's development. Subsequent literature will be 
discussed in light of the study's findings. 
Previous studies are predominantly American and have investigated the relationship 
of critical thinking to various factors. These are categorised as follows: 
Critical thinking as a correlate of success in nursing; 
Effects of Nursing education on critical thinking ability; 
Effects of different types of nursing programmes on critical thinking; 
Relationship of critical thinking to clinical decision making, professional nursing 
competence, and moral reasoning. 
Categories of Critical Thinking Studies (After Beck et al., 1992). 
2.9.1 Critical Thinking as a Correlate of Success in Nursing 
Teissen (1987) studied which variables correlated most strongly with the critical 
thinking ability of students in a four year undergraduate nursing programme. Eight 
independent variables were examined as follows: 
Standard Achievement Test verbal scores (SAT, V), 
Standard Achievement Test quantitative scores (SAT, M) 
Grade Point Average (GPA) 
Age; 
Total number of college credit hours in the natural sciences (NSCI); 
Total number of college credit hours in the behavioural / social sciences; 
Total number of college credit hours in arts and humanities (ARUM) 
Total number of college credit hours in professional nursing courses. 
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Critical thinking was measured by means of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking 
Appraisal (WGCTA) for a sample of 150 subjects. Significant correlations were 
found at the p<. 01 level for SAT M (. 38), SAT V (. 33), GPA (. 32), & AHUM 
(. 30). Multiple regression revealed a correlation between critical thinking ability, 
SAT M, AHUM, and GPA of . 49, accounting for 24% of the variance in critical 
thinking. The remaining variables were intercorrelated with SAT M, AHUM, & 
GPA. Teissen reported math ability correlated most strongly with critical thinking, 
and as she believed this was a critical ability for nursing practice was, therefore, a 
good predictor of success in a nursing programme and a valid admission criterion. 
Bauwens & Gerhard (1987) investigated the early predictors of success in a 
Baccalaureate of Science in Nursing (BSN) programme. This correlational study 
used the WGCTA as the instrument for critical thinking measurement. Subjects were 
a convenience sample of 159 volunteer students. Results suggested that entry critical 
thinking scores and pre-nursing GPA showed positive correlation with the registered 
nurse licensing examination (NCLEX) scores. There appeared to be no significant 
differences between entry and graduation critical thinking scores. 
Gross, Takazawa, & Rose (1987) studied the utility of critical thinking and the 
National League of Nursing (NLN) pre-admission examination scores as selection 
criteria, in conjunction with the effect of nursing education on critical thinking ability. 
Study design was correlational, with pre-test and post-test method with no control 
group. WGCTA was the instrument of choice for a convenience sample of 120 
students undertaking associate or baccalaureate programmes. Results showed 
positive correlation with entry critical thinking scores and NLN total with the BSN 
students' GPAs. No significant correlations were found with the maths NLN, nor 
with the NCLEX scores of either group. There were significant increases in critical 
thinking scores from entry to graduation for both groups. 
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All three studies investigated the correlations between critical thinking and other 
variables as predictors for selection purposes, but not as variables which can be 
manipulated (Beck et al. 1992). Although critical thinking was found to be a useful 
predictor of success, these correlational studies give little indication of, whether and 
if so, how, nursing programmes can improve learner's critical thinking abilities. 
Moreover, although two studies compared changes in critical thinking from entry to 
exit ; Bauwens & Gerhard (1987) & Gross et al., (1987) the former found no 
significant changes, while the latter reported highly significant changes. Beck et al. 
(1992) suggest this could be due to the relatively small samples used for a 
phenomenon of this nature. 
2.9.2 Effects of Nursing Education on Critical Thinking Ability 
Valiga (1983) investigated the cognitive development of nursing students at different 
stages of their courses, over the course of an academic year. This comparative study 
used a pre-test/post-test design with no control group. Critical thinking was 
measured using the Kne-We (Perry Scheme) which has a different conceptual basis 
to the WGCTA. Sample consisted of random selection of 123 students across three 
courses from a pool of volunteers. Results on both pre-test and post-test 
demonstrated significantly higher scores for seniors over freshmen. There were, 
however, no significant changes from pre-test to post-test for any particular group, 
with the majority of student's individual scores and all the mean scores falling into the 
dualism category of Perry's stages of cognitive development. 
Berger (1984) pondered the relationship between critical thinking and GPA? The 
differences between critical thinking abilities of BSN students and Liberal arts 
students and whether there existed changes in critical thinking abilities of BSN 
students from their sophomore to their senior years. This correlational, comparative 
study used pre-test/post-test design with no control, and the WGCTA instrument for 
a sample of 137 students. (selection criteria indeterminate). Results indicated no 
129 
significant correlation between critical thinking and GPA. Sophomore nursing 
students demonstrated higher critical thinking scores than freshmen or senior liberal 
arts students. There were significant increases in the nursing student's critical 
thinking scores from their sophomore to their senior year. 
Sullivan (1987) investigated the relationships among critical thinking, creativity, 
clinical performance, academic performance and whether critical thinking improved 
during a two year RN to BSN programme. Study design was correlational with a 
pre-test / post-test and no control. Instruments used were the WGCTA, Torrence 
test of creative thinking and the Slater - Stewart Evaluation of Nursing Scale for a 
sample of 51. Results showed positive correlations between individual students' entry 
and exit critical thinking scores, and between entry / exit GPA and creativity 
measures. There was no change in average critical thinking scores from entry to exit. 
Fleeger (1987) studied the effect of baccalaureate nursing programmes on critical 
thinking as an aspect of a larger study. This was a correlational study using the 
WGCTA on a cross-sectional sample of 91 students from years 3,4, &5 of a five year 
BSN programme. The analysis revealed no significant differences among the groups 
in critical thinking abilities. Results from this study did not support the position that 
baccalaureate nursing education improved critical thinking abilities. 
Miller (1992) in contrast reported significant differences between pre-test and post- 
test scores using the WGCTA with a sample of 137 students on a Baccalaureate 
nursing degree programme in the USA. Two of the research questions focused upon 
the differences in pre and post-test scores for the test as a whole and the five sub-test 
scores. One tailed t-tests revealed significant differences in both sets of scores 
(p<0.05). Miller (1992), thus, concluded that the findings were consistent with the 
expectation that enrolment on the Baccalaureate Nursing Degree programme would 
have a positive impact upon the overall critical thinking skills of students. She 
130 
cautions, however, against the prospect that critical thinking should be viewed as a 
skill that could be taught in a discrete unit, suggesting that this may produce 
compliant behaviour as opposed to an independent spirit of inquiry. 
Saarmann, Freitas, Rapps & Riegal (1992, p. 26) decided to investigate the 
relationship between education, critical thinking ability and values from a sociological 
perspective. The purpose of the study was to test the following assumptions: 
"If exposure to faculty is a major influence on critical thinking ability and 
professional values, then faculty must be assumed to be superior in these 
characteristics. " 
"Students exposed to faculty in longer curricula can be expected to achieve 
higher levels of critical thinking ability and professional values than those 
undertaking shorter curricula. " 
A cross-sectional survey incorporating four nursing educational institutions and local 
hospitals used a convenience sample divided into four subgroups of 32 derived from 
power analysis techniques. The sample, thus, included: members of Faculty (32); 
graduating baccalaureate in nursing (BSN) students (32) associate degree prepared 
practitioners (ADN) (32); and sophomore college students entering a BSN course 
(32). Research instruments included the Watson & Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal 
(1964) and Gordon's Personal and interpersonal Values Scales. Results demonstrated 
that the critical thinking ability of faculty was not significantly higher than that of 
sophomore nursing students when the influence of age is controlled. With regard to 
professional values the three nursing groups demonstrated striking similarities. 
Faculty valued achievement most highly (p. 0001), while sophomore students valued 
goal orientation most highly (p. 001). All subjects valued support highly but 
sophomore students singularly valued benevolence highly. The authors contend that: 
as in previous studies investigating critical thinking ability, age is an important 
influence. 
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All but the latter two of this group of studies used pre-test/post-test design without 
control groups in order to study changes in entry to exit critical thinking abilities. 
The absence of a control group means one cannot rule out the internal threats to the 
validity of these studies posed by history and maturation. It is not, therefore, 
possible to discount the general effects of college experience and maturation in 
explaining the increases in critical thinking levels from entry to exit in these particular 
studies. 
2.9.4 Effects of Different Types of Nursing Programmes on Critical thinking. 
Lynch (1988) investigated the relationship between critical thinking, age, SATs and 
how the critical thinking abilities of generic BSN students compare with those of 
Associate Degree students. This correlational comparative study utilised the 
WOCTA on a convenience sample of 87 AD and 74 BSN students. Results indicated 
there was no correlation between critical thinking and age. There was a positive 
correlation between critical thinking and SATs. The critical thinking abilities of the 
BSN students were significantly higher than those of the AD students. 
Kintgen-Andrews (1988) posed the question, how do critical thinking abilities and 
their development differ among career ladder PN students, AD students, pre-health 
science freshmen and BSN sophomore students? This comparative study used a pre- 
test / post-test design with the WGCTA on a cross section convenience volunteer 
sample of 177 students. Results demonstrated no significant differences in critical 
thinking abilities between the PN students and the pre-science freshmen. The BSN 
sophomores had significantly higher critical thinking abilities than the AD students. 
There were no significant increases in critical thinking abilities in any group over the 
course of an academic year. 
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2.9.5 The Relationship of Critical thinking to Clinical Decision Making, 
Professional Nursing Competence and Moral Reasoning. 
The following studies examined differences in critical thinking among different types 
of nursing programmes, plus the relationships between critical thinking and clinical 
decision making, diagnostic ability, nursing competence, and moral reasoning. 
Brooks & Shepherd (1990) investigated the differences in critical thinking and 
clinical decision making, and whether critical thinking and clinical decision making 
abilities among Diploma, Associate Degree (AD) RN and generic BSN students 
differed. This correlational, comparative study used the WGCTA and Govers 
Nursing Performance Simulation Instrument (1975) on a cross section convenience 
sample of 200 students. Results showed a weak but significant relationship between 
critical thinking and clinical decision making in all programmes. The critical thinking 
of students from both types of BSN programme were significantly higher than those 
of the Diploma and AD students. There was no significant difference between the 
critical thinking abilities of the RN and generic BSN students. However, the clinical 
decision-making abilities of the RN students were significantly higher than those of 
all other groups. 
Pardue (1987) studied the differences in critical thinking and clinical decision making 
among graduates of Diploma, AD, BSN and MSN programmes. This comparative 
study used the WGCTA plus a researcher designed clinical decision making tool, on 
a stratified random sample of RNs of which 121 volunteers were recruited from all 
programmes. Results revealed the critical thinking abilities of BSN & MSN 
graduates were significantly higher than those of Diploma and AD graduates. There 
were no significant differences among any of the groups in clinical decision making 
abilities. 
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Matthews & Gaul (1979) examined the relationship between critical thinking ability, 
nursing diagnostic abilities, and whether these abilities differed between senior BSN 
students (undergraduate) and graduate (postgraduate) students. Study design was 
correlational, comparative, using the WGCTA and a researcher developed case study 
to test nursing diagnosis ability. Sample size was 48 of which 22 were BSN students 
and 26 Graduates. Results indicated no correlation between critical thinking ability 
and ability to derive nursing diagnoses. There were no significant differences between 
groups in terms of critical thinking abilities. Graduate students, however, were 
significantly better at identifying nursing diagnoses than the BSN students. 
Ketefian (1981) investigated the relationships among critical thinking, moral 
judgement, level of educational preparation, and whether levels of moral judgement 
differ between nurses prepared at baccalaureate degree level or above (professional) 
and nurses prepared at diploma or associate degree level (technical). Study design 
was correlational, comparative, incorporating the WGCTA and Rest's Defining 
Issues Test, on a volunteer sample of 36 technical level and 43 professional level 
RNs. There was a significant positive relationship between critical thinking and moral 
judgement. Critical thinking and level of education together were significantly 
correlated with moral judgement. The moral judgement levels of professional nurses 
were higher than those of technical nurses. 
2.10 Summary of Empirical Nursing Literature Review. 
The above empirical nursing literature review indicates an inconclusive body of 
evidence. While some individual studies provide supporting evidence for the effect of 
nursing education on the development of critical thinking ability others do not. 
Consequently, the following conclusions are drawn: 
1. Strong support for a positive effect of nursing education on generic 
critical thinking ability is lacking; 
2. Strong support for the relationship between critical thinking and success 
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in nursing education is lacking; 
3. There is virtually no evidence to support correlation between critical 
thinking and clinical judgement (Pless & Clayton 1993). 
The variables of age, general educational achievement indicators, level and stage of 
professional education, sample size and methods appears to demonstrate little effect 
overall. Additionally, the literature reveals: a paucity of UK studies investigating 
critical thinking as a distinct outcome of nursing education; the prevalence of 
standardised quantitative approaches to measuring critical thinking in nursing; a 
heavy reliance on the WGCTA as a measure of nurse's critical thinking abilities; and a 
paucity of studies investigating qualitative evidence of critical thinking in domain 
specific concurrent nursing judgement or reasoning processes. Therefore, while there 
is a body of evidence which suggests nursing education has little effect upon nurses' 
critical thinking abilities, the evidence is generally in the form of non-significant 
changes in standardised tests scores. The evidence to date, thus, does not provide 
insights into why this might be the case or more specifically, how nurses and student 
nurses actually reason about professional issues or form professional judgements. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Overview of the Relationship Between the Curriculum and Critical Thinking - 
Registered Nurse/Diploma in Higher Education 
(RN/Dip. H. E. ) 
3.1 
The above course led to a Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA) diploma 
in Higher Education and professional registration on the appropriate part of the 
UKCC register. The Project 2000 initiative afforded the opportunity for not only 
increasing links with higher educational institutions, but also to move towards the 
development of modular and semester based courses. The ENB requirement, 
however, that nursing courses be based upon a forty-five week year as opposed to 
the usual thirty-two weeks academic year operated by higher educational institutions 
made this task problematic. Consequently, the course year consists of three fifteen 
weeks trimesters (45 wks), with the three year programme comprising nine trimesters 
in total divided between a Common Foundation Programme and a variety of Branch 
Programmes (135 wks). Typically, a student would study four modules per trimester, 
with each module requiring 150 hours study of which 45 hours is the minimum 
teacher contact time. The trimesters' sequence and structure reflect the health-to- 
illness continuum concomitant with the philosophy of Project 2000 (Macneil & 
Cavanagh, 1995). Appendix 1 demonstrates this sequence and subject content. 
Trimester one introduces students to the concept of health with trimester two then 
concentrating upon factors potentially detrimental to health. In trimester three 
students begin to observe and participate under clinical supervision in aspects of 
nursing care for a variety of patient groups. Trimester four facilitates student 
reflection upon experiences encountered in trimester three. The predominant function 
of trimester five is to act as a bridge between the Common Foundation Programme 
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and the forthcoming Branch Programmes. Trimesters six, seven and eight enable 
students to further develop the knowledge and skills acquired in the Common 
Foundation Programme by nursing patients specific to their chosen speciality in 
hospital and community settings. During trimesters seven and eight students 
complete their rostered service whereby they function as a constituent member of the 
caring team and not in a supernumerary capacity. Finally, trimester nine serves a dual 
function. Firstly, it enables students to reflect upon the experiences encountered 
during rostered service. Secondly, it encourages students to consolidate their 
knowledge of management, teaching and research to provide a foundation for 
lifelong learning as a registered practitioner. 
3.2 Credit Accumulation. 
The three year programme attracts 120 academic credits at level 1 for the Common 
Foundation Programme and 120 academic credits at level 2 for the Branch 
Programmes. Credit level is determined by: the intellectual demands of modules; the 
number of hours allocated and the nature of assessment. Academic credits are 
awarded also during periods of clinical practice calculated by the amount of 
educational input in hours per week, e. g. 10 hrs over a 15 weeks module equals 150 
hrs and, therefore, 15 credits at level 1 in CFP and similar credits at level 2 in the 
Branch Programme and rostered service (Macneil & Cavanagh, 1995). 
3.3 Course philosophy 
The programme is founded upon the following philosophical perspective extracted 
from the submission for validation document (Fig. 3.3.1): 
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"The philosophy of the Sister Dora College of Nursing and Midwifery embodies the 
belief that Nursing/Midwifery are dynamic activities that encompass aspects of caring 
for people of all ages and groups. We believe they should be holistic and 
individualised in their application. 
We believe education is a life-long process and that Nurses/Midwives engage in a 
variety of interpersonal relationships which, to be most effective must rest on a range 
of empathic and imaginative skills together with a commitment to continuing 
professional and personal development. Professional behaviour is balanced by both 
liberal and specialised education drawn from biological and behavioural sciences, 
complemented by knowledge of social policy, and social aspects of health and 
disease. In order to meet these teaching needs, the teacher must see him/herself as 
facilitator of students' intellectual and personal growth within an adult learning 
model. Thus the acquisition of higher order concepts is achievable by helping the 
student to make meaningful connections between previous experience and new 
knowledge. 
The educational programme will offer students the opportunities to conceptualise 
quality in health and health care. Students will then begin to develop or maintain an 
awareness and appreciation of the application of such concepts to a range of 
Nursing/Midwifery situations. Embodied in this process is the intention to enhance 
critical and analytic skills in order to evaluate the contribution of all complementary 
and practical perspectives in health care. 
The College acknowledges the need to be sensitive to the needs of mature students 
and to that end it offers a flexible approach to nurse education", (p. 11). 
Fig. 3.3.1 Educational Philosophy/Strategy 
With regard to the context of this study the above educational philosophy refers to 
the holistic, yet unique contextual contingencies inherent in clinical reasoning 
processes, and the value placed upon the development of critical thinking as an 
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intellectual requisite for generating and evaluating alternative perspectives of health 
and health-care. 
3.4 Curriculum Framework Model 
The course curriculum is also founded upon the Experiential Taxonomy of Steinaker 
& Bell (1979). The taxonomy identifies five categories and associated sub-categories 
purported to be measurable characteristics of learning in the experiential domain and 
demonstrate a natural progression of practical competence (Table 3.4.1). The claim 
is made that the use of experiential taxonomy categories is appropriate to all levels of 
learning and not only in relation to practice. The vital link between modules of study 
and claim for advancement is the quality of the assessment scheme and its level of 
sophistication. The categories are as follows: 
Table 3.4.1. Steinaker & Bell's (1979) Categories Within the Experiential Domain 




5. Dissemination Highest level of experiential learning 
The following curricular descriptions of the taxonomy categories are also offered for 
clarity. 
Exposure - Students are exposed to the specific knowledge or experience. They 
are encouraged to focus their attention and senses on given stimuli 
and then reflect upon the experience encountered. 
Participation - The student is expected to participate under supervision, in the 
giving of care. At this stage the student is also expected to 
demonstrate a willingness to take part and explain actions and 
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behaviours. 
Identification - This level of attainment implies that the student now accepts and 
becomes guided by the knowledge and skills already acquired. The 
knowledge, skills and total experience now influence his/her thinking, 
professional behaviour and subsequent interaction with similar data or 
experience. The individual begins to share their experience with others 
overtly relating self to experience, understands the organising 
principles gains deeper insight into structure and values, and is able to 
recognise strengths and limitations. 
Internalisation - Implies that the student becomes fully socialised in nursing 
knowledge, skills and total experience now influence his/her 
thinking, professional behaviour and subsequent interaction 
with similar data or experience. The individual begins to share 
their experience with others, overtly relating self to experience, 
understands the organising principles and gains deeper insight 
into structure and values, and is able to recognise strenths and 
limitations. 
Dissemination - Whilst teaching and role model activities can occur at earlier levels, 
this level denotes the highest degree of competency and efficiency 
for at this stage the individual is able to compare, contrast, defend 
and teach. They realise the importance of motivating others to have 
similar experiences, even creating new approaches. In general terms 
they are an excellent role model! 
The expected levels of attainment as students progress through the curriculum is that 
on completion of the Common Foundation Programme students will function at the 
level of participation and on completion of the Branch Programmes students are 
expected to function at the level of internalisation. It is in the interrelationship 
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between elements of the educational philosophy, the levels of attainment, the 
taxonomy categories and course outcomes referring to critical thinking that issues of 
internal inconsistency start to emerge. For example, one can argue that an implicit 
covariation exists between the categories of the experiential taxonomy and cognitive 
levels akin to Bloods Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (1956). Aspects of 
exposure and participation when viewed as the acquisition and understanding of 
information for example, correlate with aspects of knowledge and comprehension. It 
is not, however, until one reaches the level of dissemination that indicators of the 
higher cognitive levels commensurate with critical thinking as described previously 
appear, in the form of analysis, argumentation, and the generation of alternative 
possibilities. There thus exists considerable incongruence between the expected levels 
of attainment on the experiential taxonomy, particularly in respect of the CFP and 
one of its specific aims, namely: 
" To develop skills in critical thinking and research awareness that underpin 
nursing practice" (p. 34). 
The contradiction in aims is that, on one hand students are only expected to attain 
the level of participation on the experiential taxonomy at the end of CFP, whilst on 
the other hand students are also expected to have developed critical thinking skills at 
the same point. Additional issues arising are that although the curriculum overtly 
values critical thinking, it does not specifically describe or define critical thinking as a 
basis for evaluating aim achievement, nor is critical thinking taught as a discrete 
entity. 
3.5 Assessment Strategies 
The curriculum operates a system of continuous assessment focusing upon 
theoretical assignments and continuous assessment of clinical practice throughout the 
CFP and Branch Programmes (see appendix 1). Reference to cognitive skills and 
critical thinking is made in the criteria for grading of theoretical assignments as 
follows: 
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1. Evidence of cognitive skills: application, analysis; synthesis, evaluation. 
2. Integration of theories and principles from relevant disciplines; evidence of 
depth of knowledge. 
3. Evidence of wide reading. A competent academic literary style. 
4. Critical evaluation of research and current literature with accurate 
referencing. 
5. Logical development of argument. 
6. Neatly presented within 10% of prescribed length. 
In the case of practice assessment a system of combined experiential taxonomic 
outcomes and expected achievement indicators is used throughout the CFP and 
Branch Programmes. An example of such outcomes and achievement indicators is as 
follows: 
Outcome Required 
Conduct an holistic and comprehensive assessment by achieving the following 
indicators: 
1. Competently utilise the nursing process in nursing practice. 
2. Competently apply a model/theory for nursing within the assessment. 
3. Utilise assessment rating scales where applicable. 
4. Conduct an accurate holistic patient/client assessment. 
5. Appropriately summarise, report and record the assessment data. 
6. Recognise and appropriately respond to the patient's/client's verbal and non-verbal 
cues. 
7. Sensitively involve patient/family in the nursing assessment. 
The range of practice outcomes and indicators do not include specific reference to 
critical thinking although phrases such as: "demonstrate self awareness", "appraise 
and record effectiveness of care" and "suggest methods by which care practice may 
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be improved", may be associated with metacognition, evaluation and the 
consideration and generation of alternative possibilities. 
Finally, the curriculum implementation is underpinned by means of the following 
teaching and learning methods (Table 3.5.1. ) many of which are congruent with 
literature on critical thinking teaching strategies (Meyers, 1986; McPeck, 1990; Paul, 
1991). 
Table. 3.5.1: Summary of Teaching and Leatnin Sý trategies. 
Seminars Self evaluative practice 
Discussion groups Tutorials 
Project work Problem-solving groups 
Care studies Case studies or histories 
Debates Contract learning 
Experiential workshops 
Specialist workshops (by 
therapists) 





General Review of Methods in Approaching the Examination of Critical 
Thinking 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses upon decisions relating to the central task of this work, which 
was the development of an appropriate design and instrumentation that would 
evaluate the impact of a Project 2000 Common Foundation Programme's effect upon 
the critical thinking abilities of a group of student nurses. The research task was to 
capture valid evidence of critical thinking in student nurses' reasoning in action and, 
as a result of the CFP curriculum, that incorporated a more qualitative perspective 
than previous studies examining the same construct within a nursing context. The 
chapter will, thus, present an overview of the instruments chosen and designed in 
order to address the research purpose over four phases of data collection spanning 
the CFP programme. 
The importing of models from medical decision-making research was thought 
inappropriate because of the propensity of such models to use problems which are 
highly structured, complete and involving right answers (Barrows & Feltovich, 
1987). Nursing problems, however, tend be less clear, unenduring and ambiguous 
with few single correct outcomes. Given the nature of the research questions, the 
discussion regarding the role of logic in critical thinking and the inconclusive nature 
of previous empirical evidence (chapter 2) a decision was made to combine a 
simulation mediated approach to elicit concurrent verbal reports of student nurses' 
domain-specific reasoning, with an existing instrument designed to measure critical 
thinking. 
Concurrent verbal reports or think aloud techniques are common methods of data 
collection in research on the cognitive processes people use to solve problems or 
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make decisions (Anderson, 1987; Montgomery & Svenson, 1989; Ericsson & Simon, 
1993). One of the original intentions of this research was to understand the thinking 
of experts so that others could be taught similar strategies and thus facilitate more 
effective decision making for the many. The technique involves participants thinking 
aloud while making a decision related to a cognitive task. The resulting verbalisations 
are recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions are then analysed for aspects of the 
data relating to: information that the reasoner attends too, the way the data are 
clustered, the knowledge used, the hypotheses activated, and the heuristics employed 
to combine information and make decisions (Corcoran-Perry & Narayan, 1995). 
The overall methodological perspective underpinning the study is one of triangulation 
that combines positivist and interpretative approaches for completeness (Knafl & 
Breitmayer, 1989). With regard to the interpretative component, although the data 
are predominantly qualitative in nature they are used inductively in the context of 
examining participants' performance of a behavioural construct and not the socially 
or ontologically constructed meaning of individual experience as seen in purely 
phenomenological approaches. 
Previous attempts to measure critical thinking ability in nursing have predominantly 
utilised a psychometric approach involving pencil and paper standardised reasoning 
tests. Multiple choice formats are most widely used, because they fit well with the 
pragmatic constraints of many testing situations (Norris, 1990). Examples of such 
tests are The Watson and Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (1964; 1980; 1991) A 
Test on Principles of Critical Thinking (American Council on Education (ACE) 
(1955, Form F1-5), and The Cornell Critical Thinking Test (Ennis, Millman & 
Tomko, 1985). These and a host of other tools have been used in a variety of 
educational studies investigating critical thinking which McMillan (1987, p. 5) divides 
into three categories: 
1. Studies of specific instructional variables 
145 
2. Studies examining how entire courses may affect critical thinking 
3. Studies investigating the impact of general programmes or the 
combined effect of many courses on critical thinking. 
This particular study would fit into the second category, given that the Common 
Foundation Programme for Project 2000 courses is seen as an educational entity in 
itself with clear outcomes related to critical thinking. 
The most widely used test of critical thinking, according to the literature reviewed to 
date, is the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (1964; 1980; 1991). The test's 
particular attractions concerning this and previous nursing studies are: the author's 
definition of critical thinking as applied to practice; its claims to measure critical 
thinking as a discrete general ability; the fact that some of its indices of critical 
thinking fit well with indices identified in this study's conception of critical thinking; 
its availability in the UK and the recent development of a fully anglicised version of 
the test (Watson & Glaser, 1991). 
Form C of the test is said to achieve a broadly international frame of reference for the 
test content, thus reducing potential item bias. All American - English usage in test 
items have been replaced and the test reflects a series of scenarios familiar to the UK 
user. Given that this study aims to describe the impact of a domain specific 
programme of study on UK beginning nurses' critical thinking abilities, it was 
proposed that a measure of entry behaviour in general critical thinking ability would 
be required in the form of a pre-test utilising the Watson & Glaser Critical Thinking 
Appraisal. The next section outlines the historical development of the test and related 
issues. 
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4.2 History of The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal. 
The Watson - Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (1991) has a history of development 
and refinement spanning over half a century. The precursor to the current test was 
developed by Watson (1925) as a measurement of Fair-Mindedness. Glaser (1937) 
revised and modified this extensively for use in "An Experiment in the Development 
of Critical Thinking. " Originally forms Ym and Zm aimed at differing age ranges 
comprised 100 items divided into five subtests identified as indices of critical 
thinking. Each subtest focused on specific cognitive skills as follows: 
Inference; (Evaluating the validity of inferences drawn from a series of 
factual statements) 
Recognition of assumptions; (Identifying unstated assumptions or 
presuppositions in a series of assertive statements). 
Deduction; (Determining whether certain conclusions necessarily follow 
from the information in given statements or premises). 
Interpretation; (Weighing evidence and deciding if generalisations or 
conclusions based on the given data are warranted). 
Evaluation of Arguments. (Distinguishing between arguments that are 
strong and relevant and those that are weak or irrelevant 
to a particular question at issue), (p. 3). 
The authors attest to the neutral and controversial nature of the item contents, citing 
studies showing that " strong attitudes, opinions and biases affect some individual's 
ability to think critically. " (Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall, 1965; Mitchell & Bryne, 
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1973; Jaeger & Freijo, 1975; Jones & Cook, 1975. ), (p. 4). Examples of subtest 
content for form C items are: 
Inference -( Efficacy of teaching strategies; maintenance of a free press; use of 
community land for commercial gain) 
Recognition of Assumptions -( Availability of resources; educational resources; 
energy shortages; benefits of international 
co-operation; logical argument; fiscal prudence. 
Deduction - (Power of convictions; benefits of literature; efficacy of vaccines; 
relationship between educational philosophy and resources; 
patriotism and radicalism). 
Interpretation -( Sales techniques; educational statistics; political censorship; 
dreams as a form of communication; accident statistics; 
outcomes of teaching strategies). 
Evaluation of Arguments - (Hypothetical weaponry; Nationalisation of industry; 
Agricultural policy; Environmental issues; 
Government spending). 
Forms Ym and Zm were replaced in 1980 and currently the test exists in forms A, B, 
& C. Form C is the Anglicised version, and the 100 items is now reduced to 80 
distributed throughout the five subtests. 
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4.3 Questions of Reliability and Validity 
The reliability of the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal has been assessed in 
three ways: estimates of the tests internal consistency, the stability of test scores over 
time and the correlation between scores on alternate forms (Watson & Glaser, 1991). 
The degree of internal consistency was measured by calculating split-half reliability 
coefficients. According to the authors the usual method of correlating responses to 
alternate items could not be employed, due to the fact that groups of questions are 
associated with the same passage of text, and therefore not truly independent. For 
this reason the construction of the split-halves involved ensuring that items related 
to a given passage had to be kept together, so avoiding the prospect that items from 
any one subtest were not allocated unevenly to the two halves. Eventually all items 
across the complete item set for each form were allocated and all subtests 
represented in each half. This was achieved for example with form A by splitting the 
16 items of the inference subtest thus; 
Items 1- 10 ( referring to the first two passages of the subtest) included 
in the first split-half scores. 
Items 11 - 16 ( referring to the third passage on the subtest) included in 
the second split-half scores. 
The same principles were used in the allocation of test items for form B and C and 
scores for items on each of the halves were totalled separately. The resulting summed 
scores were correlated, and the coefficients obtained corrected for test length using 
the Spearman- Brown formula. Split-half reliability coefficients were calculated for 
Forms A&B from a number of norm groups. Coefficients range from . 
69 to. 8 S. 
Reliability of the more recent form C has been estimated from two sets of UK data 
comprising 267 and 111 administrations. The split-half coefficients of . 87 and . 
88 
respectively confirmed the authors' view that form C maintains the high standards 
demonstrated by other forms of the Watson - Glaser critical Thinking Appraisal 
(WGCTA). 
149 
The stability of scores for forms A and B over time was evaluated by administering 
the test twice to a group of students (N=96), with a three month interval between 
administrations. The means and standard deviations obtained were virtually identical 
for the first and second administrations (Watson & Glaser, 1991). 
First Administration - Mean = 57.4; Standard Deviation = 8.1 
Second Administration - Mean = 56.8; Standard Deviation = 8.4 
The correlation between responses of both administrations is . 73 which the authors 
claim reflects' ... an acceptable 
level of stability of the measure over time. " (p. 52). 
Finally, the authors claim that the reliability estimates reported are consistent with 
those observed for total test scores of the earlier forms Ym and Zm editions of the 
test (Equivalency). They conclude that these are sufficiently high to warrant use of 
the WGCTA for group administration and research studies. 
4.3.1 Validity 





Construct - related validity. 
Face validity refers to whether or not a test looks valid to candidates, administrators 
and others, that is, does it' look right' . 
If the test content does not appear relevant to 
candidates, particularly adults, then a lack of co-operation may ensue, regardless of 
the actual validity of the test. The author's claim that the WGCTA has high face 
validity because its relevance to management and decision making roles are easily 
understood by participants. Also, the operations and processes required to complete 
the subtests reflect abilities which are valued and appreciated presumably by 
administrators and individuals aspiring to these roles. They further their case by 
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claiming that the WGCTA has been a major test in the UK for many years even 
though until 1991 the test was distinctly American in its English usage and cultural 
emphasis. Despite this the test in its earlier and now its anglicised version has gained 
recognition by many leading organisations as a tool in management selection 
procedures. Implicit in this position then is the proposition that, unless a test appears 
to candidates and administrators to test what it claims to test, its validity will be 
affected. This may also suggest that when the test is used in situations when 
participants or administrators are not aspiring to or measuring management or 
decision making roles, and who may not understand or appreciate the operations and 
processes required to complete the subtests, then co-operation may not be 
forthcoming. No reference is made in this context as to the test's face validity in 
relation to educational purposes. Watson & Glaser (1991) do, however, stipulate that 
appearance and graphic design are no guarantee of quality and face validity cannot be 
considered a substitute for objectively determined validity. 
4.3.2 Content Related Validity 
In order to demonstrate the relationship between the test items and the expected 
manifestation of critical thinking ability, Watson & Glaser (1991, p. 55) suggest that 
the individual's response to the behaviour area in question is more relevant than the 
apparent relevance of the test item, because the actual processes employed by the 
candidate undertaking the test may not be evident from mere inspection of the test. 
The Watson and Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal, thus, is concerned primarily with 
the processes required in evaluating the test passages rather than in the specific 
scenarios depicted. Content validity is achieved by careful analysis of the domain to 
ensure that "... all the important features are covered by the test items, and that they 
are appropriately represented in the test according to their significance. " Emphasis is 
also placed on avoiding unbalancing the test by overloading items representing one 
particular aspect of behaviour, careful attention to literary demands and effects of 
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speed on scores. Discussion of this issue in the test manual is somewhat generalist 
and gives little indication of content related construction. 
4.3.3 Criterion Related Validity 
The Watson - Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal's concurrent criterion related 
qualities have been validated against a number of ability and achievement tests such 
as the Stanford Achievement Test in Language and the Otis-Lennon Mental Ability 
Test 
. 
Predictive validity, it is claimed, has been demonstrated to some extent by 
predicting performance of USA police academy recruits during their academic pre- 
service training. The authors, despite the longevity of their test and wide usage, 
suggest that establishing predictive validity is hampered by time constraints, and 
studies lasting many years would be required for this purpose. Concurrent validity is 
claimed to be a sufficient indicator in certain instances, because performance 
measures may be taken for a group for whom criterion data are already available. 
Thus, test scores of existing employees can be compared to work performance, and 
applied, for example, to "... recruitment or selection testing". The authors, however, 
offer no evidence in relation to this particular aspect of validity. 
4.3.4 Construct -Related Validity. 
Evidence for this type of validity is taken from data arising from several sources. 
Data relating to instructional settings in which programmes designed to improve 
critical thinking, as reflected in WGCTA test scores, has been used to establish its 
construct - validity (Sorenson, 1966; Fogg & Calia, 1967; Agne & Blick, 1972; 
Burns, 1974; Litwin & Haas, 1983; ). Another major validation criterion of a test of 
this nature is said to be age differentiation. When an ability such as critical thinking 
would be expected to increase with age and experience during childhood and 
adolescence, it can be argued that a valid test would reflect this in increased scores, 
as the authors claim this test's scores do. Should test scores of this nature fail to 
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increase with age then "... in all probability that test is not a valid measure of the 
abilities that it is intended to sample" (Watson & Glaser, 1991, pp. 60-61). They 
conclude this issue, asserting that age differentiation when applicable, is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for construct-related validity. The proposition here 
appears to be age differentiation during childhood and adolescence, with no reference 
to age differentiation and test performance in adulthood. 
High correlates between WGCTA scores , measures of general 
intelligence and other 
ability measures, e. g. Otis, Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Tests, Californian Test of 
Mental Maturity, and Miller Analogies Test are said to contribute to construct 
validity. The above correlations range from . 43 to . 75 and although the WGCTA has 
been found to correlate with general intelligence, factor analysis suggests its overlap 
as a construct is incomplete (Watson & Glaser, 1991). 
Watson & Glaser claim that factor analysis of WGCTA subtests with other measures 
of intelligence suggest that the test is measuring a dimension distinct from that of 
overall intellectual ability. Data from the work of Landis, (1976), and Follman, Miller 
& Hernandez, (1969) are said to support the notion that the WGCTA is measuring a 
discrete and unidimensional aspect of ability, and therefore provides further evidence 
of its internal consistency. The scores on the subtests are also purported to be related 
to the total score. These correlations range from: 
" . 
56 -. 79 for forms Ym and Zm 
9 . 
50 -. 69 for forms A and B combined 
". 54 -. 77 for form C 
Independent reviewers of the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal forms A& 
B raise several cautions regarding reliability and validity of the test. Helmstadter 
(1985, p. 1693) suggests the construct validity of this trait and its measure has not 
been explored sufficiently thoroughly or systematically. Although items have face 
validity and have been subjected to appropriate psychometric criteria, forms have 
153 
been equated by standard procedures, and a wide variety of reliability indexes 
computed using different groups and methods. Reliability remains adequate but not 
"outstanding", and is not yet as high as one "... normally expects for cognitive tests. " 
Moreover, Helmstadter suggests the reliability problem may stem from the fact that 
four of the five subtests are composed of items comprising only two alternatives. 
However, it may also arise from the substantial judgement component in the 
"inference" subtest which appears to relate to the amount of evidence required to 
convince the participant of an argument, as opposed to their ability to ascertain the 
validity of an inference. McPeck (1981) makes a similar critique, questioning the 
internal logic of questions and claiming that the 'inference' item responses are 
inappropriate. Inferences should be judged valid or invalid, not true or false. This 
confusion is further compounded by the subtest instructions inferring the unusual 
notion of degrees of truth or falsity which could normally be more closely associated 
with a proposition as opposed to an inference. Further weaknesses regarding 
construct validity and normalisation data were suggested by Abo El-Nasser (1978) 
and McPeck (1981) but these refer to forms Yin and Zm. Morante & Vlesky, (1984) 
further revealed that the limited information on the reliability, norms, and other 
statistical data made adequate evaluation of results problematic. Berger (1985) 
pondered the difficulty in ascertaining which items were neutral and which 
controversial. The only explanation proffered by the authors is that neutral items for 
example, deal with the weather, scientific facts or experiments. Conversely, 
controversial items deal with political, economic and social issues, which frequently 
provoke stronger feelings. 
Berger (1985) raises a caution regarding equivalence of forms, highlighting the 
authors' claim as to the "close correspondence" between Forms A&B. Berger 
asserts the authors claim, that the relationship between Forms B and Zm and Forms 
A and Ym is "highly likely to extend to the relationship between Forms B and Ym 
and A and Zm. Direct comparisons of the latter sequence had not been made 
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however. Furthermore, the close correspondence referred to is a correlation of . 69 
between forms B& Zm and . 78 
between Forms A& Ym. Whether this represents 
sufficiently "close correspondence", Berger suggests, is a matter of judgement as is 
the use of phrase "highly likely" in the light of unavailable evidence. Similar 
information in relation to Form C is currently unavailable, although a series of UK 
norms are shortly to be published. Finally, in relation to the WGCTA's ability to test 
critical thinking as a discrete ability. McPeck (1985) claims that although Watson & 
Glaser report high correlations with general intelligence, norming data, fails to 
provide cases with an inverse relationship between intelligence and critical thinking. 
In light of this, the conception of critical thinking as a general ability that may be 
measured independently of content and knowledge of the subject remains 
questionable, as does the tests discriminant validity. 
4.4 Summary of Issues Relating to the Watson & Glaser Critical Thinking 
Appraisal 
In summary, although many reviewers judge the WGCTA to be well constructed for 
use with groups (Crites, 1975; Helmstadter, 1975; Modjeski & Michael, 1983; 
Berger, 1985) and the literature reveals wide usage in relation to groups of nurses 
(Matthews & Gaul, 1979; Ketefian, 1981; Gunning, 1981; Berger, 1984; Tiessen, 
1987; Bauwens & Gerhard, 1987; Gross, Takazawa, & Rose, 1987; Sullivan, 1987; 
Fleeger, 1987; Lynch, 1988; Kintgen-Andrews, 1988; McLaughlin, 1988; Brooks & 
Shepherd, 1990; Pardue, 1987) its utility as the sole measure of critical thinking 
ability in studies is questionable. McMillan (1987) asserts that there may be sufficient 
technical limitations to significantly weaken research using this particular measure, 
and it appears unlikely that a study designed to change one or several environmental 
conditions, among many possible influences will reflect differences on the sole basis 
of WGCTA scores. He also contends that when the WGCTA is used as the 
dependent measure, the finding of non-significant differences is likely. Also if 
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students begin a specific course with high scores on a measure of critical thinking, it 
is unlikely that an intervention will statistically improve their score. McMillan (1987) 
further believes that researchers should not rely on a single measure of critical 
thinking particularly when of a psychometric nature. Dressel & Mayhew (1954, p. 36) 
similarly suggested that a "... 'test" of critical thinking with "correct" answers is 
antithetical to genuine critical thought", and implies that any evaluation of this 
nature is likely to be inadequate. The limitation of using the WGCTA as a unitary 
instrument of measurement is further alluded to by Berger (1985) who recognises 
that essentially the WGCTA appraises critical thinking through reading. The issue of 
whether people taking a similar test of critical thinking through listening would 
obtain comparable scores is not discussed. Norris (1985, p. 42) addresses these 
concerns also positing that: 
" Most critical thinking tests do not provide information about what the 
examinee is thinking. That is, they provide only the conclusions to 
thinking processes, not the processes themselves. "
Furthermore, Norris (1990) believes that what is required are explicit indications of 
individual's reasoning in order to differentiate between deficiencies in thinking and 
differences in background beliefs and assumptions. Moreover, Beck et al., (1992) 
attest to the need for development of a content-specific tool which will measure 
critical thinking in nursing and such a tool would require a set of multiple measures 
of critical thinking. There appears, thus, a need for an approach which combines 
multiple measures of critical thinking which would facilitate triangulation of results 
for a more complete representation of subject reasoning process and outcomes. For 
example, measures of student - teacher perceptions of critical thinking, criteria for 
judgmental analyses of reasoning behaviour, and locally devised instruments that are 
pertinent to the reasoning domain. Such instruments would need to address Norris's 
concerns and illuminate the characteristic processes involved in beginning nurses' 
domain specific professional reasoning. 
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Another point which was particularly pertinent to this study design is the fact that 
nurses acquire data upon which their reasoning and clinical decisions are based upon 
information from a variety of sensory modalities and not just written material. 
Examples of these are: hearing, seeing, feeling, smelling (Auscultatory, visual, tactile 
& olfactory stimuli). Any instrumentation designed to facilitate the above issues 
would need to reflect aspects of such sensory modalities. 
In summary, the literature reveals that, although numerous studies have been 
conducted in relation to nurses critical thinking, they appear exclusively to adopt a 
psychometric approach. None identified to date have attempted a more qualitative 
approach to identify the natural processes of nurses' critical reasoning, or why the 
body of evidence regarding pre and post registration educational outcomes may be 
inconclusive regarding the existence or extent of critical thinking. A suitable 
alternative methodology that would address these shortcomings, therefore, had to be 
developed for this purpose. 
4.5 Examining Alternative Methods for the Appraisal of Critical Thinking 
Given the nature of nursing practice and the scope of data acquisition upon which 
practice is dependent, plus the nature of the above methodological problems, it seems 
conceivable that if one intends to examine the processes and products of beginning 
nurses cognition from a non-physiological perspective, then the processes and 
products of beginning nurses' cognition must in some way be made public, and 
captured for analysis. One method for facilitating the expression and recording of 
subjects thinking as verbal data, is that of the 'think aloud technique' (Newell & 
Simon, 1972; Ericsson & Simon, 1984). This was the method of choice for the 
qualitative data collection phases of the study design. 
Oral discourse and Socratic teaching methods have a long history of being an 
acceptable way of capturing an individuals reasoning. Coles & Robinson (1989, p. 9) 
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contend that " Since linguistic communication is the primary vehicle of education, 
most teaching programmes centre their attention on language. Though thinking is not 
all done with language, that is how it is usually conveyed, recorded and taught. " 
Through oral discourse people are said to impose order on the randomness of 
perception which helps make sense of themselves and the world. Even those who 
primarily work within non-linguistic sign systems, for example painters, musicians, 
architects and mathematicians, articulate their intentions and describe their methods 
through oral discourse (Marzano et al., 1988). At a more generative level Van Dijk 
(1980) claims that all discourse arises from specific intentions, that is, they represent 
the thought behind the message. Schlesinger (1971) also maintains speech reflects an 
individual's thinking, asserting that the intentions behind utterances are the kernels of 
creation. Even when speakers may be unaware, their speech reflects their intentions. 
McPeck (1981, p. 63) also appears to support the interrelationship between speech 
and cognition, by stipulating that "... we must assume that a person's utterances and 
behaviour are the most direct evidence of what he is thinking or has thought. " The 
value of data obtained from think aloud methods is founded on assumptions about 
verbal reports as data as summarised below by Ericson & Simon (1984; 1993): 
1. The cognitive processes that generate verbalisations are a subset of the 
cognitive processes that generate any type of recordable response or 
behaviour; 
2. Human cognition is information processing, a sequence of internal 
states successively transformed by a series of information processes; 
3. Information recently acquired and currently being attended to is 
directly accessible as verbal data, using think aloud methods. 
4. The instruction to verbalise concurrently does not alter the course of 
subject's cognitive processes. (Reactivity) 
5. The instruction to verbalise does not significantly alter the speed of 
task performance. 
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Ericson & Simon (1993) also propose a model of verbalisation comprising three 
levels of verbalisation with associated intermediate processes. 
Level 1- Simply the verbalisation of covert articulatory or oral encodings. 
At this level, there is no intermediate processing and no special effort is 
required from the subject in order to communicate his thoughts (talk aloud). 
Level 2- Involves description or rather explication of the thought content. 
Verbalisations are assigned to this level when they bring no new information 
into the focus of the subject's attention, but only explicate or label 
information held in a compressed internal format (information reception). 
Further encoding may be required as in the case of explicating information 
not isomorphic with language such as smells. Subjects verbalising at level 2 
can be expected to take longer to complete a task, than a subject not 
verbalising. However, Ericson & Simon (1993) hypothesise such recoding 
does not alter the structure of the process for performing the main task. 
Level 3- This level of verbalisation requires the subject to explain his 
thought processes or thoughts. An explanation of thoughts, ideas, 
hypotheses, or their motives is not merely a recoding of information already 
present in short term memory, but requires linking this information to earlier 
thoughts and information attended to previously. Level 2 does not involve 
such interpretative processes. (Integration of incoming information to 
previously internalised knowledge structures). 
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4.6 Verbal Reports as Data 
The last fifteen years has marked a notable increase in the use of verbal data to study 
cognitive processes in various areas of psychology, education, cognitive science and 
nursing. Concurrent and retrospective verbal reports are now recognised generally as 
appropriate sources of data on subjects' cognitive processes in specific tasks 
(Anderson, 1987). The popularity of the method, however, has waxed and waned. 
The verbal explication of thoughts, that is, 'thinking aloud' was used early this 
century by Claper ede (1934) and has been used extensively since that time in the 
information processing approach to cognition and other paradigms (DeGroot, 1965; 
Newell, 1966; Newell & Simon, 1972; Gagne & Smith, 1962). Claper'ede 
considered it a credible procedure since it involved neither introspection nor 
retrospection. However, it did have certain drawbacks in that it required training and 
some subjects did not speak during the most interesting and active moments of 
problem solving. Neisser (1967) criticised the procedure on the grounds that speech 
is perforce sequential, and using speech to reports problem solving processes may 
make it appear or become sequential, when it may actually be operating on many 
levels simultaneously. Similarly McGuire (1976) cautioned that thinking aloud may 
make problem-solving appear (or even be) more orderly than it is. 
Ericson & Simon (1980) suggest that concern for understanding the course of 
cognitive processes has revived interest in discovering means to improve the quality 
of observations of behaviour to reveal in greater detail intermediate stages of these 
processes. One such means is the use of verbal reports as data, particularly, in the 
form of verbal protocols for analysis. From a psychological perspective a protocol 
refers to a blow by blow record of an individual's behaviour whilst engaged on a 
cognitive task, as a source of psychological data (Bryne, 1983). The recorded 
protocol often consists of a stream of verbal comments constituting a part of a 
problem path which reflects the individuals underlying reasoning in relation to the 
task at hand. The verbal report of reasoning is now observable and therefore 
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amenable to analysis. This conversion of thought to verbalisation is achieved by 
employing the technique of'thinking aloud', a process which Benjafield (1969) refers 
to as the direct output of inner speech. Crow et at. (1980) further portend that 
verbalisation in this context permits observation of the processes of decision making. 
Thinking aloud may, thus, be conceived in part as introspective and can be found in 
the three categories of Radford's (1974) taxonomy of introspective methods as 
follows: 
Thinking aloud; 
Self - Report; 
Self -Observation (Introspection proper). 
Radford (1974) refers to Tichener, an introspectionist who believed that inner 
experience could be observed, just as behaviourists would observe an organism's 
behaviour. Moreover protocol analysis is closely associated with the types of fine- 
grain observations of behaviour used successfully by the ethnologist (Tinbergen, 
1963) and treats verbalised mental events merely as pieces of behaviour, not as forms 
of explanation for such behaviour. 
An important distinction, then, is that protocol analysis examines patterns and 
sequences in a continuous stream of behaviour (Byrne, 1983) but does not attempt to 
explain the processes involved. Ericson & Simon (1993) clarify this issue by 
suggesting that thought processes can be described as a sequence of states. Each 
state contains the end products of cognitive processes. Examples of such processes 
are information retrieved from long term memory (recall), information perceived and 
recognised (interpretation) and information generated by inference (extrapolation). 
The information in a state is relatively stable and can, therefore, be input into a 
verbalisation process and reported orally. However, the retrieval and recognition 
processes delivering the end products, that is the information, to attention cannot be 
reported. 
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The results of protocol analysis according to Linde & Labov (1975), shows the rules 
of linguistic discourse, though Bryne (1982) believes they may also be treated as 
showing the form of representation of the information. Either way, the analysis is one 
of describing pattern regularities in a stream of (verbal) behaviour, from which 
analysts may infer meaning or performance. 
Ericson & Simon (1993, p. 217) believe "... recorded verbalisations can be conceived 
of as data. " They caution, however, the proviso that one does not assume that the 
verbalised description accurately reflects the internal structure of processes , or of 
heeded information, or that it has any privileged status as a direct observation. They 
further stipulate that models that can regenerate the verbalisation can be constructed 
and evaluated without such assumptions. This may be taken to mean that the method 
used for analysing patterns of verbalised content, will not be used to infer how the 
information was internally formulated in order to produce the verbalisation. 
Although the use of verbal reports as data is widely used and supported, it does have 
its critics. Modem psychology has been vague regarding the uses of verbalisation 
produced by a subject along the route to a response or solution. Even more dubious 
has been the status of subject responses to experimenter probes, or retrospective 
answers to questions about prior behaviour. These types of verbal behaviour are 
often dismissed as variants of the often discredited process of introspection (Nissbett 
& Wilson, 1977). This results from the general argument that introspection has uses 
in the discovery of psychological processes but is worthless for verification. 
Much of the scepticism surrounding aspects or introspection arise from 
disagreements over definition and tense. The previous description of protocol 
analysis by Byrne (1983) refers to verbalising whilst on a cognitive task. This 
indicates present tense and is recognised as concurrent verbalisation. By contrast, 
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Byrne believes analysing the content of verbal reports collected retrospectively, in 
order to explain other behaviour, is not regarded as protocol analysis. For this reason 
Burgoyne's (1975) use of the term protocol analysis in his "inductive analysis of 
content" is deemed inappropriate. Burgoyne asked subjects to think aloud while 
coming to evaluative judgements about their learning experiences. This is clearly an 
example of posteriori retrospection that brought into question the reliability of the 
data. Nissbett & Wilson (1977, p. 25 1) echo this sentiment and note that "... removal 
in time from the actual occurrence reduces the accuracy of the report. " The potential 
effect of such events is that subjects may reconstruct partially forgotten material, so 
rendering the data unreliable. Ericson & Simon (1993), however, report a change in 
their views of the reliability of retrospective reports in certain instances, In light of 
continued experience in eliciting retrospective reports, and much - improved 
instructional procedures. In studies related to individuals reasoning Fonteyn et al. 
(1993) suggest the possibility of obtaining fuller descriptions of the reasoning used 
during a particular cognitive task, by augmenting concurrent think aloud data with 
retrospective data from subsequent interviews. Kuipers et al. (1988) also advocated 
this approach contending that, while concurrent think aloud protocols are sensitive to 
the subject's natural control and flow of knowledge in relation to problem solving, it 
is insensitive to the limits of knowledge stored and its application to problem solving. 
Asking the subject to respond to post protocol questioning related to the problem at 
hand overcomes this deficit and provides a richer account of subject reasoning. 
Joseph & Patel (1990) concur with this approach claiming that although think aloud 
protocols provide rich data about concurrent reasoning, and changes in subjects' 
representation of a problem, they are limited to providing no more than global 
information about subjects' processing. 
Similarly, although guided interviews provide detailed data about subjects' 
representation in memory and inferences based on knowledge domain, they are 
limited in the volume of information provided about the problem solving process. 
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The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that studies combining both methods may 
provide the fullest description of subject reasoning and decision making. 
Combining concurrent verbalisation with retrospective data has been used in a variety 
of studies investigating clinician's problem solving and reasoning strategies 
(Kuipers et al., 1988; Grobe et al., 1991; Fonteyn & Fisher, 1993; Fonteyn & Grobe, 
1994). 
The above studies, among others, have developed and utilised several approaches to 
data collection. By far the most common of these is that of client simulations (Grier, 
1976; Barrows et at., 1982; Ferrand, Holzemer, & Schleutermann, 1982; Kassirer, 
Kuipers, & Gorry, 1982; Putzier, Padrick, Westfall, & Tanner, 1985; Freidman, 
Prywes, & Benbasset, 1989; Sims & Fought, 1989). The equivalency of client- 
simulations to real-life situations have been supported in health care research 
(Holzemer, Resnik, & Slichter, 1986; Holzemer & McLaughlin, 1988), although this 
needs to be viewed against a background of inconclusive evidence as to the 
effectiveness of simulation as an educational tool (Megarry, 1977; Winer & Vasquez 
- Abad, 1981; Barnett, 1984). 
Simulations of the professional practicum utilising a variety of instruments have been 
developed to facilitate domain specific learning and data collection. Examples of 
these instruments are: written case studies; 3-D models; computer simulations; 
videotaped vignettes; role play; multi-media approaches and simulated patient cases. 
Simulations are particularly relevant to health professional research and education 
because they are able to parallel reality when constructed well (Miller, 1987). They 
enable investigators to approximate the clinical practicum while controlling for 
possible variables found in real-life situations (Fonteyn, 1991). Simulations can 
convey to the learner / subject an understanding of the complexity of a system that 
may be composed of many simultaneously-acting processes, in a controlled manner 
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(Stead, 1990). Simulations can be designed to facilitate the application of knowledge 
to situations without the attendant risks of client harm. Kimmel (1988) similarly 
warns of the ethical dilemmas facing researchers regarding the preservation of "pure" 
data, and the prospect of observing unfavourable practice without interference in 
actual practice. Simulations in this context can overcome this potential dilemma and 
facilitate the acquisition of data reflecting truer replicas of performance. 
Furthermore client simulations provide opportunities for participants to deal with the 
consequences of their actions, thus facilitating valuable learning insights without 
actual cost to the client or the learner or respondent. Finally from a research 
perspective simulations can provide observable evidence of performance and 
standards. Miller's (1987) taxonomy of simulation types (table 4.6.1) reflects the 
'fidelity' of each type and provides a useful tool for researcher / educationalist choice. 
The level or degree of fidelity however, in this context, refers to how true to life the 
simulation can be to accomplish its objectives, given for example, that professional 
accountability is not evident and the imposition of real-time unpredictable extraneous 
variable is absent. 
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Table 4.6.1 Miller's Taxonomy of Simulation Types. 
Type Example Fidelity Typical use Example of use 
Written Paper and very low Teach knowledge, Patient 
simulation pencil, latent assessment. management / 
image. dia osis 
3-D models Mannequins Low Demonstration Pelvic 
examination. 
Computer Microcomputer Medium Teach cognitive Clinical 
simulation skills / problem Management 
solving 
assessment. 
Multi-media Computer linked High Teach complex Physiological 
videodiscs skills. diagnosis and 
manage ent. 
Simulated patient. Trained actor Very high Teach inter - Simulated 
personal skills mother. 
Miller, (1987 p. 36). 
The conclusions drawn from the literature were that an alternative method would 
need to be developed in order to: 
Facilitate student nurse reasoning about a suitably complex aspect of 
nursing practice; 
Provide a stimulus as the basis for the respondents' cognitive task; 
Combine concurrent and retrospective subject data; 
(Levels 2&3 Verbalisation) 
Simulate a nurse/client interaction; 
Facilitate the description of student nurse reasoning in relation to eliciting 
evidence of critical thinking; 
Be suitable to learner's level of knowledge. 
4.7 Development of instruments and procedures for data collection 
The following section deals with the development and piloting of methods and 
technology to satisfy the above objectives. Questions surrounding the above are 
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addressed by recourse to the relevant literature and by issues arising out of the pilot 
study (n = 10) conducted to develop and test the data collection procedures. 
Data collection design, pilot study, implementation and modification of data 
collection methods: instrumentation for phases 2&3. 
For phases two and three the aim was to determine the most effective method of 
producing high quality and valid qualitative data consistently, in order to achieve the 
purpose of this particular investigation. This required the development and testing of 
suitable data collection methods. Given that concurrent and retrospective verbal 
protocols were required the appropriate literature was reviewed. This revealed 
several issues that would need to be addressed in the development and application of 
the qualitative instrumentation. These issues are portrayed in the following 
instrumentation related sub-headings: 
0 1. Factors that facilitate or inhibit the processes of thinking aloud. 
" 2. The range of think aloud instrumentation, e. g. videotaped simulation, 
written case study, or other audio visual media, that could provide 
appropriate data. 
3. The completeness of the verbal reports as a record of concurrent task- 
oriented student nurse reasoning about health status, and the role that 
prompting plays in this. 
" 4. Procedures used to complement the concurrent protocols to facilitate 
as complete a description of student nurse critical reasoning about health 
status as possible. 
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5. The technology required to collect verbal data, and its appropriate 
employment. 
" 6. Respondents' instructions for thinking aloud. 
" 7. Evaluation of instrumentation for phases 2&3. 
4.7.1 Factors that facilitate or inhibit the processes of thinking aloud. 
Asking a subject to make their thoughts explicit by verbalising them or'thinking 
aloud' should not unduly affect the performance of cognitive tasks, providing the 
information required is appropriate to the task (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Bryne, 
1983; Henry et al. 1989; Norris, 1990) and the respondent wishes to participate in 
the task of verbalising. Problems of self - consciousness and cultural restraints, e. g. 
the encouragement to keep your thoughts to yourself (Lichtenstein, 1982), may be 
overcome by introducing subjects to the concept of thinking aloud in a light-hearted 
and non-threatening manner prior to the data collection proper. Previous researchers 
have used simple mathematical problems e. g. multiplication of several numbers, 
water - jug problems and mental paper folding as a means of familiarising subjects to 
the concept of thinking aloud. Hayes (1982, p. 86) supports these exercises by 
claiming 'subjects who give more than one protocol say the procedure becomes 
more comfortable with practice. ' Ericson & Simon (1993) also point to the 
importance of subjects conducting 'warm up' tasks positing that this appears to 
eliminate silence due to misunderstandings of the instruction to think aloud. Given 
that nursing behaviour in the main results from data acquired via sensory modalities 
and encoding of visual stimuli in particular, the use of visual scenes appears 
applicable in that they may more accurately reflect everyday practice environs. The 
author proposed to use videotaped scenes of commonly experienced events as a 
means of encouraging respondents to think aloud. The current choices of videotaped 
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subject matter are, firstly, a tennis match and, secondly, a form of silent traffic scene. 
The rationale for the former is that given the time of year (Wimbledon tournament) 
and the national popularity for this and other sports, It was envisaged that many 
individuals would have witnessed commentary of sporting events and, therefore, 
would have some idea of the type of things to say and when to say them. Secondly, 
the act of driving requires constant attention to situations and conditions which 
informs subsequent psycho-motor activities. Driving is also familiar to large numbers 
of the populace, so familiar, that many aspects of driving for many may, in some 
circumstances, have become so automated as to be undertaken subconsciously. 
Therefore, because driving has become such a routine daily activity for many, as has 
the recognition of traffic situations and hazards for pedestrians, merely explicating 
what they attend to during the scene should not pose great difficulties. The 
perceived outcome of this strategy is that respondents will practice thinking and 
talking aloud in a non-threatening environment which will facilitate an increase in 
comfort and a reduction in self - consciousness, thus, facilitating the acquisition of 
verbal data. 
After conducting several pilot experiments the tennis match warm up video was 
abandoned. The researcher had overestimated the game's familiarity and following, 
particularly in a culturally diverse group, resulting in poor think aloud data from 
confused and reticent participants. The traffic scene worked well, however, even 
respondents who were not drivers participated well and continuous verbal data was 
forthcoming. A second warm up programme was sought using a similar scenario. 
This time, however, it was decided to include the additional cognitive load of 
incoming verbal data in preparation for the clinical simulation proper. Assistance was 
sought from the West Midlands Police training college and a suitable traffic scene 
with accompanying commentary was secured. A simple task was set and participants 
were asked to verbalise their task oriented reasoning concurrently. This exercise was 
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also successful and respondents verbalised comfortably and consistent levels of 
verbal data were forthcoming. 
4.7.2 The range of think aloud instrumentation, e. g. videotaped simulation, 
written case study, or other audio visual media, that could provide appropriate 
data. 
Client simulation was the instrument of choice given its designated high fidelity with 
regards to Miller's (1987) taxonomy, the aims of the investigation and conclusions 
drawn from the literature. A variety of methodologically similar studies have utilised 
either written case studies, interview/cross examination techniques, videotaped 
simulations or combinations of these approaches (Corcoran, 1986; Westfall et al. 
1986; Kuipers et al. 1988; Grobe et al. 1991). None of these studies, however, 
focused on the concept of critical thinking. Written case studies were discounted on 
the grounds previously discussed as this would only perpetuate the measuring of 
critical thinking in reading and in light of the fact that nurses attend to far more 
divergent data in their clinical decision making. Three-dimensional models were also 
discounted on the grounds of expense and the difficulties anticipated in developing 
scenarios of sufficient cognitive complexity suitable to the early stages of subject 
education and experience at the time of data collection. The types available in most 
medical institutions are used predominantly for the practice of certain psycho- 
motor/clinical skills and the learning of anatomy and physiology. Their availability is 
somewhat limited in most institutions that could have resulted in the need to 
purchase a model solely for the study. 
Computer simulations would need to be of the virtual reality calibre to reflect 
anywhere near the high fidelity of a client simulation. The availability of such 
programmes pertinent to the research topic negated their use. Human model 
simulations were considered for their very high fidelity but problems of availability of 
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suitable actors for the proposed number of data collection experiments, plus issues of 
standardisation and expense deemed this method unsuitable. 
The possibility of using real patients during actual healthcare encounters was 
explored initially as a naturalistic alternative and ecologically valid instrument for 
examining concurrent professional reasoning. This approach raised the possible 
ethical dilemma of causing patient and respondent distress by the need to externalise 
respondents' thinking (Jones, 1989). This may be compounded by the nature of 
patient's health problems and the respondent's learner status. Greenwood & King 
(1995, p. 908) disagree with this sentiment on the grounds that "... nurses already 
think aloud in front of patients, especially when explaining care rationales to clinical 
teachers. " This begs the question as to the discrete nature of the care rationales and 
whether clinical teachers would expect and support learners in thinking aloud 
potentially distressing and confidential information in an essentially public learning 
encounter. In contrast, however, to their belief that thinking aloud in real practice is 
ethically sound, Greenwood & King requested that their nurse subjects selectively 
filtered any potentially distressing information from their verbal protocols. They 
defend this strategy by claiming that because the information was selectively filtered, 
it would thus be remembered and be made available for retrospective reports of 
reasoning in the absence of the patient. One question surrounding the validity of such 
a strategy however is, how might the respondent's decision making regarding what 
would constitute distressing information to an individual affect the primary reasoning 
processes and subsequent recall? 
Given the arguments above, video-taped client simulations appeared to be the 
instrument of choice because of their designated high fidelity and ethical congruence. 
They also facilitated an array of alternatives from which to choose in the form of 
vignettes and a large stock of pre-recorded examples was available at the host 
institution. A cautionary nose ngpded to be made at this point in relation to the 
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theoretical validity of non-interference between verbalisation and primary process 
and the potential effect a videotaped client simulation might impose on this. Russo et 
al. (1989) summarise the conditions for validity of this claim as follows: 
1. Subjects report only the contents of short-term memory (STM). 
2. Those contents are in oral form, i. e. coded as a string of phonemes. 
This, thus, excludes tasks that require recoding from non-oral representations as in 
pictorial mode to an oral one which may draw on differing processing resources. 
Tasks such as the one envisaged for this client simulation will involve data in oral 
form and pictorial form, hence a degree of recoding will be necessary. Rehearsal of 
previously attended to information may also be a feature of the primary task, which 
can place a heavy burden on STM. Ericson and Simon (1993, p. 249) warn that: 
"Interruption and suppression of rehearsal lead to a rapid loss of 
information from STM. Hence we would expect that prolonged attention 
to items in STM to allow verbalisation will be disruptive of tasks that 
impose loads on STM. " 
In order to reduce STM burden imposed by pictorial recoding, and loss of 
information in STM by suppression of rehearsal a question was posed to pilot 
respondents in the form of: 
" If you were gathering information from a client in an assessment 
situation, what would you do if you felt you have missed, misheard or 
forgotten a piece of information? " 
In response to this all pilot respondents answered similarly, in that they would ask the 
client to recap information generally or ask them to repeat specific information. In 
order to parallel this strategy it was proposed that pilot respondents have control of a 
remote control facility. This would enable them to rewind the videotape should they 
experience high processing burdens or missed information. This theoretically should 
facilitate the rehearsal of previously attended to information, reduce burdens on STM 
and promote completeness of descriptions of respondent reasoning. 
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Once chosen, a particular videotaped vignette would provide a stable, consistent 
clinical scenario for repeated exposures. Choice of client simulation posed a degree 
of difficulty in considering the following variables: 
Professional topic; 
Type of scenario; 
Length and complexity of simulation. 
Many hours of viewing ensued and finally a pre-recorded videotape was found which 
seemed suitable for the study purpose. The videotaped simulation chosen focused on 
issues of individuals' health status. This was deemed pertinent to the study because of 
the changing philosophical emphasis within the project 2000 curriculum which 
advocates an individualised, community-based, health promotional approach to 
nursing in contrast to the previously hospital based, medically modelled approach to 
intervention and care. Health as a concept is sufficiently complex to require critical 
thinking when decisions are to be made in relation to individual's health status. The 
importance placed on health by individuals and its meaning, is subjective, 
multifactorial, changeable, directly determined by contextual considerations and, 
therefore, is not amenable to simple yes or no responses. Concepts of health and 
illness vary among different groups within a single society and between societies over 
time. Aggleton (1990) further points to the complexity of health related decisions 
positing that some people may be healthy according to some criteria but not 
according to others. These issues imply a degree of critical reasoning that extends 
beyond hypothetico-deductive models of reasoning used in theories of medical 
decision making, where even ill-structured patient problems have a reasonably stable 
endpoint in the form of a diagnosis (Barrows & Feltovich, 1987). When decisions 
are to be made about a client's health status and subsequent interventions they would 
need to be informed by professional, individual, and contextual frames of reference 
which render them complex, indeterminate, and worthy of complex reasoning. 
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Another relevant factor in choosing a health-oriented simulation is that of the broad 
conceptual changes in the project 2000 curriculum. Kenworthy et al., (1992) allude 
to the need for nursing to be health oriented rather than illness driven. The issue of 
health as opposed to health care is also central to recent World Health Organisation 
(1985) and British Governments Health of the Nation (1991) strategies which called 
for an end to the preoccupation with treating illness and a move towards improving 
the healthy span of life. The making of health related decisions will clearly become an 
integral part of the future nurse's role. The making of these types of decision require 
that the decision-maker contemplates the prospect of more than one justifiable 
answer. The quality of the decision or answer should not be predicated right, merely 
in the sense of truth, but on the quality of the justification in context. It is for this 
reason that health as a focus for describing beginning nurses reasoning strategies 
seemed a suitably complex topic that would act as a catalyst for critical thinking. 
Issues of Reliability and Validity 
The reliability of the instrument is predominantly viewed in relation to Ericson & 
Simon's (1993) Pertinence of Verbalisation to Cognitive Process criteria which 
include a relevance criterion, a consistency criterion, and a memory criterion. 
The videotaped client simulation of choice was entitled " Whose Health is it 
Anyway? " The instrument comprises four vignettes of individuals in their natural 
social settings, discussing aspects of their lives and lifestyles. Each vignette lasts 
approximately 10 minutes and is supported by an accompanying narrative, giving 
additional information. The video is produced as an educational aid and commences 
with a discussion regarding the construct 'health' and its associated complexity. Each 
vignette concludes with a series of questions posed for the audience to stimulate 
reasoning. Given that this instrument is being used in part to facilitate the description 
of individual's reasoning in relation to a particular construct the following issues 
warranted consideration: 
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1. Will the respondent's verbalisations be pertinent to the cognitive processes. 
That is, will this simulation in conjunction with other instructions 
provide a consistent stimulus for respondents to reason about health status; 
2. Will this simulation in conjunction with other instructions and 
equipment generate consistent volumes of verbal data. 
The former issue relates to therelevance criterion and focuses on the relevance of 
verbalisations to given tasks. If, for example, all the observed verbalisations were 
irrelevant to the task pertinence could not be claimed. Newell & Simon (1972) attest 
to the fact that a priori task analysis will reveal what kind of information would be 
relevant to task performance. This issue also relates to nonveridicality of generated 
protocols (Russo et al., 1989). A protocol is nonveridical if it does not accurately 
reflect the underlying primary process. Nonveridicalities may include errors of 
omission, that is not reporting some thoughts or errors of commission as in the 
reporting of fabricated mental events. The very nature of the simulation and its 
intended educational purpose instilled significant confidence in its ability to achieve 
these aims. However, in order to augment instrument reliability in this context an 
added verbal instruction was devised in the form of 
"I want you to imagine that you are in a nurse-client interaction. The 
client named Billy is claiming that he is perfectly healthy and does not 
require any advice. I want you to make a decision as to whether you feel 
this is the case based on the information presented to you. " 
A pilot study involving ten respondents and using the above video and verbal 
instruction provided evidence that this aspect of the instrument consistently 
facilitated respondent reasoning about the identified individual's health status (Task), 
therefore, satisfying the above criterion. 
In relation to the latter issue a consistency criterion applies. To meet this criterion 
verbalisations hould be pertinent, and be logically consistent with the verbalisations 
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that immediately precede them. Should the items in a sequence of verbalisations not 
be related to each other or consistent, then independent or random processes could 
explain their generation. This could refute the claims that the verbalisations are goal- 
directed, cumulative processes with the potential for generating answers and 
solutions (Ericson & Simon, 1993). The converse is true if the verbalisations 
conform to the consistency criterion in that it implies a higher-level of control and 
organisation of the processes underpinning the verbalisations. 
Consistency in this context does not, therefore, apply to the volume of data 
generated in each experiment. There is little variation between studies using think 
aloud in relation to the average rates of verbalisation. Newell & Simon (1972, p. 165) 
report that protocols average approximately two words per second citing an example 
of " 20 minutes = 2186 words. " Other think aloud protocols range from 50 - 110 
words/minute (Ohlsson, 1980; Biggs, 1978), whereas normal relaxed continuous 
talking is said to produce between 150 - 200 words per minute. With regard to these 
differing rates of verbalisation Ericson & Simon (1993) believe it would be 
unreasonable to expect respondents to verbalise faster in experiments than in normal 
conversation and words per minute is a poor measure for comparing results across 
tasks. 
The crux of the memory criterion is that a subset of the information heeded during 
task performance will be remembered. When subjects think aloud or give 
retrospective reports much of the information coming to conscious attention will be 
remembered and available for retrieval. Identification of similar information can then 
be made at two different parts of the protocol (concurrent & retrospective). If the 
verbalisations meet these criteria, Ericson & Simon (1993) assume they could only be 
produced by a processing mechanism similar to the one utilised in performing the 
original task. Meeting the memory criterion will be discussed in relation to issue 
number four. 
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4.7.3 The completeness of the verbal reports as a record of concurrent task- 
oriented student nurse reasoning about health status, and the role that 
prompting plays in this. 
It is currently well recognised that verbal reports of cognitive process are often 
incomplete. Many processes involved in undertaking a task are subconscious, this 
implies there are instances where subjects cannot or do not report their processes 
(Nissbett & Wilson, 1977; Hayes, 1982; Bryne, 1983). Experts fall into this category 
whereby many of their cognitive processes have, over time and experience become 
implicit to the point where they are unable to spontaneously explain the route to a 
solution or decision (they know more than they can say without deep deliberation). 
Incompleteness of reports does not pose great difficulties according to Newall and 
Simon (1972) who posit that verbal reports merely enable us to infer from the 
respondents verbalisations, what he knows and what operations he performs at any 
one time. Hayes (1982, p. 86) supports this position and claims that "While protocols 
are incomplete, we must recognise that they are less incomplete than nearly any other 
method available to us. " Consequently a concern for completeness should favour 
protocol analysis rather than discredit it (Hayes, 1982). 
It is, therefore, inevitable that verbal protocols will, to some degree be incomplete. 
Hayes (1982) claims the psychologists task in analysing protocols is to take the 
incomplete record provided, together with a knowledge of human capabilities 
(critical thinking abilities /dispositions in this case) and infer from these a model of 
the underlying cognitive processes by which the respondent performs the designated 
assignment. 
To further clarify this position Hayes (1982, p. 77) uses the following analogy; 
"analysing a protocol is like following the tracks of a porpoise. Occasionally, the 
porpoise reveals itself by breaking the surface of the sea. Its brief surfacings are like 
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the glimpses which the protocols afford us of underlying mental processes. Between 
surfacings, the mental processes runs deep and silent. Our task is to infer the course 
of the process from these brief traces. " The combinations of timed standardised 
prompting and cross-examination was, thus, intended to extend the brief traces and 
provide as complete a set of verbal protocols as possible. 
Experimenter prompting is commonly used in protocol analysis to maintain 
verbalisation continuity and minimise the length of respondents' lapses into silent 
thought. These issues can have implications for the completeness of the protocols but 
if used inappropriately can alter the nature of the task directed cognitive processes. 
For example, specific probes designed to elicit specific types of information may 
suggest to respondents what aspects of the task are important, or desired by the 
experimenter (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; 1984; Byrne, 1983). 
Ericsson & Simon (1993, p. 83) posit that reminders to verbalise should be '. given 
after 15 seconds to 1 minute' and are generally standardised in order to avoid 
changing the course and structure of the cognitive processes by offering cues which 
may elicit a self - observation process, or produce, "... an other - oriented description 
as a response. " An example of this would be'what are you thinking about'. Prompts 
in the concurrent protocols will, therefore, be of a standardised non - directed form, 
e. g. "please keep talking" or "remember please keep thinking aloud. " Prompts in the 
immediate post protocol questioning which is designed to expand the protocol to 
represent the limits of knowledge stored, will take a similar form to those alluded to 
above, e. g. "why do you say that? " or "what is your thinking behind that comment? " 
During the pilot study (N=10) an initial prompting strategy was to prompt after a 15 
second subject lapse into silence. This worked reasonably well for some respondents, 
but posed problems for others. Two of the early volunteer pilot respondents 
experienced problems with frequent lapses into silences of greater than 15 seconds. 
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The effect of prompts as previously described did little to enhance completeness of 
reports, and in some cases resulted in non-pertinent verbalisations. On questioning 
the respondents concerned the problem was found to be that in these two cases, 
English was not the participant's first language. Additional processing had to take 
place as a consequence leading to a situation whereby the respondents were not only 
missing items of task information but were responding inappropriately to prompts. 
The following abstract from a debriefing interview revealed the extent of the 
problem: 
" Yeah, the trouble is being a foreigner, I've been in England for only 
four years now, I do have certain problems with the English language 
because when somebody asks me a question, I've got to translate it into 
my mother language which is French, then retranslate it into English 
which might take longer compared to an British - British spoken person. " 
Ericson & Simon (1993) recognise this phenomena and use it as an example of how 
encoding processes that are not automatic can slow processes down. Persons fluent 
in a second language can usually think aloud in that language while simultaneously 
thinking silently in the oral code of their native language. Processes in this instance 
may be slowed marginally if at all. However, in other instances the amount of 
slowing will depend upon the individual's skill in the second language. 
Other debriefing reports indicated several respondent's preoccupation with the 
perceived length of their silences in relation to the agreed prompting strategy. For 
example: 
"I mean, one of the main problems which I encountered while doing this 
exercise is, for example, when a person is talking you can't let him finish 
the whole sentence. Because if you do that, the time will start elapsing. So if 
when I'm talking I don't hear what the person is saying, he might be saying a 
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very important sentence at that time, and if I missed it , it might put me 
in the 
wrong direction. " 
Although this problem was voiced by several pilot respondents they appeared to be 
prepared to accept the situation and potential missed information, because the 
rewinding facility was not used to any great extent. Conversations with think aloud 
subjects in the USA, for whom researchers only allowed a few seconds silence, 
indicated that in these circumstances respondents often consciously verbalise non- 
pertinent utterances in an effort to maintain their verbalisations. In view of these 
reports and a recognition that respondents had to attend to incoming information as 
an antecedent to their verbalisations, it was decided to double the prompting time to 
30 seconds of silence. This strategy would also satisfy the prompting and reactivity 
concerns of Russo et al. (1989) where they state that in order to reduce the reactivity 
of protocols, prompts should be kept to a minimum in most situations. 
This strategy appeared to work well in that respondents participating under these 
conditions did not report similar concerns and prompting requirements were reduced, 
although it was noted that this could be due to other factors, one being that pilot 
respondents were not from an homogenous group, i. e. they were at different stages 
of professional education and knowledge development. The use of the remote 
control facility was reinforced resulting in increased utility in some respondents. 
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4.7.4 Procedures used to complement the concurrent protocols to facilitate as 
complete a description of student nurses' critical reasoning about health status 
as possible. 
In respect of the thinking aloud technique and subsequent protocol development, 
Kuipers et al. (1988) supplement verbal protocols with Immediate posteriori cross 
examination protocols. They support this strategy by suggesting that thinking aloud 
protocols are sensitive to the natural control flow of the respondent's problem 
solving but it is insensitive to the limits of the knowledge stored. Cross-examination 
protocols on the other hand ask the respondent to respond to specific questions 
about the problem at hand. These questions probe the limits of a respondent's 
knowledge directly but are insensitive to the respondent's natural control structure. 
Combining the two methods enables the examination of different aspects of a 
respondent's knowledge and representation. 
Much of the criticism regarding veridicality of retrospective reports as data arose as 
a result of the work of Nissbett & Wilson (1977) who claimed that individuals could 
not provide veridical reports of their cognitive processes, therefore, the utility of 
reports for inferring information processes was questionable. Individuals they say do 
have access to a great storehouse of private knowledge yet do not appear to have 
access to memories of their mental processes. Nisbett & Wilson (1977, p. 233) posit 
that when asked questions about their cognitive processes, subjects frequently do not 
base answers on memories of specific events but theorise about their processes, for 
example: 
" When reporting on the effects of stimuli, people may not interrogate 
a memory of the cognitive processes that operated on the stimuli; 
instead, they may base their reports on implicit, a priori theories 
about the causal connection between stimulus and response. " 
Although this study does not propose to examine retrospective reports of 
respondents' cognitive processes, i. e., retrieval and recognition processes, it does 
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intend to describe the products of cognitive processes in the form of verbalised 
thoughts related to a task. The fact that Nisbett & Wilson (1977) assert that people 
base their reports on a priori theories and causal connections suggests a combination 
of STM and long term memory (LTM) items. In the context of this study therefore 
using a form of retrospective questioning appears eminently suitable for the 
illustration of criticality in reasoning about complex human phenomena. 
A frequent critique of many of the studies reviewed by Nisbett & Wilson (1977) 
were of instances where the time lapse between task and probe was sufficiently great 
to make it unlikely that the relevant information would remain in STM and 
consequently less accessible. Regarding this issue Ericson & Simon (1993) conclude 
that the accuracy of verbal reports depends on the procedures employed to elicit 
them and the interrelationship between the requested information and the actual 
sequence of heeded information. The central issue of methodology in this context 
then is to reduce the time lapse between task and post protocol questioning and 
request information about points previously heeded in the course of the primary task. 
In order to achieve this a similar method to Kuipers et at., (1988) was adopted with 
some modification. In using post protocol cross-examination Kuipers et at., probe the 
limits of the respondent's knowledge in a fashion akin to oral examination. This 
suggests the pressing of a subject to furnish an answer or decision to some extent. 
Given that in this study no such aim is envisaged in that, the naturalistic reasoning 
strategies employed are the primary focus as opposed to the accuracy of the decision. 
A less threatening approach was, thus, considered appropriate to avoid the possibility 
of ego threat (Gray, 1994). To illustrate the breadth, depth and application of 
knowledge, respondents were questioned immediately after their post simulation 
decision. This approach is akin to stimulated recall as identified by Elstein et al. 
(1978), but without the use of videotape. Post simulation stimulated recall will probe 
the respondent's responses to issues raised by themselves in relation to the task at 
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hand. This, it is envisaged, would require a degree of mixing of information held in 
STM with personal knowledge and experiences held in LTM 
which may influence reasoning. This should also furnish evidence sufficient to satisfy 
the memory criterion for protocol and instrument validity previously identified. 
Questions were drawn from utterances in the respondent's concurrent protocol which 
were suggestive of underlying reasoning processes, e. g. inductive or deductive 
conclusions, opinions or stereotypical assertions. The points in the protocol at which 
these arise were noted by means of a numerical travel counter integral to the 
audiotape recorder. This would enable clarification of the respondent's comments in 
the event that the researcher's fieldnotes were incomplete. Examples arising from the 
pilot studies were: 
"Why did you say Billy needs to take more exercise? " 
" Why do you think eating a lot of frozen food is such a problem? " 
" Why do you think socialising is so important to Billy's health? " 
Because the number and referential nature of questions were dependent on the nature 
of the respondent's protocol the post judgement questions could not be standardised. 
These, however, could be influenced by respondents' interaction with the task itself. 
It was proposed that this methodology would: reduce the time oriented problems of 
retrospective verbal reports; facilitate probing of the depth and breadth of 
respondents' knowledge, plus attitudes, values, beliefs and the mixing of concurrent 
and retrospective reports in order to access a global description of respondent's 
reasoning. This would have no effect on primary task performance and involve level 
2 and possibly level 3 verbalisation. 
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4.7.5 The technology required to collect verbal data, and its appropriate 
employment. 
Thus far, the methods proposed for data collection during phases 2&3 are to 
involve the subjects viewing a videotaped client simulation, whilst verbalising their 
thoughts in relation to a specific task concurrently. Respondent's verbalisations will 
be recorded simultaneously. Respondents will be offered the opportunity to 'warm up 
' or practice thinking aloud. Respondents will also be offered the opportunity to 
access missed information, or recap forgotten information. Following the videotaped 
simulation the respondents will be asked to make a task related decision, and will be 
posed another general task and construct related question. One particular critical 
thinking skill identified by Anderson (1942) Ennis (1962) and McPeck (1981) is the 
ability to recognise when there is sufficient evidence on which to base judgements. 
This is particularly applicable to nursing practice, therefore the following question 
was posed to the respondents at this point: 
" Do you think that there was enough information to enable you to make 
this type of decision? " 
Finally, respondents were questioned regarding aspects of their concurrent task 
related protocols which was also recorded. The procedure for this type of 
questioning did not involve any prompting whatsoever on the part of the researcher. 
Subjects were told that this was to be the case and when they felt that they had dealt 
with the question to their satisfaction they should indicate this by saying, for example 
"that's it. " The researcher would then proceed to the next question. This strategy 
rests on the underlying assumption that critical thinking ability, if present, is an 
autonomous and habitual activity. Paul (1992, p. 45), in relation to the human mind's 
tendency towards critical thinking, posits: 
"It is certainly of the nature of the mind to think - spontaneously, 
continuously, and pervasively - but it is not of the nature of the human mind 
to think critically about the standards and principles guiding its spontaneous 
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thought. It has no built-in drive to question its innate tendency to believe 
what it wants to believe, what makes it comfortable, what is simple rather 
than complex, and what is commonly believed and socially rewarded. The 
human mind is ordinarily at peace with itself as it internalises and creates 
biases, prejudices, falsehoods, half-truths and distortions. Compartmentalised 
contradictions do not by their very nature disturb those who take them in and 
selectively use them. " 
This proposes critical thinking to be a conscious effort, therefore, if the curriculum 
intentions are being achieved evidence of the development or presence of critical 
thought should be evident in the reasoning of student nurses in situations that 
warrant it. It is also recognised that the strategy of not prompting respondents during 
their stimulated recall responses may add another context to the nature of these 
responses if not clearly explained. 
Together, the recorded concurrent verbalisations plus the verbal reports pertaining to 
the respondents' post decision stimulated recall would constitute the qualitative data. 
The equipment required to conduct the above experiments included (Table 4.7.5.1): 
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Table 4.7.5.1 Equipment Required for Qualitative Data Collection. 
1, VHS video recorder, 
1, Television Monitor 
1, Audiotape recorder with integral numerical counter 
1, Tie microphone 
Blank audiotapes, approximately 1 per subject 
1, Remote control facility 
1, Set of headphones to isolate simulation narrative from subject 
verbalisations. 
1, Digital stopwatch for prompting purposes (30 secs) 
1, Pre-recorded client simulation (video) 
2, Pre-recorded videotaped warm up tasks 
1, Table to accommodate equipment and taking of fieldnotes 
2, Chairs - (1 subject; 1- researcher) 
Fieldnotes equipment as required. 
The above equipment was deployed in a psychological laboratory, in order to 
promote a less threatening environment, respondent privacy, respondent 
confidentiality, noise and extraneous stimuli reduction and enhanced recording 
quality. 
4.7.6 Instructions for Participants. 
The use of precise instructions to subjects with regard to the means and importance 
of thinking aloud is strongly advocated by all workers in the protocol analysis field 
(Ericson & Simon, 1993; Bryne, 1983; Hayes, 1982; Grobe et al., 1991; Westfall et 
al. 1986; Fonteyn & Grobe, 1994). Instructions for the purposes of this study are to 
be given in written and verbal format. Written instructions appear at Appendix 2. 
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The recruitment strategy involved the verbal explanation of the nature and aims of 
the proposed study, followed by a request for the entire group to undertake the 
WGCTA in the third week of their new course. In order to preserve the integrity of 
the test, the precise name of the test was withheld and the group were asked if they 
would consent to undertake a pencil and paper reasoning test in a pre & post test 
design. The methods of data collection for phases 2 and 3 were then explained and 
volunteers requested. Some 20 volunteers were forthcoming after this initial request, 
which in relation to general qualitative sample sizes appeared more than sufficient. 
This number was, however, reduced to 13 as volunteers withdrew their consent upon 
further deliberation. The volunteer strategy would also ensure randomisation of 
sample. A consent form was designed to include both aspects of data collection, and 
this was administered to the group following ethical committee approval (See 
appendix 3 and appendix 4). 
4.7.7 Evaluation of the Instrumentation for Phases 2&3. 
The methodology in relation to phase 2 and 3 data collection was evaluated from 
data provided by a pilot respondent debriefing questionnaire (see appendix 5). 
Volunteer pilot study respondents (N=10) predominantly evaluated the preparation 
for and the conduction of the experiments positively as previously discussed. Certain 
comments have resulted in modification of methods to good effect. The range and 
deployment of equipment is deemed fit for purpose. Finally, primary analysis of the 
sets of pilot verbal data appears to meet the relevance, consistency, veridicality and 
memory criterion outlined. This evaluation utilised four tests of protocol validity as 
proposed by Ericson & Simon (1993) as follows: 
1. If a verbalisation describes a situation that the subject can perceive 
directly, its correspondence with the stimuli can be checked; 
2. Its relevance to the task and the plausible steps towards a solution 
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(as determined by task analysis) can be assessed; 
3. Its consistency with just previously verbalised information presumed 
to be in STM can be checked; 
4. Whenever there is reason to believe that verbalised information will be 
committed to memory, its presence in memory can be tested by 
subsequent demands for recall or recognition. (as in post protocol 
questioning). 
4.8 The data 
The quantitative data relative to phases 1 and 4 of the study will be in the form of 
numerical scores achieved by the individual respondents from the 80 item WGCTA 
test. These will be subject to appropriate statistical tests in order to identify mean 
scores and correlations with specific descriptive variables. The qualitative data will 
comprise the recorded verbal data relative to phases 2 and 3, collected by the means 
identified. This will then be transcribed verbatim, resulting in a collection of written 
text generated by transcription of audiotapes encapsulating the description of 




Study Design and Data Collection Procedures 
5.1 Research Design Rationale. 
Given the problem background issues, the nature and scope of the research questions 
and the issues identified in the theoretical and empirical literature review, a descriptive 
exploratory design incorporating across-method triangulation within a longitudinal case 
study was developed. This incorporated same subject multi-phase sampling to produce 
evidence of changes in the intended behavioural outcome (critical thinking) as a result of 
the CFP curriculum. These aspects of design in relation to this study are discussed 
below. 
5.1.1 Descriptive - Exploratory Design 
The descriptive-exploratory design elements are appropriate because the study's intention 
was to examine a discrete characteristic (critical thinking) in a specific population (Brink 
& Woods, 1988). The population in this context are a group of Project 2000 student 
nurses undertaking their pre-registration education at the, then, Sister Dora College of 
Nursing and Midwifery. The design, thus, entails one variable, albeit a complex one, and 
one population to be studied over time (the duration of a specific component of the 
curriculum). Another aspect of the design is the development of an alternative 
methodology to the type which has predominated in previous studies as described in 
chapter two. The flexibility associated with this research design is warranted given the 
developmental status of the task and the anticipated lack of researcher control over the 
process of illuminative quasi-naturalistic qualitative data collection. In other words the 
data will be observed as they happen and recorded with the minimum of researcher 
control whilst facilitating participant control of their reasoning processes. The aim of the 
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approach is to produce new knowledge relating to critical thinking as an outcome of a 
particular nursing curriculum compared with that generated by formal instruments such 
as the Watson & Glaser instruments 
5.1.2 Case -Study 
Aspects of the case study method also complement the purpose of this study for three 
reasons: 
1. It intends to explore a single unit of study in the form of one institution. 
2. A small number of participants are involved who are examined intensively 
3. Case studies have the potential for revealing important findings that can 
generate new hypotheses for testing. Thus, case studies can lead to future 
larger sample studies (Burns & Grove, 1995). 
5.1.3 Longitudhual Studies 
The main value of a longitudinal approach to this study was the ability to demonstrate 
trends or changes over time and the temporal sequencing of phenomena which is 
purported to reflect causality (Polft & Hungler, 1989). Establishing causality is not, 
however, the remit of this study. Various types of longitudinal study exist but the type of 
particular relevance to this study is that of panel studies, in which the same participants 
are used to supply data at multiple points in time. Since the same people are examined 
repeatedly, the researcher can identify the participants who did and did not change and 
possibly identify characteristics of the sub-groups. Potential problems with this design 
are that they can be extremely difficult and expensive to manage, and participants may be 
lost at different points in the study. Attrition is problematic for the researcher in that the 
participants lost to the study may differ in important aspects from the people who 
remain. This may impair the generalisability of the findings. Given, however, the 
evaluative, descriptive and, therefore, illuminative status of this research in parallel with 
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the non-probability sampling strategy, the issue of generalisability at this stage does not 
apply. The key outcome is to establish methods to illuminate the existence or degree to 
which critical thinking exists as a programme behavioural outcome in student nurse's 
real-time clinically oriented reasoning. 
The following longitudinal programme of data collection was thus developed to facilitate 
evaluation of the effect of the eighteen month CFP curriculum upon subjects critical 
thinking abilities. 
<0 mths- -- Common Foundation Programme Continuum - -18 mths> 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
(Pre-test) Think Aloud Think Aloud (Post-test) 
WGCTA Verbal reports Verbal reports WGCTA 
Phase I (Month 1) 
Aimed to establish the degree of content independent critical thinking ability as an 
element of respondents' entry behaviour, by using the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking 
Appraisal, Form C (1991, UK Edition). 
Phase 2 (Month 9) 
Aimed to determine evidence of critical thinking ability in relation to a nursing context. 
This involved the collection of concurrent and retrospective verbal data whilst 
respondents were engaged in a nursing oriented cognitive task and subsequent protocol 
analysis. This was timetabled 9 months into the programme for reasons identified below. 
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Phase 3 (Month 17) 
The aim for this phase was as for phase 2 with the added emphasis to demonstrate 
differences in or between respondents' critical thinking performances. This phase was 
scheduled for the penultimate month of the CFP by which time the programme outcomes 
should conceivably have been achieved. 
Phase 4 (Month 17) 
Aimed to establish the end of CFP group mean raw score for comparison with the pre- 
test mean raw score as a measure of curricular impact upon critical thinking performance 
as measured by the WGCTA. 
The Common Foundation Programme (CFP) was exclusively chosen as the period of 
evaluation for the following reasons (For further information of the CFP see chapter 3 
The Curriculum): 
0 Initial time constraints placed upon the conduct of the study; 
0 Student cohorts experience broadly similar curricular content during the CFP; 
" Curricular experiences, content and group sizes change significantly for 
Branch Programmes; 
" Critical Thinking is expressed as a specific outcome for the CFP. 
In the time between data collection phases learners were subject to broadly similar 
intervention in the form of curricular content and clinical experience. Intervals were 
carefully spaced to ensure students had all been exposed to the theoretical content upon 
which the qualitative data collection methods would focus. This was especially pertinent 
to the first qualitative data phase because it would introduce an unfair bias into subject 
reasoning performance founded upon the consensus that a knowledge base is a pre- 
requisite to critical thinking. 
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5.1.4 Across-method triangulation 
Triangulation in research is defined as the combination of two or more theories, data 
sources or methods in the study of a single phenomenon (Kimchi, Polivka, & Stevenson, 
1991). Begley (1996) suggests that a combination of methods can provide a huller and 
more accurate picture of the population studied. Combining multiple methods is also a 
useful way of bridging the divide between quantitative and interpretative (qualitative) 
methodologies for the express aim of increasing the completeness and confidence in 
research findings. Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 40) add to this position by claiming that 
ultimately'We have to face the fact that numbers and words are both needed to 
understand the world. ' Triangulation, first used in a research context by Campbell & 
Fiske (1959) derives from the profession of surveying where measurements are recorded 
from multiple points to identify more accurately a particular area. Cook (1983) 
recommends triangulation as a way to identify bias in quantitative studies by comparing 
findings with the results of qualitative methods. This of course might be taken to 
presuppose a bias to be found in the quantitative studies, and that qualitative methods are 
bias free. Triangulation in this sense does not mean that one method necessarily validates 
the other, but essentially should increase confidence in triangulated findings related to a 
particular phenomenon (Silverman, 1985). 
Denzin (1989) identified 5 types of triangulation that includes: theory, data, investigator, 
methods and multiple triangulation. The type adopted by this study is that of methods 
triangulation and, more specifically, across- method triangulation. This is the use of 
quantitative and qualitative data with the aim of achieving a degree of completeness and 
possibly convergent measurement validity, in relation to the examination of a complex 
phenomenon. As with many methods triangulation needs to be used appropriately and 
with caution if it is to achieve the specific aims intended. Table 5.1.4.1 lists the 
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advantages and disadvantages of triangulation in nursing; research as identified by 
Redfern & Norman (1994). 
Table 5.1.4.1 Advantages & Disadvantages of Using-Triangulation in Nursing Research 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Overcomes the bias of single-method, No guarantee of internal and external 
single-observer, single theory studies. validity. 
Increases confidence in the results. May compound sources of error 
Allows development and validation of Methods selected may not be the right 
instruments and methods (confirmation). ones. 
Provides an understanding of the domain Unit of analysis might not apply to all 
(completeness). methods. 
Ideal for complex social issues. Cannot compensate for researcher bias. 
Overcomes the elite bias of naturalistic Expensive. 
research. 
Overcomes the holistic fallacy of No use with the wrong question. 
naturalistic research. 
Allows divergent results to enrich Replication difficult. 
explanation. 
5.2 The Sampling Strategy and Sample 
The sampling strategy was informed by the study design and the nature of the 
developmental task directed towards the fine-grained qualitative analysis of the resulting 
verbal protocols. The descriptive-exploratory nature of the study plus the prospect of 
large quantities of rich qualitative data being generated by the think aloud sample of 
participants supported a same subject design. Random selection to the study group was 
compromised by the original commissioning criteria (limited availability of Project 2000 
students within the institution) limitations imposed by student intake frequency, by 
accessibility to students from other educational institutions and the logistical problems 
surrounding the data collection methods. Thus one entire student group from the host 
institution was used as a convenience target population (n = 57). The group comprised 
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50 females and 7 males with an age range of 18-40 yrs (mean 24 yrs). The majority of 
the group were white (n=45) with five other ethnic categories being represented by very 
small numbers. The majority of the group entered the programme via the traditional 
entry route with 50 level/GCSE qualifications. A random selection of volunteers were 
recruited for the qualitative data sample (n = 12, following the loss of one participant to 
maternity leave) which also included a range of ages, ethnicity, entry qualifications and 
both genders. 
A volunteer approach was used because of the potential for think aloud techniques to be 
perceived as intimidating or challenging to inexperienced respondents. The potential for 
biased sampling is recognised in that respondents with certain personality traits, i. e. self- 
confidence or extroversion could be more likely to volunteer. Self-confidence or 
extroversion, however, does not necessarily imply critical thinking ability or the 
converse. The volunteer approach does also involve a degree of random selection in that 
all students in the population have the opportunity to volunteer, and the researcher 
would have no knowledge who such volunteers would be, thus, the prospect of 
researcher selection bias is avoided. A full demographic profile of the sample is attached 
at appendix 7. 
5.3 Procedures: 
5.3.1 Phases 1&4 
In relation to phase 1- The WGCTA, Form C (1991) was administered to the whole 
group (N=57) in the third week of their course. Much of the course thus far had dealt 
primarily with matters of administration and introduction, consequently very little domain 
specific content had been acquired by the learners. The test was administered following 
advice from a Charted Psychologist supervising the study, and by adhering to the strict 
instructions laid down by the authors. 
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Tests were conducted in two subgroups on differing college sites some eighteen hours 
apart. Appropriate sized rooms with adequate lighting and ventilation to ensure a degree 
of comfort were pre-booked. Seating was arranged in examination style for invigilation 
purposes. An examination in progress sign was attached to the room door to reduce 
extraneous noise distraction or interruptions. The appropriate pencils with spares and 
erasers were supplied to the participants. When the sub-group were all present the nature 
of the study was explained once more and they were asked to re-iterate their consent to 
participate in the study. The Watson and Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal papers were 
then distributed with instruction to participants not to overturn the papers until 
instructed. 
The untimed approach to test administration was chosen to minimise group anxieties and 
in light of the author's claims that the WGCTA is primarily a test of power as opposed to 
speed. Watson & Glaser (1991) posit however, that the majority of people should be 
able to complete the test within forty minutes. To enable the possibility of broader 
comparisons of subsequent raw scores to norm data, subjects were requested to mark 
the last completed item with an asterisk, when instructed by the researcher at 40 minutes. 
This was established by use of a stopwatch. From that point, test completion was 
determined by individual participant performance. Upon completion participants' raw 
scores were determined by using the test-scoring template as supplied by the publishers. 
The same procedures were used for phase 4 in the final month of the CFP although the 
number of group members had been reduced to 43 by attrition at that point. 
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5.3.2 Procedures Phases 2&3 (phase 2, at 9mths - phase 3, at 17mths into CFP). 
The equipment required to facilitate data collection for these phases included the items 
identified previously in table 4.7.5.1 and reproduced here. 
1, VHS video recorder, 
1, Television Monitor 
1, Audiotape recorder with integral numerical counter 
1, Tie microphone 
Blank audiotapes, approximately 1 per subject 
1, Remote control facility 
1, Set of headphones to isolate simulation narrative from subject 
verbalisations. 
1, Digital stopwatch for prompting purposes (30 secs) 
1, Pre-recorded client simulation (video) 
2, Pre-recorded videotaped warm up tasks 
1, Table to accommodate equipment and taking of fieldnotes 
2, Chairs - (1 subject; l- researcher) 
Fieldnotes equipment as required. 
The above equipment was deployed in a psychological laboratory as discussed in chapter 
four (p. 185). 
Appointments were made with volunteer participants specifying the time and location for 
the think aloud data collection. The psychology laboratory was then booked 
correspondingly. The use of precise instructions to subjects with regard to the means and 
importance of thinking aloud, is strongly advocated by all workers in the protocol 
analysis field (Ericson & Simon, 1993; Bryne, 1983; Hayes, 1982; Grobe et at. 1991; 
Westfall et al. 1986; Fonteyn & Grobe, 1994). Instructions for the purposes of this study 
were thus given in written and verbal format (Written instructions appear at Appendix 3) 
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whilst arranging participant appointments, so as to prepare participants for the data 
collection events. 
Prior to the allotted subject appointment, the researcher arranged the above equipment 
and checked their function. A notice informing others of an experiment in progress was 
displayed to minimise disruptions. On arrival the subject was greeted, shown into the 
laboratory and the attendant equipment explained. The think aloud instructions and the 
general layout and purpose of the experiment were repeated verbally and questions 
relating to the equipment were answered as required. 
The participants were then asked to don the headphones and tie microphone. Although 
the warm up exercises were not recorded donning the equipment early facilitated 
acclimatisation and a short check of the participant's recording quality. 
Following this the silent traffic scene video was commenced, and the participant was 
instructed to merely give a verbal commentary (talk aloud) on the journey as viewed 
from the hypothetical driver's seat. The researcher as required gave an example of this. 
This initial warm up exercise could last up to 20 minutes if the participant wished to see 
the video in its entirety. During this time the researcher was present so that the 
participant became used to verbalising in his presence. 
When the participant indicated satisfaction with their verbalising performance they were 
then asked if they would like to view the second warm up exercise. They were informed 
that this exercise also included a traffic scene but with the addition of an accompanying 
narrative. Subjects were then set the following simple task: 
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"I would like you to tell me what you think is happening, and what you would 
do if you were in the driving seat of the pursuing vehicle by thinking aloud. " 
The video lasts approximately 10 minutes (see appendix 8 for narrative). At the 
conclusion of this, the participant was asked if they are ready to try the simulation 
proper. If they indicated readiness, the client simulation video was loaded and forwarded 
to the correct position. 
At this point, the participants were given the associated task which facilitated the verbal 
report of their reasoning processes. The task was as follows: 
"I want you to imagine that you are in a nurse-client interaction. The client 
named Billy is claiming that he is perfectly healthy and does not require 
any advice. I want you to make a decision as to whether you feel this is the 
case based on the information presented to you. " 
In addition to this the remote control facility was given to the participant and control of 
its use was reinforced. The participants were then informed of the prompting strategy to 
be used after 30 seconds of silence. If the participant had no further questions the task 
was repeated and the videotaped client simulation commenced. Simultaneously the tape 
recorder was switched on, the numerical counter set at zero and the timer started. From 
this point the participant verbalised concurrently about the task in relation to the 
information provided in the simulation. 
The researcher, sitting in close proximity to the participant, now had to listen to the 
participants' verbalisations for points to consider in the post task questioning aspect of 
the experiment, these were noted in writing. The stopwatch also had to be observed 
simultaneously for the need to prompt. In the event of a prompt the stopwatch was reset 
for another 30 seconds and so on. 
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At the end of the client simulation the video recorder was switched off, the audiotape 
recorder was left on and the participant asked to verbalise their decision in relation to the 
task (Post Simulation Judgement). 
Following this the participant was then asked the structured question (Test for 
Adequacy): 
"Do you think that there was enough information there to enable you to make 
this type of decision. " 
This question was designed to elicit evidence of whether: participants recognised when 
there were appropriate amounts of evidence available to make a decision; and their 
supporting arguments. 
Data collection now entered the post-decision questioning phase (Post Judgement 
Stimulated Recall). The researcher now asked questions in relation to selected issues 
raised by the individual participant in relation to the task. Participants were informed that 
responses were to be concluded at their own discretion and that no indications of 
sufficiency or completeness would be forthcoming from the researcher. Questions were 
intended to be open-ended whenever possible, e. g. 
" At point ...... in your protocol you said ..... why 
did you say that? " 
"why do you think that? " 
"why is this important in this or Billy's case? " 
Data collection was concluded when post protocol questions were exhausted. The tape 
recording was then terminated. The recorded protocols were then ready to be transcribed 
verbatim by the researcher at a suitable time. 
200 
CHAPTER SIX 
Presentation and Analysis of Qualitative Data. 
6.1 Notes on Transcription 
Sandelowski (1994) refers to a transcript as an exact copy of speech which has 
similar documentary veracity to that of a photograph. She cautions, however, that 
the process of transforming oral speech into printed copy results in a transformation 
that is representative of the original events but not isomorphic with them. For 
example, changes of pitch, volume, stress and speed of speech are difficult to 
represent adequately without affecting the readability of the transcript. Non-verbal 
behaviours such as posture, body language, in conjunction with accompanying 
sounds like laughter or sighing can add additional contextual contingencies to 
participant utterances that can further complicate the representation and analytical 
process. Even attempting to punctuate the transcript may capture the relationships 
and emphasis of words accurately but still misrepresent participants' talking 
behaviours. Researchers using transcripts, thus, have to make certain choices 
regarding which aspects of speech will be preserved and how they will appear in text. 
In the case of this study, the choice was made to include all utterances verbatim 
including paralanguage. Paralanguage is the series of informal vocal utterances that 
sometimes accompany or is interspersed with the vocabulary of formal language, 
e. g. "er", "erm", "ah" or "hmm. " These were included because of the naturalistic 
emphasis and the potential reasoning processes, such as uncertainty, that they may 
represent. Punctuation of the transcript was not deemed necessary because the aim 
was to examine performance of a behavioural construct, and not to focus 
predominantly, upon the precise literal meaning of the text (Burnard, 1994). Natural 
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pauses in participant speech were represented by a dash (-) and these were not 
precisely differentiated chronologically due to the general 30 second prompting rule. 
In the rare event of utterance interpretation difficulties the tape speed adjustment was 
used to enhance researcher interpretation. When this strategy proved unsuccessful 
third parties, in the form of professional colleagues, were used for their undirected 
interpretations. In the event that interpretative agreement could not be reached, the 
relevant utterance was omitted and represented by a series of asterisks. This, 
however, occurred on only several occasions (<10) and transcriptions were, thus, 
predominantly complete records of participants' verbal reports. Ultimately less than 
ten single words were omitted from the total body of qualitative data because they 
were essentially unintelligible. The omission of this small number of single words 
would not, it was concluded, have altered the subsequent categorisation of the 
relevant participants' performance in critical thinking. 
Researcher and participant utterances in the transcipts were represented thus: 
Researcher - (R) 
Participant - (P) 
The sequences of the transcripts were categorised as follows: 
Simulation Mediated Attentive Focal Universe 
Post Simulation Judgement 
Post Judgement Test for Adequacy 
Post Judgement Stimulated Recall 
Data analysis for the qualitative data for phases 2 and 3 required the development of 
a suitable analytic framework to fit the purpose of the study. A full account of the 
developmental and decision making process is given in the following section to 
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provide a qualitative audit trail (Sandelowski, 1994; Burns & Grove, 1995; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
6.2 The Development of an Analytic Methodology for Identifying Aspects of 
Critical Thinking in Verbal Reports of Student Nurses' Reasoning in Relation to an 
Individual's Health Status. 
Early analytic work utilised some aspects of the grounded theory approach. 
Participant protocols were subjected to open coding with a view to generating 
thematic categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This strategy, however, proved 
fruitless in that the emerging categories were more reflective of participants"thick' 
descriptions of health as opposed to evidence of critical thinking. An alternative 
strategy that viewed utterances as examples of critical and uncritical reasoning 
descriptors was subsequently devised and implemented. Participant utterances, for 
example, were given labels such as: 




Evidence based utterance 
Subjective judgement 
Erroneous interpretation 
Appeal to authority 
This strategy, however, also appeared to demonstrate little other than idiosyncratic 
time and context-specific labels that may or may not persist or transfer into the later 
phase of data collection, i. e. if a participant made a hasty generalisation in phase 2, 
but not in phase 3 could one conclude that critical thinking was evident, improved or 
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the converse? A need, therefore, emerged to search for or develop a framework of 
analysis that transcended the meaning of specific utterances in favour of broader and 
enduring reasoning generalities that may be transferred across cases consistently to 
reflect participants' naturalistic central reasoning tendencies. 
A search of the literature and iterative attempts at data analysis culminated in an 
analytic framework that would focus upon the structural complexity of participant's 
concurrent verbal reasoning or arguments, and whether they reflected fundamental 
aspects of critical thinking ability. The processes of framework development are 
presented in this section to enable the reader to appreciate the illuminative, flexible 
and iterative nature of the task. 
One of the initial problems was to bring some sense of order to the unstructured 
concurrent and retrospective qualitative data collected by means of the think aloud, 
post simulation judgement, test for adequacy and stimulated recall methods 
(Appendix 6). Given that the intention of the participants' think aloud data was to 
identify information attended to, in addition to concurrent reasoning processes and 
outcomes, a combination of line by line open coding (Straus & Corbin, 1990), 
incorporating in vivo coding (Glaser & Straus, 1968, p. 70; Straus, 1987, p. 33) and 
referring phrase analysis (Kuipers et al. 1988; Grobe et al. 1991) were used to 
identify discrete data units. A data unit in this context refers to a word, series of 
words or even sentences that refer discretely to a unique focus. The cumulative foci, 
thus, contributed to participants', 'Sequential Simulation Mediated Attentive Focal 
Universe, and relative reasoning descriptors. Table 6.2.1 demonstrates an example: 
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Table 6.2.1 Data Unit Analysis. 
Data Unit Focus Reasoning descriptor 
'an what he thinks is enough Subjective participant perception Induction (ellcct) i. e.. effect of 
exercise. necessarily isn't of client exercise sufficiency subjective perception upon 
sufficiency of exercise levels 
This strategy produces evidence of aspects of simulation information attended to 
during the think aloud phase and the degree of processing to which the information is 
subjected, i. e. to what extent do participants' utterances reflect passive reception of 
information or active processing as above. Virtual verbatim recall or paraphrasing 
would be described as information reception (IR). Data units are identified and 
contained by association with a unique referent or focus. These are then numbered to 
indicate uniqueness and sequence. 
The foci which ultimately culminate in the focal universe are derived from the 
participants' verbatim concurrent reports. The reasoning descriptors following 
recursive analysis were best described in the context of Cheng & Holyoak's (1989) 
pragmatic reasoning schemas. Cheng & Holyoak categorised inductions as 
pragmatically useful in accordance with their reasoning function or goal. Pragmatic 
reasoning schemas attempt to represent the middle ground between the belief that 
people typically reason using domain independent formal rules or that people are 
only able to reason using memory of domain-specific experiences. Pragmatic 
reasoning schemas involve the use of abstract knowledge structures derived from 
everyday ordinary life experiences and thus fit with the everyday or informal logic 
perspective underpinning the study's instrumentation. Pragmatic reasoning schemas 
consist of a set of generalised context-sensitive rules which unlike purely syntactic 
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rules are defined in terms of classes of goal such as: taking desirable actions or 
making predictions about possible future events and relationships to those goals in 
the form of obligations; causations; cause and effect; preconditions and allowable 
actions (Cheng & Holyoak, 1989). 
Additional descriptors arising from the general analysis include: 
(i) Erroneous utterance (interpretation inconsistent with task or evidence); 
(ii) Deduction (deductive conclusion - utterance that implies that a 
conclusion necessarily follows antecedents). 
In summary, to this point the qualitative data represents the number of discrete 
aspects of information attended to. This essentially represents the participants' 
sequential simulation mediated attentive focal universe i. e., the evidence attended to 
by the participant as evidenced by verbalisation, and apparently available for the 
subsequent task judgement. Secondly, the degree of information processing or 
passive information reception is also recorded prior to participants' judgements in 
accordance with the cognitive task. This indicates the volume and nature of 
participants' evidence, and evidence gathering processes (table 6.2.2). Fig. 6.2.1 
demonstrates the sequence of events to this point. 
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Tape Starts Tape Stops 





Fig. 6.2.1. Model of Think Aloud Data Collection Processes Prior to Participant 
Judgement. 
Table 6.2.2: Example of summary of think aloud pre judgement data Case 1 S52 
Phase 2: 






26 2 8 18 
6.3 Post Simulation Judgement, Test for Adequacy, Stimulated Recall 
In regard to the above sections of data analysis, the description and categorisation of 
participants' reasoning case studies was described and assessed for evidence of 
critical thinking in relation to the following criteria: 
1. Argument complexity as illuminated by a scale developed from the works of 
Schoeder et al. (1967), Levi & Tetlock, (1984); Perkins et al. (1991) & Kuhn 
(1991). 
2. Number of focal universe elements available for post simulation judgement; 
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3. Decisions as to information adequacy and supporting arguments; 
4. Degree to which participant's boundaries of evidence are internally consistent 
with the simulation or externally generated in light of their repertoire of 
knowledge, experiences, values beliefs, and everyday schemas; 
5. Graphical representation of argument structure and complexity; 
6. Participants' naturalistic central reasoning tendency (mode). 
The steps outlined above, enable the analyst to categorise and structure the 
previously unstructured data facilitating analysis and an audit trail. Integrative 
complexity provides the fundamental structure by delineating the data in relation to 
two cognitive structural properties and their relationships to the respondent's chain of 
reasoning and argument complexity. 
Originally developed by Schoeder, Driver & Streufert (1967) and further developed 
by Suefeld & Rank (1976), Suefeld & Tetlock (1977), Tetlock, (1983; 1984), 
integrative complexity focuses on the scoring of arguments and people's disposition 
to consider evidence and counterevidence in the course of reasoning about 
arguments. Tetlock's (1983; 1984) index of integrative complexity with certain 
modifications was perceived to be an apt tool for this study. This was primarily 
because the search for genuine evidence, the generation or consideration of 
alternative theories and the development or use of counterarguments are viewed as 
fundamental aspects of critical thinking performance. Moreover, critical thinking with 
its discrete cognitive skills and affective dispositions are accepted as an abstract and 
complex construct which is difficult to measure discretely. Critical thinking 
performance is also a matter of degree and disposition, in that, we may think about 
something critically in one instance about an issue, and not in another instance, even 
when the time frame between issues is relatively short and the participant domain 
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similar. The potential extraneous variables impinging on people's ability or 
disposition to reason critically are legion. However, the desire to search for and 
manipulate evidence and counterevidence to arguments, may be more pervasive, 
enduring, and observable if one has internalised critical thinking as a habitual 
reasoning behaviour and is naturalistically disposed to utilise it in everyday reasoning. 
Tetlock (1983a) defines integrative complexity as a combination of two cognitive 
structural properties, that of differentiation and integration. Differentiation concerns 
the number of different characteristics or dimensions of a problem or question -at - 
issue that an individual takes into account whilst engaged in reasoning about such 
issues. Tetlock offers an example of an undifferentiated view of capital punishment if 
an individual focuses only one dimension such as: "the need to deter murder" or on 
"... the immorality of ever taking human life" (p. 77). Another example would be 
when, in regard to the issue of abortion, an individual only focuses on abortion as a 
basic right for women or limiting women's access to abortion is an infringement of 
their civil liberties (Tetlock, 1983b). In relation to a health context, an 
undifferentiated view of this would be evident if an individual focused on only one 
element e. g., physical health characteristics. Differentiation of this nature reflects a 
one-sided view only, which neglects obvious arguments to the contrary and, thus, 
cannot be considered as critical thought. 
A more differentiated approach would be evident if individuals recognised at least 
two different dimensions, such as in relation to the capital punishment issue, when 
an individual recognised a general need to deter murder plus a general need to avoid 
the possibility of executing innocent people (Tetlock, 1983a). Another example, in 
relation to health, would be when an individual recognised the fact that there is more 
to health than just physical fitness and that there are also psychological factors. The 
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general rule then is the more dimensions or perspectives (other viewpoints) of an 
issue that are recognised, the higher is the degree of differentiation. 
The interpretation of differentiation used in the context of this study is that the 
property can have three forms. Thus, for the purpose of this study, when an 
individual recognises differing aspects relating to only one focus of a complex issue 
such as health e. g. physical health constitutes regular exercise, good diet, or non- 
smoking, this would be seen as uni-focal but divergent intra-dimensional 
differentiation. Generally this would still represent low differentiation. 
Secondly, differentiation also would be evident when, in regard to health, an 
individual recognises at least two focal dimensions (bi-focal), such as physical and 
psychological factors and their related sub dimensions. They may, however, make no 
obvious connections between them, for example, how psychological factors can 
influence physical factors. This would represent moderate differentiation. 
Thirdly, if an individual recognised more than two focal elements (multi-focal) of an 
issue, but added alternative perspectives, e. g. 'of course not everyone who smokes 
becomes seriously ill or dies young because additional factors are involved or 
individual needs for social contact differs widely' or one person's stress is another 
person's stimulation. This portrays an individual's readiness to consider 
counterevidence, alternative frames of reference or theories and an awareness of the 
increasing complexity of issues beyond mere alternation on the same dimension, e. g. 
"some people might think he drinks a lot, on the other hand some people would not". 
The former would represent high differentiation, but not necessarily high integration. 
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An additional means of coding differentiations and their contributions to the 
complexity of arguments is by means of uniqueness and utility. Schroder et al. (1967, 
p. 166) define a dimension as "A unique arrangement of stimuli. " It follows, therefore, 
that any arrangement of stimuli by an individual is a dimension and differentiation 
should correlate with the potential for the construction of abstract schemata. In order 
to discriminate one set of stimuli into a discrete dimension, that dimension should 
have functional uniqueness in that it pertains to or directly refers to the issue-at - 
hand, and is not identical to another dimension. Should this occur, and it is adjudged 
not to contribute anything uniquely to the dimension, then it should not be counted 
as a discrete dimension, and subsequently coded: no functional uniqueness (NFU). 
Sets of stimuli should also possess functional utility, this is when they should not be 
trivial or meaningless and demonstrate some clear role in the participant's reasoning 
in relation to the cognitive task. If sets of stimuli / utterances fail to demonstrate this, 
then they should not be counted and thus coded: no functional utility (NFU). 
Examples of such utterances arising from this study's data were: 'I don't like his 
wallpaper' or 'I don't like chess'. 
In the context of this study any obvious erroneous interpretations of information, i. e. 
interpretations not consistent with the simulation evidence would be coded similarly, 
because they would not be perceived as contributing to the arguments in any 
meaningful or accurate way, and could consequently lead to the construction of 
fallacious arguments. Such codings serve as a useful means of accounting for all of 
the qualitative data even though they have no function in identifying critical thinking. 
A further important consideration in the measurement of differentiation, is that 
ideally, the number of possible dimensions which can emerge should not be arbitrarily 
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limited by the experimental procedure. Thus, the design required a policy of post 
judgement non-intervention and that the researcher efrain from probing. 
In summary, differentiation refers to the representative level of non-limited, self- 
generated, unique and functional dimensions or foci which maps the components of 
participants' pre-conclusion reasoning processes. 
Integration 
Integration refers to the development of increasingly complex connections between 
the differentiated dimensions. Baron (1988, p. 278) suggests integration, in one 
instance, can exhibit "... search for goals and criteria by which the evidence will be 
weighed but in other cases it seems to represent the use of evidence to draw a 
conclusion. " 
Low integration is exhibited when the individual having recognised differentiations 
proceeds to view them in isolation, that is they see no other relationships and are, 
therefore, uni-focal e. g., health is measured solely by physical fitness nothing else is 
considered. These would be consistent with low uni-focal differentiation, therefore, 
an integrative complexity composite index of the two properties would be: low 
differentiation and low integration. 
Increasing complexity of integration is exhibited when individuals combine moderate 
to high differentiations into patterns which may portray an alternative perspective 
(counter evidence) and/or draw conclusions. This portrays moderate integration, 
e. g. that there is more to health than physical fitness, there are psychological factors 
as well. So health is more than just physical fitness. This also produces a comparative 
or general rule in order to evaluate future or alternative perspectives on the issue. 
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Thus, an integrative complexity composite index reflecting these argument structures 
would indicate: moderate -high differentiation, moderate integration. 
High integration is exhibited when an individual combines moderate to high 
differentiations into contingent and complex patterns. Thus, an example of a high 
integration model might be that: 
Health is a complex composite construct meaning different things to different 
individuals and cultures. One could appear to be healthy consistent with 
physical fitness criteria, but be psychologically disturbed. One could even 
have a physical fitness or physical appearance phobia. Sociological factors 
also contribute to conceptions of health, not only in relation to roles but also 
in opportunities to make appropriate health decisions. Health as a construct 
is, therefore, difficult to measure. Attributing an enduring diagnosis of health, 
if such a prospect is possible should therefore be based on holistic yet 
contextually individualised criteria. Even individuals suffering enduring 
chronic illnesses report periods of relative health. 
The integrative complexity composite index for arguments of this nature would be: 
High differentiation - high integration. 
Integrations (Int) - are evident when it becomes obvious that prior differentiations, or 
even new ones, are being connected in some way or when a conclusion appears to 
have been drawn in relation to the preceding dimensions. Conclusions may not be 
terminal in nature, some reports may include several which function as intermediate 
conclusions and, thus, may be cumulative. Participants' natural languages may not 
make for easy identification of such instances. Certain cue terms have, however, been 
extracted from the literature and data to assist in signifying integrations (Table 
6.3.1). 
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"is that", " which shows" "this shows" "but because of', "therefore", 
"then", "so", "must", "cannot", "so I assume", "but enough to know that", 
"since", "hence", "would" 
On some occasions, however, when such terms do not appear in the participant's 
natural language, judgements have to be made on alternative signs of integration in 
relation to the context of the series of utterances and their sequence, e. g., when no 
indicator terms as above are used, but it is obvious that a conclusion is drawn or a 
relationship is inferred. 
Integrative complexity is seen, therefore, as a composite index of the two cognitive 
structural properties differentiation and integration. Differentiation should also be 
viewed as a necessary condition for integration in that differentiations form the 
reasons or premises for integrations. Another important aspect of the integrative 
coding system is its emphasis on conceptual structure as opposed to content. There 
is no in- built philosophical bias. One can advance simple one-sided or complex 
alternative-rich arguments on any number of viewpoints or content domains. In 
terms of intregrative complexity functioning as a valid tool for measuring aspects of 
critical thinking, it is well suited because of its ability to capture participants' 
interpretative skills, search for evidence and counterevidence in the form of 
dimensions, the manipulation of dimensions into conclusions or inferences drawn, 
and the use of evidence in the construction of arguments, counterarguments and 
concomitant evaluative criteria 
Tetlock, (1983a) used a7 point scale initially developed by Schoeder, Driver & 
Streufert (1967) to assess individual differences in integrative complexity (table 
6.3.2). 
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6.3.2 Tetlock's 7 
Scores of 1 represent low differentiation and low integration 
Scores of 3 represent moderate to high differentiation and low integration 
Scores of 5 represent moderate to high differentiation and moderate integration 
Scores of 7 represent high differentiation and high integration. 
Scores of 2,4, or 6 are said to represent transition points between levels. 
During the early stages of development of the analytic framework great difficulty was 
experienced in finding clear examples of transition scores. This was exacerbated by 
the fact that Tetlock did not offer detailed guidance as to how transition scores could 
be ascertained. A scoring scale of 1-4 was, therefore, adapted utilising the works 
previously referred to as follows: 
Scale of A gument /Epistemological Complexity 
1= low unifocal / moderate differentiation and low integration: i. e. low or moderate 
differentiation culminating in a one-sided or single theory structure argument 
reflecting a narrow perspective with little search for, or, utilisation of opposing 
evidence, non consideration of alternatives or context and early closure (Absolutist 
Epistemology). 
2. = Moderate to high differentiation and low integration: i. e. Broadening of 
dimensions/evidence base, plus an attempt at generating an alternative perspective or 
recognition of context, still, however, culminating in one-sided or single structure 
argument. The alternatives are essentially ignored in favour of prevailing structure 
(Potential Multiplist Epistemology). 
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3. = Moderate to high differentiation and moderate integration: i. e. Considers 
multiple dimensions and demonstrates successful generation of an alternative 
perspective or theory and recognition of contextual issues, which clearly contrasts 
with their prevailing argument structure or theory and avoids unwarranted 
integration into a conclusive single structure (Multiplist Epistemology). 
4. = High differentiation and High integration: i. e. consideration of multiple relevant 
dimensions leading to the successful generation of, not only alternative theory 
structures which clearly contrast with initial or emergent theory structures but 
includes an attempt at or successful generation of a counterargument or rebuttal to 
the generated alternative theory utilising appropriate criteria. Closure or definitive 
conclusions may not necessarily be achieved. (Evaluative Epistemology). 
The above levels or argument complexity and associated epistemological foundations 
reflect how participants use knowledge in their naturalistic processes of knowing and 
a progression from uncritical to critical reasoning as demonstrated in table 6.3.3: 
Table 6.3.3: Progression of Reasoning Complexity. 
1- concrete or absolutist thinking 
2- potential multiplist epistemology 
3- multiplist epistemology 
4- critical or evaluative thinking 
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In relation to the recognition of when alternative theories were being considered an 
aspect of the work of Perkins et al. (1991, p. 89) in the form of'my-side' and 'other- 
side' utterances were used to facilitate precision in categorisation. Perkins et al. used 
these descriptors as criteria for measuring completeness or bias in participants' 
situation modelling or naturalistic argument complexity about cognitive tasks. 
Essentially, my-side arguments support a participant's initial judgement or represent a 
one-sided argument where alternatives to their prevailing views are not sought or 
generated. This type of reasoning is portrayed as incomplete, biased and represents a 
'makes sense epistemology', (p. 99). Perkins et al. view this as a default 
epistemology, i. e. a pattern of mind which people use as the simplest, more-or-less 
functional, and ego-defensive form of reasoning. 
Conversely, other-side arguments or utterances demonstrate opposing or competing 
lines of argument to the initial or prevailing one, thus complex arguments usually 
possess more than one theory or integration in their structure. 
Kuhn (1991) also provides a similar framework for the structural analysis of peoples' 
theories used during their reasoning processes. Her framework identifies whether 
individuals' arguments reflect either a single causal structure where a single theory 
prevails in the reasons and conclusions or, a multiple causal structure where multiple 
contrasting theories are apparent in the reasons and conclusions. The content or 
causal dimensions of the theories in Kuhn's study as in this one are of the least 
importance, what is of central concern, is the nature of the arguments associated with 
or offered in support of those theories. 
Kuhn (1991, p. 22) uses the term theory not in the sense of the fulfilment of any 
formal scientific criteria but in the sense that theories '.. . make statements about the 
world, statements that are participant to evaluation by appeal to evidence and 
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argument. ' She also contends that theories thus reflect a continuum from the most 
simplistic informal beliefs people hold to the complex and systematic formal theories 
advanced by scientists. 
This description of the term theory has been adopted for this study given the informal 
and naturalistic reasoning emphasis, the abstract nature of the simulation focus, the 
association between the generation of alternative theories and critical thinking and 
the emphasis on structural as opposed to content analysis of participants' arguments. 
Kuhn (1991) categorises arguments in terms of their theoretical structure in relation 
to whether they reflect single cause theories or multiple cause theories. The following 
examples are the author's interpretation of how Kuhn's categories apply to argument 
complexity and critical thinking in relation to the analytic framework for this study. 
Single-cause theories with single causal lines 
These are simple, unelaborated single-cause arguments that may constitute a single 
causal element as evidence for the correctness of the argument or response. 
Participants may elaborate the causal line descriptively in order to prolong their 
response, but not introduce any other discrete causal elements. This would be akin to 
low differentiation and low integration as previously outlined. 
Single-cause theories with multiple causal lines 
Single-cause theories may also include many different causal elements which are not 
merely sub-elements or alternations of volume along a causal dimension, i. e. more of, 
or less of something. Although in these cases there may be multiple causal elements 
identified, they are still categorised into the single-cause category because, clearly the 
participant uses all the causal element in cpntributiq to an outcome or conclusion 
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that is attributed to one theoretical position. This is reflective of moderate 
differentiation and low integration in relation to integrative complexity. 
Multiple-cause theories 
Multiple-cause theories contrast with single-cause theories, in that they contain 
multiple causal elements which are not integrated into a single causal structure. 
Arguments of this nature include the generation or consideration of alternative 
contrasting theories and are, thus, considered more complex and critical. 
Multiple- cause theories with multiple parallel causal lines 
Theories included in this category involve multiple causal elements which in contrast 
to the single-cause theories give no indication that they are being integrated into a 
single causal structure. That is the causal elements are not clearly regarded as 
alternatives but merely presented successively in parallel and a terminal conclusion 
related to the causal elements is not evident. The responses are thus left open ended 
and categorised as an indication of Multiplist thinking. 
Multiple-cause theories with multiple alternative causal lines 
This category contrasts explicitly with the former in that the participant indicates 
explicitly that alternative causal structures exist or are involved. This may be 
signalled in linguistic terms by indicators such as: 
'or'; 'on the other hand ; but then again; 'also'; 'however'; 'that isn't the only'. 
The alternatives generated by the participant in these cases are seen as sufficient to 
produce the outcome. Contrasting theories are thus contemplated as being equally 
likely and one is not put forward as being superior to the other in the absence of a 
counterargument and evaluative criteria based on evidence produced. 
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Kuhn also identifies the different types of genuine and non-genuine evidence used in 
support of participants' arguments and this was also used as a means of describing 
the nature of participants' reasoning in the analytic framework. This is conceived as a 
useful way of determining whether participants use genuine evidence routinely as a 






The categories of evidence referred to were applied to the participants' data and are 
described more fully in the qualitative data analytic framework presented below 
(Table 6.3.4). However, the following extracts from participant data sets 
demonstrate some examples of the above categories of evidence: 
Covariation Evidence: Participant 7, Phase 2, Question 1. U2-U3. 
U2 " He looked pale and drawn". (variable causal element) 
U3 " and as though he didn't go out very much (variable quantity) 
The participant is asserting that the degree of time outside could co-vary with skin 
complexion and appearance. 
Correlated Change Evidence: Participant 33, Phase 2 Question 12, U3. 
U3 "I mean- people who are unemployed are the most erm - unhealthy 
people. " 
In this instance, the correlation between unemployment and health brings about 
changes in health status that is above the norm (most unhealthy). 
Counterfactual Evidence: Participant 7, Phase 3, Question 12. 
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U2 " If you haven't got motivation" 
U3 " Then you're not gonna bother doing anything" 
U4 " an that needs to be encouraged" 
In this example, the absence of the external factor (motivation) leads to the non- 
operation of the causal antecedent, i. e. the individual will not perform any activity. 
The following table demonstrates how the verbatim data was treated in relation to 
the analytic elements synthesised from the works aforementioned. 
Assumption: Participant 7, Phase 3, Question 1, U4-U5 
U4 " He does play football" 
U5 " but it seemed to be like a thing he just thought of at 
the last minute - sort of thing" (pseudoevidence - plausible descriptive 
element). 
In this instance, there was no evidence to underpin the assertion in utterance 5. Billy 
stated in the simulation that he played football with his son regularly after school. 
The motive relating to the questionable accuracy of Billy's claim implicit in the 
utterance is thus assumed. 
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Table 6.3.4 Key to Qualitative Analytic Framework 
Analytic Category Relationship to transcribed verbatim utterances 
Integrative Complexity I-; lemcnt (1/C) Assignment of utterance to cognitive structural category 
I)illerentiation (1)11l) I )1lnension or element of an event, concept, of 
phenomena 
Integration (Int) Conclusion or interaction of dimensions. in %%hich one or 
more dimensions is used to relate to, or is recognised as 
atlccting another (a relationship is inferred) 
Integrations may be intermediate as it means of' 
supporting a main conclusion. 
Focus Researcher interpreted data referent 
Non-evidence Where participants imply that evidence is not necessary 
or irrelevant, e. g. 'it just is. ''fhis implies that the 
existence o! the phenomena is itself sufficient evidence 
that it is produced hs, the cause that the participant 
asserts (Kuhn 1991 ). Alternatively non-evidence may he 
in the tone ol'an erroneous interpretation or assertion 
that is not related to the issue at hand and thus cannot 
contribute to the response or argument. 
Yseudoevidence A descriptive instance, or example that elaborates it 
theory that participants take tier granted to be true, i. e. it 
plausible description of the causal sequence of 
something in the absence of a specified causal 
relationship, or obvious hearing upon the correctness of 
something. Depicts him phenomena might occur. 
(Descriptive element or assumption), (Kuhn 1991 . 
Correspondence evidence Weakest form of direct evidence. Does no more than 
note an association or co-occurrence off antecedent and 
outcome. (Causal element) (Kuhn 1991 
Covariation evidence Instances that represent one level oC the antecedent are 
compared or quantified to the incidence of the outcome, 
i. e. as one thing varies then so does the other. (stronger 
direct evidence) (Causal element) 
(Kuhn 1991 . 
ßoundanv of Evidence Whether the utterance is directly related to information 
provided by the simulation (Internal) or related to the 
participants personal reasoning strategies, knowledge. 
values beliefs etc. (External (Kuhn 1991 . 
Nature of reasoning/evidence. My-side -utterance is consistent with preceding or 
prevailing structure. 
Other-side - utterances contrasting to preceding or 
prevailing structure. This may he in the firn of an 
intermediate conclusion which is independent of the 
preceding structure thus indicating an alternative theory. 
Knowledge used h\ participants to underpin their 
judgement is viewed in the context of the type of 
evidence reflected in utterance. (Perkins, et al. 1991; 
Kuhn 1991). 
Counterfactual reasoning 'I 'lie absence of an external factor makes the existence 
and operation of the causal antecedent more likely. That 
is, il the external factor ere present, then the causal 
antecedent would not operate, e. g. If the prisoner had 
been rehabilitated he %Nould not have re-offended. Ile 
was not rehabilitated therefore he did re-offend (Kuhn 
1991). 
*RC Referent change 
*SC Structure change (other-side) 
*R1'1'S Return to prior structure 
NFU No Functional Uniqueness or Utility 
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Fahle 6.3.4 Continued 
Analytic Category Relationship to transcribed verbatim utterances 
*N('A Not ('hrunulogicalh Available - int'ormation 
luulcrpinning participants dimcnsiuns l» integrations 
were not available at the time of utterance. Dimension 
precedes simulation sequence. 
I'ragmalically Useful Induction (I't)I). Interences \thick appeal to be based on practical 
(pie-1udgcment). ever da coimespondences Ur associations, Inch m ay 
cause or atlect the phenomena in question - general 
rules, propositions, etc. Chen g&I lulvoak 1999) 
My-side conclusion Conclusion drawn from single structure reasoning. 
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6.4 Participant examples of analytic process and categorisation : 
Example One: 
Post Judgement Stimulated Recall Question: R. "Did you think his exercise was 
regular enough? " 
Table 6.4.1 Exemplification of Participant's Chain of Rcasoninu 
Data Integrative Focus Boundary of Nature of Reasoning 
com lexit Evidence & Evidence 
UI No - not regular at hit Non- regularity oi' I": Atemal Mý%- side conclusion. 
all for himself client's exercise 
U2 " Because people Dill, Prescribed daily I. xternal Mv-side, causal 
got to do it - they got to exercise regime element, 
do it - 10 minutes or correspondence 
15 minutes a day evidence. 
U3 "I3ut he's not NI ti Frroneous l: ytcrnal My-side, non-evidence 
neither doing walking interpretation 
or anything" 
114 " IIe's just a lazy I)itl' Subjective value F. xternal My-side, non-evidence. 
person. " judgement regarding 
personality 
characteristic 
U5 " So its not going lilt Non probability of External My-side conclusion. 
to happen exercise 
Ul 
U2 U3 U4 
US 
Fig. 6.4.1 Graphic representation v/Argument complexily: 
= Moderate differentiation - low Integration - no alternatives considered 
Argument complexity 1; 
Situation modelling = My-side only, biased, makes sense epistemology; 
Single theory structure - multiple lines, non-evidence & correspondence evidence 
= Absolutist epistemology. 
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In this example, the participant's response starts with a conclusion which establishes 
their my-side position. The conclusion is supported by my-side utterances 2 and 4 
which lead to the terminal conclusion, which is an extension of the initial conclusion 
(table 6.4.1, fig. 6.4.1). Utterance 3 is an erroneous interpretation that does not 
contribute to the argument because Billy clearly indicates that he does exercise 
regularly for 1 hour per day with his son. The simulation also shows Billy walking 
with his friends. Thus, this response demonstrates a my-sided single theory structure 
which asserts that Billy does not exercise regularly. No alternatives are considered 
this thus facilitates the above argument complexity categorisation. 
Example Two: Post Judgement Test for Adequacy 
In this example, although the participant does generate an alternative theory that 
contrasts to the prevailing limited information structure in U8 this is immediately 
overlooked in favour of a return to the prevailing limited information structure (table 
6.4.2, fig. 6.4.2). This exemplifies a potential towards multiplist thinking but not the 
perseverance to consider this alternative further, and a naturalistic tendency towards 
early closure. 
Researcher: "Did you think that there was sufficient information there to enable you 
to make this sort of decision? " 
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Table 6.4.2 Example two, Participant's: Chain of reasoning 
Data Integrative Focus Boundary of Nature of Reasoning 
com lexit Evidence and Evidence. 
Il I No - not really -I lilt Insufficiency of Vxteinal My-side 
don't think so (Mv side- evidence conclusion 
established) 
iU2 I saw him walking Dill' visual evidence olone Internal My - side, 
just in town. locus of activity descriptive element, 
pscudocvidcuce 
l13 It didn't give you Dill Insufficiency of l': xternal My -side, 
very much about his lifestvlc information descriptive clement. 
lifestyle tseudoevidence 
111 1 didn't hear his Dill, Absence ot'verbal Internal My -side, 
wile talk at all information from descriptive element. 
i3illv's wits ýseudoevidence 
115 didn't see the other Uif No visual information External My -side, 
children regarding the other descriptive element, 
children seudoevidence 
U6 If you - got to Dill, possibility of improved External My-side, 
know him -I mean he information gathering causal element. 
might be referred by and advising in a counterfactual 
the doctor to need clinically -specific reasoning, 
psychiatric - perhaps nursing interaction correspondence 
just to talk like the (CPN) evidence. 
Community Psychiatric 
Nurse - I'm sure you'd 
get to know more - and 
oller more advice by 
actual contact 
U7 So I think it was Int Limitations of External My -side 
quite limiting really inlotmation available conclusion. 
US *S. C. Although Difl Alternative possibility External Other - side, 
you can pick up a lot (high) of significant descriptive element, 
information acquisition pseudoevidence 
U9 * RTPS I don't hit Limitations of External Return to prior 
think there was enough inlixmation for serious my -side conclusion. 




U2 010- U3 10- U4 001- U5 U6 
O Structure change (alternativem U8 
possibility of significant 
information) 
O4 
Return to prior structure 
Fig. 6.4.2 Example 2- Cumulative Structure. 
Moderate - high differentiation 
Low integration = Argument complexity 2 
Situation Modelling - predominantly biased my-side prevails = Makes Sense 
Epistemology. 
Single theory structure prevails , alternative theory 
ignored - multiple lines, 
- psuedo, correspondence 
- counterfactual evidence, 
Potential Multiplist Epistemology 
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Example 3: Post Simulation Judgement. 
This example clearly represents an extended response which is rich in dimensions, 
referent changes, intermediate conclusions and the absence of a terminal main 
conclusion. The first part of the response comprises a large number of dimensions 
that support an unfolding my-side structure directed towards disagreement with 
Billy's personal view, that he is not unhealthy 111 - U18). There are, however, two 
structural changes which appear to contrast with this prevailing structure. U19 
contrasts with the prior structure by alternatively suggesting that Billy does not 
exhibit any indicators of ill-health or need for hospital based health care intervention. 
U20 then indicates a return to the prior structure by suggesting that, although there 
are no current ill-health indicators, there may be some in the long term. This is then 
supported by several dimensions and intermediate conclusions (U21 - 124). There 
appears to be another other-side structural change at U25 which suggests that while 
Billy may not be as healthy as he believes, he is not, however, the author of any 
health problems. U27 appears to support this structure and functions as a 
counterfactual element, i. e. there was no evidence of Billy smoking (absence of an 
external antecedent, thus the causal antecedent of Billy contributing to any ill-health 
does not operate) so "he is not trying to sort of feel ill. " This other-side structure is 
further supported by U29 - U30 and finally concludes with two repetitive dimensions 
and no main conclusion (table 6.4.3, fig. 6.4.3). This represents an open-ended 
response which is not integrated into any prevailing single theory structure, 
alternatives are considered and the response thus merits a multiplist epistemology 
categorisation. 
Researcher (R). Structured Question: Would you agree with Billy then, is he 
Healthy? 
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Table 6.4.3 Example three Participant's: Chain of Reasoning 
Data Integrative Focus Boundary of Nature of reasoning 
complexity Evidence and evidence 
lI 1. Billy didn't think Dili Billv's opinion of luternal My-side, 
himself unhealthy personal health status descriptive element 
I'suedoevidence 
U2. *RC- But I think Di 11' possible marital External My-side, 
that enn - he obviously conflict Causal element, 
- etm - there seemed a Correspondence l". 
lot of strain between 
the wile and Billy 
U3. I le's there a lot Dill, Billy's degree of l : zterual My-side. 
presence Causal element, 
Correspondence E. 
U4. He doesn't Dill' Absence of self Internal My-side, 
mention that he helps reported domestic Causal element, 
his wife - in anything assistance Correspondence F. 
around the house 
U5. *RC - So she Int Conclusion regarding External My-side conclusion. 
appeared to have the wile's attitude towards Correspondence F. 
attitude - well as long Billy's behaviour 
as you're out of my way 
- an not doing 
something - then 
y'know. 
U6. She did all - dealt Dith Wife as sole child care External My-side, 
with the children Descriptive element, 
Psuedoevidencc. 
U7. Anything around NFU - - - 
the house 
U8. Did the shopping Dill Wife as sole procurer Internal My-side, 
of family supplies Descriptive clement. 
Psuedoevidence 
U9. *RC- He felt he NFU - - - 
was keeping himself 
healthy 
U 10. Busying himself Dif personal interests as External My-side, 
with his own- er means of occupying Causal element, 
interests time Correspondence E. 
U 11. Ile didn't seem to Dill, Apparent lack of External My-side, 
get out much an exercise Causal element, 
exercise Correspondence E. 
IJ12. But we only saw NFU - - - 
him in the living room (Utility) 
U 13. So we can't really NFU - - 
-I mean that's a quick 
judgement 
U14- *RC -Ile Dill Introversion/ sell- External My-side, 
seemed very much into centred Descriptive element, 
himself Psuedoevidence. 
U 15. Not socialising Diff As utterance External My-side, 
Causal element, 
Correspondence E 
U16. Not going out to Dill' Unemployment related External My-side, 
work - mixing with isolation Causal element, 
your mates Correspondence F 
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Data Integrative Focus Boundary of Nature of reasoning 
Complexity Evidence and Evidence 
U 17. flaying the I)if Financially related lixternal My-side, 
money to socialise isolation Causal element, 
afterwards Correspondence I'. 
I) IS. When you're in lilt I )otnestic isolation External Mv-side conclusion. 
the house- you must Correspondence I;. 
become - isolated 
really and I think that 
came across 
U 19. *SC - So on the litt Absence of overt ill- Internal t )thee-side conclusion, 
outside - an seeing him health. (Structure change to 
sit in the chair - an just support Billy's 
chatting away - you perspective), 
wouldn't actually - you 
wouldn't immediately - 
think - cnn - you 
might - say he doesn't 
actually need hospital 
treatment or accident 
and emergency or 
amlhin cropping up 
U20. *R1PS - but it Dili, Speculative long term External Return to my-side, 
could be that there's health ellccts of Billy's Descriptive element. 
more long tenn effects situation on his health Psuedoevidence. 
U21. Six years 1)itl Perceived longevity of External My-side, 
unemployment is quite unemployment period Descriptive element, 
a long time Psuedoevidence. 
1122. The unemployed lilt Conclusion regarding External My-side 
become unemployable employability of the conclusion, 
- because - well unemployed with Correspondence F. 
obviously there's loads example of context. 
of factors affecting it - 
the area - if there isn't 
high employment 
U23. Ile seemed to Diff Billy's high aspirations Internal My-side. 
have high hopes in in computer sector Descriptive element, 
computers Psuedoevidence. 
U24. But often the Int Reduced computer External My-side conclusion 
case is that younger career opportunities for (maintaining 
people - come in from - older people. opposition to Billy's 
with higher education - perceived health - 
go into computers an Structure) 
the actual computer 
base for jobs is getting 
smaller - because 
computers by their 
nature - make for not 
so many - manpower 
needed. 
U25. *SC - He is not lilt Billy's non- External Other-side conclusion, 
trying to sort of feel ill. contribution to own ill- (Billy may not be 
health. trying to he unhealthy - 
Structure). 
1126. An be sorry for l)iil Self pity Internal My-side, 
himself Causal element, 
Correspondence E. 
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Data Integrative Focus Boundary of Nature of Reasoning 
Complexity Evidence and Evidence 
1J27. It didn't mention Dili Absence of smoking Internal My-side, 
if he smoked or not evidence Descriptive element 
countcrtactual) 
Psuedoevidence. 
IJ29. Stress and Dill, Examples of ill -health External My-side, 
smoking and drinking causal factors Descriptive element. 
an - not being happy Psuedoevidence. 
as in feeling fulfilled - 
U29. Can lead to quite flit possible effect of External other-side conclusion, 
a few - y'know feeling above ill-health causal Descriptive elements 
had - quite a few sort factors. Psuedoevidence. 
of cases of illnesses -I 
mean Coronary I leart 
Disease. 
U30. The statistics say Dill Geographically related External My-side, 
- it's er - an it's quite a evidence to support Causal element, 
hit in Glasgow preceding conclusion. Covariation F. 
U3 I. That lifestyle can NPU - - - 
add to that sort ofthing 
U32. I mean NFU - 
apparently he looked (U 19) 
quite well 
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(Opposition to Billy's 
perspective of personal 
*RC 
health . Structure) 
U9 *m- 









U18 Struchue change 
= 19 
(Partial agreement with 






(Billy is not the author of any 
U25 ill-health behaviours) 
U26 U_ U2E 
U29 
U30 U31 U32 
(Alternative structure not integrated into 
a single theory structure " open ended) 
Fig. 6.4.3 Example 3- Cumulative Reasoning Structure 
Moderate to high differentiation - moderate integration 
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= Argument Complexity 3 
Situation Modelling - unbiased, my-side & other-side, 
= Critical Epistemology. 
Alternative Theory Structure - multiple lines; 
- pseudo, correspondence, & covariation evidence; 
- counterfactual reasoning; 
= Multiplist Epistemology. 
In summary, this chapter has outlined the development and implementation of the 
analytic methods utilised in testing the aim of identifying evidence of critical thinking. 
It has endeavoured to clarify the decision making process in the development of the 
analytic framework and produce an audit trail with examples of data presentation and 
argument complexity categorisation. 
The next chapter will present the study findings. Participant case studies will 
incorporate the description of participants' critical reasoning in relation to the analytic 
framework developed and their Watson & Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (1991) 





The purpose of this chapter is to present and describe the results of the data analysis 
and important observations for the four phases of longitudinal data. Further 
examination of the findings and important observations will be dealt with in the 
following discussion chapter. 
The results or the WGCTA for phases 1 and 4 will be presented first in relation to: 
the frequency distribution of raw scores; the longitudinal differences in group mean 
raw scores for the untimed (RSU) WGCTA as a whole; followed by sub-test 
longitudinal mean raw scores and norm table comparisons. Further bivariate analyses 
will be presented with particular reference to relevant participant demographic 
variables and their relationship to the group scores. 
7.1 Frequency Distributions of WGCTA Raw Scores for Phases 1&4. Figures 
7.1.1 and 7.1.2 show the frequency distribution of participant test scores on the 
untimed WGCTA test. Table 7.1.1 represents a normal distribution of scores for 
phase 1, although the distribution of scores for phase 4 was bi-modal (Table 7.1.2). 
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Raw Score Untimed 








35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 
Raw Score Untimed Post Test 
Fig 7.1.2 Frequency Distribution for Raw Score Untimed Post Test (RSU/P) Phase 
4. 
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7.2 Comparisons of Phase 1 Raw Score untimed(RSU) & Phase 4 Raw Score 
Untimed Post Test (RSU/P) Mean WGCTA Raw Scores. 
A Paired t-test was deemed appropriate for this purpose given that the intention was 
to compare two measurements taken from the same experimental unit at different 
times (Haycock et al. 1994) and that the assumptions underpinning parametric testing 
were broadly met. 
Table 7.2.1 WGCTA Mean Untimed Raw Scores: Phases I&4 (n=43) 
Phase 1 Phase 4 Difference 
Minimum 34 38 +4 
Maximum 69 75 +6 
Mean 51.349 51.605 +. 256 
Std Deviation 7.721 7.320 -0.401 
Std Error 1,177 1,116 -0.61 
Variance 59.614 53.578 - 6.036 
Paired t -test 
Hypothesized Difference =0 
Mean Diff. DF t-Value P-Value 
RSU, RSU/P -. 256 42 -. 265 . 7920 
Fig. 7.2.1 Paired T-Test for Mean Raw Scores: Phases 1&4., 
The differences in mean scores for phases l&4 did not achieve statistical significance 
in test performance. This suggests that by the end of the common foundation 
programme the group's critical thinking abilities as measured by the WGCTA showed 
no change from that shown at the outset of the course. 
One difference worthy of note is that of group test completion times between phases 
1 and 4. At phase 1 the observed test completion times ranged between 40 minutes 
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and 79 minutes. These were not recorded individually due to the untimed nature of 
the test. At phase 4, however, 36 participants had completed by 40 minutes mark 
leaving just seven participants continuing to a maximum of 51 minutes. On this 
evidence it appears that the group achieved the same score, albeit in a shorter time, 
generally or that they reached the same conclusions more quickly. Given that the pre 
and post tests were almost eighteen months apart the possible transfer of skills from 
the first administration to the second should not apply (Rust & Golombok, 1989). 
There are several possible explanations for this, in that the participants were bored 
with the test, they may have valued the outcomes less or they were more confident 
with assessment events given their progression through the programme. These results 
also lend some support to the author's claims that the test is one of power and not 
necessarily speed. 
7.3 Comparisons of WGCTA Sub-Test Scores for Phases 1&4. 
Watson & Glaser (1991) do not advocate the use of the test's part scores to evaluate 
individual attainment. This is due to the insufficient reliability of what is a relatively 
small number of items when making judgements about individual performance. They 
do, however, suggest it is feasible to use these for groups in a training context to 
illuminate appropriate training in aspects of critical thinking based upon such 
analyses. In this instance, the part scores are presented below to determine whether 
longitudinal differences existed in the group's sub-test scores of critical thinking and 
as a basis for comparison to the verbal report analysis for phases 2 and 3. 
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Table 7.3.1 WGCTA Inference Sub-Test Scores: Phases 1&4 (n=43) 
Sub-test - 
INFERENCE 
Phase 1 Phase 4 Difference 
Minimum 5 3 -2 
Maximum 14 14 0 
Mean 8.488 8.372 
_ -. 
116 
Std Deviation 2.443 2.601 +. 158 
Std Error . 373 . 397 +. 
24 
Variance 5.970 6.763 + . 793 
Paired t -test 
Hypothesized Difference =0 
Mean Diff. DF t-Value P-Value 
Inference, Inference/p . 116 42 . 309 . 
7592 
Fig. 7.3.1 Paired t-test for Inference (phase 1) & Inference (Post test, phase 4). 
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Table 7.3.2 WGCTA Sub-Test Scores: Phases 1&4 (n=43) 
Sub-test - 
RECOGNITION OF Phase 1 Phase 4 Difference 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Minimum 6 4 -2 
Maximum 15 16 +1 
Mean 10.953 11.140 +. 187 
Std Deviation 2.182 2.660 +. 478 
Std Error . 333 . 406 +. 
073 
Variance 4.760 7.075 + 2.315 
Paired t test 
Hypothesized Difference -0 
Mean Diff. DF t-Value P-Value 
Rec of Ass, Rec of Ass/p -. 186 42 -. 428 . 6705 
Fig. 7 , 
3.2 Paired t-test for Recognition of Assumptions (phase 1) & Recognition of 
Assumptions (Post test, phase 4) 
Table 7 . 
3.3 WGCTA Deduction Sub-Test Scores: Phases 1 &4 (n=43) 
Sub-test - 
DEDUCTION 
Phase 1 Phase 4 Difference 
Minimum 3 4 +1 
Maximum 15 16 +1 
Mean 8.953 9.163 +. 1.10 
Std Deviation 2.627 2.419 -. 208 
Std Error . 401 . 
369 -. 032 
Variance 6.903 5.854 - 1.049 
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Paired t-test 
Hypothesized Difference -0 
Mean Diff. DF t-Value P-Value 
Deduction, Deduction /p -. 209 42 -. 445 . 6584 
Fig. 7.3.3 Paired t-test for Deduction (phase 1) & Deduction (Post test, phase 4). 
Table 7.3.4 WGCTA Sub-Test Scores: Phases 1&4 (n=43) 
Sub-test - 
INTERPRETATION 
Phase 1 Phase 4 Difference 
Minimum 6 8 +2 
Maximum 16 16 0 
Mean 12.233 12.116 -0.117 
Std Deviation 2.182 1.979 - 0.203 
Std Error . 
333 . 302 
0.031 
Variance 4.754 3.915 0.839 
Paired t test 
Hypothesized Difference =0 
Mean Diff. DF t-Value P-Value 
Interpret, Interpret/p . 116 42 . 443 . 6600 
Fig. 7.3.4 Paired t-test for Interpretation (phase 1) & Interpretation (Post test, phase 
4) 
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Phase 1 Phase 4 Difference 
Minimum 6 6 0 
Maximum 15 16 1 
Mean 10.721 11.000 0.279 
Std Deviation 2.271 2.278 0.007 
Std Error . 346 . 347 0.001 
Variance 5.158 5.190 0.032 
Paired t-test 
Hypothesized Difference -0 
Mean Diff. DF t-Value P-Value 
Eval of Arg, Evl of Arg/p -. 279 42 -. 713 . 4798 
Fig. 7.3.5 Paired t-test for Evaluation of Arguments (phase 1) & Evaluation of 
Arguments (Post test, phase 4) 
The conclusions to be drawn from the above sub-test comparison of mean scores is 
that the differences do not achieve significance at the =0.05 level and the data are in 
line with the results of the total raw score mean comparisons. Overall these scores 
suggest that participants' performance in the components of critical thinking as 
measured by the WGCTA showed no difference at the end of the Common 
Foundation Programme (CFP). 
To place these scores in a broader context a selection of norm tables are presented 
(tables 7.3.6 - 7.3.11). These tables include examples of comparative group mean 
scores. This concurs with Watson & Glaser's (1991) suggestion that test users 
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compare results with norms of occupational groups that most closely resemble the 
group being tested. Because of the high correlation coefficient between forms B&C 
(r = . 95) appropriate occupational groups that were tested using form B will be 
included. 
242 
Table 7.3.6 Norm Table 27, Sixth Form Grammar school Pupils in the UK (Watson 
& Glaser 1991, p. 99). 
Form Sample Test Type Mean S. D. S. E. M. 
B n= 127 Timed 55.1 10.4 5.4 
Table 7.3.7 Norm Table 36: Combined Sixth Form Grammar School Pupils in UK 
(Watson & Glaser 1991. p. 108) . 
Form Sample Test Te Mean S. D. S. E. M. 
C n= 108 Timed 57.7 8.3 2.9 
An international comparison is available although the academic levels of the 
programmes differ (undergraduate as opposed to diploma level). 
Table 7.3.8 Norm Table 17: Nursing Students in Baccalaureate Programs at 
Universities in Southern USA (Watson & Glaser 1991, p. 89). 
Form Sample Test Type Mean S. D. S. E. M. 
A&B n= 266 Timed 56.0 7.3 3.8 
Table 7.3.9 Norm Table 18: Nursing Students in Baccalaureate programs at 
Universities in western USA (Watson & Glaser 1991. n. 90) 
Form Sample Test Type Mean S. D. S. E. M. 
A&B n= 182 Timed 56.4 9.1 4.7 
Table 7.3.10 Norm Table 19: Nursing Students in Baccalaureate Programs at 
Universities in midwestern USA (Watson & Glaser 1991 , p. 91). 
Form Sample Test Type Mean S. D. S. E. M. 
A&B n= 203 Timed 59.8 7.5 3.9 
Table 7.3.11 Norm Table 25: Nursing Students in a Baccalaureate Program at a 
University in southern USA (Watson & Glaser 1991_ n_ 97) 
Form Sample Test Type Mean S. D. S. E. M. 
A&B n= 266 Timed 56.0 7.3 3.8 
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The above norm tables thus demonstrate that the study group's level of performance 
in the WGCTA is lower than some comparable but not equivalent international 
groups particularly for an untimed test. Comparisons with the United Kingdom norm 
tables are generally what would be expected given the differing academic levels (A 
level versus 0 level). 
7.4 Further Bivariate Analyses. 
Bryman & Cramer (1997) suggest that bivariate analysis can contribute to the 
process of theory development in relation to the phenomena under investigation by 
exploring the possible relationships between different pairs of variables. For this 
purpose several such variables were examined at phases 1 and 4. The WGCTA 
record form includes data on the demographic variables of age, gender and ethnic 
group membership. An additional variable in the form of entry qualifications at entry 
to the programme were provided by student enrolment data Unfortunately, ethnicity, 
gender, and entry qualification could not be used as independent variables in this 
analysis because the numbers of participants within each discrete category resulted in 
an insufficient representation within the study group to make judgements about 
meaningful relationships. Figs 7.4.1,7.4.3 and 7.4.5 demonstrate that the population 
was dominated by white females who entered the programme via the 50 Level 
route. Figs 7.4.2 & 7.4.4, and 7.4.6 provide further evidence of this and present 
comparisons of mean raw scores and error bars for the same demographic variables. 
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Fig. 7.4.1 Frequency Distribution of Participant Ethnicity. 
Key: 
1= White 3= Black 5= Indian 
Caribbean 
2= Black African 4= Chinese 6= Mauritian 
Cell Bar Chart 
Grouping Variable(s): Ethnic 









Fig. 7.4.2 Cell Plot: Raw Score Untimed and Group Ethnicity. 
Key: 
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I= White 3= Black 5= Indian 
Caribbean 
2= Black African 4= Chinese 6= Mauritian 
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Fig. 7.4.3 Descriptive Statistics for Group Gender (1 = Female 2= Male). 
Cell Bar Chart 
Grouping Variable(s): Gender 










Fig. 7.4.4 Cell Plot Raw Score Untmed (RSU) & Gender (1 = Female, 2= Male). 
10 
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Nominal Descriptive Statistics 
# Levels Count # Missing Mode 













Fig. 7.4.5 Descriptive Statistics: Group Entry Qualifications Categories. 
1=50 Levels 
2=0 Levels &A Levels 
3= Informal Qualifications (DC Test, Access course, BTEC) 
Cell Bar Chart 
Grouping Variable(s): EQual 









Fig. 7.4.6 Cell Plot: Raw Score Untimed and Group Entry Qualifications. 
1=50 Levels 
2=0 Levels &A Levels 
3= Informal Qualifications (DC Test, Access course, BTEC 
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Age, however, was subjected to correlational analysis to examine the test author's 
claims of an expected increase of score with advancing age. The relationship between 
untimed scores (RSU) and age were thus examined. 
seam nm 
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Fig. 7.4.7 Bivariate Plot: RSU & Age. 
Table 7.4.1 Correlation Matrix: Raw Score Untimed (RSU) and Age. 
Correlation Matrix 
RSU Aae 
RSU 1.000 . 221 
Age . 221 1.000 
43 observations were used in this computation. 
Table 7.4.1 demonstrates a positive but very weak correlation between Age and 
RSU. Although this relationship does not achieve significance it does lend weak 
support to the author's general claim of an expected increase in score with increasing 
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Fig. 7.4.8 Bivariate Plot: Raw Score Untimed Post Test RSUIP, phase 4) and Age. 
Table 7.4.2 Correlation Matrix Raw Score Untimed Post Test (RSU/P) and Age. 
Correlation Matrix 
Ana RSU/P 
Age 1.000 . 046 
RSU/P . 046 1.000 
43 observations were used In this computation. 
Cell Bar Chart 
Grouping Variable(s): Age split 










Age in years Age in years 
0 .  
Fig. 7.4.9 Cell Bar Chart Raw Score Untimed & Age Group. 
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Unpaired t-test for RSU 
Grouping Variable: Age split 
Hypothesized Difference -0 
Mean Diff. DF t-Value P-Value 
<30, >=30 -2.219 41 -. 819 . 4175 
Group Info for RSU 
Grouping Variable: Age split 
Count Mean Variance Std. Dev. Std. Err 
<30 
>=30 
32 50.781 48.693 6.978 1.234 
11 53.000 95.400 9.767 2.945 
Fig. 7.4.10 Unpaired t-test Raw Score Untimed and <30yrs and >30yrs Age, 
The above tables and figures representing phase 4 the WGCTA post tests further 
demonstrate non significant relationships between age and test scores. 
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7.5 Concurrent Think Aloud and Retrospective Qualitative Data Analysis 
Phases 2&3 
Initially the results for the twelve case studies arising from phases 2 and 3 will be 
presented in tabulated case format in conjunction with focal universe and think aloud 
characteristics. Secondly, a tabulated composite of all participant results from all four 
phases will be presented. Finally, the results and important observations arising from 
the data will be summarised. 
Case 1 (Participant 52) 
Table 7.5.1. Case 1: Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Phase 2: (Participant 52) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
26 2 8 18 
Table 7.5.2. Case 1: Categorisation of Argument Complexity(Participant 52, Phase 
2) 
Data Category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist c istcmolo (1) 
Test for Adequacy Absolutist epistemology 
Post judgement stimulated recall, Q1 Absolutist c istenmolo , (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology 
Q5 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q6 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q7 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
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Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This subject constructed a relatively small focal universe and the protocol was 
characterised by many pauses resulting in 2 researcher prompts. One rewind was 
undertaken by this participant to recapitulate previous information. Active 
information processing instances exceeded information reception instances. Ofthe 10 
simulation derived questions eight of the subject responses were categorised as being 
of an absolutist epistemology and were, thus, judged to represent the Naturalistic 
Reasoning Mode. The participant did demonstrate one example of a potential 
multiplist epistemology and one example of a multiplist epistemology. In response to 
the test for adequacy the participant responded no, and supported this by absolutist 
epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of 
correspondence evidence but with some examples of pseudo, covariation and 
counterfactual evidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology. (8) 
Table 7.5.3 Case 1: Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics. 
Phase 3: (Participant 52ý 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
31 1 11 20 
Table 7.5.4 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 52, Phase 3) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist epistemology (I) 
Test for adequacy Multi list epistemology (3) 
Post judgement stimulated recall QI Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q4 Potential multiplist epistemology (2) 
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Data category Argument complexity 
Q5 Absolutist c istcmolo gs (I ) 
(x) Absolutist c iste molo N, (I ) 
Q7 Absolutist c istcmolo v (1) 
QX Absolutist epistemology (I ) 
Q9 Absolutist epistemology (I ) 
Q l() Absolutist c istcmolo \ (1) 
Q11 Absolutist c istcmolo gy (1) 
Q12 Absolutist c istcmolo g) (I ) 
Case Summary - Phase 3: 
This participant constructed a larger focal universe for this phase than in phase 2 and 
there was only one researcher prompt required. Active information processing 
instances exceeded information reception instances. Of the 14 simulation derived 
questions 12 of the Participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist 
epistemology and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. 
The participant did demonstrate one example of a potential multiplist epistemology 
and one example of a multiplist epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy 
the participant responded no and supported this by multiplist epistemological 
reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of correspondence 
evidence but with some examples of pseudo and covariation evidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (12) 
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Case 2 (Participant 7) 
Table 7.5.5 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics. 
Phase 2: (Participant 7) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
44 0 7 37 
Table 7.5.6 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 7, Phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Ql Absolutist epistemology, (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology, (1) 
Q3 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q4 Absolutist c istemolo y- (1) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Absolutist epistemology, (1) 
Q7 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q8 Multi list epistemology (3) 
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Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This Participant constructed a focal universe of 44 elements for this phase. Active 
information processing instances exceeded information reception instances. Of the 10 
simulation derived questions eight of the participant responses were categorised as 
being of an absolutist epistemology and were thus judged to represent the 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant did demonstrate two examples of a 
multiplist epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy the participant 
responded no, and supported this by absolutist epistemological reasoning. The nature 
of reasoning was comprised predominantly of correspondence evidence but with 
some examples of pseudo, covariation and counterfactual evidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (8) 
Table 7.5.7 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Phase 3: (Participant 7) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
67 0 14 53 
Table 7.5.8 Categorisation of Argument complexity (Participant 7, Phase 3) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Q1 Absolutist e istemolo (2) 
Q2 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q3 Absolutist eistemolo y (1) 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
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Data category Argument complexity 
Q6 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q7 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Qx Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q9 Potential multi list c istemolo &-,, (2) 
Qlo Multi list c istcmolo ý (3) 
Qll Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q 12 Absolutist c istcniolo y (1) 
Q13 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q 14 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q15 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q16 Multi list c istcniolo g, (3) 
Case Summary, - Phase 3: 
This participant constructed a larger focal universe of 67 elements for this phase than 
in phase two. Active information processing instances exceeded information 
reception instances. Of the 18 simulation derived questions 12 of the participant 
responses were categorised as being of an absolutist epistemology and were thus 
judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant did 
demonstrate two examples of a potential multiplist epistemology and four examples 
of a multiplist epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy the participant 
responded no and supported this by absolutist epistemological reasoning. The nature 
of reasoning was comprised predominantly of correspondence evidence but with 
some examples of pseudo, covariation and counterfactual evidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (12) 
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Case 3 (Participant 4) 
Table 7.5.9 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Phase 2: (Participant 4) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
56 2 18 19 
Table 7.5.10 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 4, Phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgment Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Test for adequacy, Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Post judgement stimulated recall QI Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Absolutist c istemolo) (1) 
Q4 Potential multi list c istenmolo N (2) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q7 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology, (1) 
Q9 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This participant constructed a focal universe of 56 elements for this phase and two 
researcher prompts were required. Active information processing instances exceeded 
information reception instances. Of the 11 simulation derived questions 10 of the 
participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist epistemology and 
were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant did 
demonstrate one example of a potential multiplist epistemology. In response to the 
test for adequacy the participant responded yes and supported this by absolutist 
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epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of 
correspondence evidence but with many examples of pseudoevidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (10) 
Table 7.5.11 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Phase 3: (Participant 4) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
61 0 20 41 
Table 7.5.12 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 4, Phase 3) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist e istcmolo g (1) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist epistemology (l ) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Q1 Absolutist epistemology (I ) 
Q2 Absolutist c istcmolo g (I ) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology (I ) 
Q5 Absolutist c istcmolo g (I ) 
Absolutist epistemology (l ) 
Q7 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology (l ) 
Q9 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q l() Absolutist epistemology 
Ql l Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q12 Absolutist c istemolo ý(1) 
Q13 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q14 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q15 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
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Data Category Argument Complexity 
Q16 Absolutist c istcmolo y (I ) 
Q17 Absolutist c istcmolo y (1) 
Case Summary - Phase 3: 
This participant constructed a slightly larger focal universe of 61 elements for this 
phase than in phase two and no researcher prompts were required. Active 
information processing instances exceeded information reception instances. Of'the 19 
simulation derived questions 17 of the participant responses were categorised as 
being of an absolutist epistemology and were, thus, judged to represent the 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant did demonstrate two examples of a 
potential multiplist epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy the 
participant's response was equivocal and supported this by absolutist epistemological 
reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of correspondence 
evidence but with many examples of pseudoevidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (17) 
('ase 4 (Participant 45) 
Table 7.5.13 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Phase 2: (Participant 45) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
65 0 15 50 
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Table 7.5.14 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 45, Phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Potential multi list c istcmolo y (2) 
Test for adequacy Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Post jud ement stimulated recall Q1 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q2 Absolutist c istcmolo y (1) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q4 Absolutist c istcmolo g, (1) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q6 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q7 Absolutist epistemology, (1) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology- (1) 
Q9 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q10 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q11 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q12 Multi list e istemolo (3) 
Q13 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This participant constructed an initial focal universe of 65 elements for this phase 
and no researcher prompts were required. Active information processing instances 
exceeded information reception instances. Of the 15 simulation derived questions 
nine of the participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist 
epistemology and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. 
The participant did demonstrate five examples of a potential multiplist epistemology 
and one example of a multiplist epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy 
the participant's response was equivocal and supported this by potential multiplist 
epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of 
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pseudoevidence but with many examples of correspondence evidence and several 
examples of non-evidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (9) 
Table 7.5.15 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Phase 3: (Participant 45) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information Processing 
85 0 49 36 
Table 7.5.16 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 45, Phase 3) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Ql Absolutist e istemolo (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q5 Absolutist c istcmolo ' (1) 
Q6 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q7 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q9 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q10 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q11 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q12 Absolutist c istcniolo (1) 
Q13 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q14 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q15 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
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Case Summary Phase 3: 
This participant constructed a larger focal universe of 85 elements for this phase than 
in phase two and no researcher prompts were required. Information reception 
instances exceeded active information processing instances. Of the 17 simulation 
derived questions 13 of the participant responses were categorised as being of an 
absolutist epistemology and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning 
Mode. The participant did demonstrate two examples of a potential multiplist 
epistemology and two examples of a multiplist epistemology. In response to the test 
for adequacy the participant's response was no and supported this by absolutist 
epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of 
correspondence evidence but with many examples of pseudoevidence and several 
examples of non-evidence. One example of covariation evidence was demonstrated. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (13) 
Case 5 (Participant 33) 
Table 7.5.17 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Phase 2: (Participant 33) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
41 2 15 26 
Table 7.5.18 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 33, Phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist c istcmolo (1) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Ql Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q2 (1) Absolutist epistemology 
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Data Category Argument Complexity 
Q3 Absolutist c istcmolo g (1) 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q7 Absolutist c istcmolo y (1) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q9 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
QlO Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Ql 1 Potential multi list e isteniolo y (2) 
Q12 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
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Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This participant constructed an initial focal universe of4l elements for this phase and 
two researcher prompts were required. Active information processing instances 
exceeded information reception instances (26/15). Of the 14 simulation derived 
questions 11 of the participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist 
epistemology and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. 
The participant did demonstrate two examples of a potential multiplist epistemology 
and one example of a multiplist epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy 
the participant's response was equivocal and supported this by absolutist 
epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of 
correspondence evidence. There were also examples of pseudoevidence and one 
example each of covariation evidence and correlated change evidence. This 
participant also demonstrated an instance of reasoning where the response to a think 
aloud generated question was based upon evidence that would not have been 
functionally available at the time that the utterance was generated. The evidence 
related to the playing of chess came later in the simulation than the initial utterance 
relating to an active mind. It would appear, here that the participant searched 
memory stores for evidence that would best address the question, as opposed to 
recalling the actual processes that underpinned the initial utterance. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (11) 
Table 7.5.19 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Phase 3: (Participant 33) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
32 0 (long auses<30s) 7 25 
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Table 7.5.20 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 33. Phase 3) 
Data Category Argument Complexity 
Post simulation judgement Multi list epistemology (3) 
Test for adequacy Multi list epistemology (3) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Q1 Absolutist c istcmolo g\ (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Multi list c istemolo N' (z) 
Q4 Absolutist c istcmolo g (1) 
Q5 Absolutist c istemolo &y (1) 
Q6 Absolutist c istcmolo ' (1) 
Q7 Multi list c istcniolo y, (3) 
Q8 Absolutist c istcmolo y (1) 
Q9 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q10 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Ql l Absolutist epistemology (1) 
12 Absolutist epistemology 1 
Q13 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q14 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
QI5 Multi list epistemology ' (3) 
Ql6 Potential multi list e istemolo n, (2) 
Q17 Multi list e istcmolo ` (3) 
Q18 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q19 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Case Summary - Phase 3: 
This participant constructed a smaller focal universe of 32 elements for this phase 
than in phase two. No researcher prompts were required although there were many 
long pauses which did not exceed the 30 second threshold for prompting. Active 
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information processing instances exceeded information reception instances (25/7). 01' 
the 21 simulation derived questions 14 of the participant responses were categorised 
as being of an absolutist epistemology and were thus judged to represent the 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant did demonstrate one example ola 
potential multiplist epistemology and six examples of multiplist epistemology. In 
response to the test for adequacy the participant's response was no and supported 
this by multiplist epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised 
predominantly of correspondence evidence. There were also examples of 
pseudoevidence, covariation evidence and one example each of counterfactual and 
correlated change evidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (14) 
Case 6 (Participant 53) 
Table 7.5.21 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics. 
Phase 2: (Participant 53) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
44 1 2 42 
2( 
Table 7.521 Argument Complexity Categorisation (Participant 53, phase 2) 
Data category A iument com lcxih 
Post simulation judgment Absolutist c istcmolo gN (1) 
Tcst for adequacy Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Post jud cmcnt stimulated recall Q1 Absolutist c istemolo N- (1) 
Q2 Absolutist c istcnmolo y (1) 
Q3 Multi list c istcnmolo N, (z) 
Q4 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q6 Absolutist c istcniolo y (1) 
Q7 Absolutist c istcmolo g (1) 
Q8 Absolutist c istenmolo y (1) 
Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This participant constructed an initial focal universe of 44 elements for this phase. 
One researcher prompt was required. Active information processing instances 
exceeded information reception instances (42/2). Of the 10 simulation derived 
questions eight of the participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist 
epistemology and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. 
The participant did demonstrate one example of a potential multiplist epistemology 
and one example of multiplist epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy the 
participant's response was no and supported this by absolutist epistemological 
reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of correspondence 
evidence. There were also multiple examples of pseudoevidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (8) 
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Phase 3: (Participant 53) 
Table 7.5.23 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
35 () 0 15 
Table 7.5.24: Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 53, Phase 3) 
Data category Argument cmplexity 
Post simulation judgement Potential multi list e istemolo gy (2) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist c istemolo gy (1) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Ql Absolutist c istemolo gyy (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q6 Absolutist c istenmolo c (1) 
Q7 Absolutist c istemolo y, (1) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q9 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
QlO Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q 11 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q12 Multi list epistemology' (3) 
Case Summary - Phase 3: 
This participant constructed a smaller focal universe of 35 elements for this phase 
than in phase two. No researcher prompts were required. Only active information 
processing instances were demonstrated during this think aloud phase (35/0). Of the 
14 simulation derived questions 10 of the participant responses were categorised as 
being of an absolutist epistemology and were thus judged to represent the 
ý(ý; i 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant did demonstrate three examples of a 
potential multiplist epistemology and one example of multiplist epistemology. In 
response to the test for adequacy the participant's response was no and supported 
this by absolutist epistemological reasoning. The nature ot'reasoning was comprised 
predominantly of correspondence evidence with numerous examples of 
pseudoevidence. 
Naturalistic reasoning tendency = Absolutist epistemology (10) 
('use 7 (Participant 30) 
Table 7.5.25 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Phase 2: (Participant 30) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
85 0 38 47 
Table 7.5.26 Categorisation of Argument complexity (Participant 30, Phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist c istcmolo \ (1) 
Post jud ement stimulated recall Ql Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q2 Absolutist c istcniolo y (1) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q4 Absolutist e isteniolo (1) 
Q5 Potential multi list e istenmolo (2) 
Q6 Absolutist e istemolo g (1) 
Q7 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
2 09 
Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This participant constructed an initial focal universe of 85 elements ibr this phase and 
no researcher prompts were required. Active infi rmation processing instances 
exceeded information reception instances (47/38). Of the 10 simulation derived 
questions nine of the participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist 
epistemology and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. 
The participant did demonstrate one example of multiplist epistemology In response 
to the test for adequacy the participant's response was no and supported this by 
absolutist epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised 
predominantly of correspondence evidence. There were also examples of 
pseudoevidence, two instances of covariation evidence and one example of 
correlated change evidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (9) 
Phase 3: (Participant 30) 
Table 7.5.27: Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics. 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
91 O 34 57 
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Table 7.5.28: Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 30, Phase 3) 
Data category Argument omplexity 
Post simulation judgement Potential Multi list c is(cmolo) (2) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist c istcmolo y (1) 
Post jud Bement stimulated recall Q1 Absolutist c istcmolo y (1) 
Q2 Potential multi list c istcmolo g (2) 
Q3 Absolutist c istemolo &N, (1) 
Q4 Absolutist c istcmolo g (1) 
5 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q6 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q7 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q9 Absolutist c istemolo v' (1) 
QlO Absolutist c istenmolo g (1) 
Ql l Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q12 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q13 Potential Multi list epistemology (2) 
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Case Summary - Phase 3 
This participant constructed a larger focal universe of 91 elements for this phase than 
in phase two. No researcher prompts were required. Active information processing; 
instances exceeded information reception instances (57/34). Of the 15 simulation 
derived questions seven of the participant responses were categorised as being of an 
absolutist epistemology. The participant did, however, demonstrate seven examples 
of a potential multiplist epistemology and one example of a multiplist epistemology. 
The Naturalistic Reasoning Mode was, thus, judged to be of a potential multiplist 
epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy the participant's response was yes 
and supported this by multiplist epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning 
was comprised predominantly of correspondence evidence. There were also multiple 
examples of pseudoevidence, two of covariation evidence, one example of non- 
evidence and one example of counterfactual evidence. 
This participant also demonstrated several instances of metacognitive reasoning 
where the nature or fairness of the reasoning was verbalised. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Potential Multiplist Epistemology (7) 
Case 8 (Participant 10) 
Table 7.5.29: Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics. 
Phase 2: (Participant 10) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
49 0 14 35 
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Table 7.5.30: Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 10, Phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist c istemolo) (1) 
Tcst for adequacy Absolutist c istcmolo 
. 
N, (1) 
Post judgement stimulated recall QI Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q4 Absolutist c istcniolo y (1) 
Q5 Absolutist c istcnmolo y (1) 
QG Absolutist c istcmolo (1) 
Q7 Absolutist c istemolo y, (1) 
Q8 Absolutist c istemolo g' (1) 
Q9 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This participant constructed an initial focal universe of 49 elements for this phase. No 
researcher prompts were required. Active information processing instances exceeded 
information reception instances (35/14). Of the 11 simulation derived questions nine 
of the participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist epistemology 
and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant 
did demonstrate one example of a potential multiplist epistemology and one example 
of multiplist epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy the participant's 
response was no and supported this by absolutist epistemological reasoning. The 
nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of correspondence evidence with 
multiple examples of pseudoevidence and two examples of covariation evidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (9) 
27's 
Phase 3: (Participant 10) 
Table 7.5.31 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics. 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
51 0 19 11 +I NFU 
Table 7.5.32 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 10, phase 3) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Tcst for adequacy Absolutist c istcmolo gy (1) 
Post judgment stimulated recall Ql Multi list c istemolo )- (3) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Absolutist c istcmolo (1) 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q5 Absolutist c istenmolo N (1) 
Q6 Absolutist c istemolo (1) 
Q7 Absolutist c istemolo g (1) 
Q8 Absolutist c isteniolo (1) 
Q9 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
QlO Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q11 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q12 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q13 Absolutist c isteniolo y (1) 
Q14 Absolutist e isteniolo y (1) 
Case Summary - Phase 3: 
This participant constructed a slightly larger focal universe of 51 elements for this 
phase when compared to phase two. No researcher prompts were required. Active 
information processing instances exceeded information reception instances 
27.1 
(31+INFU/ 19). Of the 16 simulation derived questions 15 of the participant 
responses were categorised as being of an absolutist epistemology and were thus 
judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant did 
demonstrate one example of multiplist epistemology. In response to the test tier 
adequacy the participant's response was yes and supported this by absolutist 
epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of 
correspondence evidence. There were also multiple examples of pseudoevidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology(15). 
Case 9 (Participant 8) 
Table 7.5.33 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics. 
Phase 2: (Participant 8) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
62 0 27 35 
Table 7.. 5.34 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 8, phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist e istemolo) (1) 
Test for adequacy Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Ql Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q2 Absolutist episteniolog. N (1) 
Q3 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q4 Absolutist c istenmolo y (1) 
Q5 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q6 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q7 Absolutist c istemolo yr (1) 
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Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This participant constructed an initial focal universe of 62 elements for this phase. No 
researcher prompts were required. Active information processing instances exceeded 
information reception instances (35/27). Of the nine simulation derived questions six 
of the participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist epistemology 
and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant 
did demonstrate two examples of a potential multiplist epistemology and one 
example of multiplist epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy the 
participant's response was no and supported this by potential multiplist 
epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of 
correspondence evidence. There were also examples of pseudoevidence and one 
example of non-evidence. Some utterances in the post simulation judgement were 
not manifested in the simulation mediated attentive focal universe, silent processing 
must, therefore, have taken place. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (6) 
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Phase 3: (Participant 8) 
Table 7.5.35 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics. 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
70 0 44 26 
Table 7.5.36 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 8, phase 3) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Potential multi list c istcmolo g (2) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist c istcmolo v (1) 
Post jud cment stimulated recall QI Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Potential multi list c istemolo y, (2) 
Q4 Potential multi list c istenmolo y (2) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q6 Absolutist c istemolo , (1) 
Q7 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q8 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q9 Absolutist c istemolo yy (1) 
Ql() Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q11 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q12 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q13 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Case Summary - Phase 3: 
This participant constructed a slightly larger focal universe of 62 elements for this 
phase when compared with phase two. No researcher prompts were required. 
Information reception instances exceeded active information processing instances 
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(44/26). Of the 15 simulation derived questions nine of the participant responses 
were categorised as being of an absolutist epistemology and were thus judged to 
represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. The participant did demonstrate three 
examples of a potential multiplist epistemology and three examples of multiplist 
epistemology. In response to the test for adequacy the participant's response was no 
and supported this by absolutist epistemological reasoning. The nature of'reasoning 
was comprised predominantly of correspondence evidence. There were also multiple 
examples of pseudoevidence, three examples of covariation evidence and one 
example of counterfactual evidence. 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode = Absolutist epistemology (9) 
('ase 10 (Participant 38 
Phase 2 
Table 7.5.37 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics (Participant 38) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
34 0 0 34 
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Table 7.5.38 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 38, phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation jud cmcnt Absolutist c istemolo gy (1) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist c istcmolo gy (I ) 
Post jud cmcnt stimulated recall Q1 Absolutist c istemolo) (l ) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (I ) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q4 Absolutist c isteniolo y (I ) 
Q5 Absolutist c istcnmolo y 1) 
Q6 Absolutist c istcmolo g) (1) 
Q7 Absolutist c istcmolo) (1) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q9 Absolutist c isteniolo y (I ) 
QlO Absolutist epistemology (I ) 
QI1 Absolutist cistcmolo N- (1) 
12 Absolutist c istemolo \ 1) 
Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This participant constructed an initial focal universe of 34 elements for this phase. No 
researcher prompts were required but the protocol consisted of many long pauses not 
reaching the 30 second prompting threshold. Information processing instances were 
the only form of reasoning demonstrated in this protocol (34/0). Of the 14 simulation 
derived questions all 14 of the participant responses were categorised as being of an 
absolutist epistemology and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning 
Mode. In response to the test for adequacy the participant's response was no and 
supported this by absolutist epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was 
comprised predominantly of correspondence evidence. There were also multiple 
279 
examples of pseudoevidence. Much of this Participant's reasoning performance is 
characterised by early closure strategies. 
Naturalistic reasoning mode = Absolutist epistemology (14) 
Phase 3: 
Table 7.5.39 Focal Universe characteristics (Participant 38, phase 3) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
35 0 3 32 
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Table 7.5.40 Argument Complexity Categorisation (Participant 38, phase 3) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Absolutist c istcmolo g) (I ) 
Test for adequacy Absolutist epistemology (I ) 
Post judgment stimulated recall 1 Absolutist epistemology (I ) 
Q2 Absolutist c istcmolo g (I ) 
Q3 Absolutist c istemolo &N (I ) 
Q4 Absolutist c istcmolo y (1) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology 
Q6 Absolutist c istcmolo ' (1) 
Q7 Absolutist c istenmolo y (I ) 
Q8 Absolutist c istcmolo ) (I ) 
Q9 Absolutist epistemology 
QlO Absolutist c istenmolo y, (1) 
Q11 Absolutist c istcmolo g (1) 
Q12 Absolutist e istcmolo g (I ) 
Q13 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q 14 Absolutist c istcnmolo y (1) 
Q15 Absolutist cpistcmolo&-v 
Q16 Absolutist epistemology 
Q17 Absolutist e istemolo g (1) 
Q18 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
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Case Summary - Phase 3: 
This participant constructed a focal universe of 35 elements for this phase which was 
1 element larger than in phase two. No researcher prompts were required but the 
protocol consisted of many long pauses not reaching the 30 second prompting 
threshold. Information processing instances exceeded information reception instances 
(32/3). Of the 20 simulation derived questions all 20 of the participant responses 
were categorised as being of an absolutist epistemology and were thus judged to 
represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. In response to the test for adequacy the 
participant's response was no and supported this by absolutist epistemological 
reasoning. The nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of correspondence 
evidence. There were also multiple examples of pseudoevidence. Again, this 
participant demonstrates consistent early closure reasoning. Evidence of my-side 
arguments consistently supported across differing stimulated recall events and across 
phases. Participant demonstrates several instances of reasoning where the 
information used to support think aloud utterances were not functionally available 
(NFA). 
Naturalistic reasoning mode = Absolutist epistemology (20) 
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Case 11 (Participant 37) 
Phase 2: 
Table 7.5.41 Focal Universe and Think Aloud characteristics (Participant 17) 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
74 0 25 49 
Table 7.5.42 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 37, phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation jud ement Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Test for adequacy Multi list c istenmolo y (3) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Ql Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q5 Potential multi list e istenmolo y (2) 
Q6 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q7 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Case Summary -. Phase 2: 
This participant constructed a focal universe of 74 elements for this phase. No 
researcher prompts were required. Information processing instances exceeded 
information reception instances (49/25). Of the nine simulation derived questions six 
of the participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist epistemology 
and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. There were also 
two examples of potential epistemological and one example of multiplist 
epistemological reasoning. In response to the test for adequacy the participant's 
response was yes and supported this by multiplist epistemological reasoning. The 
2x3 
nature of reasoning was comprised predominantly of correspondence evidence. 
There were also multiple examples of pseudoevidence plus one example of' 
counterfactual and one example of covariation evidence. 
Naturalistic reasoning mode = Absolutist epistemology (6) 
Phase 3: (Participant 37) 
Table 7.5.43 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
58 o 19 19 
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Table 7.5.44 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 37, phase 3) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgment Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Test for ade uac%, Multi list epistemology (3) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Q1 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q2 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q3 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q5 Absolutist epistemology , (1) 
Q6 Absolutist epistemology , (1) 
Q7 Multi list epistemology " (3) 
Q8 Potential multi list e istemolo ), (2) 
Q9 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
QlO Absolutist epistemology (1) 
QI l Absolutist epistemology (1) 
(12 Absolutist epistemology 
13 Absolutist epistemology " (1) 
Q14 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
015 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
('ase Summary - Phase-3. 
This participant constructed a smaller focal universe of 58 elements for this phase 
than compared with phase two No researcher prompts were required. Information 
processing instances exceeded intörmation reception instances (39/19). Of the 17 
simulation derived questions II of the participant responses were categorised as 
being of'an absolutist epistemology and were thus judged to represent the 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode 'T'here were also tour examples ot'potential multiplist 
epistemological and two examples of multiplist epistemological reasoning. In 
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response to the Test for Adequacy the participant's response was equivocal, and 
supported this by multiplist epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was 
comprised predominantly of correspondence evidence. There were also multiple 
examples of pseudoevidence plus four examples of counterfactual evidence and one 
example of metacognition. 
Naturalistic reasoning mode = Absolutist epistemology (11) 
Case 12 (Participant 2) 
Phase 2: 
Table 75 45 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics: 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
essing 
72 () 37 35 
2K(ß 
Table 7.5.46 Categorisation of Argument complexity (Participant 2, phase 2) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Multi list c istcmolo g (3 ) 
Test for adequacy, Potential multi list c istemolo gy (2) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Q1 Absolutist c istemolo g) (1) 
Q2 Absolutist c istenmolo y- (1) 
Q3 Absolutist c isteniolo (1) 
Q4 Multi list epistemology (1) 
Q5 Absolutist c istenmolo y (1) 
Q6 Absolutist c istemolo) (1) 
Q7 Multi list e istemolo , (3) 
Q8 Absolutist c istenmolo y (1) 
Q9 Potential multi list epistemology, (2) 
Q10 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Ql l Absolutist c istcmolo g (1) 
Case Summary - Phase 2: 
This participant constructed a focal universe of 72 elements for this phase. No 
researcher prompts were required. Information Reception instances exceeded 
information processing instances (37/35). Of the 13 simulation derived questions 
seven of the participant responses were categorised as being of an absolutist 
epistemology and were thus judged to represent the Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. 
There were also two examples of potential multiplist epistemological and four 
examples of multiplist epistemological reasoning. In response to the Test for 
Adequacy the participant's response was no and supported this by potential multiplist 
epistemological reasoning. The nature of reasoning was almost balanced between 
pseudoevidence and correspondence evidence (48/44). There was also two examples 
of covariation evidence and one example of counterfactual evidence. 
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Naturalistic reasoning tendency = Absolutist epistemology (7) 
Phase 3: (Participant 2) 
Table 7.5.47 Focal Universe and Think Aloud Characteristics: 
Focal Universe Researcher Prompts Information Reception Information 
Processing 
75 0 35 40 
Table 7.5.48 Categorisation of Argument Complexity (Participant 2, phase 3) 
Data category Argument complexity 
Post simulation judgement Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Test for adequacy Potential multi list c istemolo gy (2) 
Post judgement stimulated recall Q1 Absolutist c istenmolo y (1) 
Q2 Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q3 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q4 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q5 Absolutist c isteniolo N (1) 
Q6 Absolutist c isteniolo (1) 
Q7 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q8 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q9 Absolutist epistemology' (1) 
QlO Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Ql l Potential multi list epistemology (2) 
Q12 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
Q13 Multi list c istemolo K' (3) 
Q14 Multi list epistemology (3) 
Q15 Absolutist epistemology (1) 
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Case Summary - Phase 3 
This participant constructed a larger focal universe of 75 elements for this phase 
when compared to phase two. No researcher prompts were required. Information 
processing instances exceeded information reception instances (40/35). Of the 17 
simulation derived questions 11 of the participant responses were categorised as 
being of an absolutist epistemology and were thus judged to represent the 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. There were also four examples of potential multiplist 
epistemological and two examples of multiplist epistemological reasoning. In 
response to the Test for Adequacy the participant's response was equivocal, and 
supported this by potential multiplist epistemological reasoning. The nature of 
reasoning was predominantly characterised by correspondence evidence (65). There 
was also multiple examples of pseudoevidence (49) and two examples of covariation 
evidence and two examples of metacognition. 
Naturalistic reasoning mode = Absolutist epistemology (11) 
7.6 Composite of Participant Longitudinal Data 
This section will present a composite of the results for the four phases of data 
analysis and subsequent statistical analysis of the differences between the phases. 
This will be followed by a description of the emergent observations relating to the 
data thus far. 
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Table 7.6.1 Composite Participant Results for Phases 1-4. 
Case no Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Argument 
complexity 
range - phases 
2&3 
1. (P52) 52 1 1 48 1&3 - 1-3 
2. (P7) 68 1 1 63 1&3 / 1-3 
3. (P4) 49 1 I 44 1/ 1-3 
4. (P45) 53 1 l 54 1-3 / 1-3 
5. (P33) 60 I 1 54 1-2 / 1-3 
6. (P53) 50 1 1 52 1/ 1-2 
7. (P30) 58 1 2 53 1-3 / 1-3 
8. (P10) 46 1 1 47 1-3 / 1-3 
9. (P8) 44 1 1 56 1-2 / 1-3 
10. (P38) 53 1 1 46 1-2 / 1-3 
11. (P37) 61 1 1 50 2-3 / 1-3 
12. (P2) 51 1 1 63 1-3 / 1-1 
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Table 7.6.2: Differences in Participant Scores for Phases I&4 
Case Phase I Phase 4 Difference 
1. (P52) 52 48 -4 
2. (P7) 68 63 -5 
3. (P4) 49 44 -5 
4. (P45) 53 54 +l 
5. (P33) 60 54 -Ci 
6. (P53) 50 52 +2 
7. (P30) 58 53 -5 
8. (P10) 46 47 +1 
9. (P8) 44 56 +12 
U). (P38) 53 46 -7 
11. (P37) 61 50 -11 
12. (P2) 51 63 +12 
Table 7.6.3 Differences in Participant Scores for Phases 2&3 
Case Phase 2 Phase 3 Differences 
1. (P52) I 1 O 
2. (P7) l 1 (1 
3. (P4) I 1 (1 
4. (P45) 1 0 
5. (P33) 1 0 
6. (P53) I 0 
7. (P30) 1 2 +l 
8. (P10) 1 0 
9. (P8) 1 0 
10. (P38) 1 1 (l 
11. (P37) 1 0 
12. (P2) 1 1 0 
Participant score differences between phases were subjected to a paired sign test to 
determine whether these differences were statistically significant. 
Paired Sign Test for Phase 1, Phase 4 
# Differences >07 
# Differences <05 
# Differences =00 
P-Value . 
7744 
Fig. 7.6.1 Paired Sign Test for Phases I and 4. 
The paired sign test was chosen because it is appropriate for non-parametric testing 
of a small sample of nominal data, that may or may not be correlated. Very few 
assumptions are made regarding the underlying distributions from which the data 
arise or the magnitude of the differences that exist between the paired data (Haycock 
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et at. 1994). The rationale in this case was to test for significant differences in 
WGCTA raw scores or argument complexity categorisation between the relevant 
phases. There were, however, insufficient changes between phases 2&3 to reveal 
significant differences. 
The above analyses demonstrate that the differences in volunteer sample scores for 
the WGCTA and qualitative data analysis do not achieve statistical significance over 
the four phases. This is in keeping with the group mean scores for the WGCTA for 
phases 1&4 
7.7 Summary of Results and Important Observations Arising from the Data. 
" The group performance on the Watson & Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal 
across phase 1&4 were unchanged. 
" The Naturalistic Reasoning Mode for the group sample were predominantly 
(n=11) of an Absolutist nature and this remained unchanged across phases 2 and 
3. This concurs with the group's unchanging results from phases 1 and 4. 
" One case demonstrated a change in Naturalistic Reasoning Mode between phases 
2&3. One case developed from an Absolutist Epistemology to a Potential 
Multiplist Epistemology. 
" Individual WGCTA scores do not appear to relate to Naturalistic Reasoning 
Mode, i. e. higher WGCTA scores do not signify a higher level of Naturalistic 
Reasoning Mode. Conversely, lower WGCTA scores do not signify a lower 
Naturalistic Reasoning Mode. 
" In this population, entry qualifications had no significant effect upon WGCTA 
scores. 
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" In this population gender had no significant effect upon WGCTA scores. 
" All of the participants rely predominantly upon the weakest form of genuine 
evidence (Kuhn, 1991) to support their arguments regardless of the level of 
argument complexity. 
" The volume of available or generated evidence (Focal Universe) does not appear 
to be related to the participants' level of argument complexity and Naturalistic 
Reasoning Mode (see table 7.7.1). 
" There is little evidence of verbalised reference to formal theory during concurrent 
reasoning and stimulated recall reasoning. 
" Where variance in argument complexity within cases is evident there is some 
evidence to suggest that metacognitive strategies or processes are used. 
" The majority of participants' responses consist predominantly of their own 
knowledge structures, i. e. inductions constructed from evidence that is external 
to the simulation evidence. 
" The volume of participant active information processing and information 
reception instances varies between participants but does not appear to have an 
effect upon the level of participants' argument complexity (see tables 7.7.2 & 
7.7.3). 
Test for adequacy responses (i. e. whether the participant response is yes, no or 
equivocal) do not appear to relate to participants' argument complexity or 
naturalistic reasoning mode. 
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Table 7.7.1 Participant Focal Universe Size and Naturalistic Reasoning Modes tier 
Phases 2&3. (P. = Participant, Absolutist = Absolutist l', pistemology, I'MI; 
Potential Multiplist Epistemology). 




- Phase 2 




- Phase 3 
1. (P. 52) 26 Absolutist 31 Absolutist 
2. (P. 7) 44 Absolutist 67 Absolutist 
3. (P. 4) 56 Absolutist 61 Absolutist 
4. (P. 45) 65 Absolutist 85 Absolutist 
5. (P. 33) 41 Absolutist 32 Absolutist 
6. (P. 53) 44 Absolutist 35 Absolutist 
7. (P. 30) 85 Absolutist 91 PME: 
8. (P. 10) 49 Absolutist 51 Absolutist 
9. (P. 8) 62 Absolutist 70 Absolutist 
10. (P. 38) 34 Absolutist 35 Absolutist 
11. (P. 37) 74 Absolutist 58 Absolutist 
12. (P. 2) 72 Absolutist 75 Absolutist 
Table 7.7.2 Participant Information Reception Instances and Naturalistic Reasoning 
Mode for Phases 2&3. 




- Phase 2 




- Phase 3 
1. (P. 52) 8 Absolutist Il Absolutist 
2. (P. 7) 7 Absolutist 14 Absolutist 
3. (P. 4) 18 Absolutist 20 Absolutist 
4. (P. 45) 15 Absolutist 49 Absolutist 
5. (P. 33) 15 Absolutist 7 Absolutist 
6. (P. 53) 2 Absolutist (1 Absolutist 
7. (P. 30) 38 Absolutist 34 PME 
8. (P. 10) 14 Absolutist 19 Absolutist 
9. (P. 8) 27 Absolutist 44 Absolutist 
10. (P. 38) 0 Absolutist 3 Absolutist 
11. (P. 37) 25 Absolutist 19 Absolutist 
12. (P. 2) 37 Absolutist 35 Absolutist 
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Table 7.7.3 Participant Information Processing- 
_Instances andNaturalistic 
Reasoning 
Mode for Phases 2&3. 




- Phase 2 




- Phase 3 
1. (P. 52) 18 Absolutist 20 Absolutist 
2. (P. 7) 37 Absolutist 53 Absolutist 
3. (P. 4) 38 Absolutist 41 Absolutist 
4. (P. 45) 50 Absolutist 36 Absolutist 
5. (P. 33) 26 Absolutist 25 Absolutist 
6. (P. 53) 42 Absolutist 35 Absolutist 
7. (P. 30) 47 Absolutist 57 PME 
8. (P. 10) 35 Absolutist 3I+I NFU Absolutist 
9. (P. 8) 35 Absolutist 26 Absolutist 
10. (P. 38) 34 Absolutist 32 Absolutist 
11. (P. 37) 49 Absolutist 39 Absolutist 
12. (P. 2) 35 Absolutist 40 Absolutist 
Further discussion of these results in relation to the research questions and the 





The aim of this chapter is to critically appraise the methodology and results of the 
study in relation to the research questions and place them in context of the previous 
and emergent literature. The first step in this process is to restate the original 
purpose, and the research questions, that this study sought to address. These are as 
follows: 
1. Does the current institutional Common Foundation Programme facilitate 
the development of critical thinking ability in student nurses? 
2. Can critical thinking be identified in student nurses' concurrent professional 
reasoning processes? 
3. Does student nurses' reasoning change in complexity over the course of 
the Common Foundation Programme? 
8.2 Research Question One: 
The results generated from the two independent study methods in relation to this 
population demonstrate that: 
the curriculum as an intervention has not resulted in changes to the group's 
performance in critical thinking ability as measured by the Watson & Glaser 
Critical Thinking Appraisal (1991) at the end of the Common Foundation 
Programme; 
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the curriculum as an intervention has not resulted in changes to the 
population sample's critical thinking ability as characterised by their 
Naturalist Reasoning Mode at the end of the Common Foundation 
Programme. 
In relation to the first point, this is evident primarily in the minor differences 
demonstrated in the group WGCTA mean raw scores and standard deviations for the 
pre and post test phases 1 and 4 (Table 7.2.1, p. 230 ). The decrease in variance 
shown also supports the fact that scores for phase four were more homogeneous 
with regard to test performance (Hicks, 1990). 
The group results of the WGCTA five sub-test raw scores also revealed no 
significant differences in performance (Tables 7.3.1 - 7.3.5, pp. 232-235) over phases 
1 and 4. The group as a whole consistently scored lowest on the inference sub-test 
across both phases. This aspect of WGCTA performance is also important in the 
volunteer samples' Post Simulation Judgement and Stimulated Recall responses 
which contribute to their Naturalistic Reasoning Mode categorisation. Several 
inferential shortcomings, as described in the psychological literature, are evident in 
the reasoning of participants' responses categorised as representing an absolutist 
epistemology (These are discussed in response to research question 2). 
In addition to the effect of the formal curriculum as an intervention, the general 
college, maturation and hidden curriculum effects, as outlined by McMillan (1987), 
do not appear to have contributed to change in the group's performance at this point. 
Results such as these are not unique and are congruent with previous North 
American studies, relating to critical thinking as an outcome of nursing education 
that used the WGCTA as an instrument (Matthews & Gaul, 1979; Valiga, 1983; 
Bauwens & Gerhard, 1987; Fleeger 1987; Sullivan, 1987; Kintgen-Andrews, 1988). 
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Each found that programmes of nursing education had no significant effect upon 
critical thinking ability as measured by the WGCTA. 
With regard to these findings, issues affecting the possible reliability of the data have 
to taken into account. Some caution is, therefore, required in the interpretation of 
these results in light of the issues raised in chapter four, particularly in relation to 
test - retest reliability. A variety of factors could contribute to individual performance 
and measurement error on both tests, e. g. health status, anxiety producing life events, 
motivation levels, discomfort, and guessing (Kline, 1993). Another important test - 
related issue is the difficulty of items. If test items are too easy for participants then 
the test - retest reliability will be very high. Conversely, items that are difficult for 
participants will produce a low test - retest reliability. Given the level of the group's 
mean scores, in the test and re-test phases when compared to the norm tables 
presented, the latter may be more reflective of the group's test experience and to 
some extent may have contributed to the results achieved. Given the group's 
composition in regard to entry qualifications, one might expect that the sample of 
individuals who entered the programme with informal qualifications (Group 3: 
n=10(23%), Fig, 7.4.5, p. 245) would conceivably have experienced greater difficulty 
with the test items. Results demonstrate, however, that no significant differences in 
scores were attributable to this variable (Fig, 7.4.6, p. 245). 
Sample size also needs to be considered, in that most statistical indices have standard 
errors indicating how reliable the results are. Kline (1993) suggests that in order to 
minimise such statistical error samples of approximately one hundred, should be 
considered. Thus, the sample used in this case study may be subject to such 
limitations. Moreover, McMillan (1987) cautions that instruments such as the 
WGCTA may not be sensitive enough to find changes in critical thinking over short 
periods of time, as in the case of a single course or semester. Conversely, the 
WGCTA could be viewed as effective in terms of discrimination in that the group's 
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levels of critical thinking were unchanged and the results portray the test reliability in 
stability over time Videbeck (1997) adds another caution to the interpretation of pre 
and post tests scores using standardised instruments where a gain in score, leads to 
inferences of changed ability. For example, she posits that instruments designed to 
measure specific attributes are by nature static and there: 
"... is a high correlation across two points in time if the measure is valid and 
reliable. Thus to pre and post test with the same instrument, and use the 
difference as a change score either yields few or no measurable results of 
change, or calls into question the reliability and validity of the instrument if 
the change score is significant", (p. 9). 
Such a view, however, appears to rule out any possibility of a valid and reliable 
instrument ever being able to capture significant improvement in individual 
performance and may reflect the general criticism of the psychometric approach in 
relation to the notion of'true score' (Rust & Golombok, 1989). 
Strategies to overcome some of the issues related to test - retest reliability have, 
however, been utilised in the study procedures to increase confidence in the results, 
in that a time gap well in excess of three months between test administrations was 
incorporated. Clear and consistent test instructions, as stipulated by the test authors, 
were implemented for both administrations, to overcome the possibility of improved 
performance, due to differences in the quality of test preparation for participants 
(Kline, 1993). 
on balance, when viewed against the supporting evidence in relation to evidence 
produced upon completion of phases two and three, the results pertaining to the 
group's unchanging naturalistic reasoning mode (n=11) there is a case to suggest that 
the WGCTA score were indicative of a particular level of performance in critical 
thinking ability that remained unchanged despite the largely homogenous curriculum 
experience. The questions arising from these results are: given that the group 
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performances were unchanged across the four phases; and the independent variables 
of age, gender, educational entry qualification and 'college effects' do not appear to 
have a bearing upon them; then, what factors have contributed to this outcome? The 
possibilities are: could they be largely due to the individual; the 
instruments; the curriculum or a combination of all of these factors? 
With regard to the second possibility, an outstanding issue with regards to the 
WGCTA, is the concern of commentators who suggest that because the test is not 
domain specific then it may not relate to the performance of individual's reasoning in 
domain specific situations. In this respect, if the test is designed to measure critical 
reasoning about general everyday issues, and a programme of professional education 
is designed to incorporate such reasoning into domain specific issues, then the test 
scores may only reflect an unchanged level of performance in regard to the former, 
with little impact upon the latter. McPeck (1984; 1990) concurs with this position 
and argues that a central prerequisite for critical thinking is a body of domain specific 
knowledge. Similar arguments have focused upon thinking skills instruction with 
several commentators claiming that such instruction should concentrate on domain 
specific problems because thinking skills are most likely to be utilised when the 
conditions for their use is easily recognised (Chi et at. 1982; Bransford et at., 1986). 
In respect of these arguments, the development of the domain specific think aloud 
and stimulated recall method employed by this study would conceivably have been 
more sensitive to critical thinking skills than the WGCTA, if, critical thinking ability 
had been incorporated into the students' reasoning strategies. (notwithstanding the 
absence of specific critical thinking skills instruction). This, however, as the results 
suggest, has not proven to be the case despite the use of two independent 
instruments, and could thus question the necessity of domain specificity in reasoning 
tasks. The alternative possibility of task appropriateness has also to be considered 
here, in that a different cognitive task or a different client simulation may have 
300 
produced different results. A test for future research would be, however, to apply the 
think aloud and analytic methodology to a variety of tasks and simulations. 
The evidence of this study does, however, conflict with several previous studies that 
did find evidence that American nursing education had a positive effect upon 
students' critical thinking abilities as measured by the WGCTA (Berger, 1984; Gross 
Takazawa & Rose, 1987; Miller, 1992). A more recent study by Pepa et at. (1997) 
used the WGCTA to investigate the potential differences between pre and post test 
scores for traditional (n=45) and accelerated (n=43 non-nursing graduates) 
undertaking the same nursing education programme. The findings revealed a 
significant increase in the traditional nursing students WGCTA scores but not of the 
accelerated student's scores. The findings regarding the accelerated student's scores 
lend support to the assertion of McMillan (1987) that students beginning a course 
with high scores on a measure of critical thinking will be unlikely to show statistically 
significant improvements because the instrument used may not be sufficiently difficult 
or discriminatory to show a difference in performance (ceiling effect). 
Some of the individual results of this study, however, show a paradox, in that some 
participants with higher pre test WGCTA scores actually demonstrate a regression in 
their post test scores (Table 7.6.1, e. g., cases 2,5 & 11, p. 288). Possible 
explanations for these events are that these students were more careless or 
demotivated during the second test, or this could represent, the phenomenon of 
regression to the mean (Garnham & Oakhill, 1994). This is a complex statistical 
phenomena but essentially refers to the possibility that people have an average 
performance on tests, and in pre test post test situations, they may score above and 
then subsequently below their average, or, vice versa. Consequently extreme or 
above average scores are an aberration and not truly reflective of average 
performance. For this reason the individual WGCTA scores could not be used as 
predictors of performance or of success in pre-registration nursing education. 
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When compared to United Kingdom and North American norm tables it is also 
apparent that this population's mean scores were lower, even though, the group 
undertook an untimed test (Tables 7.3.6 - 7.3.11, p. 241). Great caution needs to be 
exercised in interpreting the psychometric evidence in light of the small sample and 
case study design of this study. The evidence from phases 1 and 4, thus, adds to the 
body of evidence that does not support the assertion that nursing education develops 
critical thinking abilities in nursing students. The psychometric evidence, however, as 
previously identified does not provide insights into the actual reasoning processes of 
individual students in the way that the study's additional methods have been designed 
to illuminate. 
Another caution in regard to these results also needs to be reported in regards to 
curricular outcomes regarding nursing competence. Such evidence has to be seen in 
the context of the specific construct under investigation and should not be 
extrapolated to the alternative issue of nursing competence as an outcome of nursing 
education. The issue of whether critical thinking is an essential component of general 
nursing competence has not been addressed in this study or in many of the above 
examples. Although it would be difficult to assume that an individual could develop 
professional competence without concomitant critical thinking skills, to what degree, 
one is related to the other is still undetermined (Stark et at. 1986; Maynard, 1996). 
Moreover, Matthews & Gaul (1979); Pardue (1987); Brooks & Shepherd (1990) and 
Pless & Clayton (1993) demonstrated non-significant relationships between critical 
thinking ability and clinical reasoning abilities. 
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8.3 Research Question 2 
The development of the client simulation, think aloud and data analysis strategies 
have afforded significant evidence concerning the way that the participants in this 
sample have reasoned about a complex professional issue. In so doing, the 
methodology has also provided evidence of aspects of critical thinking as defined in 
chapter two. The findings will, thus, be evaluated in relation to this, and the recent 
literature involving qualitative approaches to investigating critical thinking in nursing. 
The systematic analytic strategy, and results for phases 2 and 3, have outlined how 
each participant's verbal responses to the cognitive task and stimulated recall 
questions were categorised in relation to argument complexity as an index of critical 
thinking. 
The instrumentation developed for phase two and three has proved capable of 
illuminating certain aspects of critical thinking as portrayed in the argument 
complexity of participants' responses to the simulated domain -specific cognitive 
task. The majority of participants, however, do not demonstrate critical thinking 
ability consistently within their individual responses to the simulation, or, across 
phases. 
With the exception of one case, the majority of participants have consistently 
demonstrated a naturalistic reasoning mode reflective of an absolutist epistemology 
across phases two and three. Reasoning of this nature violates not only the definition 
of critical thinking proposed, but also a number of the discrete characteristic 
affective dispositions, the cognitive skills, intellectual standards and the contextual 
abilities related to critical thinking (Chapter 2). These issues will, thus, be evaluated 
in this context. 
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8.3.1 Characteristics of Participants' Absolutist Epistemological Reasoning. 
Reasoning from an absolutist epistemology is defined in the scale developed to 
categorise argument and epistemological complexity as follows: 
Low unifocal - moderate differentiation and low integration: i. e. low or moderate 
differentiation culminating in a one-sided or single theory structure argument 
reflecting a narrow perspective, with little search for, or utilisation of, opposing 
evidence, non consideration of alternatives or context and early closure (Absolutist 
Epistemology). 
Evidence arising from the qualitative data demonstrates that participants who reason 
from this epistemological perspective characteristically construct my-side or single 
theory structure arguments. These responses do not include the search for or 
generation of alternatives, in the form of other views or possibilities where their 
claims or assertions could be inaccurate or ambiguous in the face of additional 
evidence or perspective. Graphic representation of participants' response structures 
identify two predominant models of reasoning whereby participants either: respond 
to the questions posed with a primary conclusion, which they then support, with 
evidence that solely supports that conclusion and which may be repeated at the end 
of the reasoning sequence; or, they initially provide supporting evidence which then 
leads to a terminal my-sided conclusion. Both models may or may not include, 
intermediate conclusions. An example of one these models is presented below: 
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Table 8.3.1 Example of Absolutist epistemological reasoning-with primary 
conclusion. 
Participant 30, phase 2, question 2. 
Researcher (R) - "What made you think he (Billy) was probably in his thirties. " 
Participant (P) - 
Data Integrative Focus Boundaryof Nature of Reasoning 
complexity Evidence & Evidence 
[Il "lust experience I Ini I\hetiential evidence I vrili il ht% . ulk- c,, n( lii, n)11. 
suppose its basis liar conclusion causal element. 
correspondence 
evidence. 
U "an from looking at Dili, Appearance as External Mv-side, causal 
him I guessed from experiential indicator element. 
y'know - guessing from of age estimation coil espolidelice 
experience he was evidence. 
about that age 
1J3 "And then he I)if , Children's ages as FAtcl-nal M\-side, causal 
talked about the age of confirming principle clement. 
his children - it correspondence 
confirmed my ideas evidence. 
1J4 " So 1 just - yeah - lilt I : \ternal M. -side conclusion 
based it on my own 
experience as for - of 
the stage he was at and 




U? AN> U; 
if O 
Fig 8.3.1 : Representation of Absolutist epistemological reasoning with primary 
conclusion: (Participant 30, Phase 2, Question 2). 
The above example clearly demonstrates an initial conclusion where the participant 
stipulates that experience (external knowledge structure) was a sufficient basis upon 
which to determine Billy's age. This conclusion is then supported by the two further 
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dimensions, where experience in relation to the nature of Billy's appearance or looks 
and the age of Billy's children enables the participant to estimate Billy's age. This 
sequence is further supported by a reaffirmation of the original conclusion in 
combination with the other dimensions. 
This exemplifies a single theory or my-side only argument representative of an 
absolutist epistemology. The participant gives no thought to alternative contextual 
possibilities that could refute such a conclusion, for example, possible instances 
where individuals' appearances are incongruent with their chronological age. There 
are many examples where people look much older than their years, or where people 
look younger than their years. Peoples' lifestyle choices, occupation, health status 
ethnicity have some bearing upon their appearance, and given these possible 
dimensions, will increase the variability of this phenomena. Secondly, the age of 
people's children in current society must be seen as a poor indicator of age, in the 
context of individuals choosing to have children later in life, and the increase of 
second marriages, where people with older children from one marriage choose to 
start new families with their new partners. This particular approach to reasoning 
must also bring into question people's perception of their experiences in respect of 
the occurrence of the issues in question, and their acceptance of this as a factual basis 
upon which to draw conclusions about the world. In the case of the above example, 
it would be difficult to imagine that an adult who is also undertaking a course in 
professional education, would not have encountered individuals who violate the 
principles of such reasoning, yet do not take account of these, in their everyday or 
domain specific reasoning. Another important consideration in regard to reasoning of 
this nature is, how would such reasoning contribute to the professional decision 
making or professional perception of the nature of patient's 
health needs, or the nature of the nurse-patient relationship? 
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The above example is not wholly characteristic of the sample's range of argument 
structures that appear within the absolutist epistemology category. Whilst Fig. 8.2.1 
reveals a simple structure incorporating only two conclusions and two intervening 
differentiations, other participant structures reveal a variable number of dimensions 
that may progress through several referent changes each in turn containing a number 
of sub-elements prior to arriving at a conclusion. In relation to argument complexity 
though, these elaborate structures, may be less complex than responses that contain 
fewer dimensions or referents but reveal alternative theory structures that contrast 
with the original or prevailing theory. 
The volume of the evidence itself in these instances is, therefore, of secondary 
importance to the structure complexity of the responses, in that some participants' 
arguments are quite detailed in the number of elements involved, yet the structure of 
their arguments are simplistic, because they do not consider alternatives and are thus 
constrained within a single theory structure. This characteristic absolutist reasoning 
parallels that found elsewhere (Kuhn, 1991; Perkins et al. 1991), in that absolutist 
epistemologists or individuals whose arguments reflect my-side situation modelling 
do not generate opposing arguments to their original theories or conclusions. 
For those that use them, the correctness of single theory structures is thus by their 
very nature a given or self-evident truth. This contrasts to structures that are at least 
subjected to the generation of alternatives that could be just as true (multiplist 
epistemology), which ultimately are subjected to a complex critical evaluation of the 
variety of possibilities (evaluative epistemology). 
The nature of the evidence used by participants in their responses was predominantly 
correspondence or pseudo evidence. Some instances of stronger evidence 
(covariation and correlated change evidence) were identified, but did not generally 
contribute to the formation of more complex arguments (see case summaries, p. 244). 
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Many responses, thus, reflected a combination of descriptive attempts to construct 
plausible responses that explain how situations or events could occur, and causal 
elements where phenomena were linked to either the causal antecedence or 
consequence of the issue at hand. Very few participant responses comprised a 
singular type of evidence. Where this did occur the responses were very brief and 
tended to reveal that the participants were either reticent or unable to pursue a 
particular question. These responses generally comprised pseudoevidence, non- 
evidence or utterances that were categorised as having no functional uniqueness or 
utility (NFU). 
Correspondence evidence is described as the weakest form of genuine evidence 
(Kuhn 1991), in that it only establishes, in the mind of the reasoner, a possible link 
between the phenomena identified and the issue at hand. This link, thus, serves as a 
possible premise within the argument structure because it is used as an element that 
has a bearing upon the correctness of the conclusion or outcome. Correspondence 
evidence is, therefore, superior to pseudoevidence, in that it is definitive. This is an 
important factor in arguments that suggest that the use of particular evidence types 
merely reflect alternative explanatory styles or preferences or that it is used to 
support individuals causal inferences that portray confirmation or belief biases 
(Shultz, 1982; Schustack, 1988; Baron, 1988; Evans, 1989). Explanatory styles of 
reasoning are thus viewed as less definitive than styles that utilise causal links to 
construct and support arguments. The issues of confirmation and belief bias are 
central to the evidence of this study, in that individuals arguments, that were 
categorised as being of an absolutist epistemology, appear to be biased by their initial 
beliefs or hypotheses. The evidence thus demonstrates that, regardless of the nature 
of the evidence used, the responses tend, towards the support of initial hypotheses at 
the expense of the evaluation of evidence in the generation of alternative theories. 
This strategy, thus, maintains the validity of the original theories because objections 
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to that position, or the information contained within them, are not raised or 
challenged (Stein & Miller, 1991). 
The predominance of the weaker forms of evidence utilised by the participants, 
however, could also be a consequence of a variety of additional factors. This could, 
for example, be influenced by their stages of knowledge development in relation to 
the curriculum, the abstract nature of health as the cognitive task and the degree of 
nursing related empirical evidence available related to this task. 
According to Kuhn (1991) those people reasoning with absolutist arguments enjoy a 
high degree of personal certainty regarding their theories because they view knowing 
as factual, objective and simply cumulative. As a result of this perspective absolutist 
epistemologists tend to believe that argument is superfluous. One possible 
explanation for this particular approach to reasoning is that absolutist epistemologists 
do not have the resources to reconcile alternative views. They, thus, try to reconcile 
divergent views with their own by the reliance upon their arguments as facts that 
should encourage those holding alternative views to compromise in favour of their 
view. Kuhn does not, however, stipulate whether the lack of resources in dealing 
with divergent perspectives is due to a lack of cognitive resources or the lack of 
affective dispositions, such as scepticism, perseverance or a tolerance of ambiguity. 
The nature of the participant's reasoning structures should thus be evaluated in 
relation to this study's model of critical thinking. 
8.4 Absolutist Epistemological Reasoning in Relation to the Conception of 
Critical Thinking. 
The conception of critical thinking developed for the purpose of this study 
incorporates four interrelated elements, each with their specific constituents 
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encompassed within a definition of the construct. The definition is repeated here for 
the readers benefit: 
Critical thinking is autonomous, purposeful, reasoned thinking that enables an 
individual to determine the authenticity, accuracy, consistency, objectivity 
and worth of information, arguments and knowledge claims (Beyer, 1985), by 
avoiding the indiscriminate acceptance of one-sided 
(Face value) arguments, and avoiding the indiscriminate construction and 
defence of one-sided arguments. 
As aforementioned, a characteristic of this study's methodology is that participants 
were not prompted to elaborate upon their initial responses. This was in order to 
reflect their levels of autonomous or self-directed reasoning strategies espoused as a 
characteristic of critical thinking as defined above. The evidence from phases two 
and three, thus, suggests that given the group sample's overall naturalistic tendency 
towards absolutist reasoning, they do not demonstrate the tendency to avoid the 
construction and acceptance of one-sided arguments. There appears also to be little 
consistent application of the dispositions of inquisitiveness, scepticism, resistance to 
early closure, desire to search for evidence, open-mindedness, metacognition and 
tolerance of ambiguity. The contribution of the non-application of these dispositions 
to the participants' reasoning performances is discussed below. 
8.4.1 Participant reasoning in relation to characteristic affective dispositions of 
critical thinking. 
8.4.1.1 Scepticism: 
With regard to the disposition of scepticism, many responses were, for example, 
sceptical or even cynical in respect of Billy's assertions and the motives underpinning 
these, yet that scepticism was not extended to their own reasoning about Billy. Thus, 
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many arguments criticising Billy's one sided or vested interest behaviours were 
substituted for their own single perspective reasoning that also portrayed a lack of 
open-mindedness, inquisitiveness, or flexibility. Many of these arguments also 
reflected biased gender role, cultural, health behaviour and lifestyle expectations. 
Scepticism regarding the contextual issues surrounding Billy's situation was in many 
instances not demonstrated, particularly in relation to Billy's relationship with his 
family, his efforts to find work, his age, his sleeping patterns, the family's nutritional 
status and length of unemployment. There were many contextual circumstances that 
could be considered in relation to the rationale and validity of Billy's behaviour that 
were essentially overlooked in favour of prevailing theories. 
Examples of these referred to the fact that Billy arose from bed at midday on most 
days. As a consequence of this several participants inferred that Billy was by nature a 
lazy person and that this deliberate strategy excluded him from the early morning 
division of labour in relation to preparing the older children for school and the 
feeding of the baby. Little consideration was actually given to the hour that Billy may 
have retired, whether he stayed up late to study for his correspondence course, what 
his prevailing sleeping patterns were, whether aspects of his course work or 
employment search information was televised in the early hours or whether he and 
his wife preferred or had negotiated this pattern (P. 33, phase 3, Q1, P. 7, phase 3, 
Q. 4, P. 30, Phase 3, Q1). 
8.4.1.2 Tolerance of Ambiguity : 
Absolutist epistemologists did not characteristically demonstrate a tolerance for 
ambiguity. Instead, they sought the security of one-sided arguments with definitive 
terminal conclusions based upon limited evidence and no consideration that issues 
may not be amenable to the formulation of such conclusions or right answers. 
Conversely, multiplist responses were characterised by responses that not only 
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considered alternatives but also left responses open-ended without explicit evidence 
of closure in the form of one-sided conclusions. 
8.4.1.3 Resisting Early Closure: 
Resistance to early closure was not a feature in the reasoning of those making 
absolutist epistemological responses. This is evident in many of the models which are 
similar to those in Fig. 8.3.1. There are, however, instances where some participants 
appear to avoid early closure, by constructing prolonged responses that elaborate 
upon premises and descriptions of plausible operation of the premises. These 
examples are often characterised by mere repetitions of former utterances. The 
critical point in these examples, is that although it appears that participants do not 
appear to rush to a snap judgement, the responses are nonetheless impoverished as a 
consequence of the non-generation of alternatives and counterevidence. The reasons 
for this approach are conceivably underpinned by the very complex issue of the 
individual recognition of evidence sufficiency, which is beyond the scope of this 
current study. There were contrasting examples, however, to the elaborate single 
structure responses, whereby the participants' responses may not have been as 
lengthy as some others, but nonetheless were categorised as more complex, because 
by nature they demonstrated alternative theory structures that were not integrated 
into an original theory. These were essentially open-ended responses that resisted 
definitive closure and therefore categorised as of a multiplist epistemology. 
8.4.1.4 Open- Mindedness : 
Open-mindedness was not evident in any of the absolutist participant responses. This 
indeed was the critical criterion for higher levels of categorisation, in that it enables 
the avoidance of single theory or my-side biased arguments by the envisioning of 
alternative theories and perspectives. When open-mindedness was evident it was 
either transient as in the reasoning of the potential multiplist category, where 
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alternatives were ignored or distorted in favour of the original structure or in the 
multiplist category where alternatives were generated in an open-ended argument 
structure. 
The above examples not only provide insights into the critical thinking shortcomings 
of absolutist epistemologists in relation to this particular population and method, but 
also, demonstrate the interrelationships between the discrete dispositions in the 
integrated practice of critical thinking. As previously discussed the characteristic 
affective dispositions serve as the vehicle or carriers of a range of cognitive skills that 
also contribute to the model of critical thinking. Their relationship to absolutist 
epistemological reasoning and critical thinking will now be addressed. 
8.4.2 Participant Reasoning in Relation to Cognitive Skills and Critical Thinking. 
8.4.2.1 Selective Attention 
With regard to selective attention, the participants consistently demonstrated the 
ability to fully engage with the simulation and cognitive task with little evidence of 
loss of concentration, distraction or disinterest. Collectively they were able to remain 
focused and required little recapitulation of trains of thought, or repetition of 
information, from the researcher. This, however, has to be viewed in the context of 
the semi-controlled laboratory environment, and the absence of competing 
extraneous stimuli that would be a feature of real-time clinically situated professional 
reasoning. The transference of this skill to the clinical practicum could, therefore, be 
problematic. 
8.4.2.2 Interpretation : 
In many of the responses the participant's interpretation was demonstrated by 
information reception utterances that merely repeated the information emitted from 
the simulation and was, thus, generally accurate. Where the participant's 
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interpretation often conflicted with the critical thinking model was during active 
information processing instances where the interpretation and subsequent conclusion 
was informed by erroneous inferences. An example of this is: 
" He's wallpapering. " (P. 30, phase 2, think aloud data), "when he thought the 
electricity was getting on too high - he's just switch off the computer. " 
(P. 4, Phase 2, PSJ), he sold his golf clubs... he must have been desperate (P. 
33, Phase 3, Q. 13), "So - seems they are managing to survive within the two 
incomes" (P. 10, Phase 2, Q. 3 U4). 
An alternative example occurs when the interpretation of evidence, was founded 
upon either biased or cynical perspectives, e. g. 
"I don't like to think of people lying in bed until 12: 00. " (Midday), (P. 7, 
Phase 3, Q. 4), "Because I wouldn't be happy with the situation if it were me" 
(P. 33, Phase 2, Q. 5). 
Some of the utterances were also of a meta-perceptive nature whereby the 
participant offered insights into how Billy was thinking e. g., 
" He thinks that life should go - continue as it did before", (P38, phase 3, Q. 3 
U5). "It's like (Billy thinks) the world owes him something now because he's 
unemployed", (P38, Phase 2, Q. 5, U2). "I think he must be aware that it 
(alcohol consumption) is heavy", (P2 phase 2, Q. 10, U2). "I think he knows 
there could be improvements", (P2, phase 3, PSJ, U3). 
This type of vicarious perception were obviously derived from participants' 
ontological constructs based upon their personal experiences, values and beliefs but 
without the benefit of Billy's clarification or reinforcement. Such interpretations thus 
serve as the grounds or premises for further stages in the reasoning process and the 
application of other cognitive skills. These examples serve to demonstrate the 
importance of interpretation in the early stages of reasoning and their possible 
influences upon subsequent argument construction i. e., that if information is 
perceived or encoded from a biased or erroneous perspective then it appears likely, in 
this sample, that the responses will be contained within this type of situation 
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modelling. Thus, if individuals do not question or clarify the accuracy or fairness of 
their interpretations of information at the outset of a reasoning process, then the 
resultant situation modelling could be impoverished. Evans (1989) suggests that such 
processes are actually heuristic strategies that are not deliberate, but relate to the 
automatic and preconscious stages of comprehension. Evans asserts that this 
phenomenon represents a matching bias and that it occurs before any analytic 
processes are brought to bear on the issues at hand. The educational task in regard of 
these processes would appear to be directed towards enabling individuals to 
recognise their automatic matching biases during the interpretation and 
comprehension stages of professional judgement. 
8.4.2.3 Analysis: 
The participants demonstrated analytic ability by the generation of differentiations 
and discrete foci that contributed to their overall conclusions. The analytic processes 
evident in the examples of absolutist epistemological reasoning, however, conflict 
with the conception of critical thinking, in that the analyses served to support the 
one-sided arguments characteristic of this type of reasoning. In relation to the 
spectrum of uncritical to critical models of reasoning and their potential impact upon 
beliefs and action (chapter 2, p. 63) the absolutist epistemologist would conceivably 
stop at stage two due to a lack of ability or the absence of a disposition to process 
information further. 
Interpretation has obvious implications for the processes of analysis in such 
instances, in that the deconstruction of the situation into its discrete constituents 
(differentiations) will be driven by the way that the information is initially interpreted. 
The relationships between these constituents will conceivably be dependent upon 
knowledge structures and beliefs that underpin this process. One of the stark 
omissions in analysis of absolutist epistemologists is the failure to recognise 
contextual contingencies as illustrated earlier. In those examples that more closely 
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reflected the conception of critical thinking, the development of a more diverse 
universe of constituents in the form of alternative theories and contextual 
contingencies were evident. These would, therefore, result in a more complex 
analysis of the issue at hand, and provide the foundations for more complex 
argument structures such as those characterised by the potential multiplist and 
multiplist epistemological categories. 
8.4.2.4 Inference: 
The inferential strategies demonstrated by those participants reasoning from an 
absolutist epistemology tended to characterise simple if-then stereotypical deductive 
inferences. Fig 8.3.1 exemplifies this type of inference as follows: 
If a person looks a certain age; 
If that person has children of certain ages; 
Then that person is that certain age. 
Another similar though more professionally salient example was portrayed by one 
participant in the form of (Participant 7, Phase 3, Q. 4). 
If Billy lays in bed until 12: 00; 
If Billy has nothing to get up for; 
then Billy is depressed. 
Such inferential strategies have been reported in the psychological literature as 
inferential shortcomings (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 1986), 
in that they represent biased heuristics (rules of thumb or shortcuts to reasoning). 
Tversky & Kahneman (1986) suggest that during judgmental reasoning processes, 
particularly under conditions of uncertainty, people tend to rely on a limited number 
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of heuristic principles whose function is to reduce complex reasoning tasks to simpler 
judgmental operations. This built on the work of Simon (1959) who proposed the 
notion of bounded rationality as a reaction to flaws in utility theory (Edwards, 1954). 
Bounded rationality proposes that cognitive limitations force people to construct 
simplified models of problems and the solution to problems is based upon the 
satisficing principle, i. e. the first solution that has a satisfactory outcome as perceived 
by the individual is selected. Thus, instead of considering a large number of possible 
alternatives people use subjective probability judgements known as heuristics when 
making judgements. Such heuristics can be useful and appropriate in a general sense 
and in nursing practice may even reflect intuitive knowledge (Cioffi, 1997). 
Heuristics can, however, sometimes lead to systematic reasoning errors termed as: 
representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment (this particular heuristic 
relates to numerical estimation and, thus, is not relevant to the nature of the study's 
cognitive task). The application of these particular heuristic processes during 
reasoning thus results in biased judgements. There is also evidence that these 
reasoning strategies are not qualitatively improved by domain experience, volume of 
available evidence and education (Hogarth, 1981; Goldberg, 1986; Brehmer, 1986; 
Kuhn, 1991; Perkins et al. 1991). 
The Representative Heuristic. 
Many of the judgements in which people are concerned involve the cognitive tasks of 
assessing probabilities or predicting values (Kahneman & Tversky, 1986) Examples 
of such tasks are: 
(i) What is the probability that object A belongs to class B? (e. g. council 
houses to working class families); 
(ii) What is the probability that event A originates from process B? (e. g. 
staying in bed late originates from depression ); 
(iii) What is the probability that process B will generate event A? (e. g. 
consuming frozen food will result in poor nutrition). 
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The potential effect of the representative heuristic upon such tasks is that the 
probability of the occurrence of such processes and events are evaluated as being too 
likely or too unlikely based upon conceptions of the similarity of events to 
stereotypical belief frameworks. Tversky and Kahneman tested this phenomenon by 
asking subjects to match personality characteristics to likely occupations, e. g. what 
would be the probability that someone who is shy, retiring, orderly and helpful would 
be either a salesman, airline pilot, librarian or a physician? Subjects consistently 
linked such characteristics to the stereotype of a librarian. Similar evidence is 
portrayed in some of the absolutist epistemological reasoning of the think aloud 
participants, in the form of 
If frozen food is stereotypically associated with a reduction in vitamins and 
nutrients, as opposed to fresh food, then it is probable that people who 
regularly consume frozen foods will have a poor nutritional status. 
Such an approach to reasoning can lead to serious errors because people's 
judgements of similarity and probability are not sufficiently influenced by factors that 
should be taken into consideration. One such factor is the base rate frequency of 
outcomes, e. g. should the fact that there are many more farmers in the population 
than librarians and the proliferation of frozen foods and frozen food outlets alter the 
probability of the above outcomes? However, the fact that people reason by 
representativeness alone will result in the base rate frequency being neglected in 
favour of their stereotypical images. Insensitivity to sample size is another important 
factor, in that when people reason by representativeness their judgements will by and 
large be independent of sample size. Thus, the probable distributions of certain 
characteristics such as average height, weight or age will be the same in sample sizes 
of 10,100 or even 1000. This approach tends to disregard the fundamental statistical 
notion that larger samples will tend to reflect averages more accurately. The 
318 
conceivable effect of such an insensitivity, is that individuals would be more likely to 
generalise the effects or contribution of phenomena to their judgements from small 
samples or scant experiences. This was also evident in the reasoning of absolutist 
epistemologists, whereby they tended to make definitive judgements from the limited 
evidence available within a ten minute video-taped simulation of one person's 
circumstances. Some participants, however, resisted this approach by acknowledging 
that a longer period of observation and the gathering of additional sources of 
evidence would be required before definitive judgements could be made. These types 
of responses were thus generally categorised at a higher level of argument 
complexity particularly in relation to the Test for Adequacy responses. 
The illusion of validity also plays a significant part in reasoning based upon 
representativeness because such an approach is based on the goodness of fit between 
the input and output. Thus, if the evidence, however scanty or unreliable, fits with 
the reasoner's stereotypical conception of the issue or subject, then the internal 
consistency of the pattern generated is taken as an indicator of the validity of the 
outcome or judgement and results in a confident conclusion. Missing from these 
judgements, however, are the factors that should limit the predictive accuracy of such 
reasoning such as spurious correlations, irrelevant and contextually sensitive 
variables. Misconceptions of regression are also evident in many instances of 
absolutist epistemological reasoning, particularly in relation to the form illustrated by 
Tversky & Kahneman regarding the effect of reward and punishment upon behaviour 
or performance. The concept of regression essentially refers to the likelihood that 
extreme measures of performance will not be consistent. Thus, one excellent test 
score or athletic performance by an individual is just as likely to be followed by a 
poorer score or performance on subsequent iterations, that will be more 
representative of the mean distribution. Kahneman & Tversky (1973) claim that the 
phenomenon of regression is poorly understood because it is incompatible with the 
belief that predicted outcomes are directly representative of the degree or nature of 
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the input, and hence, the more you put in, the more you get out of any process or 
event. Failure to recognise the existence or importance of regression can have serious 
consequences for judgements. This is exemplified by Kahneman & Tversky's 
experiences with flight instructors by the recognition that when students were praised 
for a very good landing, this was typically followed by a poor landing. Conversely, 
students that were reprimanded harshly for a very poor landing, typically followed 
this with a good landing. The instructors erroneously concluded that verbal rewards 
were detrimental to performance while verbal punishments were beneficial to 
performance although this runs contrary to accepted psychological and educational 
doctrines of positive and negative reinforcement. Conclusions such as this are 
unwarranted because of the possibility of regression to the mean. 
Similar examples of this approach are demonstrated in participants' reasoning in 
relation to some of Billy's perceived behaviours and antecedent motives. Many 
responses included such verbal punishments as " I'd tell him to get off his backside an 
get a job. " or, I'd chuck him out - if he sat round all day playing computers. " or, I'd 
soon stop him going out drinking with his mates. " Such responses appeared to 
disregard the possibility that over the six year period of Billy's unemployment his 
levels of motivation and performance could have peaked and regressed. There could, 
therefore, be a possibility that the portrayal of Billy's behaviour in the simulation 
snapshot of Billy's circumstances could have represented a period of regression. 
Subsequently, this may have led to the experiences of Billy and his family, that effort, 
reinforcement and admonishment, do not consistently have the desired effect, and 
thus, the current status quo could have been arrived at by trial and error and a 
recognition that the family's needs are best met by their respective behaviours. 
In summary, the representative heuristic is an inferential strategy used by people to 
make judgements regarding the membership of classes of phenomena based upon 
how closely the phenomena in question resembles the stereotypical examples of the 
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class. This judgement is typically made without the use of analytic method or 
deliberate calculation, and regardless of information that might conflict with the 
accuracy of the judgement. Reasoning of this nature has been identified by the 
methods employed in this study and is in conflict with the model of critical thinking 
and the application of the discrete cognitive ability of inference. 
The Availability Heuristic 
According to this heuristic the probability of an event, or whether or not an item has 
a particular property, is based upon the ease at which the evidence of such instances 
can be brought to mind, i. e. their availability in memory. Crucial elements in many 
judgements affected by the notion of availability is the size of classes, illusory 
correlation and psychological saliency as opposed to the accuracy of the evidence. 
The effect of this heuristic upon people's judgements is that highly publicised or 
personally salient events tends to make people overestimate the probability or 
accuracy of events or properties and can thus lead to systematic errors of judgement. 
Examples of this heuristic characterised many absolutist epistemological responses. 
Participants frequently made judgements about Billy's situation based upon salient 
personal experiences relating to unemployment, socialisation, reliance on computers 
for stimulation, complexity of chess, drinking behaviour, relationship with spouse and 
childcare issues. In these instances the search for conflicting contextual evidence or 
the generation of alternatives was not engaged in and, thus, participants tended to 
demonstrate early closure. 
8.4.2.5 Generation of Alternatives: 
The generation of alternatives is conceived of as a fundamental skill in critical 
thinking as discussed previously (chapter 2). One of the central omissions in the 
reasoning of absolutist epistemologists was the consideration or generation of 
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alternative possibilities in relation to issues in question. The result of this was that 
participant responses categorised as absolutist in nature were of a my-side nature that 
as aforementioned constructed and supported simple single theory, as opposed to 
more complex argument structures. 
The four point argument complexity scale constructed in conjunction with the 
analytic framework enabled the identification of several levels of the generation of 
alternative theories within participant responses. These are as follows: 
Potential Multiplist Epistemology - The generation of an alternative 
theory that contrasts with the original theory explicit in the response, that 
is then ignored or distorted and thus integrated into the original structure 
at the expense of pursuing the alternative line of inquiry. 
Multiplist Epistemology - The generation of alternative theory that clearly 
contrasts with the original theory that is not clearly ignored or distorted 
and integrated into the original structure. The line of inquiry may not be 
rigorously pursued, but the argument structure is thus more complex and 
open-ended. 
Evaluative Epistemology - The further generation, not only of an 
alternative theory, but of a further counterargument that evaluates the 
alternative theory using genuine evidence and criteria in order to pursue 
the line of inquiry and arrive at a reasoned or justifiable conclusion. 
The scale essentially encompasses increasing complexity from the mere generation of 
alternatives to the full critical evaluation of such alternatives (although the latter 
element of the scale was not demonstrated in the data). Kuhn (1991) asserts The 
ability to conceive of counterarguments is fully as critical as the ability to conceive of 
alternative theories" (p. 266). In the absence of the ability to generate alternatives and 
counterarguments the ability to thus examine the correctness of individual's own 
theories is limited and the result is essentially simple answers to complex problems as 
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demonstrated by absolutist reasoning. The generation of alternatives in instances of 
judgement and choice is said to differ from hypothesis testing, in that hypothesis 
testing uses both inductive and deductive processes in addressing a single proposition 
(Stevenson, 1993). In situations requiring judgement and choice, however, reliance 
on induction alone can result in reasoning errors, because theories based on 
experiences (inductions) can be restrained by prior knowledge and the bypassing of 
logical processes by direct retrieval from memory of well learned structures, e. g. 
attitudes or well learned procedures. This appears to be the case in the instances of 
absolutist reasoning, in that the participant's inductions appeared to reflect such rigid 
experiential or knowledge mediated structures in the absence of logical deductive 
processes, such as assessing the trustworthiness of evidence or identifying 
assumptions. It has thus been argued that induction has to be accompanied by 
deductive processes for sufficient hypothesis generation and testing, although the 
deductive processes can be over-ridden by the errors of induction derived from the 
heuristic processes outlined (Stevenson, 1993). 
The non-generation of alternatives could also be explained by a phenomenon known 
as psychological essentialism that has similarities to the representative heuristic 
(Medin, 1989). Medin suggested that psychological essentialism was instrumental in 
people's concept formation behaviour. Concepts have not only a meaning but also a 
prototype or set of exemplars that enable us to pick out instances of the concept 
from events in the real world. Thus when we pick out examples of the concept we 
rely upon certain characteristics that contribute to the exemplar. Medin, therefore, 
argues that people adopt the hypothesis that things that look alike will share 
underlying principles. Moreover, people's theories provide the causal links from 
underlying principles to surface similarities and thus provide confirmation of those 
theories or judgements in keeping with the satisficing principle. These theoretical 
propositions could all provide insights into participant shortcomings in the generation 
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of alternatives. The reasons why people either choose not to, or are unable to 
generate alternatives is, however, beyond the scope of this current study. 
Perkins, Farady & Bushey (1991) also found that peoples' everyday reasoning 
performances were marred by the absence of generated alternatives or other-side 
arguments (n=300). The absence of such alternative perspectives or evidence was 
said to represent biased and incomplete situation modelling of events. This, as in 
many of the instances demonstrated in this study resulted in impoverished reasoning 
structures that supported the initial conclusions or judgements of their participants. 
Arguments such as these were described as reflecting makes-sense epistemologies 
that were faulty in both bias and depth. Moreover, they reported that these findings 
were strongly suggestive that poor situation modelling was the norm as opposed to 
the exception, and that situation modelling of this nature, was not affected by levels 
of motivation, knowledge or general intelligence. Indeed, individuals intelligently but 
selectively support their my-sided arguments, as opposed to investing in the full and 
fair exploration of issues. 
In summary, the results in relation to the participants' naturalistic tendencies not to 
consider or generate alternatives to their own arguments are largely in keeping with 
the findings of previous works. Research suggests that reasoning of this nature can 
be in many instances, perfectly adequate for everyday living and fits well with the 
human characteristics of an organism whose information processing capabilities are 
limited, as evidenced by bounded rationality. Thus, people can stop reasoning about 
issues when they achieve a superficial sense of completeness, as opposed to seeking 
out more complications. Furthermore, such superficial reasoning can provide a form 
of ego defence that does not require the individual to explore or challenge cherished 
beliefs about the self and the world thus avoiding the possibility of cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Paul, 1987). Important questions to emerge from such 
evidence are: firstly, to what extent could reasoning of this type be adequate for 
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nursing practice? Second, to what extent could a knowledge of these human 
characteristics of reasoning behaviour contribute to curriculum development and 
outcomes? 
Although participants did display a capability for developing alternatives 
autonomously in some responses this was not consistently displayed, with the 
exception of one case, to the point where their assessed naturalistic reasoning mode 
would reflect this (See Question 3). 
8.4.2.6 Evaluation: 
The participants' performance in relation to this particular cognitive skill did not 
achieve the levels of evaluation as defined for the purposes of this research. 
Evaluation is held to exemplify the highest order of thinking in terms of the 
assessment methods employed in this study and by other commentators in the fields 
of education, critical thinking and reasoning (Bloom, 1965; Kallick, 1991; Kuhn, 
1991). 
No participant responses were categorised as reflecting an evaluative epistemology. 
It is obvious that the participants categorised as absolutist epistemologists were not 
using any form of evaluative process to arrive at their conclusions. This conclusion 
was based upon their generation of superficial one- sided levels of evidence. They 
also displayed characteristic levels of certainty regarding the validity of the evidence 
used in respect of the question posed. Kuhn (1991, p. 202), however, believes that 
evaluative epistemologists demonstrate a combination of skills that "... lie at the heart 
of skilled argument. " Evaluative epistemologists characteristically believe that 
absolute certainty is impossible and knowledge is viewed as the product of a 
continuing process of evaluation and judgement of different and competing evidence. 
A key component of evaluation is the argumentative skill of counterargument in 
respect of alternative theories. The key element in the development of a 
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counterargument is the use of genuine evidence that is weighed against other 
evidence and used as criteria for judgement on the understanding that the resulting 
conclusions may not be finite. Furthermore, the fundamental tenets of evaluative 
epistemologists reasoning are: the capability to think about or fully engage in a 
theory; and to contemplate the evidence supporting the theory as being fully integral 
to the theory and not just merely assimilated indiscriminately to it. Thus the weak 
assimilation or assignment of evidence to theories can cause confusion as to what 
should follow from a piece of evidence and what one believes to be true. 
The naturalistic tendency of the participants as absolutist epistemologists tended to 
reflect the latter, in that participants merely assimilated their evidence to their 
theories, without fully contemplating whether their theories should follow from that 
evidence. 
Evaluation skills, according to Marzano et al. (1988), involve assessing the 
reasonableness of theories and comprise the two discrete skills of establishing criteria 
and verification. The establishment of criteria and subsequent verification refers to 
the setting of standards for judging the value or logic of theories or claims. These 
criteria are thus rational principles that are ultimately derived from culture, 
experience and education. The crucial element of this process would appear to be 
that of rationality and the individual perceptions of this in the development of 
appropriate evaluative criteria. Given the proposition that humans (other than in 
purely physiologically mediated reflex actions) would seldom act in an arrational 
manner, then the notion of irrationality, must bear upon the value or worth of 
people's reasoning principles. Rational action is action carried out for the subjective 
reasons or purposes of the agent (Graham, 1993). Where rational behaviour and 
irrational behaviour differ is in the quality of the reasons or premises that underpin 
such behaviour. Thus, good behaviour or action il }inderpinn! d by good reasons and 
bad behaviour of action is underpinned by bad reasons. This, iowever suggests the 
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universal acceptance of good and bad reasons, and discounts the possibility of these 
categories being derived from a subjective point of view or perspective. Graham 
(1993) argues, however, that such reasons may be judged against either internal 
standards (those that solely meet the needs or beliefs of the agent) or by external 
standards (those for example, derived from moral, legal or scientific in conjunction 
with some internal criteria). With regard to the evaluative performance of the 
absolutist epistemologists the criteria for the reasons tended to be of the former. 
Evidence was thus generated and evaluated in respect of simple patterns of argument 
that met with the subjective theories and beliefs of the participant in the formulation 
of their judgements. The judgements however, would conceivably be judged as 
rational by the participants, for the reasons given above, in the absence of critical 
thinking skills, that contribute to the generation of more rigorous and veridical 
criteria that would be more reflective of an evaluative epistemology. 
8.4.2.7 Metacognition: 
Suffice to say absolutist epistemologists displayed little explicit evidence of 
metacognitive processes as defined in the model of critical thinking and the literature. 
When explicit evidence of such processes were revealed verbally, they tended to be 
instances of potential multiplist or multiplist epistemological responses. This 
particular aspect of cognitive skill will thus be addressed more fully in relation to 
research question three. 
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8.5 The Characteristics of Absolutist Epistemological Reasoning in Relation to 
Intellectual Standards: 
Paul (1991) suggests that intellectual standards provide another framework for 
assisting in the evaluation of participants' reasoning performances with particular 
reference to: precision; accuracy; relevance; consistency; logicalness; significance; 
fairness and adequacy. Participant reasoning will be discussed in relation to these 
discrete standards. 
8.5.1 Precision: 
Precision is important in the expression of arguments and in this context refers 
essentially to language and the use of words within argument structures. O'Reilly 
(1991) argues that students need to be conscious of imprecise words that can allow 
assertions to blur troublesome issues. This of course, is extremely important to 
nursing practice, in regard to the communication processes between health care 
professionals and patients. A variety of imprecise terms were used in participants' 
responses. Examples of these were the use of terms such as "... lazy... ", "... too 
much... ", "... not enough... ", "... more with it... ", "... well off... " The imprecision 
within these terms would be that, e. g., people would have different ideas as to how 
much wealth would be required before one could be considered well off. Similarly, 
the question arises of how little or how slowly would one have to work to be 
classified as lazy? Perjorative terms such as this can also be used to add force to 
arguments in an attempt to sway the unwary to accept one-sided views. They may 
also be used consciously or unconsciously by absolutists to construct sophistic or 
one-sided arguments. 
8.5.2 Accuracy: 
Many participant responses reflected inaccuracies in information reception and 
erroneous inferences based upon misinterpretation of evidence as identified 
previously. Examples of this were evident in relation to Billy's employment search 
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strategies, volume of alcohol intake, levels of exercise, child care duties and 
budgeting responsibilities. 
8.5.3 Relevance: 
The majority of utterances were of relevance to the issues raised in the simulation 
and stimulated recall questions. When irrelevant utterances were demonstrated these 
were characterised by opinions regarding domestic decor, Billy's clothing, 
participants' personal abilities in chess or computing and their alcohol consumption 
capabilities. 
8.5.4 Consistency: 
Consistency was generally apparent in the majority of responses although this was 
characterised by consistency in maintaining the integrity of participants' theories. 
Consistency in negative attitudes towards Billy's behaviours were often maintained 
across the think aloud, post simulation judgement and stimulated recall phases. For 
example, if a participant stated that Billy was not contributing to family life or that he 
was not sincere in his job searching behaviour, this belief was restated again in 
several responses. Direct contradictions were evident in some participant responses. 
For example, one participant contradicted a position from one question to the next 
by asserting in one response that "... Billy had no hope for the future... " regarding 
finding employment. In response to the next question, however, the participant 
asserted that Billy is highly motivated because of his correspondence course, and that 
the skills gained from this will increase the likelihood of future employment 
(Participant 33, phase 3, Q. 18 &19). Potential multiplist responses also 
demonstrated inconsistency in pursuing lines of argument by ignoring alternative 
possibilities and returning to prior theoretical structures. 
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8.5.5 Logicalness: 
Illogical reasoning strategies were mainly exemplified by the way many of the 
absolutist epistemologist conclusions did not meet the informal logic criteria of 
soundness and plausibility, as in the case where conclusions did not necessarily or 
plausibly follow from the participants' premises. 
8.5.6 Depth and incompleteness: 
Absolutist responses were characterised by superficial and incomplete reasoning in 
terms of the generation of single theory and my-side structures that were devoid of 
alternative possibilities and contextual contingencies. Greater depth and 
completeness was, however, achieved by potential multiplist and multiplist responses 
that did demonstrate these characteristics. 
8.5.7 Significance: 
Significance is obviously a matter of individual context and thus participant 
utterances were perforce of significance in the context of their respective arguments. 
Significance in terms of objective assessment, however, is a matter of degree to the 
extent that evidence represents sufficient grounds to warrant conclusions. The issue 
of omission of significant dimensions was an important factor in absolutist responses, 
in that they were either not generated or ignored. With regard to triviality this could 
be regarded in a similar light to the issue of irrelevant utterances as described above. 
8.5.8 Fairness : 
Fairness is an important constituent of critical thinking, in that it should facilitate the 
balanced open-minded appraisal of situations and arguments that takes a variety of 
evidence, beliefs, perspectives and possibilities into account before conclusions are 
formulated. This standard was not evident in absolutist responses in that the very 
nature of one-sided arguments does not demonstrate fairness in the ways described. 
An example of unfair or biased reasoning is demonstrated as follows: 
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Q. 12 (R) Was his drinking excessive do you think? " 
(P) U1 "Yeah. " 
U2 "But I would -I guess it - that's my own personal influence. " 
U3 " Cause I'm not a drinker. " 
U4 " An I think that even one drink can influence a person's thought 
and body. " (Participant 33, Phase 3, Q. 12) 
Although the above example reveals this participant's knowledge of the influence that 
their views may have on their reasoning, it should not be confused with 
metacognition, in that metacognition should demonstrate an appreciation that this 
may have unfair consequences and lead to a modification in lines of argument as a 
consequence. Fairness was evident in some multiplist epistemological responses, 
particularly when metacognitive processes were explicit. 
8.5.9 Adequacy : 
Absolutist responses are characteristically inadequate for purpose because of their 
incapability to reflect the possible complexity of the issues in question. From the 
absolutist's perspective, however, given the methodological instruction to reason 
until they felt satisfied that they had addressed the question adequately, one can infer 
that they believed their responses were adequate. 
8.6 Absolutist Epistemological Reasoning in relation to Contextual Ability. 
Contextual ability as defined in chapter two is a fundamental constituent of the model 
of critical thinking and, thus, argument construction and analysis. In the absence of 
contextual considerations evidence, argumentative conclusions, clinical reasoning 
and clinical judgement are exposed to incompleteness and thus the acceptance or 
construction of one-sided arguments. Many of the absolutist responses were 
incomplete in this respect as demonstrated in previous examples, particularly those 
that use representative heuristics in their reasoning. 
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These two examples demonstrate first a decontextualised response to a question 
about the relationship between work and health and the second assumptions made 
about domicile location: 
(R) "You focused on work a lot. Why do you think work is important to 
health? 
(P) Ul "I think it's important to your psychological health" 
U2 "because it was what gave him his reason for being who he was" 
U3 "his role in life was to- or seemed to be to provide money for his 
children and family" 
U4 " now he hasn't got that role anymore it was his complete reason 
for being. " (Participant 7, Phase 3, Q. 4). 
(R) You focused on the idea that he lived on a council estate. Would that be 
significant in any way? 
(P) U1 "Only in terms of it gives you some sort of idea - of the kind of 
lifestyle" 
U2 "or the kind of work - he probably did" 
U3 " er - money coming in - that sort of thing" 
j4 "an general health in - in health really" 
U5 "it would give you an idea of his social status -I suppose - you 
would have to say - since the two go together - I'm saying to some 
extent" (Participant 30, phase 3, Q. 2). 
The first response reflects a one-sided argument based upon the assumption that Billy 
actually feels this way about his work and 
its fundamental role in his persona and 
perspective on life. There was no explicit evidence of this in the simulation and 
therefore the response appears to be founded upon external knowledge structures 
utilised in a decontextualised representative 
heuristic process. The response is further 
decontextualised, in that it only focuses upon psychological health and no 
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consideration is given to contexts where work or changed working circumstances 
may actually be detrimental to individual or family health. 
The second response also demonstrates that the numerous potential alternative 
contextual circumstances that would contrast to the stereotypical relationship 
between living on a council estate and type of occupation, income levels and health 
status are not considered. Reasoning that is devoid of such contextual contingencies 
is perforce incomplete and biased for the reasons given by Bower (1993). Such an 
omission can have significant implications for the quality of critical thinking and 
professional judgement. 
In summary, this section has discussed the results in relation to the majority of the 
sample's naturalistic reasoning mode and the tendency towards reasoning from an 
absolutist epistemology. Reasoning of this nature has been discussed in relation to 
the study's model of critical thinking with reference to the appropriate literature. 
Evidence is presented of specific instances of participant reasoning that represents 
absolutist epistemological reasoning and how it contrasts with the characteristic 
affective dispositions, the cognitive skills, intellectual standards and contextual ability 
inherent in that model. The next section will discuss instances where more complex 
argument structures were used in participant responses. 
8.7 Research Question Three. 
Of the twelve longitudinal case studies only one demonstrated a qualitative change 
in their naturalistic reasoning mode over the course of the Common Foundation 
Programme (Participant 30). This participant demonstrated a change in naturalistic 
reasoning mode from an absolutist epistemology to a potential multiplist 
epistemology. In this case, there remained numerous instances of absolutist 
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epistemological reasoning, but the instances of the higher category exceeded these 
and, thus, led to a qualitative change in reasoning mode. 
The categorical criteria for the qualitative change of mode are inherent in the 
argument complexity scale. In the case of a potential multiplist epistemology the 
participant provides evidence of the generation of alternative theories. The 
alternatives are not, however, pursued and the participant ignores the line of inquiry 
or evidence that the alternative may illuminate, in favour of a return to their prior 
theoretical structure. The multiplist epistemological category, however, involves a 
demonstration of the ability to generate alternative theories and avoid the distortion 
or integration of the alternative into the prior structure thus leaving the response 
open-ended and uncertain. 
Reasoning assigned to these categories would by its nature involve the use of 
characteristic affective dispositions, cognitive skills, intellectual standards and 
contextual ability to a greater degree than to the absolutist epistemological category. 
For example, in the case of a potential multiplist epistemology the generation of an 
alternative would theoretically involve a degree of scepticism towards evidence as 
presented following an analysis of the situation, a degree of resistance to early 
closure, a desire to search for independent evidence and the ability to generate an 
alternative theory based on the new evidence. These strategies may be as a result of 
metacognitive processes that lead the individual to monitor and question their view 
of the evidence or their approach to their reasoning. The disposition to pursue the 
issue further (inquisitiveness) and utilise more dispositions, skills and contextual 
ability to meet the intellectual standards, however, would conclude at this point, thus 
bringing the reasoning episode to a close in favour of a one-sided argument. 
With regard to a multiplist epistemology the nature of the reasoning would include 
the above strategies and constituents but be extended to include a greater 
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inquisitiveness in the form of a desire to pursue the issue at hand further. This may be 
as a result of higher levels of self-confidence in reasoning ability and metacognitive 
processes, but would also demonstrate an open-mindedness, flexibility and tolerance 
of ambiguity in order to resist both early closure and the integration of reasoning 
elements into a one-sided argument. By nature, this approach to reasoning would 
include a greater degree of contextual ability and thus more adequately meet the 
intellectual standards integral to critical reasoning. 
With regard to the one case of qualitative change and the general variance of within- 
case complexity of responses, the possible explanations for this are conceived of as 
being extremely complex and could involve psychological, social, environmental, 
curricular and methodological issues. An important observation however, illuminated 
by the methods employed in the study, is that, in instances where responses were 
assigned to categories above the absolutist epistemological category there was 
greater evidence of metacognitive processes explicit in the participants' verbal 
reports. Metacognition as defined in the critical thinking model requires that 
individuals not only monitor their thinking but also modify their reasoning as a result 
of this. 
There were many examples of how participants would recognise possible flaws in 
how they were thinking such as: 
(P) U7 "So you can't really generalise - it would give me clues - to the 
kind of lifestyle that he may probably - but it would perhaps 
be in danger of being an assumption. " (Participant. 30, phase 3, 
Q. 2). 
The above extract clearly demonstrates that the participant recognises the dangers of 
generalising from insufficient evidence and that any conclusions drawn as a 
consequence of such a generalisation would be based upon an assumption that the 
clues referred to may not reflect reality. However, the above example does not lead 
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the participant to modify their previous theory. The participant overlooks the 
possible consequences of their metacognitive utterances and returns to a prior 
structure regardless of these as follows: 
(P) U8 "but that to me would be significant that he lived on a council estate 
- it would tell me quite a lot about him before I even met him. " 
(Participant 30, Phase 3, Q. 2). 
The above extract clearly demonstrates that although the participant was aware of 
the potential for making erroneous inferences this did not lead to a modification of 
the prevailing theory. 
Instances of metacognition that did lead to a modification in argument ultimately led 
to more complex arguments and thus assignment to a higher category. The following 
example includes extracts from a multiplist epistemological response as follows: 
(R) "You said he wasn't very animated why would that be significant? " 
(P) UI "Well perhaps because - erm - it's just sort of me - this sort of 
idea that usually when you're communicating with someone- 
perhaps because it's something I do that the whole lot goes - 
that - as well as talking to someone - usually when you're 
speaking there's a lot of other - sort of body language going on. " 
(*SC) 
(P) U7 "Unless he was being very controlled in - in his actions - he was 
either being very controlled in that he didn't want to give anything 
away - an he was trying to keep very - on top of everything. " 
U8 "Or on the other hand - he was just y'know - he was just past it. " 
U9 "I can't quite decide what it is - but I was conscious of that he was 
remarkably still - for what reason -I don't know -I would have to 
think about why - why he was. " (Participant 30, phase 3, Q. 7). 
336 
The above example suggests that the participants metacognitive insights into their 
own behaviour and assumptions led the participant to question whether that was 
generalisable to Billy's behaviour. This subsequently led to various alternative theory 
structures and ultimate uncertainty and an open-ended response. 
Another example also includes extracts from a multiplist epistemological response 
for participant 37, phase 3, Test for Adequacy (TFA). 
(P) 
... 
"U4 "his daily pattern exactly" 
U5 "what he exactly does eat" 
U6 "how much he really does drink" 
U7 "what type of drinks he drinks -I mean he says he drinks - pints 
but I suppose at the end of the day it could have been low - 
alcohol lager - or diet pop" 
U8 "y'know it was just an inference that was made- that it was 
pints of alcohol. " (Participant 37, phase 3, TFA). 
Once again, the participant recognises the potential flaws or assumptions in their 
reasoning and this contributes to a change in argument structure that ultimately 
reflects a more complex argument and thus categorisation to a multiplist 
epistemology. 
The influence of metacognition upon the quality of reasoning could, thus, be 
important and have possible implications for curriculum development in nursing, 
teaching and learning strategies, assessment processes and ultimately clinical 
practice. The evidence provided by phases two and three of this study suggests that 
absolutist epistemological reasoning is commonplace following the Common 
Foundation Programme and that reasoning of this nature is largely founded upon 
existing knowledge structures, values, belief systems and reasoning strategies that 
appear impervious to the volume, character or validity of evidence. Evidence also 
suggests that metacognitive processes may be instrumental in the development of 
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more complex arguments and, thus, enable individuals to avoid the indiscriminate 
acceptance, construction and defence of one-sided arguments as portrayed in 
absolutist reasoning. 
The literature pertaining to the influence that metacognition has upon human 
reasoning tends to reflect the view that metacognition is fundamental to the 
development of thinking skills. Moreover, it is necessary to be conscious of the 
processes and products of individual's thoughts, so that such awareness can control 
and execute thinking to overcome the powerful influences of personal perception, 
values and beliefs so integral to human nature (Flavell, 1978; Halpern, 1989; Kuhn, 
1991; Swartz, 1991; Fountain & Fusco, 1991; Alfaro-LeFevre, 1995; Fonteyn & 
Cahill, 1998). 
Flavell (1978) stresses that the issue of control has three important elements in the 
form of knowledge of the person (self) knowledge of the task and knowledge of 
strategy or process. Knowledge of the self essentially involves an awareness of 
individual values and belief systems and awareness of the need to control for these in 
relation to a commitment to reason about issues. This also involves the control of 
people's attention level and personal attitudes towards the issue at hand. Knowledge 
of the task refers as aforementioned to the influence of domain knowledge upon the 
task in question. Knowledge of this type according to Paris et al. (1983) 
incorporates: declarative, procedural and conditional (contextual) knowledge. 
With regard to knowledge of strategy this involves the regulation and evaluation of 
knowledge, evidence, thinking strategies and would resemble the composite 
implementation of the fourfold components of the study's model of critical thinking 
whilst engaged on a reasoning task. A possible question for future research would, 
thus, be: to what extent would the teaching of metacognition and argument analysis 
affect students' critical thinking abilities? 
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An issue worthy of further consideration in relation to the quality of participants' 
reasoning in the context of methods employed by the study is the absence of 
accountability and practice related stress and how this might affect the outcome of 
reasoning. There is evidence to suggest that individual reasoning strategies are 
affected by the degree to which one may be held accountable for their decisions 
(Tetlock, 1980; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Tetlock, 1983). Participants virtually 
never expect to have to account for decisions taken in research settings. The 
question, thus, arises as to whether participants would put more intellectual effort 
into making judgements about which they would be, or, feel more personally 
accountable. Moreover, the participants in this study were making judgements in the 
safety and comfort of a psychological laboratory and not exposed to the multitude of 
competing demands upon their attention and affective processes that the normal 
clinical environment can have. Thus, given the within-sample naturalistic reasoning 
mode evident whilst reasoning in the above secure setting, it would not be 
unreasonable to suggest that similar approaches to participant reasoning may be 
perpetuated in the complex clinical arena. 
In summary, this section has evaluated the results in relation to research question 
three and the possible relationship between explicit verbal evidence of metacognitive 
processes and the sample's performance in the construction of more complex 
arguments reflective of potential multiplist or multiplist epistemologies. The elements 
of metacognitive processes as identified are congruent with components of the model 
of critical thinking developed as a framework for analysis of the qualitative data and 
a combination of these may serve as a basis for future research and curriculum 
development in programmes of nurse education. 
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8.8 The Contribution of More Recent Critical Thinking Nursing Literature. 
Relevant empirical papers examining the issue of critical thinking as an outcome of 
nursing education or in relation to clinical practice are included in this review, 
theoretical papers and works examining disciplinary perceptions of the construct are 
excluded. The above literature has been categorised as follows: 
" The use of simulation in the assessment of nurses' critical thinking 
abilities; 
" The relationship between critical thinking disposition and competent 
clinical judgement; 
" The effect of specific educational interventions upon nurses' critical 
thinking abilities; 
" The relationship between critical thinking and professional nursing 
competence; 
" Studies using qualitative data sources for the investigation of critical 
thinking in nursing; 
" Critical thinking as an outcome of nursing education. 
8.8.1 The use of simulation in the assessment of nurse' critical thinking ability. 
Johannsson & Wertenberger (1996) evaluated the critical thinking ability of final 
term diploma nursing students in the areas of clinical decision-making, problem- 
solving, priority setting, and care planning, using a series of methods encompassed in 
the critical thinking component of the Performance Based Development System 
(PBDS). The system is a sophisticated performance assessment methodology 
developed in 1985 by nine acute American hospitals in conjunction with Baxter 
Management Services and uses simulations to test critical thinking ability (del Bueno, 
1990; Johannsson & Wertenberger, 1996). A convenience sample (n = 18) viewed a 
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series of video-taped medical and surgical vignettes. These were between 2-4 
minutes long and represented a continuum of task complexity and difficulty 
including a diverse range of client situations and problems assigned to overt or covert 
categories. The tasks inherent in the simulations assess learners ability to: identify 
problems; describe acceptable and effective nursing interventions; and provide 
rationale for actions. Participant responses were compared to model responses and 
rated as: acceptable; partially acceptable; or unacceptable. It is not made clear, 
however, whether responses that did not concur with the model or right responses 
could be viewed as possible alternatives from a critical, creative or innovative 
perspective. Results for the three identified categories were: 
Problem recognition 
" Students were more likely to identify correct problem labels for overt video 
simulations 
" Students were more successful with problems classified as 'easy' 
Prioritising Nursing Intervention 
" Students were less likely to be correct in prioritising interventions than in 
prioritising problems; 
Supporting Rationale 
" The majority of students provided an acceptable rationale 
" The most common reasons for less than acceptable ratings were vague rationale 
or rationale omitted in favour of subject perceived missing or additional 
interventions 
" The urgency of situations were correctly identified by 60% of subjects. 
The authors concluded that this aspect of the study demonstrated a consistent 
difference between the ability to recognise problems and knowing how to deal with 
them. Their concern was compounded by the relative urgency of the particular 
situations. 
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In addition, data from the simulations were compared with data from a pencil and 
paper "what if test. The test comprised 15 events that required nursing interventions 
within an hour. Scores from the test revealed that: 
" 80% of subjects correctly rated the priority for events. 
" In most cases of a less than acceptable priority rating 75% of subjects 
overestimated the urgency of situations. 
0 Subjects were less successful in identifying acceptable interventions in 'urgent' or 
'must do' events (31%). 
" In the cases of less than acceptable ratings the most common reasons were for 
incomplete assessments and omission of vital interventions. 
These data sets revealed similarities, in that most subjects were rated partially 
acceptable for their nursing interventions, followed by those rating acceptable, and 
finally unacceptable. Subjects stated that they had difficulty identifying the most 
important nursing interventions, a point which should be of concern given the 
subjects' apparent proximity to professional registration. An important 
methodological issue is that during de-briefing interviews subjects commented on 
their propensity to not record nursing interventions which they thought too 
straightforward to mention. This would have implications for the rater's subjective 
assessment of performance rating. The authors however express confidence in the 
tool's construct validity by citing del Bueno's (1990) claim that the method is more 
likely to err on the side of failing a subject with the desired or expected ability than 
to pass a subject without the ability. 
Regarding the method's ability to assess critical thinking, it is questionable whether 
the right or wrong answer approach inherent in the simulations provides the right 
medium in which to detect this ability, given that a fundamental canon of critical 
thinking theory is the generation of alternative perspectives or theories. The right or 
wrong answer approach in this context may be more capable of illuminating heuristic 
diagnostic pattern matching behaviour as opposed to critical evaluation of the 
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simulated events. The method would conceivably require the utilisation of a number 
of critical thinking skills and dispositions as defined in chapter two, e. g. selective 
attention, interpretation, analysis, inference, scepticism inquisitiveness, but may not 
be sensitive to appreciating the generation of alternatives, fair-mindedness, and 
contextual ability. In respect of this, however, the authors identify the potential for 
the instrument to be punitive to subjects who demonstrate creativity and offer 
innovative, but arational diagnoses and interventions. For these reasons the authors 
suggest that the PBDS may not be the ideal tool for assessing critical thinking, but 
would serve as a useful teaching instrument. 
8.8.2 The Relationship Between Critical Thinking or Critical Thinking Disposition 
and Competent Clinical Judgement. 
Maynard (1996) decided to investigate the possible relationship of critical thinking to 
professional nursing competence. The study's conceptual framework incorporated 
Benner's (1984) stages of nurses' skill acquisition. Other instruments included the 
WGCTA and the Six Dimension Scale of Nursing Performance (Schirwian, 1978). A 
randomly selected, cross-sectional sample of nursing graduates was used (n=121). 
Two cohorts of the sample group were measured longitudinally for critical thinking 
ability (n=30), relationships between the measures of critical thinking and the 
professional competencies of leadership, critical care, teaching and collaboration, 
planning and evaluation, interpersonal communication, and professional development 
(Schwirian, 1981). Critical thinking was measured over time from neophyte student 
to registered practitioner (5yrs). The authors concluded that no relationship was 
demonstrated between critical thinking ability and professional competence, and 
nurses appeared to gain competence independently of their critical thinking ability. 
The experiential component, i. e. years of experience of nursing practice, emerged as 
the most important influencing factor on the development of professional nursing 
competence and critical thinking. 
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Facione, Facione & Sanchez (1994) utilised the data profiles of two nursing students 
derived from the California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory (CCTDI), as a 
means of inferring clinical judgement abilities. Developed by Facione & Facione 
(1992) the instrument is claimed to be the first designed to measure the following 
aspects of critical thinking disposition exclusively (Table 8.8.2.1): 





Critical thinking self-confidence 
Inquisitiveness 
Maturity 
The dispositional subscales were derived from the Delphi Report's conceptual 
definition of critical thinking by the American Philosophical Association (1990) , plus 
item and factor analysis techniques. 
Facione, Facione, & Sanchez (1994) used the CCTDI score profiles of the two 
nursing students to infer critical thinking deficiencies, and the potential effect of this 
on their clinical judgement. One example is that of one of the subjects, who having 
scored low on truth - seeking, critical thinking self - confidence and maturity would 
have difficulty in deciding between points of view and be unable to determine when it 
would be necessary to close an issue. Inferences such as these are problematic in that 
although the critical thinking subscales have empirical bases, they are still not domain 
specific and may not be universally transferable to the complexity of clinical 
judgements. The above example would not apply to an individual who had scored 
low on the argument complexity scale used in the current study, in that an absolutist 
epistemologist would not be in a position to choose between points of view and 
would not have difficulty in closing an issue. 
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8.8.3 The Effect of Specific Educational Interventions Upon Critical Thinking 
Ability. 
Girot (1995) used an evaluative quasi-experimental approach to explore the 
perceived development of critical thinking skills within two groups of post 
registration nursing students. Both groups were accessing a teaching and assessing in 
clinical practice module by differing routes. One by means of the third year of a BSc 
(Hons) in Nursing route (control group, n =15) and the other via a "Study Skills" 
programme designed for individuals not previously exposed to academic study (n = 
25). Quantitative and qualitative data were collected using a semi-structured 
questionnaire and subjected to content analytic techniques. Examination of emergent 
themes was conducted in relation to the study's literature review. Girot's findings are 
presented as follows: 
1.72% of the intervention group associated critical thinking with the ability 
to analyse written text. 
2.28% of the intervention group and 100% of the control group viewed 
critical thinking as being directly related to their own clinical practice, as 
opposed to achieving success in theoretical assignments. 
3. Each subject within the control group was confident that they had 
developed in their ability to think critically. This was characterised by 
abilities to question their own thought, decisions and practice, as well as 
that of others, to think laterally and be more receptive of new ideas, 
express and support their ideas more confidently. This increased breadth 
and depth of thought resulted in more flexible and less ritualistic practice. 
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4. Subjects in the intervention group generally felt underconfident in their 
ability to think critically. This, they attributed to an unawareness of the 
level of academic ability expected of them and that the intervention 
course was not long enough to develop the abilities required. 
5. In relation to teaching and assessing strategies, all subjects believed that 
exposure to discussion and debate was necessary to develop critical 
thinking. Similarly, all subjects believed that teacher input should be 
high at the beginning of the course and reduce gradually as the course 
progresses. 
In light of the negative perceptions of the intervention group Girot contends that the 
separation of study skills from domain specific content may be a significant 
contributory factor. She, thus, recommends that study skills programmes be linked 
with domain content, teachers be more aware of teaching and learning strategies that 
stimulate critical thinking, and innovative assessment tools be developed in order to 
measure success in nurse's critical thinking. Although Girot recognises the limitations 
regarding the study's convenience sample, she does not make clear her definition of 
critical thinking, its constituents or whether the control group's characteristic abilities 
are congruent with this. Accepting subject perceptions of personal critical thinking 
abilities without clear construct criteria would, therefore, be problematic regarding 
validity, consistency and possibly fidelity. One finding of particular interest is the 
control group's overwhelming consensus that critical thinking is directly related to 
their practice, this raises the question whether it is, therefore, discernible in their 
practice? 
Martin (1996) attempted to assess tudent nurses' critical thinking performance in 
their written work using a qualitative action research approach. A model of two 
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research cycles each represented by a post registration ENB course (ENB 998: 
ENB941), incorporated three staged elements in the form of 
Specific sessions on critical thinking; 
Use of problem solving teaching strategies throughout the courses; 
Regular tutorials to monitor and facilitate progress. 
The data analytic framework consisted of three critical thinking criteria namely: 
Reflective Scepticism. 
Identifying and challenging assumptions. 
Imagining and exploring alternatives. 
These derived from the work of Brookfield (1987); Watson & Glaser (1964) and 
Miller (1992). During Cycle 1 (ENB 998) Martin found that students had difficulty in 
analysing practice, although some alternatives were discussed. As the cycle 
progressed a session on critical thinking with subsequent feedback sessions enabled 
the students to demonstrate critical analysis in the classroom setting in relation to the 
above criteria. However, the submitted assignments revealed a'falling off of analytic 
skills in comparison to performances in tutorials and classroom sessions. Martin 
suggests, in relation to this cycle, that when the formal sessions and tutorial support 
had concluded the students appeared to forget or ignore their critical thinking 
processes. 
Cycle 2 (ENB 941) commenced with another formal session on critical thinking, 
albeit this time the content directly related to project writing and tutorials were 
arranged on a more regular basis in an attempt to avoid the 'falling off of critical 
thinking processes demonstrated by cycle one. This time 50% of students versus 
25% in cycle one were able to demonstrate more consistent critical thinking 
performances. 
Martin concludes that while students are supported in tutorial sessions to engage in 
critical analysis, some improvements can be seen in relation to the three identified 
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criteria. This is, however, patchy and few students demonstrate consistency in 
maintaining this in their written work. 
Perciful & Nester (1996) conducted a quasi-experimental study to determine the 
effect of the integration of Ausubel's Assimilation Theory, within the nursing process, 
in clinical teaching strategies for psychiatric nursing student's knowledge and critical 
thinking skills. Two hypotheses were tested at the 0.05 level of significance as 
follows: 
1. Nursing students in the comparison group will obtain significantly higher 
scores for the measurement of knowledge of psychiatric nursing content 
than those of the students in the control group; 
2. Nursing students in the comparison group will obtain significantly higher 
scores for the measurement of critical thinking skills than those of the 
students in the control group. 
A convenience sample (N=83) was divided into a control group and a comparison 
group. The control group received traditional teaching methods and clinical 
experiences during a seven week clinical placement. The comparison group received 
an alternative programme that included a member of staff as a preceptor and a series 
of computer assisted instruction (CAI) programmes. Student knowledge was 
measured using two standardised tests: the Mosby Assess Test and two parts of the 
National League for Nursing's (NLN) Psychiatric Mental Health Nursing Exam. 
Critical thinking skills were measured indirectly using another two parts of the NLN 
Psychiatric Nursing Exam that focuses upon assessment, analysing and evaluation. 
Results indicated that hypothesis one could not be supported. No significant 
differences (t-test) were found in knowledge between groups across all measures. 
Hypothesis two was, however, supported, in that significant t-test differences were 
found for critical thinking skills (p<. 025). The authors concluded that CAI 
programmes can foster critical thinking skills and that the availability of a preceptor 
348 
may also be an important element in this. Limitations in relation to sample size 
instrumentation and the use of a single institution are noted and the authors suggest 
that the use of more qualitative methods may provide more accurate insights into the 
process of critical thinking. 
Haller & Raingruber (1998) used a phenomenological approach to discover student 
nurses' experiences of clinical reasoning and critical thinking development following 
participation in a clinical reasoning course. A narrative approach using observation of 
student reasoning performance during classroom sessions and students' written logs 
were chosen to allow holistic access to students' understanding. This was based on 
the belief that clinical reasoning and critical thinking are not solely cognitive entities, 
but are also grounded in practice and have affective elements. 
Data analysis involved the researchers visiting and revisiting the texts independently 
to identify themes, exemplars and paradigm cases. Themes were compared and the 
most significant agreed upon. When wording of themes differed the text was 
revisited to try to find in vivo codes for narrative themes. The researchers then 
agreed upon exemplars and paradigm cases that exemplified the complexities of the 
themes. 
Haffer & Raingruber reported that the purpose of the study had been achieved in that 
a greater understanding of student experiences of clinical reasoning and critical 
thinking emerged. The importance of confidence in reasoning abilities emerged as the 
most significant aspect of the reasoning processes. Student perceptions of threats to 
confidence and means of building confidence provided pedagogic insights for future 
development. Over the course of the programme students moved, for example, from 
being overwhelmed by inexperience through to drawing strength from others' 
experiences to becoming organised and focused in reasoning under stress. They also 
moved from lacking the confidence to question to discover the power in questioning. 
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The researchers report that confidence in reasoning and critical thinking emerged as a 
result of this intervention and was not consciously taught. Moreover, the 
development of confidence cannot be seen as separate from the growth in reasoning 
performance found in the study because confidence and experience are inextricably 
linked and derive from the authentic grasp of situations. An essential part of learning 
to become a nurse according to Haffer and Raingruber, is by enabling students to 
understand what it means to be a nurse through interactions with others within the 
profession. Confidence and self-understanding evolve from such interactions and 
students are thus empowered to ask questions. Finally the researchers suggest that 
confidence and therefore clinical reasoning and critical thinking can be nurtured by 
not asking students what they know, but by asking what they feel they need to know 
and how they might find answers. 
8.8.4 The Relationship Between Critical Thinking and Professional Nursing 
Competence. 
May et at. (1999) aimed to test the relationship between critical thinking and nursing 
competence because of their espoused interdependence. The study utilised a 
descriptive non-experimental case study design with an heterogeneous sample (2 
nursing student groups n=143). The instruments used were the California Critical 
Thinking Skills Test (CCTST), the California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory 
(CCTDI) and a locally developed standardised clinical competency evaluation tool 
encompassing a Likert scale of 0-4 (0 = never achieving competency -4 always 
achieving competency). The latter instrument was scored by students, clinical 
instructors and preceptors. The study aims were: 
" To describe the results of the CCTST and CCTDI measures with this 
population. 
" To describe the results of the clinical competency measure. 
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" To discover the relationship between critical thinking and clinical 
competence 
Results for aim one, demonstrated that the mean total score on the CCTDI for the 
group was 311 which is above the established mean score of 304 (Facione & 
Facione, 1994) and 93% of students achieved the cut-off point of 40 for at least of 
the seven subscales. Results for the CCTST revealed a group mean score of 16.37 
which is above the established mean of 15.89. 
Results for the clinical competence evaluation instrument revealed that all students 
had met the minimum pass score of 2.5 and that students consistently scored 
themselves higher than the clinical instructors and preceptors had. 
With regard to aim three, no statistically significant relationships were found between 
clinical competency and the critical thinking tests scores. 
May et al. (1999) concluded that the study had failed to establish a correlation 
between critical thinking and clinical competence. They found, however, that the 
CCTST and the CCTDI provided useful quantitative information regarding the 
critical thinking abilities of senior students and the effectiveness of the nursing 
programme in this respect. The authors also suggest that intuitively it would seem 
that critical thinking and clinical competency are related and the fact that this study 
had not found a correlation, may be due to the instrument's inability to capture this 
relationship. Moreover, they suggest that triangulated research designs that include 
both quantitative and qualitative data may provide more meaningful contexts to the 
numbers. 
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8.8.5 Studies Using Qualitative Data Sources for the Investigation of Critical 
Thinking in Nursing: 
Sedlak (1997, p. 12) used a qualitative case study approach to describe seven female 
baccalaureate nursing students' reflection and critical thinking processes during the 
first year of their programme. Critical thinking was defined as: " ... a reasoning 
process in which the nursing student reflects on the ideas, actions and decisions of 
oneself and others related to clinical experiences. " Paul's (1993) critical thinking 
dimensions served as the theoretical framework for the study. Data sources included: 
journals of weekly reflective accounts of their clinical experiences; three 30-minute 
audiotaped structured interviews at the beginning, middle and end of the 
programme; non-participatory observation of 2 hour clinical laboratory sessions 
during which learners practise clinical skills and participated in group discussions. 
Data analysis included coding and thematic development techniques derived from the 
works of a variety of qualitative analytic frameworks, e. g. Miles & Huberman (1994) 
and Merriam (1988). The qualitative data were coded into reflective, cognitive and 
psychomotor categories and critical thinking dimensions. The findings were 
subsumed under an organising theme of perspective development. Within this, four 
major themes reflecting the learner's development in critical thinking were identified 
in relation to their clinical decisions, as follows: 
1. Development of the professional self-perspective with orchestration of the 
emotional self, 
2. Development of a perfectionist perspective; 
3. Development of a caring perspective; 
4. Development of a self directed learning perspective. 
Many of the situations reported by the learners were often more descriptive than 
critical, in that there was little evidence of the generation of alternative arguments of 
perspectives and more a reporting of the feeling and emotions experienced. Although 
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it is difficult to discern from the paper how data were coded to Paul's critical thinking 
dimensions, the data does reveal instances where learners begin to 
think critically. Examples of this are in regard to the learners becoming aware of the 
complexity of patient problems, when they realise that there are very few right or 
wrong answers. Other dimensions evident in the data were the development of 
intellectual humility (awareness of mistakes) and identification of the limitations of 
their thinking brought about by stress, inexperience and lack of confidence. 
The author concludes that the descriptive nature of the study has been instrumental 
in revealing the extent of learner's critical thinking in the early components of their 
professional education, and facilitated insights, that standardised instruments such as 
the WGCTA would not provide. The key elements in ensuring that students develop 
critical thinking skill are reported as: early and prolonged interaction with senior 
students and clinical preceptors; a dialogic approach to learning in the clinical 
environment and stress reduction processes in the early clinical experiences. 
8.8.6 Studies Relating to Critical Thinking as an Outcome of Nursing Education. 
Behrens (1996) used the WGCTA to assess the academic performance of traditional 
and non-traditional (>23yrs of age) nursing diploma students in the USA. Academic 
performance was measured by Grade Point Average (GPA). A pretest - posttest 
design using a sample of 109 students involved WGCTA testing over a time period 
of five semesters. A Pearson correlation of greater significance between WGCTA 
raw score and GPA was reported at the pretest phase for traditional diploma students 
than for non-traditional students. Pretest results also demonstrated a positive 
relationship between chronological age and WGCTA and GPA scores. At post-test, 
however, the mean WGCTA score differences were not significant demonstrating 
that scores had not increased as a result of the nursing curriculum. 
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Behrens concluded that caution must be exercised in relating WGCTA performance 
to long range outcomes. He also postulates that the nursing curriculum may not 
significantly affect critical thinking skills as measured by the WGCTA and that it is 
doubtful that a single measure can be found that will appropriately measure the 
performance of programme outcomes that involve many cognitive skills, attitudes 
and knowledge. 
Adams, Stover, & Whitlow (1999) conducted a longitudinal study between the 
sophomore and senior years of a baccalaureate nursing programme in the USA 
(n=203). The WGCTA (1980) forms A&b were used as the measure of critical 
thinking ability. Additional variables were also included for evidence of correlation 
these included: American College Test Scores (ACT); Grade Point Average (GPA); 
and age. Further nominal variables were also examined and these included gender 
and whether participants were undergraduates or postgraduates. 
The pre and post test WGCTA scores showed no change from sophomore year to 
senior year. A paired sample t-test also showed no significant statistical difference. 
There were no significant differences found in the overall subtest scores. Although a 
moderate positive correlation was found between WGCTA scores and ACT scores, a 
weak positive correlation was found between Sophomore and Senior WGCTA raw 
scores and GPA. No significant relationship, however, was found between WGCTA 
raw scores and age. 
Adams et al. (1999) concluded that the WUCTA is not the instrument of choice for 
longitudinal measurement of critical thinking ability in baccalaureate nursing 
programmes. They advocated that nurse educators should investigate the use of 
other quantitative instruments and develop qualitative methods for the measurement 
of critical thinking in nursing. 
354 
McCarthy et at. (1999) also used a longitudinal study to evaluate the development of 
critical thinking ability in an American baccalaureate nursing programme. The 
California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST) and the California Critical Thinking 
Disposition Test (CCTDI) were used to address the following questions: 
0 Are there differences between sophomore and senior students on total 
scores of the CCTST? 
" Are there differences between sophomore and senior students on total 
scores of the CCTDI and the subscales of the CCTDI? 
" Is there a relationship between the CCTST and the CCTDI? 
The Cross-sectional design comprised a sample of 241 nursing students of which 156 
were sophomores and 85 were seniors. Both groups demonstrated similar pre 
programme mean Grade Point Averages and American College Test Scores. The 
Sophomore group comprised 43 males and the senior group 18 males. Form A of the 
CCTST was used for pre and post tests which were twelve months apart. 
Results for question one demonstrated a significant difference between sophomore 
and senior score on the CCTST. 
For question two scores on the CCTDI showed that seniors scored significantly 
higher than sophomores on the total scores and on four of the subscale scores, i. e. 
truth-seeking, self-confidence, analyticity and inquisitiveness. There were no 
significant differences in the subscales of open-mindedness, systematicity or cognitive 
maturity. 
Results relating to question three demonstrated a weak correlation coefficient 
between the two measures. 
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McCarthy et at. concluded that the cross-sectional design may have produced results 
that were an outcome of cohort differences as opposed to differences related to the 
passage of time. The results overall supported the previous findings of Berger (1984) 
and Gross et al. (1987), although correlation between the CCTST and the CCDTI 
was lower than that reported by Facione, Facione and Sanchez (1994). The authors 
further concluded that future research is needed to explore the relationships between 
critical thinking skill, critical thinking dispositions and curriculum characteristics. 
The above empirical nursing literature review maintains the inconclusive nature of 
the body of evidence relating to the development of critical thinking as an outcome 
of nursing education. This latter group of studies encompass a range of sample sizes 
and methodological diversity. However, the situation remains complex and unclear, 
while some individual studies provide supporting evidence for the effect of nursing 
education on the development of critical thinking ability others do not. It would 
appear that, with the exception of McCarthy et al, Girot's control group and the 
qualitative studies of Haller & Raingruber and Sedlak, most studies had negative 
outcomes in terms of critical thinking skill development. More recent studies (May et 
al. 1999; McCarthy et al. 1999) reflect the growing popularity with the CCTST and 
the CCTDI over the WGCTA. These tools tend to also reflect more positive 
outcomes for nursing education. The issue of the relationship between critical 
thinking and clinical competency remains, as yet, unanswered. This trend in evidence 
is in keeping with the findings of this particular study although no other study has 
investigated the construct in the way this study has. Furthermore, no other study 
appears to place argumentation and the development of more or less complex 




In Summary, this chapter has evaluated the study findings in relation to the research 
questions posed and the definition of critical thinking proposed. The qualitative data 
and research literature have been discussed to elucidate and evaluate the issues 
arising from the data. As with other studies investigating critical thinking in nursing 
education, the data produced in this study suggests that a significant component of 
the nursing curriculum does not appear to have realised the aim of developing 
uniform critical thinking abilities in a group of student nurses. The WGCTA scores in 
this instance have not proved to be useful predictors of student performance in terms 
of success in the programme as a whole, given that the majority of learners went on 
to qualify. The unchanging level of mean scores identified in phases one and two, 
however, are congruent with the unchanging level of group naturalistic reasoning 
mode for phases two and three. The triangulation of methods has, thus, made a 
useful contribution in providing a degree of completeness to the examination of 
critical thinking. 
The body of evidence relating to this phenomenon, thus, remains inconclusive. The 
data produced has been useful, however, in providing insights into the actual 
concurrent professional reasoning strategies of the group of nurses and will serve as 
a basis for the consideration of educational strategies to address these issues. 
The educational task remains a complex one. The evidence generated in this study 
further demonstrates that the epistemologies underpinning participants' everyday 
reasoning strategies are powerful and appear unrelated to educational processes 
(course content) and volume of evidence (focal universe). The absence of explicit 
reference to formal theories in participant protocols suggests that the sample's 
reasoning may. still be based upon individual internal knowledge and belief structures 
at least to this point in the programme. Differing constituent complexity in terms of 
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the focal universes generated by participants has also been shown to have little 
relation to the naturalistic reasoning mode of this sample. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.0 Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the various elements of the study and 
draw conclusions in relation to the original aims and make recommendations in light of 
these for the curriculum and future research. To achieve this the chapter will review the 
following: 
" The purpose of the study and its contribution to the body of knowledge. 
" Methodological issues and contribution to the field. 
" Implications of the findings in relation to nursing practice. 
" Implications of the findings in relation to curriculum development. 
" Limitations of the study. 
" Recommendations and suggestions for future research. 
9.1 Study Purpose and its Contribution to the Body of Knowledge. 
When this study commenced in April 1993 pre-registration education had undergone a 
process of review and change which had culminated in the development of project 2000 
pre-registration programmes. These programmes are now implemented nationally, are 
referred to as RN/Dip HE programmes and are validated at diploma level with 
institutions of higher education. The stated outcomes of the new programmes were 
replete with terms such as: knowledgeable doer, autonomous, critical, creative and 
emancipatory (UKCC, 1986). 
the international literature at that time espoused the virtue 
of critical thinking as an essential constituent of nursing practice and as an outcome of 
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nursing education. The purpose of this study was to examine whether the curriculum 
operating within the author's School of Nursing & Midwifery was achieving the discrete 
curricular outcome of developing critical thinking ability in student nurses during the 
Common Foundation Programme. Three specific research questions were, thus, 
formulated to address the overall purpose of the study in relation to the complex issue of 
critical thinking and whether it could be identified in student nurses' concurrent domain 
specific reasoning. 
This purpose was facilitated by the development of a longitudinal across-method 
triangulation research design that produced comprehensive data over time relating to 
student performance, particularly in relation to the argumentative, contextual, and 
metacognitive aspects critical thinking. The findings produced are not entirely unique 
when compared to the overall body of evidence currently relating to critical thinking and 
nursing education and in the absence of specific teaching. The findings, however, have 
served to illuminate problems of student reasoning in relation to argument construction 
and analysis. This will assist teachers in future attempts to encourage more effective and 
complex clinical reasoning strategies. Although this study has focused upon the verbal 
reports of concurrent professional reasoning, the findings may also facilitate 
understanding and evaluation of student performance in written assignments where 
descriptive and simplistic arguments may also be evident. 
Another important contribution arising from the study is that a deeper insight into the 
conceptual nature and complexity of critical thinking, and how it relates to nursing 
practice has been forthcoming (Daly, 1998). As the study progressed it became apparent 
from the literature that a consensus as to the meaning and constituency of critical 
thinking did not exist. The study's contribution in respect of this was that a conceptual 
definition with constituent elements was developed to contribute to the knowledge and 
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serve as a basis for subsequent evaluation. The development of the definition of critical 
thinking and its fourfold components clarified the role of argumentation and contextual 
ability within the spectrum of critical thinking which also served as a sound basis for the 
operational aspects of critical thinking within the study. These served as useful indices of 
critical thinking in the analysis of the large and rich body of qualitative data produced by 
the study's methodology for phases two and three. 
9.2 Methodological Issues and Contribution to the Field. 
As the study and the literature review progressed it became apparent that no research 
specifically relating to critical thinking as a specific outcome of nursing education had 
been conducted in the United Kingdom at that time. The body of empirical evidence was 
largely American and was also inconclusive. In addition to this, criticisms were emerging 
relating to the reliance upon standardised instruments of measurement for such a 
complex construct, and that the instruments were not domain specific. Calls for 
alternative methods of examining critical thinking in nursing were being made and these 
became the impetus for the development of the alternative methodological approach 
designed for this study. 
A triangulated approach was chosen in order to utilise an existing instrument to provide 
a reference point for an alternative methodology. The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking 
Appraisal (1991) was chosen for the reasons previously identified and provided evidence, 
as in other studies, that nursing education does not consistently improve scores in this 
test. Test scores such as these however, do not provide insights into the type of 
reasoning underpinning the scores achieved. The think aloud method subsequently 
developed for the study was designed to overcome this knowledge gap and the criticisms 
that previous instruments were not domain specific. The simulation approach was also 
361 
intended to overcome the criticism that written case study type instruments did not 
capture or provide the situated complexity reflective of nurses' judgement processes. 
One of the early challenges in the study was to design and perfect the think aloud 
technique for data collection. This involved a prolonged iterative approach in the form of 
a pilot study involving ten willing volunteers from a variety of student groups. Following 
the development and refinement of the think aloud data collection methods, the next 
challenge was to secure volunteers for the study proper. This proved difficult initially. 
Whilst students readily consented to undertake the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking 
Appraisal fewer felt able to volunteer for the think aloud phases of the research. 
However, with diligent and persistent explanation and gentle persuasion thirteen 
volunteers from an initial cohort of twenty plus were secured. One, however, was 
subsequently lost to maternity leave, resulting in the final sample of twelve. As with any 
longitudinal study this sample was prone to the danger of sample mortality, but 
fortunately, this sample remained stable over the various phases of the study. In terms of 
data production the twelve volunteers provided a large body of rich qualitative data 
which was sufficient for purpose. 
In combination the study's methods and longitudinal design have provided evidence that 
achieves a degree of completeness not achieved by previous studies. The WGCTA 
scores are consistent with other studies that show no significant changes in score as a 
result of an educational programme and that demographic variables have no significant 
effect on test performance. The simulated think aloud task and argument complexity 
analytic strategy however, extends our insights as to why learners may not demonstrate 
changes in test performance by illuminating their contemporaneous reasoning strategies 
and shortcomings in respect of this. Outcomes such as this are supported by Haffer & 
Raingruber (1998) who argue that a need exists for nurse educators to be better 
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grounded in the ways that students actually reason in relation to professional issues. 
Without these insights they claim educators will be unable to assist in the development of 
clinical reasoning and critical thinking. 
The illumination of the underlying epistemologies of the participants in the think aloud 
sample is useful for educators and students because it provides clear insights into 
reasoning processes. These are particularly important in relation to weaknesses in the 
construction of simplistic one-sided arguments, and the strengths inherent in multiplist or 
evaluative arguments. Such information can also serve as indices of performance in 
future reflective strategies or in the development of assessment criteria as in the grading 
scale attached at appendix 9 which is based upon the findings of this study. 
As with many studies that generate qualitative data to understand and describe 
phenomena, the development of the analytic framework has been an arduous and 
iterative process that initially proved extremely vexing. The complexity of critical 
thinking as an entity also contributed to the difficulty of the research task and many 
exploratory pathways led to analytic cut de sacs. The outcome of this aspect of the 
study, however, is a framework that with practice can analyse argument complexity 
reasonably quickly and facilitates an auditable trail for qualitative analysis. The 
framework also provides a sound basis for the analysis of reasoning over time as was the 
case over phases two and three of this study. 
9.3 The Implications of the Findings for Nursing Practice. 
Reasoning from an absolutist epistemology may have implications for clinical practice. 
As stated previously, this study has not focused on issues of professional competence 
discretely and as the evidence presented previously suggests there appears to be no 
evidence that critical thinking is a pre-requisite for competent nursing practice. The 
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implications for nursing practice can only be inferred at this point founded upon the 
premise that such an epistemology endured throughout the subsequent Branch 
Programmes. 
Reasoning from an absolutist epistemology could conceivably impoverish clinical 
reasoning, in that the aspects of assessment, diagnosis, implementation and evaluation of 
patient care and intervention may reflect the values and stereotypical frameworks of the 
practitioner and not take into account relevant alternative possibilities and individual 
contexts of the patient and family. Practitioners may fail to attend to the potential 
complexity of patient situations during the professional judgement process. Alternative 
perspectives and, therefore, alternative care frameworks and solutions may be excluded 
in patient responses to and management of their healthcare needs. The element of early 
closure characteristic of an absolutist epistemology may compound these consequences, 
because practitioners can be over-confident about judgements, that are based upon 
limited search for alternative information and possibilities (Lange et at. 1997). Such an 
absolutist approach to clinical reasoning would have implications for the development of 
reflective practice, in that practitioners may not be disposed to, or perceive themselves as 
capable of, the search for contradictory evidence in the evaluation of their practice. 
The inappropriate use of representative heuristic strategies may also result in the 
reasoning within stereotypical frameworks. An example of this is demonstrated by 
Bowler (1993) which identified the practices of midwives who did not approach female 
Asian patients with family planning advice because of a stereotypical perception that they 
would not be interested in such information. A further consequence for nursing practice, 
is that reasoning from an epistemology that characteristically eliminates curiosity, 
inquiry, questioning doubt and the consideration of alternatives could serve to maintain 
the status quo and the perpetuation of ritualistic practices regardless of their utility and 
efficacy. This would not only conflict with contemporary initiatives to foster clinical 
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effectiveness (NHS Executive, 1996: RCN, 1996: Oldham, 1997), but could impoverish 
reasoning and performance in relation to broader professional, ethical and organisational 
issues that extend beyond that of immediate clinical priorities amidst a climate of 
perpetual change. Moreover, individuals who reason from an absolutist epistemology 
may not be predisposed to engage with the processes of change and innovation. Hogan 
(1997) suggests that innovatory behaviour involves the explicit proactive search for the 
opportunities for productive change. In the absence of multiplist or evaluative 
approaches to reasoning associated with innovation however, absolutist epistemologists 
may reject opportunities for innovation, in favour of maintenance of the status quo. 
Furthermore, critical thinking and innovation are not the sole responsibility of 
practitioners. From a broader perspective, the organisational climate and culture must 
also encourage and support such practices. This to some extent presupposes that 
managers are also sensitive to, and equipped with, critical thinking abilities and are 
prepared to nurture and develop a culture that will value and appreciate such abilities. 
Hollaway & Penson (1987) and Wilson & Startup (1991) argued that the pressures to 
conform to socialisation in the practice environment are enormous. Thus, practitioners 
have to choose their own priorities in relation to the associated risks between passivity 
and critical activity in practice. Caution must also be exercised in moves towards the 
development and implementation of standardised procedures, guidelines and care 
pathways. Instruments such as these may well be welcomed by individuals with a 
predisposition towards absolutist reasoning because they may appear to give the illusion 
of generalisability and completeness for individuals not predisposed to question, doubt, 
or search for inconsistencies, shortcomings or alternatives. They may, thus, compound 
the problems of simplistic and decontextualised rote clinical judgements that do not meet 
the complexity of patient or client need. 
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9.4 Implication of Findings for Curriculum Development 
The main implication for the Common Foundation Programme curriculum, Is that the 
intended outcome for the development of critical thinking during the programme does 
not appear to have been achieved, at least not in the ways operationalised by this 
particular study, or within the time frame involved. This outcome must be viewed in light 
of the absence of a common institutional definition and understanding of the nature of 
critical thinking and in the absence of specific teaching and learning strategies in respect 
of the above. This may also illuminate the possibility that the host institution, and even 
the broader nurse education establishment, did not have clear insights into the nature of 
critical thinking during the design, teaching, and assessment of early project 2000 type 
programmes. Moreover, Adams (1999) questions that if nursing education does not 
teach what critical thinking is, or teach by means that stimulate critical thinking, then 
how will nursing students learn the skill and apply it in practice? The next logical 
consideration would thus be whether teaching and learning strategies that specifically 
focus upon the definition and implementation of critical thinking would improve the 
situation. Previous researchers have reported that specifically designed teaching and 
learning strategies can encourage critical thinking and problem solving skills (Feuerstein 
et al. 1980; Resnick, 1983; Glaser, 1984; Strong, 1985; Leroux, 1986; Weinstein & 
Mayer, 1986; Herrnstein et al. 1986; Schonfeld, 1987; Wang & Palinscar, 1989; 
Weaver, 1989; Dunkhase & Penrick, 1990). Teaching strategies range from courses 
designed to focus upon the array of discrete critical thinking skills and logical 
competence to problem based strategies involving debating skills and argument analysis. 
The former approach has been criticised on the grounds that although skills oriented 
courses teach skills, they may not necessarily challenge thinking. Paul (1987b) argues for 
example, that such courses may actually encourage sophistry by enabling students to 
rationalise their existing biases. Strategies involving debate and argument analysis 
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however, may lead to a more mature evaluative epistemology (Perry, 1970; Belenky et 
al. 1986; Kurfiss, 1988; Paul, 1987b; Kuhn, 1991). The problems facing nursing 
education, however, would be which approach to adopt, and how would such discrete or 
self contained programmes be incorporated into an already comprehensive and complex 
curriculum that has too many statutory elements? In order to overcome problems of 
trying to fit additional discrete modules into the existing curriculum, an alternative 
approach may be to try to develop an underlying critical thinking culture that pervades 
and underpins the teaching and learning strategies as a whole. 
One way of achieving this could be to develop an institutional consensus as to the 
definition, value and constituent characteristics of critical thinking using this study's 
conception as a basis for debate. The value of critical thinking and its perceived relation 
to effective clinical reasoning and caring would need to be explored and established. 
Various studies have already demonstrated the diverse conceptions of that exist among 
academic institutions and staff (Jones & Brown, 1993; Videbeck, 1997; Adams, 
1999). With an academic body of approximately one hundred and twenty members and 
many more clinical colleagues involved in the teaching and learning of student nurses, 
within the author's host institution, this would be an arduous and complex process. If 
achieved, however, such a strategy would pay dividends in the development of future 
academic and practice assessment based upon a common understanding and 
operationalisation of the construct. 
In addition to a critical thinking consensus, issues identified in this study could be utilised 
to serve as a foundation for discussion of the development of teaching and learning 
strategies to stimulate and support critical thinking in the academic and clinical 
components of the curriculum. The study findings in relation to the naturalistic reasoning 
mode of the volunteer sample and the scale of argument complexity could be 
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disseminated to illuminate the nature of reasoning and potential shortcomings of such 
reasoning in relation to clinical reasoning and academic performance. The centrality of 
argumentation and argument analysis to critical thinking could also be illuminated with a 
view to fostering the development of academic assignments that would require the 
utilisation of the skills of argument analysis as a train of reasoning in which claims, 
supporting reasons and alternatives are linked to the construction of a justifiable position, 
diagnosis or therapeutic decision. Argument analysis would, thus, provide students and 
academic staff with a mutual framework for the conduct and assessment of student work 
that extends beyond factual and procedural correctness. This would also provide some 
criteria for the pervasive requirement to 'discuss', 'analyse' and 'critically appraise' 
phenomena, practices and issues. Teaching strategies in the classroom utilising real 
problems encountered in practice, could also incorporate such argumentative approaches 
to learning, in relation to appropriate complex issues such as ethical dilemmas, health, 
health promotion, cultural and spiritual aspects of care and interdisciplinary perspectives 
of health care. This type of approach to teaching and learning could not only help to 
develop the cognitive and contextual skills inherent in this study's conception of critical 
thinking, but may also stimulate the various characteristic dispositions to think critically 
if the encounters can be readily linked to patient outcomes in the practice domain. 
The potential positive interrelationship between metacognitive strategies and reasoning 
as identified in the literature and this study's findings should also be considered in the 
development of teaching and learning strategies to promote critical thinking. Challenging 
students and colleagues to externalise their reasoning about positions and practices can 
facilitate greater insights into the processes, consistency, relevance, contexts and 
appropriateness of their reasoning. This could be achieved both in the classroom and in 
practice learning encounters by the use of more Socratic approaches where students and 
teachers are encouraged to explain the thinking behind their views and decisions. There 
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is some evidence to suggest that small group tutorials, one-to-one preceptorship and the 
appropriate use of questioning strategies during clinical teaching is important in fostering 
the utilisation of critical thinking skills in clinical reasoning (Martin, 1996; Perclful & 
Nester, 1996; Sellappah et al. 1998). Such approaches can illuminate the knowledge 
structures, heuristic strategies, experiences and beliefs that influence reasoning and 
facilitate an exploration of the accuracy, appropriateness and completeness of peoples' 
thinking. Metacognition can also be encouraged and developed by the use of reflective 
logs or dairies particularly in relation to learning in the clinical environment where time 
frames and workplace demands may not provide consistent opportunities for Socratic 
approaches to operate. Fonteyn & Cahill (1998) report that students prefer the use of 
clinical logs to other written forms of assessment and assert that clinical logs, maintained 
on a daily basis, enable students to become more active learners, manage their own 
thinking and improve their metacognition. Reflective dairies have recently been 
introduced into some areas of the institutions' curricular assessment strategies but these 
would need to be evaluated in respect of their capability to stimulate critical thinking and 
metacognition in the ways outlined above. 
9.5 Limitations of the Study. 
This study set out to address a complex issue and contribute to investigation of critical 
thinking in a nursing context by developing an alternative methodology to provide 
evidence of critical thinking as an educational outcome, by means other than the sole use 
of a standardised instrument. The study did not, thus, aim to produce findings that were 
necessarily generalisable to other populations at this stage in knowledge development. 
The body of longitudinal data upon which the findings are founded has been considerable 
although the generalisability of the findings may be limited by the sample size. Moreover, 
the fact that the simulation chosen to underpin the data collection methods represents 
only one of the myriad of possible professional judgement situations encountered by 
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students and practitioners it must be, thus, recognised that an alternative simulation, 
focusing on a different or more structured factually oriented situation or focus, may have 
produced different responses. 
The study also focused only on one group and one, albeit homogenous, component of 
the pre registration curriculum. Student reasoning performance may have been different 
at the end of the heterogeneous Branch Programmes. Given the fact, however, that the 
sample's underlying epistemology had remained predominantly unchanged over the 
course of the CFP, where workplace demands and socialisation pressures would be less 
apparent, the maintenance of such an underlying epistemology appears feasible and 
indeed probable. 
The study's longitudinal approach may also be an important limitation, in that critical 
thinking in the ways identified in the conception of critical thinking used in this study 
need not emerge over this length of time, or, at this stage in the students' learning. We 
may thus be expecting too much of our learners, too soon in the educational process. 
The early professional socialisation processes and the acquisition of a professional 
knowledge base may impinge upon learners' cognitive and affective abilities to the extent 
that it impacts upon the development of critical thinking abilities in their early 
professional development. The development of critical thinking skills may need to be 
viewed as a continual process that requires the elucidation of levels or stages of critical 
thinking development that develops as professional knowledge and experience expands. 
This work does not offer a detailed model of the mental operations that student nurses 
execute in performing professional reasoning and judgement, as do those developed by 
cognitive psychologists as in other reasoning or problem-solving research. It does, 
however, contribute several things that are of direct relevance to the study of student 
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nurses' thinking skills. First, it identifies specific forms of reasoning in relation to an 
abstract professional issue, that are central to critical thinking, and shows how they relate 
to specific constituents of critical thinking. Second, it demonstrates that the forms of 
reasoning identified are enduring, irrespective of a period of professional education and 
experience, and establishes their generality within a sample. Third, it provides detailed 
empirical evidence regarding the structure of the various forms of reasoning in relation to 
the cognitive task. The information, thus, provided is important if one wishes to 
promote, teach and assess critical thinking through educational intervention. 
Based upon the data generated from this study, the subsequent discussion and 
conclusions discussed above the following recommendations are made: 
9.6. Recommendations for Curriculum Development and Further Research. 
" An institutional statement regarding the value of critical thinking and its 
relationship to academic development and clinical practice should be explicit 
in the institution's philosophy, mission statements and programme 
documentation. 
" An institutional consensus as to the definition and constitution of critical 
thinking should be developed in order to facilitate uniform teaching and 
learning strategies. 
" Students should be made aware of the institution's definition and constitution 
of critical thinking and the role it plays in their academic and professional 
development. 
" Teaching and learning strategies that incorporate and develop metacognitive 
processes hould be investigated as a means of promoting critical thinking 
and reflective, innovative practice. 
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" Teaching and learning strategies that facilitate more Socratic small group or 
one-to-one preceptorship opportunities in the clinical environment, based 
upon real case studies and clinical problems, should be considered. 
9 Argument analysis as a framework for curriculum development and teaching 
and learning strategies should be considered as a vehicle for promoting 
critical thinking abilities. 
" Levels of critical thinking ability commensurate with discrete stages of 
academic and experiential development should be considered as indicators of 
appropriate achievement. 
" Consideration should be given as to whether teaching and strategies 
specifically designed to promote and assess critical thinking should be explicit 
in programme validation criteria. 
" Further research should be conducted using a range of learners and clinical 
simulations to further test the generalisability of the study's methods and 
analytic framework. 
" Further research should be conducted using a range of qualified practitioners 
in various settings to determine the role that clinical experience and other 
factors may play in the complexity of clinical reasoning strategies and 
reasoning outcomes. 
" Further research should be conducted to examine whether the argument 
complexity scale could be transferred to the assessment of reasoning in 
written course work. 
" Further research should be conducted to examine whether the argument 
complexity scale could be adapted and utilised as a component of the 
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Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research programme, your personal 
contribution is greatly valued and will assist in the development, and refinement of 
the proposed methodology for data collection and subsequent analysis. The focus of 
the study is to investigate certain aspects of student nurses problem-solving / 
reasoning processes. For this reason I would like you to 'think aloud' as you 
consider the material presented to you. This may seem strange initially and we will 
try to overcome this feeling, if applicable by using 'warm up' exercises. Some of you 
may already be used to 'talking to yourself as you work through problems, (its not 
true what they say! ). 
The important thing is that you try to talk aloud constantly from the time I present 
the material to be considered. This should include everything that comes to mind e. g. 
false starts, repetitions, mistakes etc. It does not matter how irrelevant or trivial the 
thought might appear, I would like to hear it please. Try not to plan what to say, but 
let your thoughts speak as though you were really thinking out loud. 
You may find yourself lapsing into silence at intervals, and in order to maintain 
continuity of your account I will occasionally or maybe even frequently prompt you 
to "Please keep talking" or " Please remember to tell me what you are 
thinking". Please try not to get frustrated or concerned by this, silent thought is 
perfectly natural, and nothing personal is meant by the frequency of prompting. 
However as complete a record as possible is important. Should you have any 
concerns regarding this procedure please "think them aloud to me". 




The purpose of this study is to investigate certain aspects of students nurse's 
reasoning/ problem solving abilities and processes, whilst engaged on a nursing 
orientated cognitive task. Part of the study will examine your reasoning in action, 
that is, as you actually work through a task. 
Data collection methods are to include undertaking of a pencil and paper test lasting 
approximately 40 minutes in the first instance, followed at a later date by the viewing 
of a videotaped nursing orientated scene. During your viewing of the scene you will 
be requested to 'think aloud', that is talk about what you are thinking. This is to 
enable the researcher to capture precisely how you set about dealing with the task at 
hand. Your verbalised thoughts will then be recorded on audiotape and transcribed 
verbatim in order to facilitate analysis. 
There are no perceived physiological or psychological hazards associated with these 
techniques. 
Anyone volunteering to participate in this study should do so on the understanding 
that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving reasons, 
and without fear of penalty. Similarly, no personal benefit of any kind is to be 
implied or expected by your decision to participate. 
Your rights in law are to be in no way compromised by your consent to participate in 
the project. All data will be confidential and used solely for research purposes. 
If these criteria meet with your approval could you please sign and date the consent 
form provided. Could you please explain in your own terms what you are being 
asked to participate in. 
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Consent to participate in Research. 
I .......................................................... confirm that the nature of the study overleaf, 
and the proposed methods of data collection have been explained to my full 
satisfaction, and I am in agreement with the consent criteria. 
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Pilot Study Debriefing Interview Details. 
Thank you for participating in this exercise. Now that the actual data collection is 
complete, it would be helpful if you could report your experiences of the methods 
used. This additional information will assist the researcher in further developing or 
refining the methods for future use. 
Questions. 
1. How did you feel prior to the commencement of the exercise? 
2. What are your views on the instructions you were given? 
3. How did you feel about the way the instructions were administered? 
4. Could the instructions be improved in any way? 
5. How did you feel about the volume and arrangement of equipment used? 
6. Could this be improved in any way for you? 
7. What are your views on the 'warm up' exercises? (if applicable). 
8. What did you think of the quality of the case study, as presented to you? 
9. How did you feel about'thinking aloud'? 
10. Could your 'thinking aloud' performance have been assisted / improved in 
any way? 
11. Did my presence have any affect on your performance? 
12. Were you conscious of any distractions / difficulties in concentrating ? 
13. Do you feel you have benefitted in any way from this exercise? 
14. Would you do it again? 




Data: Phase Two 
Participant 2 
S. I see in front of me - er -a chap - erm - middle forties - he's in his house - er - 
sitting on his sofa - he's chatting about his lifestyle - how he sees it - he considers 
himself healthy - he is actually - he's got a Scottish accent - so - an he says he has 
been unemployed - an in Scotland its quite unemploy - er - high unemployment rate - 
he's explaining how he actually erm - goes job hunting - an er - er he's talking about 
holidays - quitea time ago he seems to say - he's actually talking of money - he's - he's 
reading a large newspaper now - can't see which the title is - theres er - trophies in 
the cupboard - so obviously they do some sports - well spread family - lives in a 
council house - right by a road - there could be traffic polution - er - obviously - he 
sounds like - there could be tension at home - if - if he's at home a long time - erm - 
explaining how he spends his day - an it is a tabloid paper - oh yeah - tch - not a 
tabloid - tis a large broadsheet paper - he explains - see - seems to be wanting er to 
keep his mind busy - actual body language - he's holding his hands - an er - sitting 
quite relaxed in the chair - an he's thinking things - an actually makes - he - he's 
actually explaining his day all in little compartments - what he does - he seems to 
being unemployed wants the need to erm - feel that he's doing things - explains about 
his wife - his wifes actually on the picture - she's smiling at the baby - so it must be 
quite a worry really - having children - an not having a job - his actual skin looks a 
little - little marked- whether thats a liitle bit - the diet they have - or worry coming 
out - stress - erm - he erm - he actually hasn't explained that he helps much with the 
children - but er - he's explaining that his wife perhaps looks after the children - not 
himself - so much - actually in the cupboard they're er - little miniatures of whisky 
bottles there - could perhaps be er - drink - it might not be er -a drinking problem - 
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but in Scotland sometimes people like collecting whisky - books on the side - 
childrens toys around quite a lot - er - he's explaing that he's at home quite a lot - so 
he's very - he finds it hard that - he does seem to be talking - he finds it very hard not 
having a job - an - he yeah - he's keeps saying difficult - an he does look quite tense 
actually when he's talking this way - yeah - erm - he's actually verbalizing what 
people do think -I think they think - at first they're full of enthusiasm - they can get a 
job pretty quickly - but then long term unemployed people often suffer - more from 
not receiving a job - getting a job straight away - an I should imagine that'd be - for 
me it would be seem very depressing - to - not that - he - he does like to - Billy does 
like to - erm - take up his time - getting definite - filling up his time - he feels he 
doesn't just want to sit around - or- hasn't actually said that he - goes out - an goes 
out a lot - spends a lot of time in the house actually doing his things - er - actually - 
speaking of the house - the house doesn't look untidy - it looks very neat - but er - 
he's expressing - that er - home decor - er - home improvements are very hard - and 
also ( laughs) - he's talking of his motivation of - doing actual -I think - actual tasks - 
that he thinks are more - er - male - sort of decorating about the house - an er - 
golfing - an other er - work colleagues - he's actually his social life has changed - 
from - not - er -I suppose from a financial point of view he's actually saying - that er 
- socialising it could be a sport - but obviously there's more to it than that - an there's 
er - actual - buying of drinks afterwards - er - er - obvious - er - he's speaking of his 
wife - er organizing - budgeting the household - er - the household er - finances - an 
it must be very hard really - having no spare money - at all - an - his wife actually 
seems to take on quite a lot of the decisions now - because it is the house - an - an 
the house is traditionally -I suppose the womans point of view - she's at home 
making the home - an looking after the children - oh - he's spoken of what - seems to 
me quite heavy drinking - he's just actually explained - that er - it isn't - they don't er 
- consid - people who do drink a lot - an perhaps his friends (laughs) - actually 
mentioned the medical profession - that - they would erm - say that it is quite a lot - 
14 pints - but he's sort of - er - he's sort of saying that - that isn't er -I think - its - 
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people like to er - make their point of view - make it seem that its right - sort of talk 
it round - specially drinking or smoking - its er -a social event really - an - it seems 
that thats what Billy's saying - socialising with his male friends - an -a male sort of 
thing - he's actually speaking of something engineering - thats er - his job - an he's 
perhaps saying there isn't so much more - manual work to - to get - he's just 
expressed - that he's doing computer work - an that could possibly be - er - how - er 
-aware that that could be a one - the job of the future - he's study - studying at home 
- he's got a lot of tapes an information in front of him - seems - seems like he's 
possibly motivated in that way - that he'd like to do that. (simulation ends) 
R. Would you agree with Billy then. Is he healthy? 
S. I think er - Billy didn't think himself unhealthy - but I think that erm - he 
obviously - erm -I think there seemed to be a little bit of strain between the wife and 
Billy - he's there a lot - what he actually likes to do - he doesn't mention that he helps 
his wife - in anything around the house - an so she appeared to have the attitude - 
this is what Billyl (simulates anger) - er sort of verbalised - that sort of - well a long 
as you're out of my way - an not doing something - then y'know - she did all the - 
dealt with the children - erm - anything around the house - and er - did the shopping 
and domestic chores - an he sort of - an he - he found that - he felt that he was 
keeping healthy - busying himself with enn - his own er - y; know interests - er but it 
didn't seem to er - actually - whether -I don't know - he didn't seem to actually get 
out much an exercise - but we only saw him in the living room - so we can't really -I 
mean thats a quick judgement - enn - an he seemed very much into himself - er - 
obviously you have - you not socialising - you not going out at work - mixing with 
your mates - having the money to socialise afterwards also - erm - when you're in the 
house -I think you must - must become - more sort of - er - isolated really - an I 
think that came across - an that - also - his own views - growing up - what he was 
used to - what his mates did - what was acceptable - enn - people seem to want to 
quantify -I don't know - qual - whats the word - qualify - what - what they think - an 
they'll say - an often - you'll often hear that - er - Oh I know I've read it somewhere - 
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or somebody -a doctor or someones told me - that it - or - the doctors' wouldn't say 
that - they'd say it was bad - but - people want to then add - well that I- well 
its 
never hurt me I've been doing it for years - an - so - it - on the outside - an seeing 
him sit in the chair - an just chatting away - you wouldn't actually - you wouldn't 
immediately think - erm - you might say - he doesn't actually need hospital - traum - 
er - treatment - like trauma or accident and emergency or anything cropping up - but 
it could be that - er - there's more long term affects - erm - six years unemployed - is 
quite a long time - sometimes the unemployed become unemployable - because - an 
it could be - well obviously there's loads of factors affecting it - the area - er - if there 
isn't high employment - he - he seemed to really have erm high hopes in computers - 
but often - the case is that very youngsters - er - younger people - an they come in 
from - with er - higher education - go into computers an that the actual computer er - 
base for jobs is getting smaller - because computers by their nature - make for not 
some many er - y'know the sort of manpower needed - so - I'd say he - erm - I'd say 
he doesn't see - whether - if a pers - if you put something to a person whether they'd 
then -I don't know - he is really trying to not to sort of feel ill - an be sorry for 
himself - but he could possibly have - erm - well it didn't mention if he smoked or not 
- or I didn't hear - whether I was talking - when it came up - but er -a thing - er its - 
if you -a lot of things - er - stress and smoking and drinking an er - not being happy 
as in feeling fulfilled - it can lead to quite a few - y'know feeling bad erm - quite a 
few sort of cases of illneses -I mean - coronary heart disease - the statistics say - its 
-er - an its er quite a lot more 
in glasgow -I didn't hear where that area was either - 
but its very high - the cases are very high - an that - is the sort of thing that adds to - 
that life style can add to that sort of thing -I mean I'm summising -I mean - 
apparently he looked quite well - but it can all add to it - 
R. Did you think that there was enough information there to enable you to make that 
decision? 
S. No - not really -I didn't think so - ern -I didn't see actually -I saw him walking 
just in town - but it didn't really give you very much about his lifestyle - erm -I didn't 
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hear his wife talk at all - didn't see the other children - erm - no I don't really think 
there was -I mean -I think you'd possibly if you were there an you got to know him 
- whatever situation you were in -I mean - as a nurse -I mean he might be referred 
by the doctor to need psychiatric - perhaps just to talk like the community psychiatric 
nurse - I'm sure you'd get to know more - an could offer more advice by - y'know 
actual physical - con - well y; know - meeting - contact in that way - so I think it was 
quite limiting really - the - although you can pick up quite - y'know you can pick up 
quite a lot -I don't think there was enough - really if you were making serious 
decisions - 
Post Decision Stimulated Recall 
R. What made you think Billy was in his middle forties? 
S erm - he'd got a family - so er - an - we were told there were three - an the baby 
was six months - an the others - were quite a gap between them - so I sort of was 
using that - the actual look of the chap - an that er - er - he was established as a 
turner - so erm - in engineering firms that would have been - to be established - you 
have to have - an apprenticeship - an get - so you wouldn't be thirty -I thought -I 
sort of - middle forties was a loose - sort of guess - thats it - 
R. Why did you mention the prospect of traffic pollution? 
S. I saw er - was very close - his house was actually very close to - er - overhead 
road - like a bridge - it was something -I mean they build those - they're either a 
dual carriageway or a motorway - they're not usually little side roads - so that must 
be heavy traffic I thought there - an it - er was on a council estate - an you'd got a 
little pan of the view of it - an it didn't look - in the coutryside sort of place - it didn't 
look rural to me - thats it - 
R. You mentioned that he likes to keep his mind busy. Is that important to health do 
you think? 
S. Yes I would say so - enm - just from my own judgement - erm - its all according 
-I suppose to what you've been used to - but I think - if you - if you don't then you 
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can become very bored - an I think - boredom -a-I don't know - if you - if - yeah if 
you become bored -I think it can be a bit soul destroying - in that sort of way - an I 
think - yeah - your mind an how you feel - affects you - an how you approach other 
things in life - dealing with things - so I would say that - an then - y'know keeping 
your mind busy - if - if thats what you're used to -I mean - thats - thats - y'know -I 
wouldn't sort of say - you must read this - an you mustn't do - its all according - 
y'know - er -I would say that yeah - it could definitely - it could be definitely 
detrimental if you -just sort of relaxed into - well not relaxed - thats the right word - 
just sort of didn't bother anymore -I think its the bothering - an er keeping busy in 
that way - 
R You mentioned his skin appearance, and that there might be a dietary connection. 
What did you mean by this? 
S. erm - well - it just looked a little bit unclear - erm - an it just came to my mind - 
that er - er - possibly - erm - that - y'know - if - there's - there's evidence that er - if 
you are eating - little bit more greasy foods - an er - not fresh diet - not fruit - er 
there is evid - y'know - you could sort of suffer in that way - although - sometimes I 
mean it - you get a skin complexion with stress - it doesn't always just dietary - thats 
just what crossed my mind then - 
R. What you think he looked tense? 
S. he's - he was holding his hands - he erm - he appeared to be relaxed - but I think 
his shoulders looked quite set - an he didn't really move - have like body movement a 
lot - and he held his hands - sort of clasped - an then a little bit moving the thumbs - 
an that just seemed to me a little bit tense - possibly he's having an interview aswell 
(laughs) - feeling tense in that way - thats it - 
R. You mentioned that he was home a lot. Would this be a problem in Billy's 
situation, or to health in general. 
S. erm - it just - see - he - by the fact that he actually mentioned it - and he also 
mentioned that his wife was mentioning it - that I think it seemed perhaps there was a 
little bit of strain there - that he was around a lot -I mean - possibly just the 
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relationship they had -I mean up to -up to six years ago perhaps - er his wife was 
used to looking after the children on her own - at home -a lot in the day - or doing 
whatever - often - well - then if you're around you - erm - perhaps - that could be a 
little more strain - between erm -a couple - or the family - an he mentioned that the 
children asked also - about his situation - so obviously he -I think he was thinking 
about it anyway -I mean - it could cause a strain - being there - if your not -I don't - 
they didn't actually do things together - it appeared - it was separate things - being in 
the same house - but separately - an perhaps you - they got in each others way a little 
bit - that what I felt about that - 
R. You mentioned the term motivation on several ocassions. Is motivation 
important to health? 
S. erm -I think I used the term - probably - motivation to do things - an I was sort 
of thinking getting a job - if - you needed - y'know obviously - like there's a lot of - 
you feel you need a job - you need a job for money - an then to go out an actually if 
you're a part of the society -I think you could lose motivation very easily if you 
come across a lot of rejections - so yeah I think you do need motivation - er I think it 
possibly is part of health - er - if you haven't got it it could detract from your health a 
little bit - yeah - thats it - 
R In a similar vein you mentioned socialisation. Why is that important to health? 
S. I think that ern - looking at Billy - from what we saw - he was mainly in the house 
- an that he said he spent a lot of time in the house - an the person he saw socially 
was his wife an children - an other people - possibly his family -I think it - yeah -I 
think it is important to see other people - an he obviously has been used to seeing 
other people - and er he's also mentioned that he used to go drinking ern - with his 
mates -so obviously its important to him - he mentioned it an now he feels thats - he's 
missing something - its been taken away - so I think - yeah -I think you need -I 
think socialisation is important - or feeling that you can go an er relax a little - an 
feel social with people - yeah -I think he -I definitely think - he - he mentioned it - 
he felt - that had gone - that had been taken away - somehow - 
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R. You mentioned that his wife made all the decisions. Might this pose problems 
do you think? 
S. Yes - he explained that - got his Giro - then is was - cut up into all the various 
things they needed - which were vital things they needed to survive - an then perhaps 
if there was some left - he'd get a little share - an the way he explained it - although - 
I think he was both admiring his wife for coping - but also saying - er - he - he didn't 
like it - the fact that - this is important - that is important - that came first - then if 
there was any left - he would get some -I definitely think he felt that he was in the 
house - whether it was again by tradition an erm - thats the wife- thats his wifes 
domain - an she sorted things - an that was the law - as it was - an he was almost 
treated - well he didn't say that - but this was me sort of thinking like - the eldest 
child and given pocket money -I think sort of came across -a little bit - an he didn't 
have that many decisions to make - thats it - 
R. You mentioned Billy drinking. Did you think he drank heavily? 
S. erm - he's - he mentioned that he has before - he doesn't consder it heavy -I think 
he must be aware that it is heavy - because he also said professionals would say its 
heavy so he - didn't say an they don't know what they're talking about - but he just 
mentioned it - but he said - in their community or wherever they live it wasn't 
considered heavy - an you had at least 14 pints when you went out - the actual video 
showed a pub - he didn't actually say if it was his local or not - now - and from what 
he said he didn't really have a lot of money - left to drink a lot -I would say - that 
he's had to cut down -I think - that he - this is just me looking at everything - that 
he would still drink - because -I think that he would see it as a pleasure - an if he'd 
got money he would drink - whether heavily I'm not sure - whether the circumstances 
would stop him drinking heavily - but I don't think -I think if he suddenly had 20 
pounds - he would run somewhere -I think - he wouldn't think it very bad if he went 
and drank -I don't think that he thinks its bad - 
R. You mentioned that people tend to justify their health behaviours. Do you think 
people do this to serve their own interests? 
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S. Yeah -I-I-I think that people do - erm -I think they - they consider it - that - 
they'll sometimes - people will say - its their pleasure - or I don't know if its their only 
pleasure - or its how they relax - how - their means of relaxing - or socialising - and 
whats acceptable - and yeah I think they -I think they must be aware that it is 
damaging - some things are damaging - there's evidence of that - which they can't 
argue - but they do argue that - they've decided thats what they want to do - and - 
they're - although it can be damaging to health - it can -I think that they think it can - 
help their health - by relaxing them - or er they can be sociable - or that sort of side 
of it -I think they -I think they do like to justify it - it - that -I think that because 
they think there's more emphasis on it now - than ever - but I still think they do it - 
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Data: Phase 3 
Subject 47 
S. Bill - Bill is unemployed - he's erm lost the job - an erm - he's at home - and erm - 
and erm he - all what he does is erm - doing some exercises at home - but er - he 
does that er - its - its - its - his exercises is not regular -I mean his time interval - erm 
- Bill is a family man - erm - he's unemployed - for a long time - about six years - erm 
-I think erm - its affecting his health - y'know - despite his exercises an amount of 
his erm -I think he's erm - lost er - his self - esteem -I think he spends most of de 
time - er - in - in - indoors - just moves upstairs and downstairs - er - his wife - has er 
a baby y'know - because of that I don't think the wife too is working - and er - life is 
really making hard for - y'know - an he spends most of the time reading newspapers - 
an er - the way I see Bill he - he sits - isolates himself from the family - while the wife 
is er - attending to the baby - and er - y'know - Bill is desparately looking for a job - 
y'know - er - he - he always think about the family - an er - he - he - erm - Bill has 
been itching to get a job - for quite a long time - since enn - he lost his job - about 
six years ago - an he - he always think about getting a job - an er -I think thats - 
thats a bit of er - its - its - its more of a problem to him - an er -I think he wishes to 
take any job at all - that comes on his way now - er - yeah - he sees on play - er - 
playing for hours an hours indoors and er -I don't think that is going - is going to 
help Bill - ern - he needs to go out an socialise - as a family man he's - he's lost self- 
esteem - er - erm yeah - the - the - yeah - the - the job he lost has affected him in so 
many ways - er - it has affected er - his social behaviour - his outings his er - he used 
to play golf - but because of that he stopped playing the golf - and er - he can't afford 
to pay the cost involved - to buy equipment for this sports and games - an er - he 
seems isolated now - he's financially ill - and er cannot make ends meet now - er -I 
think he's depressed - mentally ill now - hmm - he likes - erm he used to drink -a lot 
- an er - the job - an he's being unemployed - er - has er - affected him in oh so many 
ways - he's really depressed y'know - and er - always think of the burden he's got - 
421 
the family - er - hes - hes er lost some - er - relationship - with friends - hmm - oh 
yeah - 
B. please keep talking. 
S. he's doing - he's doing - he's doing some - some correspondence course - so er - 
and er its based on home studies - erm yeah - he - hes - hes thinking that er - maybe 
in future that will - no I don't think Bill is right there ( simulation ends). 
R Would you agree with Billy then. Is he healthy? 
S. No no - no no - not really - not at all - somebody who is er unemployed for six 
years - er - with a family - and er - owns a home - he's depressed - mentally ill - really 
- financially ill - and erm - has lost social interactions - social contact - because of er - 
he doesn't play games anymore - because he can't afford - and er - the family is a 
burden now to him - he's lost some friends - so erm - he - he at times - all he seems - 
to talk to himself - and er - he spends all the time indoors - which is not - you should 
go out an socialise - er but er - he's - he's isolate - he's not healthy at all - Bill - Bill 
isn't - er - an he's - desperate - looking for job - an he's been itching for quite a long 
time for job - an I think whatever comes in his way - any job at all - that come across 
Bill - Bill will take it - no matter what - an erm he's trying to - do some 
correspondence course - at home - with the aim that maybe in future - he - it can help 
- well thats a good idea - but still - he's very desperate - he's a desperate man - he's er 
- Bill is not healthy - cause er - if you - if erm - you read er the United Nations erm - 
definition for health - its not er - merely absence of diseases - er well - Bill - Bill 
physically you see Bill - is er - is a healthy man - hes not deformed in any way - he 
hasn't got any headache or something like that - but socially - emotionally - he's not 
sound - thats what the united nations definition say - its not merely the absence of 
disease - but erm - the holistic erm - of man - physical - like er - social - er - physical 
- mental - an all aspects that makes one unhealthy - so - erm - health - ern - as an 
individual pers - er perspection -I mean individual perspective - my position - Bill is 
ill - he's not a healthy man. 
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R Did you think that there was sufficient information there to enable you to make 
that judgment? 
S. erm - well - there was - but - is erm - bit of rush - so quick - an -I mean I could 
pick - was the matter -I just - tend to - -- thats why I hesitated some time to listen 
towards er Bill - thats y'know - about what I think - the - well - the information is -I 
thinking is about 70% - hmm - 
Post Judgment Stimulated Recall 
R. You mentioned early in the simulation that his exercise wasn't regular. Why did 
you think that ? 
S. yeah - because erm - he says something like er - sometimes once a week - or once 
in two weeks - sometimes three months - an - which is - er - not - the - the 
appropriate way of doing exercise -I mean - if he wants to do exercise - he should be 
- here - continuous - er - so that er -I mean - 
it will aid the circulation of blood - and 
er - erm I mean - that is his - relieves him a 
bit from stress - but if he -I mean - leaves 
an interval - quite a long - er - erm -I mean - an interval -a tch - quite a long time - 
its erm - the - the more stress it puts on him - and er -I think - his circulation - the - 
erm - the metabolic rate - or something like that - performs malfunction - er - doesn't 
function properly - er - within the body - er -I think he should have done some 
regular exercises - er - because he stopped playing the golf - because of financial - 
reason - er - problem - the golf was er - the kind of exercise - which was - it was 
very good - and I think that he - did that every week - because erm - it as erm - from 
the employers - or something like that - but - he doesn't get that anymore - hmm - so 
its definitely affect - him - 
R You mentioned that he'd been unemployed for six years now, and it was affecting 
his health. Why did you think that? 
S. yeah - because rm - If one loses a job today - one - thinks of erm - erm - how do 
I put it - one - aims of getting a job the next day - okay - erm - the following day - 
you still have the hope - but if it continues - for some time - then you see that - the 
situation is deteriorating - and - the er - amount of money - you've got er starts 
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running down - because you utilise - what you've got - without getting er any input 
in - hmm - so - one starts become depressed - hmm - an desperate - an this is whats 
happening to Bill now - hmm - because he thinks he's far away from job - and why 
can't he get job - hmm see - looking it as a whole - the family an all this - why can't 
he get a job to cater for the family - hmm - so that makes him sick - he thinks all the 
time - he spends all the time thinking about it - 
R What made you think that he had lost his self-esteem? 
S. well - he works in the factory - plays - er - er an important part - working in a 
machine - an er - as a professional man - an now - erm - he's out of it - erm - he can't 
do that anymore - ern - he's lost all the social - reasons - er er - out of this - out of 
the the the the employment - so he feels low himself - he thinks er - an I not a human 
being - or am I not part of this society - now thats why I thought that - 
TL You focused on the fact that he spent a lot of time indoors. Why would that be a 
problem? 
S. erm - yeah - thats a very - big problem - because er - the more you stay indoors 
the more you lose social contact - erm -I mean - if you - if you want to sit down the 
whole day - in the - in the house - without going out - you tend to think about certain 
things you shouldn't - er - think about - er - but if - er - you go out - you meet 
friends - er - you see whats going on - cars moving an things like that -I mean - that 
relieves you a bit - this is happening to Bill - Bill is all the time indoors - playing 
games - reading newspapers - running up stiles - upstairs and downstairs - and er - he 
keeps thinking about the job all the time - so -I think he should go out a bit - 
R. You also mentioned that you didn't think that his wife was working because she 
had a baby. Why do you think that this follows? 
S. er - the -I could see that the baby was about - er - not even up to one year - six 
months - an er - most people don't prefer taking er - those infants like that - toddlers 
like that - to nannies - they should be - should be near them - so definitely the wife 
has to be at home - an then - look for the - cater for that er small infant - so thats 
what I think - 
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R. You mentioned that you thought he spent a lot of time reading newspapers. 
Would this pose problems? 
S. erm - reading newspapers yeah - erm - newspapers contain a whole lot of 
information - good and bad - he might come across a situation like his own - an that 
might add more stress - isn't it - and sometimes too - can - well - relieve a bit from 
the - oh well I'm not the only person in such a situation - y'see - so its er both sides - 
and that - er well - you shouldn't read - it all the time - like that -I mean one has to 
devote some time for newspapers - but not to make it everything - like that - to 
newspapers all the time like that - is - is - is even boring - an how much can you - er - 
how many words can you read a day - 
R. Why did you think he was isolating himself from his family? 
S. I could see from the video - that er - while the wife was feeding the baby - Bill 
was sitting some way - reading the newspapers - if I were Bill I would go in -just to 
care for that little - that - that even relieves - erm from the stress -I would go - try to 
carry the baby -I-I can give him feed - the er - little - er - how can I put it - the little 
baby - like that - so I think he should participate - in those activities - er - so that er - 
he will feel - sometimes he will feel at ease- 
R. What made you think that he always thought of his family? 
S. cause erm - he owns a home - hmm - probably is paying mortgage - and er - the 
children needs clothing - and this comes to worry the wife - the wife - the wife is - is 
not working because of the baby - so where can they get clothing to the children - if 
er - lets say its er - birthday to one of the children - how are they going to celebrate 
it - y'see - this makes life different in his family - and is all a problem - to him - 
because er - he has to - dad is not - er doing this because of that - erm the children 
go to school - they meet friends an they talk about their family - about home their 
parents - oh it was my birthday yesterday an this is what happened - yeah - but Bills 
children are not getting that - because he's unemployed - 
R. What made you think that Billy was actively seeking employment ? 
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S. hmm - yes he was - yeah he - yeah he was itching to get a job - yeah he 
mentioned that he has been unemployed for six years - and er - so - he can't get any 
job - an if he get a job today he would take it - hence he was using his spare time - to 
do that correspondence course - so that he gets something to come - out of it - 
actually he is desperately looking for -a job - because he is financially weak - and er 
- even his - his own outings - he used to drink - he used to drink - er - he has caught 
his limit now - hmm - because he cant afford any more - its all affecting him - 
R. why would playing indoors a lot be a particular problem? 
S. yeah - it er - erm - he - he play indoors an he plays alone - an thats not - 
socialising - er - so erm - losing contact an erm - he doesn't hear from people - other 
people - probably if he had gone out - to play outside aswell -I mean - he might have 
got some- I mean - advice from friends - and other people aswell - and the - the - the 
time he spends at home playing - he could have - he could have used the time to go 
to the job centre - to find something else - for - that could have even helped - even he 
could - even he meet a friend - and the friend can mention that a job is going 
somewhere - er -I think that might help - rather than to be sitting down playing the 
games all the time - er what - can that - yeah - one has to play - you can play a game 
- for some time - but then - you've got to think - that what is it going to give to me - 
and then - so if you go out to look for - y'know - 
R. Why is socialising so important? 
S. er - if you socialise - you don't get more stress - if you are stressed - and you do 
socialise - ern - its - it -relieves you a bit - from I mean stress - because er you - it 
decreases your thinking ability - er - yeah - you don't think too much - because you 
are with people - and er - some trouble looks less in the pub - theres music - and live 
band - and film or something like that - so - it - keeps you mind afresh - rather than 
to be sitting down - then - to be thinking all the time about - hmm - so - socialising is 
a very important role in ones life - and er - Bill should have - er -I mean - er - adopt 
to that kind of system - an - the more you socialise - the more you hear from people 
- the more you hear a lot from other people - to know what to do -I mean 
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sometimes problems are solved - when you meet other people - and then - you can 
put your problem before other people - some people an -I mean - take the advice 
from them - sit down - an then er - analyze - and assert - the - assess the advice - an 
-I mean - you can work yourself through -I think Bill should have done that - 
R. How has Billy's unemployment affected his social behaviour? 
S. erm - because -er - hes not receiving money anymore to pay for outings - and er - 
his er sporting activities suffers because of the financial er - aspect - and er - he feels 
- because hes lost self esteem - he feels odd to go to other people - he feels so - 
hmm look at my state - erm - do I fit - to be another - they've got - they are jobs - 
they are well off now - they - they - they can look after their family - I'm not one of 
them -I don't fit in that kind of- erm - psychological - hmm - er - he thinks like that - 
so he feels that he doesn't fit into that kind of group - yeah - 
R. Why did you think he actually gave up golf? 
S. hmm - he mentioned that he couldn't afford to pay - er - for the golf -and er - to 
buy the equipment - and all this - its all to do with financial problems - and er - erm - 
an one thing I think - is erm - if - he feel depressed an erm - he couldn't cope - with 
the sporting activities - because of this - and he doesn't even feel like going to - yeah 
- going to -I mean do that kind of sporting activities - and er - really he can't cope - 
and moreover - he stopped for some time - and its not easy to begin with again - 
because he felt weak himself - because he - he been sitting down - all the time at 
home - to catch up - would be - er another different thing - also to maybe to get er - 
to get er a new equipment - or something to start with - then he - he can't afford - 
R. What did you mean by that statement that he's financially ill? 
S. erm - Financially ill - yeah - er - means financial problems - he hasn't got money - 
and er - even to buy this much - involves money - erm - to even buy the feed for the 
that - infant - needs money - so he keeps thinking about it - an that makes him ill - 
R. why did you actually think he was mentally ill ? 
S. hmm - if erm - one started thinking all the time - er - because of financial 
problems - or er - loss of job - marriage - broken marriages an all that kind of things - 
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erm - things you used to do before - an now you can't do it -I mean - you become 
depressed - and thats mental illness - mentally - its not physical - but its mental 
illness - in the brain - because the brain is - malfunctioning - hmm - yeah - an er - the 
- its - its receiving er - loads of er - thinking - which is er - so that makes him 
mentally ill 
R. Why did you think he used to drink a lot at work? 
S. er- no -I said er - he used to drink - to drink when he was working - because he 
mentioned that he used to go to pubs - hmm - to drink - because he has lost the job - 
he can't get money anymore to buy the drink - so he drinks not a lot - 
R. Why is losing contact with his friends significant? 
S. hmm - if erm - he he - he feels - how do I put it - he feels low to go to the friends 
now - he feels - ern - the friends are higher than his position - because they are still 
having their job and er - they are well off- they are well to do - and he is not - and he 
has lost his self esteem - so - he doesn't feel fit in that group - yeah - 
R. Did you think home studies were a good idea for Billy? 
S. No - at - looking at Bills state - he should have taken a part time job somewhere - 
for lectures - to receive lectures - and er - no matter the subject - counselling comes 
in - every subject - which could have helped maybe - an he could have found more 
from other mates - an the tutors as well - so I think -I mean he can do the home 
studies in his spare time - hnun - an then - the rest of the time at the college or the 
adult institution or something like that or something - thats what I felt - (end). 
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Appendix 7 
Watson - Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal 
Group 293 
Combined Raw Scores and Demographic Data 
Subject Age Gender Ethnicity E/ uals RSU RST 
1. 37 F W DC(1)53 65 48 
2. 32 F W 50 /GCE 51 38 
3. 21 F W 5 O/GCE 48 27 
4. 20 F M 5 O/GCE 49 34 
5. 19 F I 5 O/GCE 35 35 
6. 35 F W DC(3)60 61 61 
7. 32 F W 5 O/GCE 68 54 
8. 26 F W DC(1)51 44 35 
9. 23 M I 5 O/GCE 38 30 
10. 28 M B-A 5 O/GCE 46 40 
11. 21 F W 5 O/GCE 49 32 
12. 18 F W 5 O/GCE 49 33 
13. 19 F W 5 O/GCE 51 34 
14. 21 F W 5 O/GCE 53 46 
15. 29 F W 30+1A 53 31 
16. 23 F W DC(2)52 63 60 
17. 23 F W 5 O/GCE 49 42 
18. 22 F W 5 O/GCE 49 47 
19. 28 F W 5 O/GCE 59 53 
20. 18 F W 5 O/GCE 46 41 
429 
Subiect Age Gender Ethnicity E/Ouals RSIJ RST 
21. 21 F W DC(1)52 47 31 
22. 35 F W 5 O/GCE 54 44 
23. 20 F W 5 O/GCE 50 50 
24. 21 F C 3 0+ IA 48 48 
25. 18 F W 5 O/GCE 44 32 
26. 19 F W BTEC 49 49 
27 29 F W 5 O/GCE 43 27 
28. 20 M I 5 O/GCE 47 29 
29. 24 F I DC(2)54 50 40 
30. 40 F W 30+1A 58 57 
31. 31 F W 5 O/GCE 53 52 
32. 39 F W DC(1)53 58 42 
33. 33 F W 5 O/GCE 60 36 
34. 22 F W 5 O/GCE 58 49 
35. 28 F W 5 O/GCE 69 55 
36. 25 F W 5 O/GCE 50 39 
37. 23 F W 5 O/GCE 61 51 
38. 20 F W 5 O/GCE 53 51 
39. 28 F W 5 O/GCE 56 33 
40. 19 F W DC(1)57 58 47 
41. 24 F M DC(2)64 36 26 
42. 37 F W 5 O/GCE 54 46 
43. 21 F W 5 O/GCE 44 22 
44. 19 F W 5 O/GCE 57 31 
45. 20 F W 5 O/GCE 53 33 
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Subiect Age Gender Ethnicity E/ uals RSU RST 
46. 32 M W DC(1)58 47 21 
47. 35 M B-A 5 O/GCE 34 18 
48. 25 M B-C DC(1)59 56 52 
49. 23 F W 5 O/GCE 46 36 
50. 19 F W 5 O/GCE 44 27 
51. 36 F W Access 46 42 
52. 28 F W 5 O/GCE 52 45 
53. 31 F W DC(2)53 50 47 
54. 20 F W 5 O/GCE 68 63 
55. 19 F W DC(2)53 62 50 
56. 23 F W 5 O/GCE 52 33 
57. 21 F W 5 O/GCE 54 26 
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Appendix 8 
Simulation Narrative (Billy) 
I've never felt my health being affected through being unemployed - 
because I've - occasionally I do some exercises -I go up the stairs - an whenever it 
takes my fancy - an I do a lot of exercises - but then -I- as - being only human 
y'know - its few an far between - but I do enough - to make me feel good for a- 
when I've got an interest - I'll maybe do it two or three days - in succession - then it'll 
go out of my head - that I can't -I can't be bothered doing it again - maybe for 
another week - two weeks - three weeks -a month maybe even three months - 
y'know it all depends just the way I feel - The last time I had a holiday was in 1981 - 
an it could be another seven years before I get one the way things are y'know - 
Commentator - Billy Bums lives with his family in South Queensferry - he an his 
wife Francis have three children - two are older school children - and the youngest is 
a six month old baby - Billy owns his own home - but has been unemployed for the 
last six years - he was a skilled machine turner - 
B- When I- when I get up which is usually close on to midday - because my wife - 
she prefers me to be out of the road in the morning - to get her chores done - get the 
kJJ out to school - then -I get up - have something to eat - read my morning paper 
lkj pw -I always get a good quality paper so as it'll last me all day y'know - then 
that I'll put on a game on the computer - or a game of chess or a game of 
iqrpble - which I play for hours on end - y'know fills up a lot of time - then that 
on - that goes on - maybe until - well after the kids come home from school - 
then after that - its er - tea -I go out the back - play football with my boy for maybe 
about an hour - back - back to the chess again at night - an - most days are the same 
- Francis always - er - is sort of fully - fully in charge y'know - as far as housework - 
an looking after the baby's concerned - an she prefers it that way - because she can 
get on with her work without bothering about me - an -I just -I can sit just playing 
the computer all day - an - or reading my paper - its not - its not as if I'm - arguing - 
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or y'know - doing a lot of er discussing with each other - because shes got - 
practically a full-time job - with the baby - an therefore shes - y'know shes - shes not 
got time to bother about me - so shes quite happy about me just sitting - sitting about 
- goes to the shops - comes back - she always takes her baby with her - then she goes 
about her business - gets the meals ready for the kids - coming in from school -I 
always look everyday -I always look in the paper for a job - but they never - never 
seem to crop up - it never erm - undermines my confidence - because I realise its not 
my fault - if I- if I had er a job tomorrow -I would take it - it does make it hardest 
when er - the kids mention - mention it - that makes it - that makes it hard - an - 
mostly the fact that its hard to explain it - y'know - about the way I feel about it - Its 
one thing trying to explain it - but - its not only explaining the situation - its 
explaining my attitude towards that situation - y'know - it make it even more difficult 
-I-I found - er - at first- when I first became unemployed -I thought I would have 
got a job within days - y'know - let alone weeks -I thought it'd only take days to get 
a- an I tried everywhere - then thats when I realised how hard it was -I went to 
places that no longer existed - an er -I got a right shock then - but after that -I just 
came to accept it - there's - there's not really much I came do about it -I never get 
fed up because er - chess is one of these games - that y'know - that you just don't get 
fed up with - you play it for hours an hours - an every game - every games different - 
every moves different - you don't have to be good at it - y'know - just enjoy it y'know 
- an its very intriguing - things that were important to me in the past when I was 
working - y'know if something needed painted -I- I'd get up and paint it - y'know - 
if er - wallpaper - anything like that - I'd do it - just as a matter of course - where 
now - well for one thing I can't afford the materials - but - also for a small thing - I'd 
put it offy'know -I just - I've not got the motivation I used to have- I don't play golf 
anymore -I gave my clubs away to my young brother - because er -I couldn't afford 
the social side of goin to the golf - because its a thing you do - is - after the golf you 
always go into the clubhouse afterwards for a drink - so I had to give up golf - for 
that reason y'know - cause I couldn't afford to - to keep up that way y'know - with 
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the golf situation - although the golf is cheaper being on er - when you're 
unemployed - but it costs a lot more after the golfs finished - so I had to give that up 
- well I get my Giro once a fortnight - an er - my wife cashes it along at the post 
office - then she sits down an she works out how much needs for to pay the bills - 
which of the bills were found due for that fortnight - she'll budget for that - she'll 
make out a list for a- the meals we're going to use- going to - have to buy for the 
next fortnight - then er - she goes into town - buys - buys er - all the teas we want 
from er - the freezer - the freezer centre - enough to last us for these two weeks - 
and whatever - whatevers left y'know she'll leave me something extra to go out for a 
drink y'know - an depending how long other people stay - I'll usually stay as well 
y'know because thats my day out y'know - an that - that session could be anything 
between about 8 pints - an 14 pints y'know - but to - it sounds a great - by - to 
people that er - drink fairly regular - its not really a lot y'know - maybe a doctor 
wouldn't say so - but er - for people that drink regularly its not really a great deal - 
not on a fortnightly basis - but maybe so for people doing it - if they were doing it 
everyday - that eats a lot into the meagre budget I've got at the moment - but er - the 
friends because I've known them so long - they've been prepared to pay that little 
extra y'know just to keep the company going an -I always met them - prior to being 
unemployed - it was at - it was a regular occurance -I don't see them as much as I 
used to - but we've all - socialised with each other for so long - we just feel that 
there's got to be some kind of continuity -I could never get another job as a turner - 
in the forseeable future -I- an er - as a manual - manual worker y'know with er - in 
the computer side that would be my only chance I think - I'm doing er -a 
correspondence course at the present moment from Telford College - its called er - 
flexi-study - an you study at home - its just another - another avenue y'know for an 
interest - an hopefully - somewhere along the line it could lead to - to employment in 
the future. (end) 
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Appendix 9 
MSc Advanced Clinical Practice 
Grading Scale - Level 4 
Exceptional Standard 
A grade category: The student demonstrates an excellent capacity to express views 
and conclusions based upon sound argument, counterargument, judgmental or 
contextual criteria and genuine evidence in an articulate and concise manner. The 
original views of the student and those inherent within the literature are clearly 
differentiated and inferences are valid. There is evidence of a comprehensive 
overview of an area of professional concern, which includes a comparative and 
critical review of a variety of theories, concepts, knowledge claims and alternative 
frames of reference. There is evidence of an ability to successfully synthesise 
theoretical issues into practice and evaluate the possible implications using 
appropriate professional or clinical criteria. 
Overall presentation: The assignment has a lucid structure, a clear statement of 
intent, that is adhered to, and a concluding section. The introduction and rationale 
for selection of topic is clear and precise. The standard of writing, sentence 
construction, spelling and logical development of argument is excellent. The 
Harvard System of referencing is used accurately throughout in text and reference 
list. Appendices are clearly labelled, germane to the work and are explicitly 
referenced in the main body of the text. Empirical evidence when used is accurate, 
clearly presented and relevant to the assignment. Worthy of publication. 
Very Good Standard 
B grade category: High level of analysis, synthesis and evaluation. The student's 
views and arguments are coherent, realistic, and well founded upon genuine 
evidence. The work represents a clear overview and interpretation of the issues in 
question as applied to a professional context. Concepts, theories, positions and 
knowledge claims are considered critically throughout and inferences are generally 
valid. Alternative theories and counterarguments are generated although the criteria 
for evaluation may not be clear or consistently substantiated. The implications for 
professional practice are critically discussed and appropriately applied. 
Overall presentation: The assignment has a lucid structure, a clear statement of 
intent which is adhered to, and a concluding section. The introduction and rationale 
for selection of topic is clear and precise. A high standard of writing, sentence 
construction, spelling and logical development of argument is evident. The Harvard 
System of referencing is used accurately throughout in text and list. Appendices are 
clearly labelled, germane to the work and are explicitly referenced in the main body 
of the text. Empirical evidence when used is accurate, clearly presented and relevant 
to the assignment. 
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Good Standard 
C grade category: Higher level of analysis demonstrated by the identification of a 
variety of dimensions and concepts pertinent to the subject area or issue at hand. 
Interrelationships are alluded to but not rigorously or systematically described, 
justified or substantiated. There is evidence of appropriate interpretation, however, 
some inferences are questionable. Any potential for bias or counterargument is raised 
but not expanded upon or thoughtfully considered throughout. 
Overall presentation: The assignment does not have an entirely lucid structure, a 
clear statement of intent that is adhered to, or a concluding section. Introduction and 
rationale for selection of topic is clear, but could be more precise. There is a 
satisfactory standard of writing, sentence construction, and spelling although some 
errors are evident and a logical development of argument is at times unclear. The 
Harvard System of referencing is used with some errors throughout. Empirical 
evidence when used is accurate, clearly presented and relevant to the assignment. 
Satisfactory Standard 
D grade category: There is evidence of a degree of interpretation showing 
knowledge and understanding of the subject area. The level of analysis is acceptable, 
in that, appropriate dimensions and concepts are identified and discussed but not 
necessarily interrelated and synthesised to practice. Alternative perspectives are not 
consistently identified or pursued with any depth or rigour. Alternatives raised are 
essentially distorted or ignored for a one-sided perspective and not integrated into 
the terminal conclusions. The validity of inferences is questionable. Potential 
limitations of the work are not explored fully. Implications for professional practice 
are considered but essentially from a one-sided, superficial perspective, which could 
be more rigorously explored and substantiated. 
Overall presentation: The assignment does not have an entirely lucid structure, a 
clear statement of intent that is adhered to or a concluding section. The introduction 
and rationale are reasonably clear but lacks precision. A generally acceptable 
standard of writing and sentence construction although some errors in syntax, 
grammar and spelling exist. Arguments are simplistic and not systematically thought 
out. Harvard system used with numerous errors. 
Unsatisfactory Standard - Resubmission Allowed 
E grade category: A purely descriptive account demonstrating only minimal 
interpretation. 
There is some limited discussion of the dimensions and conceptual issues surrounding 
the topic and no evidence of analysis, synthesis or evaluation. 
The work shows some insight into the subject area but is limited to a simplistic one- 
sided perspective. No counterarguments or alternative frames of reference are 
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generated or considered. Implications for professional practice are considered in a 
superficial or inappropriate manner. 
Overall presentation: Introduction and rationale lack direction, purpose and clarity. 
Writing style is at times incoherent and presentation is poor with many errors in 
syntax, grammar and spelling. Harvard style of referencing is used but with numerous 
errors. Barely acceptable presentation. 
Unsatisfactory Standard - Retake of Module Required 
F grade category: Fails to meet the criteria for E. Unacceptable 
FO: Non-submission of assignment. 
This scale has been founded upon the work of the following individuals: 
Professor C. Clifford (University of Birmingham); 
Jo Allen (1996) Design for Learning 2nd Ed, University of Wolverhampton. 
W. M. Daly (University of Wolverhampton). 
Mapping of Common Grade Point Scale to Four Point Scale 
Pass with Distinction - (PD) approx. 70% of passes 
at A grade, i. e. for 4 
modules + dissertation 
Pass 
Recoverable Fail 
- (P) -D-B range 
- (E) -E 
Fail which requires the module to be taken again - (F) -F1- FO. 
